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INTRODUCTION
The conversion of domesticated plant species into
transgenic plants and their subsequent utilization in the
agricultural production of usable crops has created a tension
between the farmer, the seed manufacturer, and the public.
The farmer desires to save the progeny transgenic seeds from
one planting cycle for use in the next and to be autonomous in
his decisions regarding the utilization of his land, his financial
resources, and his crop. The seed manufacturer desires to
make a profit from the transgenic plant. The public desires
that the food and fiber produced by the transgenic plants be
safe for consumption. While all of these positions are equally
valid, discussions among these three parties usually fall into a
quagmire of often emotional and irrational arguments. The
theory upon which this paper is founded is that each of the
parties is merely articulating, sometimes without eloquence, a
position derived from the property rights fundamental to each
party. Through examination of the property rights of each of
the parties, a path to the resolution of the tension will be
illuminated. This paper aims to examine the farmer’s and seed
manufacturers’ property rights in genetically modified plants,
leaving the public property rights for the time being. The story
2
of Jack and the Beanstalk provides a useful allegory and sets
1. J.D. candidate, University of Minnesota Law School, 2002. B.S.
Chemical Engineering, Purdue University, 1978.
Ph. D. Biomedical
Engineering, Louisiana Tech University, 1984. Ph. D. Chemical Engineering,
Rutgers University, 1995. I wish to thank Dr. Edward Coen, Professor
Emeritus of Economics at the University of Minnesota, for many helpful and
constructive discussions on the topics addressed in this work. I also wish to
recognize the assistance of the librarians of the University of Minnesota Law
School law library. Without their patient assistance this work would never
have been brought forward.
2. See generally PAUL GALDONE, JACK AND THE BEANSTALK (1974)
(published by Clarion Books, New York). The version of the tale of Jack and
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the stage for this discussion.
In the tale of Jack and the Beanstalk, Jack trades a
3
sixpence, which his mother gave him for a magic bean. Jack
plants the bean, which produces a vine that reaches up to a
magic castle in the clouds. The spectacular growth rate and
ultimate size of Jack’s beanstalk resulted from the bean’s
magic.
The vine also produced progeny beans.
Jack,
presuming he was a clever entrepreneur, could have either
saved the progeny beans for planting the next year (and hence
found another magic castle in the clouds) or sold the beans to
others. No legal consequences would have befallen Jack for
engaging in either of these two alternatives. With current
biotechnology results analogous to the beanstalk’s spectacular
growth rate and size, Jack’s beanstalk could be the result of
genetic modification. In modern times, various statutes would
protect Jack’s genetically modified progeny beans. While an
innocent child’s story, the tale of Jack and his beanstalk would
indeed keep modern day attorneys busy for quite some time. In
modern times, Jack, by purchasing the bean, might be subject
4
to restraints imposed by the Plant Variety Protection Act and
the Patent Act. By planting the bean and growing the
beanstalk, Jack could be infringing the protections afforded by
a utility patent granted to the bean’s manufacturer. In
addition, by harvesting the progeny beans from the beanstalk,
Jack might be liable for damages under the Patent Act, the
Plant Variety Protection Act, and contract law for violating the
terms of a license agreement. The following two examples
illustrate that Jack’s modern day hypothetical case indeed
resembles reality in several aspects.
Percy Schmeiser, a canola farmer in Canada, has been
developing a variety of canola suitable for his farming practice
for nearly 50 years. Monsanto representatives entered his
fields and found plants bearing Monsanto’s gene, which confers
the Beanstalk written by Paul Galdone was adapted from B. A. T., THE
HISTORY OF MOTHER TWADDLE AND THE MARVELOUS ACHIEVEMENTS OF HER
SON JACK and published by J. Harris, corner of St. Paul’s Churchyard (1807).
3. In the story of Jack and the Beanstalk, Mother Twaddle found the
sixpence while cleaning her cottage. She sent Jack to the fair to purchase a
goose for dinner. Instead of purchasing the goose, Jack spent the entire
sixpence on a single bean. Because of the special properties of the bean, a
modern version of the story might posit that the bean was genetically
modified.
4. Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970)
(current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2582 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)).
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glyphosate resistance on the canola. Monsanto sued Mr.
5
Schmeiser. The result: Monsanto won. In his decision, Judge
W. Andrew MacKay found Mr. Schmeiser guilty of infringing
6
Canadian Letters Patent No. 1,313,830 assigned to Monsanto.
Dallas Thomason is a cotton and beef farmer in Rayville,
Louisiana. He also owns a cotton ginning facility. Mr.
Thomason purchased “brown-bag” cotton seed from a local
commercial seed dealer; however, he did not know that the
seeds were Bt cotton seeds. The commercial seed dealer
neither asked Mr. Thomason to sign a technology use license
nor did Mr. Thomason actually sign such a license. After Mr.
Thomason planted the cotton seeds, Monsanto received a tip
that the seeds Mr. Thomason had planted were Bt cotton
7
seeds. Monsanto sued because Mr. Thomason did not obtain a
technology use license before planting the seeds. Monsanto
8
won.
Dallas Thomason was found guilty of patent
5. Monsanto has also levied a heavy fine against farmers who have
genetically modified plants on their land without a valid license agreement.
Once Monsanto finds that a farmer is allegedly growing an unlicensed crop, it
sends a letter to the farmer demanding payment of a fine. One of these
letters, made available on the Internet, was sent to Mr. Edward Zielinski of
Mikado, Saskatchewan, on November 12, 1998 and signed by Mr. Keith A.
MacMillian, Director of Legal Affairs of Monsanto Canada, Inc. Mr. Zielinski
had obtained the seeds at issue as the result of a trade with a farmer from
Prince Albert. See http://www.tv.cbc.ca/national/pgminfo/canola (last visited
Oct. 20, 2001). The letter stated that Monsanto Canada had “very good
evidence to believe that Roundup Ready canola was planted on approximately
250 acres of land identified as SE 28-30-2, NE 28-30-2 and SE 19-30-2 in
violation” of propriety rights which Monsanto had in the Roundup Ready
canola. The letter further stated that before “making any final decision as to
what steps we will be taking, and in an attempt to resolve this issue in a
timely and economical manner, we are prepared to refrain from commencing
any legal proceedings against you subject to the following” conditions: first,
that a fine be paid to Monsanto in the amount of $28,750.00; second, that
“Monsanto has the right to take samples from all of your owned or leased land
and storage bins for three years from the date of this letter”; and third, that
Mr. Zielinski “agree not to disclose the specific terms and conditions of this
Settlement Agreement to any third party.” This letter is available at
http://www.tv.cbc.ca/national/pgminfo/canola/docz1.html (last visited Oct. 20,
2001).
6. See Monsanto Can., Inc. v. Schmeiser Enters., Ltd., 2001 FCT 256
(Fed. Ct. Canada 2001), available at http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2001/
2001fct256.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2001).
7. Evidently, the person who sold Mr. Thomason the Bt cotton seeds also
informed Monsanto that Mr. Thomason was using those same seeds without
the technology use license. Telephone Interview with Mr. Dallas Thomason,
Farmer, Rayville, Louisiana (July 3, 2001) [hereinafter Interview: Thomason].
8. See Grower Fined for Saving Bollgard Seed, PROGRESSIVE FARMER,
October 2000, at 10.
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infringement and violation of the provisions of the Plant
Variety Protection Act in a pre-trial decision by Federal
Magistrate Kirk. The trial jury, deciding on the question of
damages only, found Mr. Thomason liable to Monsanto for
$401.00 per acre for infringing the patent, and liable to Delta
and Pine Land for $100.00 per acre for violating the PVPA.
Typically, Mr. Thomason retained neighboring farmers’ cotton
seeds as consideration for ginning their cotton. Most of these
seeds he sold for animal feed and oil extraction, while retaining
the balance for planting his own fields. Even if the case
against Mr. Thomason concerned these particular seeds, he
would still have been found guilty of infringement and violation
of the Plant Variety Protection Act because he would be using
the Bt cotton seeds without a license.
The fictional case of Jack and the Beanstalk and the real
cases involving Percy Schmeiser and Dallas Thomason
intrinsically involve property rights in genetically modified
plants. This Note discusses the mechanism by which the seed
manufacturers retain property rights in genetically modified
plants while denying the farmer property rights in both the
progeny seed that he has grown on his own land and the land
upon which the genetically modified plants are grown. In Part
I, the foundation of property rights in genetically modified
plants is discussed. In Part II, the development of the law with
regard to property rights in genetically modified plants, and
how the seed manufacturers who develop the seeds retain those
rights is discussed. In Part III, the provisions of the law that
remove the property rights from the farmer and allocate those
rights to the seed manufacturer are discussed. Also, the
mechanisms by which the farmer can retract those same
property rights are discussed in this section.
This Note argues that the current state of judicial
interpretation of property rights in genetically modified plants
weighs heavily in favor of the seed manufacturers, and that
such an interpretation is justified if only the costs to the seed
manufacturers are considered. This Note proposes that the
farmer is an integral part of agricultural biotechnology and
must be accounted for when statutes granting property rights
are interpreted. Such an interpretation would strike a balance
between the needs and costs incurred by the seed
manufacturers and the needs and costs incurred by the
farmers.
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BACKGROUND

“Labor, for a fair remuneration, whether of the brain or
hand, should be the glory of America; besides, there is true
9
dignity in labor, especially in cultivating the soil.”
A.

AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY

Farming is a business, and as such, the entrepreneurs
engaged in it are driven to maximize profit by increasing
10
productivity while minimizing labor and financial input.
Since the early stages of cultivating crops, improvements in
productivity were obtained by one of two mechanisms: artificial
selection and plant breeding. Artificial selection functions on
the genetic variability of plants and appears to have been the
first method successfully employed for increasing productivity.
The earliest farmers would have selected those plants with the
most favorable traits, such as the largest or most abundant
fruits. Early on, the gains realized by artificial selection could
have occurred rapidly and required only a rudimentary
understanding by the farmers that the most favorable traits
would have been found in the each succeeding generation. It is
not surprising then, that since the beginning of recorded
11
history (and perhaps before that time in certain societies )
12
farmers have been artificially selecting plants for the most
9. Isaac Newton, Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture for the Year
1862, 1862 U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORT 1, 15 (1863) (also published as: ISAAC
NEWTON, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR
1862, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 37-78, at 15 (3d. Sess. 1863)).
10. From nearly the beginning of the development of genetically modified
plants it was recognized that productivity from the genetically modified plant
was significantly lower than from similar but non-genetically modified plants.
See BOARD ON AGRICULTURE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETIC
ENGINEERING OF PLANTS: AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES AND
POLICY CONCERNS 45 (1984) (program of the convocation on genetic
engineering of plants published by the National Academy Press) [hereinafter
BOARD ON AGRICULTURE: AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES AND
POLICY CONCERNS]. Now, over a decade and a half later, the farmers have
become keenly aware that the genetically modified plants do not out produce
traditional hybrid lines despite assurances by the seed manufactures that the
plants would do so. Therefore, those farmers who employ genetically modified
plants may remain competitive only by minimizing input costs and labor, not
by gaining an improvement in productivity.
11. See KONRAD SPINDLER, THE MAN IN THE ICE (1994) (published by
Harmony Books).
12. It is essential to understand the difference between natural and
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desirable characteristics in each planting cycle. Seeds from
plants that displayed these characteristics were saved and used
14
in a subsequent planting cycle.
Through artificial selection, plants that were deemed
suitable
for
agricultural
purposes
were
eventually
domesticated. The domestication of plants was a long-term
process that had evolutionary consequences for many species.
From the agricultural viewpoint, the result of the
domestication process was the creation of a relatively narrow
15
set of plants that now serve human needs. In some species of
domesticated plants, artificial selection has altered the genetic
construct to the extent that no wild relatives exist with which
to cross breed the domesticated plant in order to expand its
16
genome. There can be no doubt that traditional agricultural
practices narrowed the range of species employed in providing
food and fiber for humans. However, the continued practice of
artificial selection can have the effect of expanding the genetic
diversity within a particular species.
Through artificial
selection, those plants that exhibit some trait that is different
than the characteristics exhibited by other plants of the same
species and is the result of genetic variation created by
artificial selection. Charles Darwin argued that a species currently in
existence had evolved from an ancestral species as the result of environmental
factors. This evolution was termed, by Darwin, as “natural selection”. See
generally CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL
SELECTION (D. Appleton and Co., New York 1890) (1848). Artificial selection
is the result of human intervention in the process of the “natural” evolution of
a species whereby humans select, for breeding, the next generation of a
particular species from a particular subset of the current generation of that
same species. See NEIL A. CAMPBELL, BIOLOGY 399 (4th ed. 1996). It might
be noted that humans have been engaged in artificial selection of not only
plant species, but also human and non-human animal species for millennia.
See generally Manspeizer, infra note 145.
13. See NEIL A. CAMPBELL, BIOLOGY 399, 407 (4th ed. 1996).
14. See id. at 399 ff.
15. See generally TRANSGENIC PLANTS AND WORLD AGRICULTURE
(Washington,
D.C.,
National
Academy
Press
2000),
at
http://www.nap.edu/html/transgenic (last visited Feb. 15, 2001) [hereinafter
TRANSGENIC PLANTS].
16. It is known that certain traits can be bred into a domesticated plant
only by the use of a non-domesticated “wild” close relative plant species. For
example, the insertion of atrazine resistance into canola was accomplished by
cross breeding domesticated canola with the atrazine-resistant weed wild
turnip (Bassica campestris). See BOARD ON AGRICULTURE: AGRICULTURAL
RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY CONCERNS, supra note 10, at 42. The
report summarizes the discussions of the convocation for examination of the
potential contribution of genetic manipulation to agricultural productivity.
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environmental factors, can be used as progenitor plants for a
new variety. The multi-millenia old practice of artificial
selection is still employed at the outset of the twenty-first
century, even by “modern” farmers.
For example, Mr.
Schmeiser, a Canadian canola farmer, has been developing his
own variety of canola, suitable for the soil and environmental
conditions in his region, for over a half century. His practice
has involved exclusively the technique of artificial selection.
While the practice of artificial selection may not be suitable for
all crop species, the practice still must be preserved and
continued because it exerts an expanding pressure on the
genetic diversity in the domesticated plant species.
The process of artificial selection by farmers became an
agricultural institution at this country’s beginnings and
continued as a core function of agricultural production up
17
In early
through the early part of the twentieth century.
America, very few native plant species were suitable for
agricultural production. Plant species imported from England
and Europe were likewise unsuitable for agricultural
production in North America. The early non-indigenous
farmers realized that these imported plant varieties were not
immediately well suited for large-scale agricultural production
18
in North America due to the continent’s unique climate and
soil.
Consequently, these early farmers soon determined that
seeds and plants had to be selected which were best adapted to
19
the climate and local environment of North America.
The
farmer was the only instrument by which agricultural
techniques including domesticated plants, that were suitable
for the soil, climate, and population of the (eventual) United
States were developed. The farmer was responsible for the
adaptation of native species for domestic purposes, the
adoption of species already domesticated by indigenous peoples
for commercial purposes, and the development of new varieties
of agricultural plants from those plants familiar in Europe.
The early American farmers’ process of adoption and

17. The advent and introduction of hybrid crop varieties effectively halted
the practice of artificial selection by the farmers. The hybrid qualities, which
were desired in the first generation plants, would not necessarily be
transmitted to progeny plants.
18. See JACK RALPH KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY, 1492-2000 51 (1988).
19. See id.
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adaptation of plants for American agriculture involved testing
different seed varieties and saving seed from those plants with
20
the most favorable characteristics for the next planting cycle.
Thus, the farmers established artificial selection as a central
principle of agricultural practice early in the development of
this country.
Through the practice of artificial selection, a base of
21
germplasm was developed which eventually became well
22
suited to large-scale agriculture in North America.
The
process of germplasm development, and the farmer’s role in
that process, was well established before the independence of
the United States, even though the product of the process was
23
nowhere near mature in nature.
The process of artificially selecting plan varieties did not
benefit all farmers uniformly. Certain farmers practiced
artificial selection through the late eighteenth century on
24
However, not all farmers
private or communal farms.
possessed the skill or resources to mount an effective program
25
of plant variety development.
A few wealthy landowners,
including Thomas Jefferson and George Washington, could
26
afford to import exotic seeds and adapt those seeds to local
conditions. Seeds from these privately grown varieties that

20. See id. at 51-52.
21. The collective genetic stock of a species of plant is the called its
germplasm. See JOHN MILTON POEHLMAN, BREEDING FIELD CROPS 4 (3d ed.
1987).
22. The roles of the government, industry, and farmers in the
development of the germplasm base in the United States has been detailed in
a recently published article. See Debra L. Blair, Intellectual Property
Protection and Its Impact On The U.S. Seed Industry, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L.
297 (1999). Since certain aspects of the interaction between the government,
industry, and farmers are central to the analysis presented here, and since
some of these points are inadequately treated by Blair, it is necessary to
review the background on the development of the germplasm base given in
part by Blair.
23. An excellent history is given by Cary Fowler, The Plant Patent Act Of
1930: A Sociological History Of Its Creation, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y. 621 (2000).
24. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 52-53.
25. George Washington recognized that successful agriculture would not
advance by following “the ordinary farm routine which his neighbors
practiced.” ALFRED CHARLES TRUE, A History of Agricultural Education in the
United States, 36 U.S.D.A. MISC. PUB. 14 (1929). Because of this observation,
Washington devoted considerable resources to agricultural experiments aimed
at improving varieties and introducing exotic species of plants. See id. at 15.
26. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 52.
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performed well and exhibited desired characteristics were
distributed among the members of agricultural societies to
27
which the grower belonged.
As a result, members of
agricultural societies were able to develop successful farms and
plantations while simultaneously broadening the germplasm
28
available in the United States. Because the common farmer
could not gain membership to these agricultural societies he
had either no or limited access to these new and exotic
29
The common farmer was then economically
varieties.
disadvantaged in a system that granted an exclusive interest to
those who could afford to develop the plant varieties best suited
to agriculture in the United States.
Maintaining control of the nation’s germplasm base in the
hands of a few wealthy merchants and farmers had the effect of
limiting the agricultural productivity of the significantly larger
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. The stature of those who organized and were members of the
agricultural societies leads one to the conclusion that the societies were not
meant for the common farmer. A few examples illustrate the point. The
South Carolina Society for Promoting and Improving Agriculture and Other
Rural Concerns was established in 1784. In the rules of the society it was
recommended that the farmer set aside a portion of his lands upon which
agricultural experiments would be conducted. Further, written records of the
experiments should be maintained and reported to the society. See ALFRED
CHARLES TRUE, A History of Agricultural Experimentation and Research in
the United States, 251 U.S.D.A. MISC. PUB. 6-7 (1937). The Philadelphia
Society for Promoting Agriculture was organized in 1785 by Judge Bordley
and “23 distinguished citizens of that city” and whose first president was
“Samuel Powel, a graduate of the College of Philadelphia, and twice mayor of
that city.” See TRUE, supra note 25, at 7. The society set goals similar to the
other agricultural societies for its members and added the lure of premiums
for the best agricultural experiments. See id. The New York Society for the
Promotion of Agriculture, Arts, and Manufactures was established in 1791 for
the communication of results of experiments in agriculture, the useful arts
and manufacturing. See id. at 7. The Society for Promoting Agriculture in the
State of Connecticut, formed in 1794, invited its members “to make
experiments in the various departments of Agriculture,” id. at 9 (quoting E. H.
Jenkins, HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT), the results of which were to be freely
communicated to the society. The Albemarle Agricultural Society was formed
in 1817 by 30 men under the leadership of Thomas Jefferson. See TRUE, supra
note 25, at 15. Careful examination of the history of the agricultural societies
indicates that a common thread running through all of the early agricultural
societies is that the membership was limited to those who could engage in the
gentlemanly endeavor of “scientific agriculture” and who could accurately
record and report the results of that endeavor to the membership of the
society. Indeed, the common farmer most certainly lacked the resources to
engage in such endeavors and therefore would not be able to benefit from the
seed-sharing programs of the agricultural societies.
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number of common farmers. To aid agricultural productivity in
general and to continue broadening the germplasm available to
American farms, Secretary of the Treasury William H.
Crawford requested in 1819 that ambassadors and military
officers retrieve seed from countries around the world and
30
supply that seed to American farmers. The project initiated
by Crawford had the effect of initializing the process of
centralizing the maintenance and extension of the available
31
Such
germplasm base with the United States government.
centralization had the effect of providing new varieties of seed
to all farmers rather than to only those farmers wealthy
enough to belong to exclusive agricultural societies. To solidify
centralization of control of the germplasm base with the
government, the Commissioner of Patents, Henry Ellsworth, in
1839 obtained federal funding for the collection and
32
The
distribution of new plant varieties to the farmers.
30. See NELSON KLOSE, AMERICA’S CROP HERITAGE: THE HISTORY OF
FOREIGN PLANT INTRODUCTION BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 26 (1950)
(describing the introduction of exotic plants into the United States, and roles
that the federal government, farmers, and seed manufacturers had in
developing modern plant agriculture).
31. Because the project was unfunded, it was not immediately successful.
However, because naval officers had an inherent interest in collecting exotic
species, during their travels around the world, for their own use, the
germplasm did arrive in the United States as a result of the program. See
KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 55. More importantly, however, was the
recognition that the collection and introduction of new varieties and species
into the United States and the successful adaptation of those exotic plants for
agricultural purposes in the United States was beyond the capacity of
individuals. Rather the efforts must be accomplished by the collective efforts
available through the federal government. See id. at 54.
32. See KLOSE, supra note 30, at 39. By 1837, Commissioner Ellsworth
had clearly recognized the importance of instituting a seed collection and
distribution program under the purview of the federal government.
Specifically, Commissioner Ellsworth stated that husbandry might derive
assistance “from the establishment of a regular system for the selection and
distribution of grain and seeds of the choicest varieties for agricultural
purposes.” HENRY ELLSWORTH, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS
FOR THE YEAR 1837, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 25-112, at 5 (3d. Sess. 1838). As
early as 1835, Ellsworth was collecting and distributing various types of
agricultural seeds from the Patent Office. In his own words:
[t]he Patent Office is crowded with men of enterprise, who, when
they bring the models of their improvements in such implements [of
husbandry], are eager to communicate a knowledge of every other
kind of improvement in agriculture, and especially new and
valuable varieties of seeds and plants. Hence, the undersigned
[Commissioner] has been led to receive and distribute, during the
last two years, many articles of this kind which have been
committed to his care; and experience has induced him to believe
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collection and distribution efforts were eventually assigned to
the Patent Office. With congressional funding, by 1847 the
Patent Office was distributing approximately 60,000 packets of
33
seed to farmers free of charge. The program of collecting and
distributing seed continued to expand so that more than one
34
million packages of seed were distributed by 1855. While the
government played an important role as collector and

that there is no spot in the Union so favorable to this object as the
seat of Government.
The great disideratum at the present time seems to be, that some
place should be designated and known as the depository of all
articles of this kind, and from whence they may be dispensed to
every part of the United States.
Id. at. 5. Thus, Commissioner Ellsworth urged upon Congress the concept
that agricultural productivity could be assisted to a considerable extent in the
United States if the management of the seed collection and distribution
program were to be formalized within the federal government. Ellsworth
supported his position with a set of well articulated examples. The first
concerns the production of wheat:
[a] short time since, the most eastern State of our Union was, in a
measure, dependent on others for her bread-stuffs. That State is
now becoming able to supply its own wants, and will soon have a
surplus for exportation; and this is effected by the extensive
introduction of spring wheat. Among the varieties of this wheat,
however, there is great room for selection: there is at least 20 per
cent. Difference, if regard is paid to the quality and quantity of the
crop.
Id. The second concerns experiments on the production of maize:
[f]rom experiments made the last summer, there can be no doubt
that the crop of Indian corn [maize] may be improved at least onethird, without any extra labor; and this, effected by a due regard
only to the selection of seeds.
And here it may be mentioned, that an individual has devoted
twenty-five years to this single object; and, from our common Indian
corn, has produced a new variety, which, if distributed as it ought to
be, may prove a great benefit to the husbandman and to the country.
From samples transmitted to the Patent Office, especially from the
shores of lake Superior, there is a moral certainty of a good crop of
corn in the higher latitudes, if proper attention is paid to the
selection of seeds.
Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added). Thus, it appears that Ellsworth understood that
the development of new varieties by a single person or by individual
agricultural societies would be of little use to agricultural production in the
United States without a well designed, and federally backed, seed collection
and distribution system. He certainly recognized that individual farmers
could play a critical role in the distribution system, but also certainly was not
promoting the distribution program merely to benefit the welfare of the
farmers.
33. See id.
34. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 56.
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distributor of seed, the farmer remained an essential
functionary in the process of refining and developing the
35
available germplasm in the United States.
Through the process of screening and selecting those
plants and seeds that gave superior yields, the farmers in
partnership with the federal government had created a well36
developed germplasm base by the start of the Civil War. To
rationalize and continue the centralized control of germplasm
development and distribution, Congress in 1862 established the
37
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to “acquire
35. See id.
36. See J. C. FORBES & R. D. WATSON, PLANTS IN AGRICULTURE 212
(1992) [hereinafter FORBES & WATSON].
37. The United States Department of Agriculture was created in 1862
with Isaac Newton appointed as the first Commissioner of Agriculture. See
Isaac Newton, Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture for the Year 1862,
1862 U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORT 1, 3 (1863) (also published as: ISAAC NEWTON,
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR 1862, H.R.
EXEC. DOC. NO. 37-78, at 3 (3d. Sess. 1863)). The Department of Agriculture,
with Isaac Newton as its first Commissioner, started operation on July 1,
1862, with a budget allowance of $60,000 of which $34,342.27 was spent by
the end of the year. Id. at 21. Commissioner Isaac Newton articulated the
objectives of the Department of Agriculture as follows:
Collecting, arranging, publishing, and disseminating, for the benefit
of the nation, statistical and other useful information in regard to
agriculture in its widest acceptation, embracing, not only the usual
cultivation of the soil, but orcharding, plain and ornamental
gardening, rural embellishment, the veterinary art, and household
economy. In this connexion the department whould aim to teach or
recommend authoritatively, by concentrating the ripest agricultural
experience and scholarship, the best methods of culture, the choicest
plants, vegetables, and fruits, the most valuable grains, grasses, and
animals, domestic and otherwise, and the most improved
implements of husbandry.
Collecting, from different parts of our own and foreign lands, such
valuable animals, cereals, seeds, plants, slips, and cuttings as may
be obtained by exchange, purchase, or gift, with information as to
their modes of propagation, culture, preservation, and preparation
for market, and distributing the same throughout the country.
Through our postal franking privilege at home, and our foreign
ministers, consuls, merchants, missionaries, travellers, and the
officers of our naval and merchant fleet, the government enjoys
unusual facilities for carrying out this project.
Answering inquiries of farmers and others on all matters relating to
agriculture, at the same time stimulating inquiry, inviting
discussion, and rewarding research by publishing agricultural
statistics of various States and sections of States in order to guard
against the excess or diminution of given products, thereby saving
much time, labor and capital to farmers. And as this department
has been created and is sustained for their benefit, they are
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and to diffuse among the people of the United States useful
information in subjects connected with agriculture in the most
general and comprehensive sense of that word, and to procure,
propagate, and distribute among the people new and valuable
38
seeds and plants.” The establishment of the USDA in effect
institutionalized within the government the artificial selection
model of plant evolution, which had previously been conducted
39
by individual farmers. After the Civil War, the development
and testing of new varieties of domestic crop species were
earnestly invited to correspond with it in order that a proper
selection of subjects may be afforded for publication.
Testing, by experiment, the value of different agricultural
implements and their adaptation to the purposes intended, as well
as testing the value of cereals, seeds, and plants, and their
adaptation to our soil and climate, before transmitting them to our
farmers. In order to carry out this object the department should
have under its control a model farm.
Analysis, by means of a chemical laboratory, of various soils, grains,
fruits, plants, vegetables, and manures, and publishing the results
for the guidance and benefit of agriculturists.
Establishing a professorship of botany and entomology. It is well
known that insects are annually destroying a vast amount of the
products of our soil, and that their ravages appear to be on the
increase. If the damage done to our wheat crop alone could be
prevented, millions of money would be saved to the country.
Establishing an agricultural library and museum. In this library the
most valuable works would gradually accumulate by exchange, gift
and purchase, forming a rich mine of knowledge. The museum
would embrace models of all the most approved implements of
husbandry; specimens of soils, rocks, \&c.; samples of the various
productions of garden, field, and forest; varieties of grain in straw,
and in sample, now generally cultivated or recently introduced into
the country, with explanations respecting their soils, climates,
weight, yield per acre, and their value as food. Here should be
arranged specimens of the component parts of soils, manures, and
all the products of agriculture, showing especially the values of
different kinds of food. On the walls of this museum should hand
the portraits of animals of the most celebrated breeds, and under its
roof should be gathered whatever would tend to attract and instruct
persons of the highest taste and education.
Id. at 20-1.
38. Act of May 15, 1862, ch. 72, 12 Stat. 387 (the act is entitled: “An Act to
establish a Department of Agriculture”). See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at
59 (quoting GLADYS L. BAKER ET AL., CENTURY OF SERVICE: THE FIRST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 13 (1963)). See also
Isaac Newton, supra note 37 at 3.
39. See Frederick H. Buttel & Jill Belsky, Biotechnology, Plant Breeding,
and Intellectual Property: Social and Ethical Dimensions, in OWNING
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION, VALUE AND ETHICAL ISSUES 110
(Vivian Weil & John W. Snapper eds., 1989) [hereinafter Buttel & Belsky].
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conducted primarily by the land grant colleges in conjunction
with the USDA and the resulting seeds were distributed free of
40
charge to the nation’s farmers. Efforts by the USDA and land
grant colleges, however, did not reach vegetable and plant
varieties intended for domestic use as these varieties were
already marketed to the farmer and home gardener through a
41
The growth of the collection and
small private seed trade.
distribution program was so extensive that by 1878
approximately one-third of the department’s budget was
42
By the end of the nineteenth
committed to the project.
century the program had become exceedingly successful, and
the germplasm was as well developed as possible given the
limited understanding, by both the farmer and applied
scientist, of plant genetics. From a business perspective, the
government-farmer relationship was in prime condition for the
newly founded seed companies to replace the government and
exploit the well developed germplasm base. In order to affect
the replacement, the seed manufacturers found a sympathetic
ear and a powerful friend in the then Secretary of Agriculture
J. Sterling Morton.
Mr. M. Fagan, Chief of the Seed Division under Secretary
Morton, considered the gratuitous distribution of seed as a
program that “has outlived its usefulness, and that its further
continuance is an infringement of the rights of citizens engaged
43
in legitimate trade pursuits” and in 1893 called for the end of

40. See Rick Weiss, Seeds of Discord: Monsanto’s Gene Police Raise Alarm
on Farmers’ Rights, Rural Tradition, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1999, at A6.
41. See Buttel & Belsky, supra note 39, at 113.
42. See KLOSE, supra note 30, at 62
43. M. E. Fagen, Report of the Chief of the Seed Division, in 1893 U.S.D.A.
ANNUAL REPORTS 389, 391 (1894) (also published in: REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR 1893, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO.
53-1, pt. 6, at 389-91 (2d. Sess. 1894)). Mr. J. Sterling Morton, in the same
year, called the gratuitous seed program one of “unwieldy, unnecessary, and
extravagant proportions,” J. STERLING MORTON, Report of the Commissioner
of Agriculture, 1893 U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORTS 7, 19 (1894) (also published
as: J. STERLING MORTON, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE
FOR THE YEAR 1893, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 53-1, pt. 6, at 389-91 (2d. Sess.
1894)), that was an “enormous expenditure, without compensatory benefits,
[that] ought to be abolished.” Id. at 20. Then, as now, proponents of
monopolization by a particular sector of the business community argue that
such monopolization is to protect “the rights of citizens engaged in legitimate
trade pursuits” (that is the businessmen). What these proponents fail to
realize is that the prior legal structure already protected the interests of
persons engaged in a “legitimate trade pursuit” (that is the farmers) as well as
building a stronger community. That special interests could not enter into the
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44

the project. Despite Morton’s claims of infringement and his
belief that the gratuitous distribution of the seed was
“antagonistic to the seed as a commodity-form and in direct
45
competition with the private seed trade,” Congress refused to
46
halt the program. Morton failed to veil his contempt for the
gratuitous seed program devised to aid the farmers and to help
47
feed the American people. Since Congress refused to halt the
market arena is neither the fault of the farmers (they were engaging in the
economically sound practice of maximizing output while minimizing input of
labor and capital) nor of the nation, but rather their own inability to compete
in a market which favors the public welfare rather than the welfare of a select
group of businessmen. Kloppenburg also employed this quote, although in a
different context. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 62.
44. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18 at 62-63.
45. Id. at 63.
46. See id.
47. Mr. J. Sterling Morton, in his report for 1894, stated that: “[t]he
extravagance and inutility of these disbursements are apparent to any person
who will investigate the results of the expenditure.” J. Sterling Morton, Report
of the Secretary of Agriculture, 1894 U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORTS 5, 69 (1895)
(also published as: J. STERLING MORTON, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR 1894, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 53-1, pt. 6, at 69 (3d.
Sess. 1895)). He further argues that those to whom the seeds were distributed
were not only ungrateful, but indifferent as well. Identifying that the newly
established agricultural experiment stations “are in charge of scientific men”
who are “particularly well equipped for the trial, testing, and approval or
condemnation of such new varieties as may be introduced from time to time,”
his position was that the responsibility of artificial selection of new varieties
should fall to these experiment stations. See id. at 69-70. Since Secretary
Morton was closely aligned with the emerging private seed manufacturing
industry (see KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 61-65), his argument, contained
in his annual report for the year 1894, clearly indicated that he expected the
United States government to continue funding agricultural research and that
the private seed manufacturers would later have an opportunity to reap some
monetary benefits from that research. It is ironic that Morton expressed his
desired for the agricultural experimental stations to have control of the
discovery and introduction of new varieties in light of his well-articulated
contempt for both the land grant universities and the agricultural experiment
stations. See J. Sterling Morton, Report of the Secretary of Agriculture, 1893
U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORTS 7, 8 (1894) (also published as: J. STERLING
MORTON, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR
1894, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 53-1, pt. 6, at 8 (2nd. Sess.1894)). Based upon his
conservative federalist views, Morton believed that both the university system
and the experimental stations were the responsibility of the several States.
Because of his close alignment with industry, Morton was apparently blinded
to the fact that agriculture problems and developments to solve those
problems do not end at the state line. He was also unable to understand that
no single state could be completely self supporting in any manner, and that
federally guided programs that encouraged the production and dissemination
among the peoples of the several States of knowledge and technology is the
critical factor to continued development of the nation. It is fortunate that
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48

seed program, Morton took it upon himself to not only
terminate the seed distribution program in 1894, but also to
completely eliminate the USDA’s ability to ever engage in the
49
distribution program again. Not only did Secretary Morton
openly display his contempt for the gratuitous seed distribution
50
program in 1894, but he also openly demonstrated his disgust
Commissioner Morton did not succeed in defeating the land grant university
program or the agricultural experiment station program. This is because the
agricultural industry has and continues to benefit from both public
institutions. See generally Donald N. Duvick, Biotechnology in the 1930s: The
Development of Hybrid Maize, 2 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 69-74 (Jan.,
2001).
48. The stated duty of the USDA was to collect and disseminate
information, seeds, and plants for the advancement of agriculture in the
United States. See supra note 37. However, members of Congress found the
gratuitous seed distribution so politically attractive that, by 1878,
Commissioner William LeDuc found it necessary to remind Congress that by
statute the distribution of seed was exclusively the duty of the USDA. See
William G. LeDuc, Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture for the Year
1878, 1878 U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORT 5, 32-9 (1879). LeDuc admonished
Congress stating that: “[o]nly by obeying the organic law, which requires the
Commissioner of Agriculture to distribute to agriculturist the seeds which
invite them, can we hope to obtain these reports with any degree of certainty.
This law is mandatory and must be obeyed until Congress shall see fit to
amend the same, and thus permit or prescribe some other method of
distribution.” Id. at 34. Commissioner LeDuc then instituted a program
whereby he wrestled control of the program from the members of Congress.
By 1879, LeDuc’s program had gained the approval of agricultural
organizations, several newspaper editors, and some members of Congress. See
William G. LeDuc, Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture for the Year
Evidently, some
1879, 1879 U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORT 5, 21 (1880).
Congressmen found the political benefits of the largesse attendant to the
gratuitous seed distribution program so attractive that, by 1885, two-thirds of
all seeds, plants, and cuttings distributed through the gratuitous seed
program were actually being distributed by members of Congress. See Norman
J. Colman, Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture for the Year 1884, 1884
U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORT 5, 25-6 (1885). Even in the case of a program
meant to benefit all of society, by increasing and diversifying the germplasm
base, members of Congress seemed to have no compunction over using that
program for their own political benefit.
49. See J. Sterling Morton, Report of the Secretary of Agriculture, 1894
U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORTS 7, 67-70 (1895) (also published as: J. STERLING
MORTON, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR
1894, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 53-1, pt. 6, at 67-70 (3d. Sess. 1895)).
50. In 1895, Commissioner Morton reminded Congress that in 1893 he:
“recommend[ed] that the purchase of seed for gratuitous and promiscuous
distribution be utterly abolished, and that not one cent be appropriated for
such distribution.” J. Sterling Morton, Report of the Secretary of Agriculture,
1894 U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORTS 7, 67 (1895) (also published as: J. STERLING
MORTON, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR
1894, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 53-1, pt. 6, at 67 (3d. Sess. 1895)). To buttress his
position, Secretary Morton included in his report for 1894 a report from Mr.
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51

for Congress’ decision to continue the program by turning to
United States Attorney General Richard Olney in 1894 for a
non-judicial interpretation of the statute which established the
United States Department of Agriculture. Secretary Morton
believed that Attorney General Olney had stated that the
Secretary of Agriculture reserved the right to determine
whether government was obliged to continue the gratuitous
seed program. Consequently, Secretary Morton rejected three
bids in response to a limiting advertisement for seeds in an
overt move to eliminate the gratuitous seed program in fiscal
52
year 1895. Such an outcome is hardly surprising given the
members of the board were seedsmen, including Mr. Enos S.

Enos S. Harnden, Special Agent for the Purchase of Seed for the United States
Department of Agriculture. Mr. Harnden stated that: “[i]n the light of my
experience as a former seedsman, however, I consider the free distribution of
seeds by this Department as an infringement upon and interference with a
legitimate business, and I believe it should be abolished.” Id. at 211. Further,
Mr. Harnden stated that: “this Department has no moral right to interfere
with this or any other legitimate business interest by a free political
distribution of garden seeds . . . or any other commodity the subject of
legitimate trade.” Id. Conceding that “years ago the seed division did much
for the agricultural interests of the country in introducing new and improved
cereals and other field seeds,” id. at 212, Harnden argues that “the recipients,
as a rule, want to obtain good seeds for the least possible money,” id., and
suggests “that the purchase of seeds for free distribution by this Department
be discontinued,” id. at 213.
51. Perhaps the contempt that Mr. Morton felt for Congress was the
consequence of the result of a hearing held before the Committee of Elections
of the House of Representatives in 1862. See MR. DAWES, J. STERLING
MORTON VS. SAMUEL G. DAILY, HOUSE COMM. OF ELECTIONS, H.R. REP. NO.
37-69, at 1-18 (2d. Sess. 1862) [hereinafter DAWES]; see also MR. VOORHEES, J.
STERLING MORTON VS. SAMUEL G. DAILY: VIEWS OF THE MINORITY, HOUSE
COMM. OF ELECTIONS, H.R. REP. NO. 37-69, at 1-15 (2d. Sess. 1862)
[hereinafter VOORHEES]. The election for the pertinent seat in the House of
Representatives was held on October 9, 1860 in the Territory of Nebraska.
Between Mr. Morton and Mr. Daily, the initial election results were in favor of
Mr. Morton by 14 votes (2957 for Mr. Morton, 2945 for Mr. Daily). See DAWES,
supra, at 1. Upon contest of the election results by Mr. Daily, the governor of
the Territory of Nebraska revoked the certificate of election (initially given in
favor of Mr. Morton) and granted it to Mr. Daily. The ground upon which the
governor reversed the election was alleged voter fraud in the vote counted for
Mr. Morton. See DAWES, supra, at 1. The Committee reviewed extensive
testimony on the question, found instances of voter fraud in favor of Morton,
and consequently upheld the certificate of election in favor of Mr. Daily. See
DAWES, supra, at 18.
52. See J. Sterling Morton, Report of the Secretary of Agriculture, 1895
U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORT 5, 53-5 (1895) (also published as: J. STERLING
MORTON, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR
1895, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 54-6, at 53-5 (1st. Sess. 1895)).
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53

Harnden. The space previously occupied by the Seed Division
of the USDA was “speedily transformed into apartments for the
Division of Entomology and the Division of Ornithology and
Mammalogy, and immediately occupied by the chiefs and clerks
54
Further, arguing that the introduction of exotic
thereof.”
species and varieties was the duty of the agricultural
experiment stations, Secretary Morton urged Congress to
“materially and profitably reduce[]” the “appropriation for the
care of the thirty-five acres of grounds about” the USDA which
were previously used as grounds for the cultivation of plants for
55
home use and for distribution.
Notwithstanding Morton’s use of the Attorney General as
an authority on the meaning of the statute, Congress clearly
felt that Morton had overstepped his authority by terminating
the seed program. In 1895, Morton grudgingly reinstated the
56
This is one of the clearest
seed distribution program.
53. Secretary Morton quoted a report from Mr. Harnden as stating that:
“we have opened and examined the bids received and find that the same do
not meet the requirements of the advertisement as printed, and therefore
respectfully recommend that all bids be rejected.” Id. at 55.
54. Id. at 55.
55. Id. at 56.
56. See J. Sterling Morton, Report of the Secretary of Agriculture, 1896
U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORT v (1896) (also published as: J. STERLING MORTON,
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR 1896, H.R.
EXEC. DOC. NO. 54-6, at v (2nd. Sess. 1896)). Commissioner Morton stated
that if the garden area planted by the gratuitous seed were a strip of ground a
single rod in width, it would stretch around the globe one and one-half times.
He also argued that: “[t]he 10,125,000 packets of vegetable seeds cost the
Government $75,000, while the transportation of the same through the mails
added the sum of $74,520,” a cost “paid for by money raised from all the
people, and bestowed upon only a few people.” Id. at xxxix. The computation
reported by Commissioner Morton was provided by Mr. Harnden. See Enos S.
Harnden, Report of the Special Agent on Seed Distribution, in 1896 U.S.D.A.
ANNUAL REPORTS 155-57 (1896) (also published in: REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR 1896, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO.
54-6, at 155-57 (2nd. Sess. 1896)). Mr. Harnden, maintaining an unwavering
contempt equaled only by that of Commissioner Morton for both the
gratuitous seed distribution program and for Congress, complained in 1896,
following reinstitution of the seed distribution program, that “[e]stimating
each Congressional quota on a basis of 450 equal parts, each Senator,
Member, and Delegate would receive sufficient seed to plant a trifle more than
163 1/2 acres to garden truck,” and that if this land was accumulated into a
patch 1 rod in width, “a fast express train traveling at the rate of 60 miles per
hour along this garden patch would require fifty-one days three hours and
fourteen minutes to pass from one end to the other.” Id. at 156. Only due to
the greed for political power exhibited by the members of Congress was the
centralized institution of agricultural management preserved for another 28
years for the benefit of the farmers and the peoples of this nation.
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examples of a government officer using the power vested in his
office to destroy the long-established business practice of a
large group of people in order to create a new business practice
which benefits only a small group of favored individuals.
Despite Secretary Morton’s efforts, the gratuitous seed
distribution program had grown and was so pervasive that by
1897 the USDA was distributing approximately one billion
57
packets of seed per year.
Without the government seed program and the efforts of
58
American farmers, the germplasm base present in the United
States by the end of the nineteenth century, would certainly
not have been developed. The underlying purpose of the
government’s gratuitous seed program was to expand the
germplasm available and to allow farmers to develop varieties
59
that were particularly well suited for the local environment.
The seed manufacturers’ main goal was to develop the
minimum number of varieties that would maximize sales to the
grower and hence maximize profits.
Development of a
multitude of seed varieties is both costly for a single entity and
may not be an optimal business strategy. Thus, the gratuitous
seed program’s purpose is antithetical to that underlying the
seed manufacturers’ business strategy. The government’s
intention of expanding the available germplasm base, of
increasing the number of varieties of exotic and native seeds
used by the farmers, and of adapting new varieties to the local
environments found in the United States, was a resounding
60
success. The process of artificial selection by the farmer had
61
become a well-established agricultural practice in part
because the farmer was well equipped to carry out the simple
program required for successful artificial selection. As such,
57. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 64-65.
58. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING GLOBAL GENETIC
RESOURCES: THE U.S. NATIONAL PLANT GERMPLASM SYSTEM 1 (1991)
(published by the National Academy Press). The USDA has an ongoing and
active program to preserve the germplasm diversity by storing seeds of all
known plant varieties at the National Seed Storage Laboratory in Fort
Collins, Colorado.
59. Kloppenburg argues that members of Congress had an the ulterior
motive of maintaining “a convenient means of ingratiating themselves with
their constituents.” See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 63. While this
argument may be valid, the ultimate support for the program must have been
predicated upon the demand by the farmers and consumers for the gratuitous
seed provided by the government. See id.
60. See id. at 61.
61. See id. at 65.
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the farmer was a “researcher”, a “plant breeder”, and his
practice of artificial selection was a “natural right” possessed
by him before the framing of the Constitution.
By 1897, the Department of Agriculture’s attitude had
changed significantly with the appointment of Mr. James
Wilson as Secretary of Agriculture. Recognizing that the
63
“country has profited by introducing new seeds and plants,”
but that the progress was made without a clear scientific basis,
the Secretary appointed a scientist to “have charge of seed and
64
plant importation,” and to bring a scientific basis to the
importation and adaptation of plants for use in the United
States. The Secretary was careful to recognize that the “law
requires that the seeds, plants, bulbs, etc., be rare and
65
valuable,” and thus urged Congress that “more of the
appropriation given for seeds should be available for the
66
introduction of what is new and rare.” While Congress was
obviously reluctant to decrease funding for the politically
popular gratuitous seed program, it appropriated $130,000 for
the program in 1897 and $20,000 for distribution of the seeds
and for discovering and importing new and rare varieties in the
same year. For fiscal year 1899, Congress appropriated
$130,000 for the “purchase and distribution of valuable
67
seeds.” Of that amount, $70,978.36 was used for the purchase
68
of seeds to be distributed through the Members of Congress.
Under Secretary Wilson, the program of discovering, importing,
and adapting new and rare varieties of seed constituted “[q]uite
69
a large percentage of the $130,000 appropriated” by Congress.
Even though Secretary Wilson urged Congress to
appropriate larger sums to the importation and adaptation of

62. See infra, Parts II.B.3, for an analysis of why the farmer may be both
a researcher and a plant breeder.
63. JAMES WILSON, Report of the Secretary of Agriculture, 1897 U.S.D.A.
ANNUAL REPORTS v, vii (1897) (also published as: JAMES WILSON, REPORT OF
THE COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR 1897, H.R. EXEC. DOC.
NO. 55-6, at vii (2nd. Sess. 1897)).
64. Id.
65. Id. at xxxvi.
66. Id.
67. See JAMES WILSON, Report of the Secretary of Agriculture, 1899
U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORTS, ix, lv (1899) (also published as: JAMES WILSON,
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR 1899, H.R.
EXEC. DOC. NO. 56-6, at lv (2nd. Sess. 1899)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at lvi.
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new and rare varieties, the seed manufacturing industry was
still pressing Congress to discontinue the gratuitous seed
program. Secretary Wilson recognized that the Department of
Agriculture’s distribution of seeds that compete directly with
the seed manufacturers’ sales was a questionable practice
(particularly when no experimental feature existed, and “no
intelligent direction regarding the use of the seeds beyond that
70
which is provided by dealers” ). However, he also recognized
that the Department of Agriculture’s distribution of seeds and
plants served a very valuable commercial and social purpose.
In particular, he stated that: “[t]he introduction of these and
many other seeds and plants, entirely beyond the ability of
private individuals to compass, in order that such seeds and
plants may eventually enter the commercial class and be
handled by seedsmen, is the aim of the Department of
71
Agriculture in seed distribution at the present time.”
Obviously, by 1899 the seed manufacturing industry had made
little progress against the Department of Agriculture’s
gratuitous seed distribution program.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the seed
manufacturing industry had gained only a small fraction of the
market for field crop seeds, a market that was almost
exclusively dominated by on-farm production of the seed and
72
During the
sale of the seed through inter-farm commerce.
last forty years of the nineteenth century, the seed
manufacturing industry was, however, able to make
substantial inroads into the flower and vegetable seeds market.
This is because the seed sets in most vegetables and flowers
develop when the plant is mature and after the crops are
73
harvested, thus, the home gardener was disinclined to
produce flower and vegetable seeds for himself. There was,
therefore, very little competition between the seed
manufacturing industry and the individual farmers for the
production and sale of garden plant variety seeds. This
market, however, was threatened by the expansion of the
government’s gratuitous seed program into the area of garden
74
The seed manufacturing
vegetable and flower seeds.
industry, not surprisingly, responded to this threat by
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at lvi
Id.
See id. at 61.
See id.
See id.
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pressuring the USDA to halt its seed program. Due to this
pressure, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the government eventually relinquished control of
the nation’s germplasm base, including both field and garden
crop varieties, to the private seed manufacturing companies.
The process by which control was ceded is outlined below.
Before 1900, the farmer had several options for obtaining
seed for planting: he could grow the seed himself or obtain the
seed through the inter-farm commerce system; purchase the
seed from fledgling seed manufacturers; or, obtain the seed
stock gratis from the USDA. Obtaining seed for a subsequent
planting cycle either from his own crop or through inter-farm
commerce usually involved crop improvement through either
artificial selection, or in certain limited situations, crop75
breeding. Because the farmer could obtain new seed stocks
gratis from the USDA, there was no incentive for him to pay for
the seed from seed manufacturers. The disincentive was
sharpened in light of the relative quality and productivity of
varieties available through the seed manufacturers and

75. See Edmund Burke, Report of the Commissioner of Patents, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS; FOR THE YEAR 1847 1, 131, (1849)
(also published as: EDMUND BURKE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER
OF PATENTS, FOR THE YEAR 1847, H.R. EXEC. DOC. 30-54, at 131 (1st Sess.
1848). Commissioner of Patents Edmund Burke reported that:
[a]n interesting experiment, in which a fine variety was secured, by
blending two or three dissimilar ones, is mentioned in the Columbia
Advocate of South Carolina. The corn produced is stated to have
measured, in some cases, from twelve to thirteen inches in
circumference, and from twelve to fourteen inches in length, having
from forty to forty-eight rows of grain in an ear. This was, however,
the yield of a single ear to a stalk; the ears which were from stalks
bearing five or six ears, even of those stalks would each measure,
when shelled, nearly twice as much as the largest ear of common
corn. It was mostly of the white gourd seed, but the varieties from
which selection had been made were thus described: The one was
remarkable only for the length of the cob, but extremely slender.
Either of these varieties, regarded singly or separately as to its
properties, would have been considered hardly worth the planting.
By attention, and suitably blending these varieties, he obtained the
valuable one which has been mentioned above, and which might be
truly called a mammoth corn. The ground on which it was raised is
described as being an exhausted plantation near Monticello, on the
red hills of Little river, but the mode of cultivation is not given.
Many instances might be mentioned of the uncommon size of single
ears or large crops of corn. A few, however, will be all that we shall
quote to shew the capabilities of this most valuable grain.
Id.
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available to the farmer through other channels.
The
consequence of the long-term practice of artificial selection and
inter-farm commerce can easily be determined as follows.
Upon examination of the agricultural productivity before
1900 in general, and for maize in particular, it is clear that
77
productivity in the United States was stagnating. While new
varieties of plants were initially rapidly and successfully
introduced to American agriculture through the traditional
practice of artificial selection, the stagnation in agricultural
productivity near the end of the nineteenth century required
the introduction of alternative practices of developing new
78
varieties. Although hybridization technology was becoming
79
important in agricultural research, and hybrid varieties were
being developed, commercial or production scale use of hybrids
80
did not exist.
While the farmer was able to perform the
76. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 8 (discussing the quality of seeds
distributed by the early seed manufacturers).
77. See id. at 66. The production and economic trends surrounding the
recent and current development and deployment of genetically modified plants
is analogous to the production and economic trends surrounding the
deployment of hybrid seed varieties in the United States between 1933 and
1946. See Appendix A for a discussion of the economics of maize production in
during the years between 1933 and 1946, and Appendix B for a discussion of
the methods of data analysis used to develop the discussion in Appendix A.
78. See Buttel & Belsky, supra note 39, at 114. Hybridization is an
artificial selection technique where plants are the result of interbreeding of
two distant and distinct lines of the same plant species.
Ricard A.
Steinbrecher and Patric Mooney, Terminator Technology: The Threat to World
Food Security, 28 THE ECOLOGIST 276 (1998) [hereinafter Steinbrecher &
Mooney]. The hybrid resulting hybrid seeds will incorporate the desirable
characteristics of the parental lines whilst suppressing the undesirable
characteristics. See id. The seeds from the first generation hybrid plants will
not be able, in general, to express the desirable qualities, resulting in a loss of
yield, and plant variability. See Lewontin, infra note 127, at 72. Because the
quality “hybridized” into the seed would generally be lost after the first
generation, the development of hybridization technology prevented farmers
from saving the seeds from one crop for planting the following crop cycle. As a
result, the plant breeders were able to capitalize on the development of new
seed varieties. See Steinbrecher & Mooney, supra at 276. While the
hybridization technique has been technically and economically feasible for
corn, cotton, sunflowers and tomatoes it cannot be applied to important crops
such as soybeans and wheat. See id. Furthermore, the hybridization
technology cannot always be used to introduce specific characteristics into the
plant. See id.
79. See generally Diane B. Paul & Barbara A. Kimmelman, Mendel in
America: Theory and Practice, 1900-1919, in THE AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT OF
BIOLOGY 281 (Ronald Rainger, Keith R. Benson & Jan Maienschein eds. 1988)
[hereinafter Paul & Kimmelman].
80. See Appendix A for a discussion of the economics of maize production
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function of simple artificial selection, and more sophisticated
farmers were able to perform simple cross-breeding, it is not
clear that the individual farmer was capable of engaging in the
more sophisticated plant breeding techniques required to
produce a uniform and consistent hybrid variety. Simply put,
the farmers were not skilled enough in research and plant
breeding methods to undertake developing hybrid varieties for
themselves.
The fledgling seed manufacturing industry
evidently was incapable of engaging in the level of research
required to significantly alter the stagnation in agricultural
productivity. Thus, the nearly simultaneous creation of the
81
82
USDA and land grant colleges set the stage for shifting the
development of new varieties from the farmer to research
establishments staffed and operated strictly by state
83
agricultural colleges and funded by the USDA. Before 1900,
these efforts were unable to yield the much-needed revolution
in agricultural practices. Such a revolution took the form of
extraordinary developments in science and a shift in control of
the nation’s germplasm base.
In the years between 1883 and 1924 three significant
events brought change to the dynamic between the
government, the farmer, and the seed industry: the
establishment of the American Seed Trade Association in 1883;
the discovery and publication of Mendel’s works in 1900; and,
the termination of the gratuitous seed program in 1924.
In 1883, the American Seed Trade Association was formed
in New York City by representatives of thirty-four seed
84
manufacturing companies. The purpose of the American Seed
Trade Association was to promote the seed companies’ interests
85
to the United States Government.
in during the years between 1866 and 2001, and Appendix B for a discussion
of the methods of data analysis used to develop the discussion in Appendix A.
81. See generally Newton, supra note 37.
82. The Morrill Land-Grant Act establishing the land grant colleges was
signed by President Lincoln on July 2, 1862. See TRUE, supra note 25, at 106.
The purpose of these colleges was to “claim the authority of teachers to
announce facts and fix laws, and to scatter broadcast that knowledge which
will be useful in building up a great nation.” See id. at 107.
83. While the establishment of state agricultural experiment stations
precedes the establishment of both the USDA and land-grant colleges (see
TRUE, supra note 29, at 67-130), the Hatch Act, signed on March 2, 1887 by
President Cleveland, formalized the establishment of federally funded
agricultural experiment stations in the United States. See id. at 129.
84. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 62.
85. See id.
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The rediscovery and publication of Mendel’s laws in 1900
lead to the rationalization of crop-breeding science. In the
crop-breeding technique, the farmer or plant breeder selects
two plant varieties, each of which has some particular set of
86
desired traits for cross-breeding.
When crossed, the first
generation progeny may exhibit the desired traits of both
parents, depending upon which traits are recessive and which
are dominant.
The technique was initially unsuccessful
because farmers and plant breeders did not understand the
mechanism for transmitting traits and, therefore, were unable
to predict the likely outcome of the cross of two particular plant
varieties.
The basis of inheritance of a particular trait by the first
generation progeny from two cross-bred progenitors was not
well understood until the Mendel’s work was “rediscovered.”
By studying peas in his monastery garden in the 1860’s, Gregor
Mendel deduced that the inherited traits were stored in
87
discrete units that are now called genes. Mendel published
88
his observations in 1866. However, between the time when
Mendel’s observations were first published and the turn of the
89
twentieth century, his work was largely ignored for reasons
that are not entirely clear. In 1900, Mendel’s work was
90
91
“rediscovered”
by three botanists: Hugo de Vries
of
86. Edmund Burke gave early reports of successful crop-breeding
experiments in 1847. See Burke, supra note 75 (reporting that a variety of
maize “secured” by blending two or three dissimilar ones, is mentioned in the
Columbia Advocate of South Carolina).
87. See
BOARD
ON
AGRICULTURE:
AGRICULTURAL
RESEARCH
OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY CONCERNS, supra note 16, at 6.
88. Gregor Mendel, Versuche über Pflazen-Hybriden, 4 VERHANDLUNGEN
DES NATURFORSCHENDEN VEREINES, ABHANDLUNGEN, 4 Brünn 3 (1866). The
English translations appear in THE ORIGIN OF GENETICS: A MENDEL SOURCE
BOOK, (Curt Stern & Eva R. Sherwood, ed.) (1966) [hereinafter Stern &
Sherwood]; J. H. BENNET, EXPERIMENTS IN PLANT HYBRIDIZATION, (1965);
and JAMES ARTHUR PETER, CLASSIC PAPERS IN GENETICS, (1959).
89. “Mendel’s concept of the laws of genetics was lost to the world for a
generation because his publication did not reach the few who were capable of
grasping and extending it; and this sort of catastrophe is undoubtedly being
repeated all about us, as truly significant attainments become lost in the mass
of the inconsequential.” Vannevar Bush, As We May Think, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 101 (July 1945).
90. See Daniel L. Hartl & Vitezslav Orel, What Did Gregor Mendel Think
He Discovered?, 131 GENETICS 245 (1992).
91. See Hugo de Vries, The Law of Separation of Characteristics in
Crosses, 25 J. ROYAL HORTICULTURAL SOCIETY 243 (1900) (arguing that
specific characteristics of the plants must be regarded as “sharply separated
quantities,” id. at 243, independent from all the other quantities); Hugo de
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92

Amsterdam, Carl Correns
of Tubingen, and Eric von
93
Tschermak of Esslingen, Austria. Shortly following the
“rediscovery,” the geneticist William Bateson stated “[a]n exact
determination of the laws of heredity will probably work more
change in man’s outlook on the world, and in his power over
nature, than any other advance in natural knowledge that can
94
Indeed, in the first decade of the twentieth
be foreseen.”
century, Mendel’s investigations stimulated an enormous
95
amount of work in the science of genetics.
As a result,
biologists in the early 1900’s discovered how genes were
assorted in the process of cell division and how the properties of
the progeny are determined. Using the science of genetics,
plant breeders were able to cross-breed plants with precision,
manipulating the genome to successfully produce new varieties
96
with desired traits.
The early hybridization experiments, conducted mainly at
97
government and university experimental stations, resulted in
improved varieties through the introduction of a single trait or
selected traits from one variety, crossed into another variety

Vries, On Crosses With Dissimilar Heredity, 25 J. ROYAL HORTICULTURAL
SOCIETY 249 (1900) de Vries discloses the observation that false hybrids,
cenothera muricata, follow Mendel’s laws, see id. at 255.
92. See Carl Correns, G. Mendel’s Regel Über das Verhalten der
Nachkommenschaft der Rassenbastarde, 18 BERICHTE DER DEUTSCHE
BOTANISCHEN GESELLSCHAFT 158-68 (1900). For an English translation, see:
Leonie Kellen Piternick, G. Mendel’s Law Concerning the Behavior of Progeny
of Varietal Hybrids, 35 SUPPLEMENT TO GENETICS NO. 5, PT. 2 33-41 (1950);
and Stern & Sherwood, supra note 88, at 119-32.
93. See Eric von Tschermak, Über künstliche Kreuzung bei Pisum
Sativum, 18 BERICHTE DER DEUTSCHE BOTANISCHEN GESELLSCHAFT 232-39
(1900). For an English translation, see Aloha Hannah, Concerning Artificial
Crossing in Pisum Sativum, 35 SUPPLEMENT TO GENETICS NO. 5, PT. 2 42-47
(1950).
94. William Bateson, Problems of Heredity as a Subject for Horticultural
Investigation, 25 J. ROYAL HORTICULTURAL SOCIETY 54, 54 (1900) (a lecture
presented at the Royal Horticultural Society on Mendel’s work in order to
persuade its members to adopt and use the laws of heredity to improve the
understanding of the transmission of genetic traits).
95. Hybrid technology was already well advanced by 1900. See generally
R. Irwin Lynch, The Evolution of Plants, 25 J. ROYAL HORTICULTURAL
SOCIETY 54-61 (1900). However, the developments were progressing slowly
because of a lack of understanding of the transmission of genes from
progenitor to progeny plants.
96. See
BOARD
ON
AGRICULTURE:
AGRICULTURAL
RESEARCH
OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY CONCERNS, supra note 16, at 6.
97. See Paul & Kimmelman, supra note 79.
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98

through backcrossing. This practice constitutes hybridization
in the more expansive sense of the word, whereas hybridization
to produce a hybrid maize plant, for example, represents a
99
narrower construction of the word. Through the early 1900s,
the field crop seeds produced by cross-breeding different
100
101
varieties were open pollinated varieties, which meant that
a progeny plant would closely resemble the progenitor plant.
While these early breeding experiments, which took place
102
of
before the rediscovery and widespread acceptance
103
Mendel’s works, created new plant varieties with traits which
were of interest to the farmers, commercial seed manufacturers
still faced the inherent problem that the seed a farmer planted
for one growing cycle would create a sufficiently similar
progeny seed for that farmer to plant during the subsequent
104
In addition, because there were no legal
growing cycle.
protections in place for the seeds that the commercial seed
manufacturer produced, the farmer was free to sell progeny
seed to his neighbor farmers. In fact, there were no legal
constraints prohibiting the farmer from growing sufficient
progeny seed to establish his own seed business. Before the
use of Mendel’s work to establish the hybrid seed industry in
the United States, it was precisely this problem which
inhibited the growth of the commercial farm-crop seed
industry. This is because without legal protection for varieties
that were created by the seed manufacturers, it would be
difficult to obtain an adequate return on the investment in
105
Today,
order to research and develop the new varieties.
commercial seed manufacturers still employ this same
argument to justify bringing the full weight of their legal
departments against any farmer whom they perceive might be
stealing their profits through “nefarious dealings.” Given the
advance in techniques for producing new varieties, such a
position by commercial seed manufacturers may be supported
only by clear and convincing evidence of the cost of bringing a
98.
99.
100.
101.

See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 78-81.
See id. at 68.
See POEHLMAN, supra note 21, at 20.
See CURTIS NORSKOG, HYBRID SEED CORN ENTERPRISES: A BRIEF
HISTORY 69 (Maracom Corp. 1995).
102. Bateson presents an excellent discussion on the importance of
Mendel’s works. See BATESON, supra note 94.
103. See Paul & Kimmelman, supra note 79.
104. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 71.
105. See id. at 81.
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variety to market and the profits gained from that variety.
Such an accounting has yet to be produced by commercial seed
manufacturers.
Between 1915 and 1925, government researchers’ efforts at
many United States agricultural experiment stations were
directed toward the development and evaluation of inbred seed
106
Inbred seed lines are so
lines and hybrid seed varieties.
genetically stable, or homozygous, that when allowed to selffertilize, the resulting progeny seed will grow a plant that is
107
It is precisely these
nearly identical to the progenitor plant.
germplasm lines that farmers and governmental plant breeders
had worked since the early nineteenth century to develop. By
cross-breeding the inbred seed lines to each other (a single
cross) or by cross-breeding the single-cross progeny plants to
each other (double-cross), the resulting progeny plants had a
mix of genetic material that produced far more vigorous
progeny plants with much higher yields than the progenitor
108
109
The discovery of the new hybrid vigor, or
plants exhibited.
106. See ARNEL R. HALLAUER ET AL., CORN BREEDING AMERICAN SOC’Y OF
AGRONOMY, INC. ET AL., AGRONOMY PUB. NO. 18, CORN AND CORN
IMPROVEMENT 463, 463-464 (George F. Sprague & John Wesley Dudley eds.,
3d ed. 1988); see generally Paul & Kimmelman, supra note 79.
107. See generally FORBES & WATSON, supra note 36, at 224-227.
108. See generally POEHLMAN, supra note 21, at 239-46.
109. The court in Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc. v Holden Foundation Seeds,
Inc., 1987 WL 341211 (S.D.Iowa 1987) gave an unusually clear discussion of
hybrid vigor. Specifically, the court stated that:
[t]he number of inbred lines that are used to produce the hybrid sold
to the farmers has varied. In the early days, there were double
crosses, which meant that the hybrid sold to the farmer was a cross
of two F sub1 hybrids. (Tr. 3018). The companies preferred singlecross hybrids because of ease of production and economic
advantages. By the 1960s, single-cross hybrids became dominant.
(Tr. 3018). Each parent of a single-cross hybrid is an inbred. (Tr.
3018). However, in many cases, modified single crosses are used in
which one or the other parent of the hybrid is a backcross rather
than a 100% pure inbred. In order to create a hybrid seed, a
company typically plants four to six rows of a particular parent
referred to as a female, and alongside of it two rows of a parent
referred to as the male. All plants in the female rows are detassled
so that no pollen from those plants can fertilize the silks on those
same plants.
Seed fields are usually planted in isolation from other corn. Thus,
the only pollen that can fertilize the female rows is from the male
rows planted alongside. The seed on the ears in the female rows is
the F sub1 hybrid seed. The male rows self pollinate, have no value
in the further breeding process, and are either chopped out or
harvested separately and fed to livestock or commingled with other
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heterosis, was of considerable benefit to the farmer who desired
an increased yield, however, the discovery also brought an even
110
greater benefit to the commercial seed manufacturers.
Once
the first generation hybrid plant was grown and allowed to
open pollinate, the genetic construct of the progeny hybrid
plant was such that the hybrid vigor and productivity began to
111
Due to the diminished productivity, the farmer
diminish.
was disinclined to save the progeny seeds from hybrid
progenitor plants for replanting. The inbred seed lines, which
were used to create the first generation hybrid plant, could
remain a trade secret held by the seed manufacturer because
112
Thus, if the farmer
only the progeny hybrid seeds were sold.
wished to maintain a profitable level of productivity and
remain competitive, he was forced to abandon his traditional
practice of saving seed to plant in the next crop cycle and
instead become reliant on the seed manufacturing industry.
The seed manufacturer’s market for the first generation hybrid
seed line had two sources: first, the biological fact that open
pollination of hybrid progenitor plants yield progeny with
reduced vigor and productivity; and second, the seed
manufacturers controlled the inbred germplasm lines
113
necessary to create the first generation hybrid seed lines.
corn at elevators.
The parent or inbred material may often have rather small-even
deformed-ears. However, when one such parent is crossed with
another parent as above described, the result of mixing the genes,
called “heterosis,” . . . is such that if the proper parents are selected,
the resulting hybrid seed produces a splendid crop, i.e., a large ear, a
higher yield, and other sought-after characteristics.
To put it another way, if an inbred line-called A-with small stalks,
small ears and low yield, is crossed with itself or another inbred line
essentially the same as A, all you are going to get are plants that are
small, have small ears and low yield. Similarly, an inbred line called
B, crossed with itself or a similar inbred line will produce only plants
much like those of inbred line B. However, if you crossed inbred line
A with inbred line B each with small stalks, small ears and low
yield, sometimes if you have the right cross, the hybrid of inbred A
times inbred B will produce plants of great vigor, good ears and
outstanding yield. This phenomenon is called hybrid vigor.
Id. at 2-3.
110. See id.
111. See generally FORBES & WATSON, supra note 36, at 231.
112. See generally POEHLMAN, supra note 21, at 239-46.
113. There is a yet another manner in which hybrid seeds afford seed
manufacturers property right protection. Recently, a seed manufacturer
developed a molecular technique for producing fertile hybrid seed. The method
and product appear to be patentable. See Steven F. Fabijanski, Diego Albani,
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Aside from these two sources, there was no way to protect their
seeds.
With the benefit of hindsight, one can see that the
“rediscovery” of Mendel’s work at the beginning of the
twentieth century caused the demise of the farmer as a plant
breeder and the rise of the dominance of commercial seed
manufacturers in creating and distributing both field and
garden crop seed varieties. The transition from the farmerbased artificial selection program to the seed manufacturerbased plant-breeding program occurred over a half-century
114
115
span between the 1880’s and the 1930’s.
The end result
was that the farmer no longer had the partnership with the
government that was responsible for giving the United States
its germplasm base which the commercial seed manufacturers
116
eventually used to breed seeds to sell to farmers.
Laurian S. Robert & Paul G. Arnison, Molecular Methods of Hybrid Seed
Production, U.S. PAT. NO. 6,013,859 (issued Jan. 11, 2000).
114. See Paul & Kimmelman, supra note 79.
115. By the late 1930’s, the adoption of hybrid seed varieties was nearly
complete such that by 1946 nearly 100 percent of corn, wheat, and soybeans
planted in the Midwest were of hybrid varieties. See U.S.D.A., Table 46.Hybrid Corn: Percentage of Total Corn Acreage Planted With Hybrid Seed, by
States, 1933-1945, 1945 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 42 (1945); Table
U.S.D.A., 47.-Hybrid Corn: Percentage of Total Corn Acreage Planted With
Hybrid Seed, by States, 1937-1946, 1946 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS
41 (1946).
116. The acceptance of the hybrid maize seed lines was nearly complete in
the corn belt states by 1946. However, the increase in yields from the fields
planted to the hybrid maize lines did not start to rise significantly until the
early 1950’s. See Appendix A, infra. This is due primarily to the introduction
and use of synthetic nitrogen fertilizers starting in the early 1950’s, as well as
other advances in agricultural technology. These advances include the use of
chemical herbicides starting in the early 1950’s and the use of more efficient
planting and harvesting machinery. See Donald N. Duvick, Biotechnology in
the 1930s: The Development of Hybrid Maize, 2 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS
69-74, 71 (January 2001). One might argue that had the traditional varieties
been used with the new agricultural technology, then the advances in yield
observed starting in the early 1950’s would still have been observed. To
simplify, the argument holds that the increase in yield is not due to the hybrid
but rather to the farming practices. This argument is incorrect on two points:
first, the hybrid varieties produce a more uniform ear at a more uniform
height from the ground and the hybrid varieties do not lodge. Hence, the
hybrid varieties are readily and more efficiently harvested by modern
machinery. See id. at 73. Second, the hybrid varieties are more resistant to
drought, disease, insects, and environmental stress, see id. at 71, as well as
the stress of high production levels under conditions of high fertilizer usage,
see id. at 73. Therefore, the hybrid varieties were necessary to permit the
development and deployment of technological advances in agriculture since
the early 1950s.
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The agricultural stagnation of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century combined with the newly available
“scientific” approach to plant breeding, caused the business
community to pressure Congress to create resources for basic
agricultural research. This political pressure exerted by the
seed manufacturing industry pushed the USDA into basic
117
agricultural research.
Once this had been accomplished, the
ASTA, the American Breeders Association and the seed
manufacturers were in a position to force the USDA out of the
business of seed distribution.
In 1924, the gratuitous
distribution of seeds and plants by the USDA was
118
It is interesting to note that the cooperation
terminated.
between the USDA and agricultural colleges continued to
119
improve the understanding of plant genetics, an effort that
vastly assisted the seed manufacturers in their exploitation of
their new found market in seeds and plants.
The farmer, by the mid 1920’s, had lost control of and
access to the inbred lines, and lacked the expertise and
resources necessary to create first generation hybrid seeds.
The farmer could only maximize his yield by purchasing first
generation hybrid seeds from the commercial seed
120
Because the hybrid seeds afforded the seed
manufacturer.
manufacturing industry some protection for their market
advantage, the emergence of the hybrid seed technology helped
facilitate the dominance of the seed production and distribution
by the seed manufacturers.
The government’s exit from the program of collecting,
producing and distributing seed varieties left the market open
to commercial seed manufacturers. While it was not of interest
to either the government or university researchers to obtain
protection for the intellectual property in the germplasm lines
that they had produced, the commercial seed manufacturers
believed that such protection was critical. Legal prohibitions
on propagation of the variety are a prerequisite to successful
marketing of plant varieties that are not amenable to
hybridization or inbred lines.
The seed manufacturers were faced with a set of difficult
problems. First, the seed manufacturers would market a

117.
118.
119.
120.

See Paul & Kimmelman, supra note 79.
See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 71.
See TRUE, supra note 29, at 255-60.
See generally FORBES & WATSON, supra note 36, at 231.
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variety (non-hybrid) of seeds to the farmer and since the
progeny crop was nearly identical to the parent crop, the
121
farmer could sell the progeny to his neighboring farmers
122
through the mechanism of inter-farm commerce. Second, the
seed manufacturer would employ certain farmers to grow the
seed crop and if the seed company failed to take the entire crop
from the farmer, the farmer could sell the excess to his
123
Without intellectual property
neighboring farmers.
protection, and without the natural protection afforded through
the hybrid seed lines, the seed manufacturers were creating
124
their own competition in the farmers.
While all new seed varieties represented the intellectual
property of the seed manufacturers, the hybrid seed
represented, in addition, a means for protecting that
intellectual capital. The introduction of hybrid seed, while not
eliminating the need for legal intellectual property protection,
certainly reduced the possibility that the farmer would be a
direct competitor to the seed manufacturer. The introduction
of hybridization technology also accompanied the movement
from the dependence upon a centralized public institution for
germplasm maintenance to privatization of the seed and plant
industry. During the transition phase (in the early decades of
the twentieth century) the farmer was left in the position of
either depending upon the government for both inbred and
125
for both the first and subsequent
hybridized seed lines
generations of seeds, or, depending upon the commercial seed
126
manufacturers, which would provide only the hybrid seeds.
The later option left the farmer in the unfamiliar territory of
being unable to save seed from one planting cycle for use in the
127
next planting cycle.
The result was that the farmer, by
128
necessity, had to purchase new seed each planting cycle and
the well-established practice of saving seed for planting the
next crop cycle had to be abandoned for most field crops; that
the process of artificial selection and adoption of new and exotic

121. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 72.
122. See id. at 47 and 61.
123. See id. at 72.
124. See id.
125. See generally Buttel & Belsky, supra note 39.
126. See id. at 114.
127. See R. C. Lewontin, The Maturing of Capitalist Agriculture: Farmer as
Proletarian, 50 MONTHLY REV. 72-84 (July/August, 1998).
128. See id.
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plant species and varieties was effectively terminated; and the
informal inter-farm commerce in most seeds ceased to exist.
Had the gratuitous seed program not existed, the seed
manufacturers would have had incentives to expand earlier
129
than they eventually did.
The seed manufacturers would
have been motivated to develop techniques for protecting their
130
market share from inter-farm commerce.
The result would
have been that the development of the germplasm base would
have been in the hands of the seed manufacturers and the vast
array of individual farmers, with there first hand knowledge of
plant husbandry, would have been excluded. The landscape of
American agriculture might very well have looked considerably
different today had the seed manufacturers been given an
earlier entrance into the management of the American
germplasm base-certainly to the detriment of agriculture in
this country.
Between 1924 and 1970, three pieces of legislation were
enacted which permanently changed the manner in which the
seed and plant manufacturing industry operated. First, in
1924, Congress enacted legislation that terminated the
gratuitous distribution of seeds to farmers by the federal
government, causing the farmers to rely exclusively on private
131
132
Second, the Plant Patent Act of 1930
seed manufacturers.
133
granted patent protection for asexually reproduced plants.
The Plant Patent Act of 1930 did not include sexually
reproduced plants because it was thought that plants could not
be reliably reproduced from seeds. Third, in 1970 Congress
enacted the Plant Variety Protection Act that provided
134
intellectual property protection for sexually reproduced seed.
Subsequently, in 1980 the Supreme Court recognized patent
135
protection in living organisms under 35 U.S.C. section 101.
The seed manufacturers now have the full weight of the law to
apply against any farmer who would attempt the traditional
practice of artificial selection of crop varieties.
129. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 54.
130. See id. at 61.
131. See Buttel & Belsky, supra note 39, at 113.
132. Plant Patent Act, Pub. L. No. 71-245, 46 Stat. 376 (1930) (current
version at 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
133. Asexually reproduced plants are those which are the product of either
grafting of part of one plant onto another, or the result of growing up cuttings
from a parent plant.
134. See Buttel & Belsky, supra note 39, at 113.
135. See generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-10 (1980).
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Although the seed manufacturers were willing to take the
profits which accrued when the federal government cancelled
the program of collecting and distributing seeds, the
manufacturers certainly were, and are, unwilling to bear the
cost of research necessary to develop technologies underlying
the new varieties. Such a position was clearly articulated by
Renvan Sacher, then director of biological research at
Monsanto Co., in his statement that by coupling the research
talent available in American universities “with the
development skills of American industry in general” the United
136
States can remain at “the leading edge in biotechnology.”
Sacher related Monsanto’s position that “it is ‘inconceivable’
that industry support [for university research] will exceed 6 or
137
7 percent,” with the balance coming from the government.
This position was codified into legislation enacted in the 1980’s,
which encouraged cooperation between federal agencies and
138
private seed manufacturers.
The result of this cooperation
between federal agencies or universities and the seed
manufacturers is that the seed manufacturers have been able
to enjoy a substantial profit margin from seeds developed with
139
In the meantime, the farmer is left
government assistance.
completely marginalized and subject to commercial and legal
exploitation of the seed manufacturers.

136. See
BOARD
ON
AGRICULTURE:
AGRICULTURAL
RESEARCH
OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY CONCERNS, supra note 16, at 63.
137. See id. at 64.
138. See Weiss, supra note 40, at A1.
139. See Melvin John Oliver, Jerry Edwin Norma Lee Glover Trolinder &
Don Lee Keim, Control of Plant Gene Expression, U.S. PATENT NO. 5,723,765
(issued Mar. 3, 1998). The terminator seed technology, which is the subject of
‘765, was developed during collaboration between the government and Delta
and Pine Land, Inc. The assignees were: “Delta and Pine Land Co. (Scott, MS)
and The United States of America . . . (Washington, DC).” Id.
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GENETICALLY MANIPULATED PLANTS
140

Genetic manipulation
has been most successfully
141
142
143
employed to create herbicide and insect resistant field
crops, although genetically modified plants resistant to certain
144
other plant pathogens have been created.
Genetic
manipulation involves harvesting a gene, or ideally multiple
genes, from the donor organism and inserting the gene, or set
145
In the case of plants, the cell is
of genes, into the target cell.
140. This author prefers the more precise term “genetic manipulation” to
the more obtuse terminology “genetic engineering”. Genetic engineering is, to
the best of this author’s ability to determine, the practice of applying
engineering principles to genetics; very much as the terminology “chemical
engineering” has been used to describe the practice of applying engineering
principles to chemistry. Traditionally, the result of the practice of chemical
engineering was the mass production of chemical compounds for the consumer
market. The situation is significantly different in the case of “genetic
engineering” where the focus of the practice is to insert a gene into the genome
of an organism. Such activity more closely resembles the science of chemistry
than the practice of engineering. “Genetic manipulation”, by distinction, is far
more descriptive of what actually occurs when the genome of an organism is
manipulated in such as way as to introduce a particular gene.
141. Other applications of genetic manipulation technology have recently
been employed. See Gerard F. Barry, Jan Willem de Weerd, Ganesh Murthy
Kishore, Gerard Francis Barry & Marcia Lee Weldon, Expression of Sucrose
Phosphorylase in Plants, U.S. PAT. NO. 6,222,098 (issued Apr. 24, 2001).
142. See Dilip M. Shah, Creve Coeur, Stephen G. Rogers, Robert Horsch &
Robert T. Fraley, Glyphosate-Resistant Plants, U.S. PAT. NO. 4,940,835 (issued
Jul. 10, 1990); Dilip M. Shah, Stephen G. Rogers, Robert B. Horsch & Robert
T. Fraley, Glyphosate-Resistant Plants, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,188,642 (issued Feb.
23, 1993); Robert T. Fraley, Robert B. Horsch & Stephen G. Rogers, Chimeric
Genes for Transforming Plant Cells Using Viral Promoters, U.S. PAT. NO.
5,352,605 (issued Oct. 4, 1994); Robert T. Fraley, Robert B. Horsch & Stephen
G. Rogers, Chimeric Genes for Transforming Plant Cells Using Viral
Promoters, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,530,196 (issued June 25, 1996).
143. Stephen G. Rogers, Leslie Brand, Robert B. Horsch, Robert T. Fraley,
James Scott Elmer & David Bisaro, Plant Vectors, U.S. PAT. NO. 6,147,278
(issued Nov. 14 2000); Uwe Sonnewald, Marcus Ebneth & Ralf-Michael
Schmidt, Leaf-Specific Gene Expression in Transgenic Plants, U.S. PAT. NO.
6,229,067 (issued May 8, 2001); Camille Deluca-Flaherty, Victor J. Chan,
Liliana E. C. Scarafia & Karen J. Brunke, Thiol Protease Inhibitor, U.S. PAT.
NO. 5,629,469 (issued May 13, 1997); Thomas Malvar and Amy Jelen Gilmer,
Hybrid Bacillus thuringiensis -endotoxins With Novel Broad-Spectrum
Insecticidal Activity, U.S. PAT. NO. 6,156,573 (issued Dec. 5, 2000).
144. See Brian J. Staskawics, Karen S. Century, Allan Shapiro, Peter P.
Repetti & Douglas Dahlbeck, Composition and Method for Plant Pathogen
Resistance, U.S. PAT. NO. 6,166,295 (issued Dec. 26, 2000).
145. See generally David Manspeizer, The Cheshire Cat, the March Hare,
and the Harvard Mouse: Animal Patents Open Up a New, GeneticallyEngineered Wonderland, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 417 (1991).
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147

induced to produce a mature adult plant in which the
cellular machinery is caused to produce the desired protein or
148
other molecule.
In the case of animals, it is not yet possible
to produce an adult animal from a single donor cell in an in
149
vitro culture system.
At the core of genetic manipulation
technology lies the DNA molecule.
The double helical structure of the deoxyribose nucleic acid
150
(DNA) molecule, which carries the genetic information of the
151
cell, was revealed in 1953 by Watson and Crick.
DNA
152
consists of a sequence of nucleotides,
the exact linear
146. See CAMPBELL, supra note 13, at 390.
147. See
BOARD
ON
AGRICULTURE:
AGRICULTURAL
RESEARCH
OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY CONCERNS, supra note 16, at 33-39.
148. See generally Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology and Patent Law: Fitting
Innovation to the Procrustean Bed, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J., 1
(1991).
149. See generally Timothy A. Stewart, Erwin F. Wagner & Beatrice Mintz,
Human -Globin Gene Sequences Injected into Mouse Eggs, Retained in Adults,
and Transmitted to Progeny, 217 SCIENCE 1046-48 (1982). Leder and Stewart
demonstrated that foreign gene sequences can be inserted into a mammalian
genome, that after birth of the animal, the foreign gene sequences are present,
expressed, and transmissible in mammals.
A patent was issued for
“transgenic non-human mammals.” See Philip Leder & Timothy A. Stewart,
Transgenic non-human mammals, U.S. PAT. NO. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12,
1988). See also I. Wilmut, A. E. Schnieke, J. McWhir, A. J. Kind & K. H. S.
Campbell, Viable Offspring Derived From Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells,
385 NATURE, 810-12 (1997); GINA KOLATA, CLONE: THE ROAD TO DOLLY, at
27-28 (1998) (examining the creation of Dolly and the future of mammalian
cloning).
150. It has since been discovered that DNA does not have a single unique
helical structure, but has a set of stable structures depending upon
environment, amongst other factors. See WILLIAM H. ELLIOT & DAPHNE C.
ELLIOT, BIOCHEMISTRY AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 244 (1997).
151. See Francis Crick & James Watson, Molecular Structure of Nucleic
Acids: A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 737 (1953).
152. For a comprehensible description of the construction and functioning
of DNA in the cell, See Note, Altering Natures Blueprint for Profit: Patenting
Multicellular Animals, 74 VA. L. REV. 1327, 1330-1333 (1988). Because the
basic structure of the DNA molecule is of some import to this discussion, a
brief review of the essentials follows. A single nucleotide consists of a
backbone of sugar and phosphate molecules. See ELLIOT & ELLIOT, supra note
150, at 239. The phosphate-sugar backbone is connected to one of four base
molecules: adenine (A), thymine (T), cytosine (C), and guanine (G). See id. at
240. The bases hydrogen bond to form pairs, A-T and C-G, with the phosphatesugar backbone on the outside and the base pairs on the inside. See id. at 242.
The phosphate-sugar backbone then form a polymer sequence, which
naturally forms a double helical structure. Genes are groups of nucleotides,
which are not necessarily contiguous. The encoding of a single amino acid,
which is the building block of peptides and proteins, is found in each triplet of
bases in the gene. See CHRISTOPHER K. MATHEWS AND K. E. VAN HOLDE,
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sequence and expression of which determines the organism’s
153
characteristics. A sequence of nucleotide triplets constitute a
gene; multiple genes are in turn connected to form a
chromosome. The creation of a successful transgenic plant
requires, at least initially, that three identifications be
completed: first, the identification of the plant pathology
(whether fungal, parasitic, insect or herbal); second, the
identification of the molecular compound that is key to
resolving the pathology; and third, the identification of the
genetic code (the gene) which ultimately leads the plant to
154
express the desired compound or resistance.
Transgenic organisms are produced by using the gene from
a donor organism and placing it into the genome of the host
organism. Neither the genus nor the species of the host
organism necessarily need be the same as either the genus or
species of the donor organism. The technology involved in
transferring a gene from a donor organism to a host organism
155
Recombinant
is known as recombinant DNA technology.
DNA technology is comprised of several techniques: first, the
use of restriction enzymes to specifically cleave the DNA
molecule at particular locations to extract the gene; second,
identification of the desired sequence of DNA by its ability to
bind a complementary nucleic acid sequence; third, amplifying,
by cloning, the amount of the desired specific DNA sequence by
integrating that sequence into a genetic element which is

BIOCHEMISTRY 119 (1990).
153. It is known that not all of the nucleotides in the cellular DNA of an
organism are “expressed”, that is they do not all encode for proteins that are
actually constructed by the cell. For instance, Agrobacterium tumefaciens was
genetically manipulated by incorporating into its genome the nod and nif
genes from the bacteria Rhizobium. While the transformed Agrobacterium
tumefaciens infected the roots of an alfalfa plant and induced the formation of
both root nodules and infection threads, the gene for nitrogen fixation failed to
be expressed. See BOARD ON AGRICULTURE: AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH
OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY CONCERNS, supra note 16, at 51.
154. Introduction of a gene from one genus and species into another genus
and species does not necessarily imply that the gene will be expressed. In
fact, the plant cellular machinery requires a different nucleotide composition
for expression than does the insect or animal genome. Therefore, the
introduction of the Bacillus thuringiensis, a gram-positive bacterium, endotoxin gene into maize may yield a genetically modified plant that does not
express the desired -endotoxin. See generally Koziel, infra note 173.
155. Insertion of the donor DNA fragment into the host cell may be
accomplished by a number of techniques. See generally BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL.
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 199 (1983) (published by Garland
Publishing, Inc. New York).
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capable of rapid expansion, such as a plasmid or virus, and
cloning that element in yeast cells or bacteria; and fourth,
extraction of the desired cloned DNA sequence from the
amplification culture; and sequencing of the nucleotides in a
156
cloned DNA fragment. These steps form only a small, but
key, fraction of the steps involved in recombinant DNA
technology. They are, however, by no means trivial and do not
always succeed. Because gene expression depends upon a
number of cellular level factors beyond the mere presence of
157
the gene, the gene may not function normally, if at all, in the
host organism, and hence, will not produce the desired
158
product.
159
Advances in biotechnology have yielded techniques for
160
the introduction of genes from a non-plant species into the
genome of a plant species where the transformed cells of the
161
plant species are able to produce fully fertile plants.
A
favored technique in producing transgenic maize is the particle
162
bombardment of embryonic maize cells.
These cells are then
grown to yield fully fertile adult plants. These adult transgenic
plants are crossed with non-genetically modified elite lines to
produce the final, marketable seed product. By introducing the
non-plant genes into elite maize lines, the time required to
develop commercial transgenic hybrids can be significantly
163
reduced.
Altering the genetic construct of plants has been difficult
despite the rapid advances in genetic manipulation
164
technology.
Three primary reasons lie behind the slow
156. See id.
157. See generally BOARD ON AGRICULTURE: AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH
OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY CONCERNS, supra note 16.
158. See Manspeizer, supra note 145, at 424.
159. See generally HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, TRANSGENIC ANIMAL
PATENT REFORM ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 888, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-35 (1988);
Booth, Simple Gene-Altering Method Claimed, WASH. POST, June 2, 1989, at
A3, col. 1; Schmeck, Simplified Gene Transplant Method Reported, N. Y.
TIMES, June 2, 1989, at A1, col. 2.
160. See J. S. Feitelson, J. Payne & L. Kim, Bacillus thuringiensis: Insects
and Beyond, 10 BIO/TECHNOLOGY 271 (1992).
161. See W. J. Gordon-Kamm et al., Transformation of Maize Cells and
Regeneration of Fertile Transgenic Plants 2 PLANT CELL 603 (1990).
162. See Paul Christou, Dennis McCabe, William F. Swain & Kenneth A.
Barton, Particle-Mediated Transformation of Soybean Plants and Lines, U.S.
PAT. NO. 5,015,580 (issued May 14, 1991).
163. See KOZIEL, infra note 173, at 168.
164. See CAMPBELL, supra note 13, at 390.
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progress of genetic manipulation of plants: first, identifying
particular genes of interest is a complex and time-consuming
165
process; second, gene expression may change when the gene
166
is placed into the host cell; and third, some desirable traits
require the transfer of multiple genes which yields extremely
167
difficult genetic manipulation problems.
Despite the
difficulties involved in genetic manipulation technology, the
products of genetic manipulation technology are extremely
168
This profitability and the use
profitable for seed companies.
of genetically manipulated seeds by farmers appears to have
169
permanently altered the agricultural landscape.
C.

DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSGENIC PLANTS

The most significant systematic source of yield loss in
170
world agricultural crops is insect pests. For example, the loss
in the North American maize crop due to the European corn
borer, Ostrinia nubilalis (Hübner) is in excess of $1 billion
171
Some crop species or varieties express natural
annually.
165. See id.
166. See David Ehrenfeld, A Techno-Pox Upon the Land, 295 HARPER’S
MAG. 13-17 (Oct. 1, 1997).
167. See CAMPBELL, supra note 13, at 390.
168. See Scott Kilman & Susan Warren, Old Rivals Fight for New Turf,
WALL STREET J., May 27, 1998, at B1.
169. Indeed, genetically modified seeds appear to have been widely
accepted by farmers in the United States. Given the global resistance to
genetically modified crops, the lower yields and higher herbicide use
associated with the use of these plants, the contamination of the human food
chain with crops not approved for human consumption, and questions
regarding the safety and environmental impact of genetically modified plants
it is not clear that acceptance of the current generation of genetically modified
plants by farmers will continue to be the rule. Even in light of the admonition
by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger that “the genetic research and related
technological developments may spread pollution and disease, that it may
result in a loss of genetic diversity, and that its practice may tend to
depreciate the value of human life,” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
316 (1980), genetically modified seeds have had, and will continue to have, an
enormous impact on American agriculture. Perhaps Justice Burger was
correct in stating that, “it is sometimes better to bear those ills we have than
fly to others that we know not of.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. See TRANSGENIC PLANTS, supra note 15, at 4, 12.
171. See J. F. Witkowski et al., Bt Corn & European Corn Borer, NCR
PUBLICATION 602 (Univ. of Minnesota Extension Service, St. Paul, MN, 1997)
(K. R. Ostlie, W. D. Hutchinson, and R. L. Hellmich, eds.). This manuscript is
also
available
at
www.extension.umn.edu/distribution/cropsystems/
DC7055.html (last visited Apr. 2 2001).

40

MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW

[Vol. 3:1

172

insect resistance, which provides at least some protection for
173
that particular species or variety.
When the resistance is
found to be endogenous to a particular variety of a crop species,
it may be moved to another variety through traditional plant
breeding techniques. This is true whether the resistance is to
plant pathogens, insects, or to herbicide since what is actually
being moved by conventional cross-breeding techniques is the
gene, or genes, which confer the resistance. While successful in
some cases, the traditional plant breeding technique for moving
the resistance between varieties of the same plant species is
counter-indicated on three points: first, the traditional breeding
technique is often time-consuming and can take as long as ten
174
years to yield the final product; second, the genes that carry
the resistance may be tightly linked with other genes which,
when transferred with the desired gene, may have a
deleterious effect on yield from the final plant product; and
third, the desired gene conferring the resistance simply does
not exist in the particular plant species. In most cases, these
three situations are neither exclusive nor independent.
Therefore, the desired resistance cannot, in general, be
obtained in a particular plant variety by traditional plant
breeding techniques. Alternative routes of control include
insecticides for control of insect pests in agriculture, and
herbicides for control of weeds. Broadcasting herbicides may
172. See COMMITTEE ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED
PLANTS, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS: SCIENCE AND
REGULATION 55 (2000) (report on the science and regulation of plants which
have been genetically manipulated for increased pest resistance) [hereinafter
COMMITTEE ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS].
173. See Michael G. Koziel et al., Transgenic Maize for the Control of
European Corn Borer and Other Maize Insect Pests, 792 ANNALS N. Y. ACAD.
SCI. 164 (1996). This paper presents the scientific developments behind the
production of a maize resistant to European corn borer and is directed towards
an audience of scientists working in the areas of plant molecular biology, and
as such is virtually impenetrable by laypersons. Since understanding the work
is important in developing our argument for property rights in genetically
manipulated plants, a review, reduced as much as possible to lay terms, is
presented here. The study of this example is useful because the method is
similar to that used to transfect other varieties or species to confer desired
resistance characteristics.
174. While the argument that the time required to create transgenic plants
that express particular traits should be shorter than that required for
traditional breeding methods is popular, it is essentially without merit. In
fact, the time required to produce a transgenic plant product is nearly the
same as that required to produce a plant product using traditional breeding
techniques. See Ronald L. Meeusen, Commercialization of Transgenic Seed
Product: Two Case Studies, 792 ANNALS N. Y. ACAD. SCI. 172 (1996).
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be problematic because many herbicides are unable to
distinguish between the desired plant and the noxious plant.
Chemical insecticides have proven valuable for controlling
insect pests in most areas.
However, insecticides are
expensive, and can adversely affect human health as well as
175
the environment.
These factors militate an increase in the
use of insecticides in agricultural practice. Early efforts of
producing transgenic plants were motivated by the need to
reduce the use of herbicides and insecticides and increase the
overall yield per acre of crops. That is, the motivation for
creating transgenic crops was to increase productivity and
reduce inputs, which is similar to the motivation for using the
process of artificial selection and plant breeding. Through
genetic manipulation, the plant can be induced to produce its
176
One of the most successful examples of this
own resistance.
strategy is genetically modified corn, or maize.
Maize is one of the most important crops in the United
States. Through traditional breeding practices, the yields of
modern maize varieties have seen substantial improvements in
177
As previously mentioned,
the course of the last century.
maize is subject to insect pests, in particular the European corn
borer, Ostrinia nubilalis. The European corn borer has two
generations per year in most growing regions in the United
States. The first generation larvae feed on the tissue in the
corn whorl and then bore into the stalk, where they continue to
178
These larvae then pupate within the stalk
feed and grow.
and subsequently emerge as adult moths.
The second
generation of larvae feed on the pollen that has accumulated in
the leaf axials, sheath, and collar tissue before boring into the
stalk. In the stalk these larvae repeat the same cycle as the
first generation larvae. The European corn borer spends most
of its life cycle in the corn stalk; consequently disrupting the

175. See TRANSGENIC PLANTS, supra note 15, at 5.
176. See, e.g., R. B. Horsch, J. E. Fry, N. L. Hoffmann, D. Eichholtz, S. G.
Rogers & R. T. Fraley, A Simple and General Method for Transferring Genes
into Plants, 227 SCIENCE 1229 (1985) (describing a method for transferring
the nopaline synthase gene and the chimeric NOS/ NPTII/ NOS gene for
kanamycin resistance into Nicotiana tabacum Samson, N. tabacum Havana
425, F1 hybrid of Petunia hybrida and L-2 tomato plants using Agrobacterium
tumefaciens strain (GV3Ti11SE)).
177. See Appendix A for a discussion of the economics of maize production
in during the years between 1866 and 2001, and Appendix B for a discussion
of the methods of data analysis used to develop the discussion in Appendix A.
178. See generally Witkowski, supra note 171.
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179

normal physiologic plant processes.
The result can be
between three and seven percent yield loss for each insect in
180
each plant.
Traditional breeding techniques provide limited
success in producing hybrid, or inbred, maize lines which
control the European corn borer in general and the second181
generation European corn borer larvae in particular. The use
of conventional chemical insecticides has proven to be of
limited value in controlling the European corn borer because
the insect spends very little time feeding on the exterior of the
182
Also, those exterior plant tissue regions which are
plant.
favored by the first and second generation European corn borer
183
are difficult to reach with chemical insecticide sprays.
Recently, biologic insecticides have been developed which have
been proven to be of some limited efficacy in controlling insect
pests. The most common of the biologic insecticides are those
based on microbial sprays that employ the fermentation of
gram-positive bacterium, which is typically Bacillus
thuringiensis (Bt). However, the biologic insecticidal sprays
face the same practical constraints as do the chemical
184
In addition to the problems discussed
insecticidal sprays.
above, several other points lead to early attempts to induce
maize to produce its own insecticide.
It was observed that the -endotoxins produced by Bt have
a high specific activity towards a relatively narrow spectrum of
185
insect pests, including the European corn borer. Early in the
186
process of developing techniques for plant transformation, it
was determined that a possible method of controlling boring
187
insects would induce the plants to express the -endotoxins.
Biotechnology provided the tools that allow the insertion of
specific genes into the genome of the target, or host, cells. Once

179. See id.
180. See generally R. E. Lynch, European Corn Borer: Yield Losses in
Relation to Hybrid and Stage of Corn Development, 73 J. ECON. ENTOMOL. 159
(1980).
181. See generally Koziel, supra note 173.
182. See generally Witkowski, supra note 171.
183. See generally Koziel, supra note 173.
184. See id.
185. See generally Witkowski, supra note 171.
186. The first reports of plant transformation were presented at the Miami
Winter Symposium in January 1983. See generally Meeusen, supra note 174.
187. See generally Meeusen, supra note 174; See generally Lynch, supra
note 180.
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188

the gene is inserted into the genome, the trait related to that
particular gene may be expressed as any other trait of the
plant. Thus, insect resistance may be conferred upon the maize
plant by inserting the relevant gene, or genes, into the plant
genome. In the case of maize, the -endotoxin of early interest
was CryIA(b) from the Bacillus thuringiensis kurstaki strain
189
HD-1.
The CryIA(b) -endotoxin protein is approximately 130
kDa in size and the amino-terminus half of the protein is
190
proteolytically active in the insect midgut.
Insertion of the
191
native gene for a -endotoxin into the genome of plants has
192
been successful in some circumstances,
but has been
determined to depend, in part, upon the particular promoters
193
employed for expression and, in part, upon the particular
194
codon usage preference of the plant.
When the native gene
for Bacillus thuringiensis kurstaki kurhd1
-endotoxin

188. A gene consists of deoxyribonucleic acid, which is a hetero-polymer of
nucleotides. A nucleotide is composed of a backbone of sugar and phosphate
molecules, to which one of four bases is attached. The four different types of
bases are: adenine (A), thymine (T), cytosine (C), and guanine (G). Every three
bases in order are called a codon, and each codon codes for a specific amino
acid (of which there are 24). For example, the sequence CTA-AGG-GTC codes
for the amino acid sequence leucine-arginine-valine. Amino acids make up all
proteins, and proteins, in turn, are responsible for the manufacture of every
molecule that comprises an organism. See Note, Altering Nature’s Blueprint
for Profit: Patenting Multicellular Animals, 74 VA. L. REV. 1327, 1330-33
(1988).
189. See M. S. Geiser, S. Schweitzer & C. Grimm, The Hypervariable
Region in the Genes Coding for Entomopathogenic Crystal Proteins of Bacillus
thuringiensis: Nucleotide Sequence of the kurhd 1 Gene of Subsp. kurstaki HD1, 48 GENE 109 (1986).
190. A nice brief discussion of the mechanism of activity is given by Robert
Shields. See Shields, infra note 204, at 12.
191. See M. Vaeck et al., Transgenic Plants Protected From Insect Attack,
328 NATURE 33 (1987).
192. See K. A. Barton et al., Bacillus thuringiensis•delta-endotoxin
expression in transgenic Nicotiana tabacum Provides Resistance to
Lepidopteran Insects, 85 PLANT PHYSIOL. 1103, (1987); D. A. Fischhoff et al.,
Insect Tolerant Transgenic Tomato Plants, 5 BIO/TECHNOLOGY 807 (1987).
193. See N. B. Carozzi et al., Expression of a Chimeric CaMv 35S Bacillus
thuringiensis Insecticidal Protein Gene in Transgenic Tobacco 20 PLANT
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 539 (1992); G. W. Warren et al., Field Evaluation of
Transgenic Tobacco Containing a Bacillus thuringiensis Insecticidal Protein
Gene, 5 J. ECON. ENTOMOL. 1651 (1992); X. Delannay et al., Field Performance
of Transgenic Tomato Plants Expressing the Bacillus thuringiensis var.
kurstaki Insect Control Protein, 7 BIO/TECHNOLOGY 1265 (1989).
194. See E. E. Murray, J. Lotzer & M. Eberle, Codon Usage in Plant Genes,
17 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES. 477 (1989).
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CryIA(b) was inserted into maize, the endotoxin was not
195
expressed.
When a synthetic gene for only the active region
of the CryIA(b) protein, which contained approximately 65
percent G-C content as compared with approximately 37
percent in the native form, was inserted into maize, high levels
196
of CryIA(b) -endotoxin protein were expressed.
To create the final maize product, the synthetic gene was
197
fused with several promoters inserted into the genome, and
the progeny plants were cross-bred with several different
pristine elite maize inbred lines using traditional breeding
198
Because the promoter sequence may be tissue
techniques.
199
type specific, it is theoretically possible to limit the tissues
within the maize plant in which the -endotoxin protein is
actually expressed, even though every cell in the plant may
contain the gene coding for the protein. It is possible, then, to
develop transgenic maize plants that do not express the
200
transgenic protein in the edible portion of the plant.
However, such a transgenic plant has yet to be produced.
Because the transgenic maize is an article of manufacture, the
European corn borer resistant maize expressing the CryIA(b) 201
202
endotoxin protein is protected under utility patent.
195. See generally Michael G. Koziel et al., Field Performance of Elite
Transgenic Maize Plants Expressing an Insecticidal Protein Derived from
Bacillus thuringiensis, 11 BIO/TECHNOLOGY 194 (1993).
196. See Koziel, supra note 173, at 166.
197. See generally R. L. Hudspeth & J. W. Grula, Structure and Expression
of the Maize Gene Encoding the Phosphoenolpyruvate Carboxylase Isozyme
Involved in C4 Photosynthesis, 12 PLANT MOLEC. BIOL 579 (1989); C. J.
Thompson et al., Characterization of the Herbicide-Resistance Gene Bar from
Streptomyces hygroscopicus 6 EMBO J. 2519 (1987).
198. See generally KOZIEL, supra note 195.
199. See generally KOZIEL, supra note 173.
200. See M. E. Fromm et al., Inheritance and Expression of Chimeric Genes
in the Progeny of Transgenic Maize Plants, 8 BIO/TECHNOLOGY 833 (1990).
201. See U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, NEW
DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: PATENTING LIFE-SPECIAL REPORT 13
(1989).
202. See Gregory W. Warren Michael G. Koziel, Martha A. Mullins, Brian
Carr, Nalini M. Desai & Kristy Kostichka, Pesticidal Proteins and Strains,
U.S. PAT. NO. 5,840,868 (issued Nov. 24, 1998) (“The present invention is
drawn to pesticidal strains and proteins. Bacillus strains which are capable of
producing pesticidal proteins and auxiliary proteins during vegetative growth
are provided. Also provided are the purified proteins, nucleotide sequences
encoding the proteins and methods for using the strains, proteins and genes
for controlling pests.” Id. at 1.); Gregory W. Warren, Michael G. Koziel,
Martha A. Mullins, Gordon J. Nye, Brian Carr, Nalini M. Desai, Kristy
Kostichka, Nicholas B. Duck & Juan J. Estruch, Pesticidal Proteins and
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A central concern to farmers, seed manufacturers, the
203
204
Environmental Protection Agency, and the public is the
development of Bt -endotoxin protein resistance in targeted
205
insect types.
One argument holds that the concerns are
based upon projections obtained from computer models that are
206
sensitive to various parameters in the models.
The same

Strains, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,849,870 (issued Dec. 15, 1998) (“The present
invention is drawn to pesticidal strains and proteins. Bacillus strains which
are capable of producing pesticidal proteins and auxiliary proteins during
vegetative growth are provided. Also provided are the purified proteins,
nucleotide sequences encoding the proteins and methods for using the strains,
proteins and genes for controlling pests.” Id. at 1.); Gregory W. Warren
Michael G. Koziel, Martha A. Mullins, Gordon J. Nye, Brian Carr & Nalini M.
Desai, Pesticidal Proteins and Strains, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,872,212 (issued Feb.
16, 1998) (“The present invention is drawn to pesticidal strains and proteins.
Bacillus strains which are capable of producing pesticidal proteins and
auxiliary proteins during vegetative growth are provided. Also provided are
the purified proteins, nucleotide sequences encoding the proteins and methods
for using the strains, proteins and genes for controlling pests.” Id. at 1.);
Gregory W. Warren, Martha A. Mullins & Annick J. de Framond, Pesticidal
Proteins and Strains, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,888,801 (issued Mar. 30, 1999) (“The
present invention is drawn to pesticidal strains and proteins. Bacillus strains
which are capable of producing pesticidal proteins and auxiliary proteins
during vegetative growth are provided. Also provided are the purified
proteins, nucleotide sequences encoding the proteins and methods for using
the strains, proteins and genes for controlling pests.” Id. at 1.); Gregory W.
Warren, Michael G. Koziel, Martha A. Mullilns, Gordon J. Nye, Brian Carr,
Nalini M. Desai, Kristy Kostichka & Juan J. Estruch, Nucleotide sequences
encoding pesticidal proteins, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,889,174 (issued Mar. 30, 1999)
(“The present invention is drawn to pesticidal strains and proteins. Bacillus
strains which are capable of producing pesticidal proteins and auxiliary
proteins during vegetative growth are provided. Also provided are the purified
proteins, nucleotide sequences encoding the proteins and methods for using
the strains, proteins and genes for controlling pests.” Id. at 1.).
203. See COMMITTEE ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED
PLANTS, supra note 172, at 100.
204. See Robert Shields, Towards Insect-Resistant Plants, 328 NATURE 1213 (1987) (raising the issue of whether “widespread use of plants depending on
a single gene encoding pest resistance” could be inviting the rapid
development of insecticide resistance in insect pests, id. at 12).
205. See W. H. McGaughey & M. E. Whalon, Managing Insect Resistance to
Bacillus thuringiensis Toxins, 258 SCIENCE 1451 (1992).
206. See Koziel, supra note 173, at 168. This statement by Koziel is either
disingenuous or based upon ignorance regarding the development and use of
valid models. A central tenant of theoretical model development is that the
essence of the system, which is being modeled, is captured in as simplistic a
mathematical theory as possible with the fewest possible number of
parameters. Within this last constraint, the model must incorporate as many
known parameters as are available, thus reducing the number of unknown
parameters to the bare minimum. Those parameters that are highly
correlated (the correlation between the model parameters can be readily
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argument also holds that where resistance has been observed
in field situations or in the laboratory, the resistance was
developed in isolated populations of insects that were exposed
to sub-lethal concentrations of -endotoxin protein for relatively
207
short periods.
It is further argued that the transgenic plants
express high concentrations of -endotoxin protein to which the
208
insects are exposed for an extended period.
Therefore, the
argument concludes, the development of resistance in insects to
209
Bt -endotoxin protein will not develop.
Recent reports have
indicated that such a dismissive attitude toward the
development of insect resistance to Bt -endotoxin protein is
210
indeed misplaced.
211
Because the selection among insect communities
for
resistance to Bt -endotoxin protein is intense due to the large
amount of transgenic plants being employed in the United

T

determined by considering the matrix product J J, where J is the jacobian
matrix) should be redefined to eliminate the correlation, and those parameters
that influence the variability in the independent parameters should be
eliminated entirely. The resultant model, then, will have only a few
parameters; the remaining parameters will be uncorrelated, and small
variances in the resulting parameters will have a significant affect upon the
predicted value of the independent variable. Given these basic rules, then, it
is easy to see that Koziel’s dismissal of the predicted development of endotoxin tolerance by the European corn borer, because such predictions are
based upon the sensitivity of parameters in the model, is equivalent to a
complete dismissal of the basic rules underlying theoretical model
development. Alternatively, such a dismissal is simply a statement that if
Koziel claims that -endotoxin tolerance will not develop in the European corn
borer, then that is the way that reality actually works. The conclusion to be
drawn from the first analysis is that the dismissal is based upon ignorance
regarding the area of theoretical model development and use; the conclusion to
be drawn from the second analysis is that such dismissals are disingenuous.
In fact, the predictions of a well-developed theoretical model can be quite
accurate and should be seriously considered.
207. These conditions constitute the so-called “acute” exposure selection.
208. See Koziel, supra note 173, at 166.
209. See id.
210. See generally F. Huang et al., Inheritance of Resistance to Bacillus
thuringiensis Toxin (Dipel ES) in the European Corn Borer, 284 SCIENCE 965
(1999).
211. Bacillus thuringiensis -endotoxin resistance has been observed in
approximately fifteen laboratory colonies of insect pests, including: Indian
meal moth, tobacco budworm, beet armyworm, pink bollworm and Colorado
potato beetle. Also, Bacillus thuringiensis -endotoxin resistance has been
observed in the diamondback moth in field populations of cole crops in Hawaii
and Florida. See generally Witkowski, supra note 171. There are a growing
number of observations of insect resistance to the Bacillus thuringiensis endotoxin in the field, requiring spraying with traditional insecticides.

2002]

JACK AND THE BEANSTALK

47

212

States, the development of resistance is, arguably, a given
certainty. The U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
has recognized this possibility and has taken an active role in
213
developing resistance management programs to secure the
214
long-term utility of the Bt technology.
The currently
215
216
employed management strategy is the “high-dose /refuge”
217
strategy in which approximately 20 percent of the farmer’s
fields are to be planted with a non-genetically modified variety
212. An understanding of the development of resistance to Bt protein has
been developed through studies of resistance development in many insects and
through studies of Bacillus thuringiensis -endotoxin resistance by tobacco
budworm and diamondback moth in particular. Specifically, in any given
population of European corn borers a fraction of the insects will have no copies
of the gene for Bacillus thuringiensis -endotoxin resistance (ss), a fraction
will have one gene (rs), and a small fraction will have two genes (rr). Those
(rr) and (rs) individuals could survive and produce offspring after feeding on
Bt corn. With an increase in the acreage of Bt corn, increase in time of
exposure of an increasing population of resistant individuals, more (rs) or (rr)
larvae could survive to adulthood. The fraction of the European corn borer
population which carry Bt resistance genes would increase until a control
failure occurs. At that point, the population of Bt resistant insects would be
similar to those levels found in non- Bacillus thuringiensis fields. See id.
213. See generally B. E. Tabashnik, Evolution of Resistance to Bacillus
thuringiensis, 39 ANNU. REV. ENTOMOL. 47 (1994).
214. See generally McGaughey & Whalon, supra note 205; EPA and USDA
Position Paper on Insect Resistance Management in Bt Crops, (1999) available
at http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/otherdocs/bt-position-paper618.htm (visited Aug. 21, 2001). See also COMMITTEE ON GENETICALLY
MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS, supra note 172, at 97-101.
215. The Bt crops, particularly corn, were designed to produce levels of Bt
-endotoxin protein in concentrations that are much higher than levels found
on corn treated with endogenous Bt insecticides. It is presumed that with
such high concentrations of Bt -endotoxin protein, those individuals with no
resistance gene and those with a single resistance gene would not survive to
adulthood. If the level of Bt -endotoxin protein is not sufficiently high, and if
(rs) individuals survive, then they would mate with other (rs) individuals or
with (rr) individuals. The result would be a population of individuals that are
resistant to the Bt -endotoxin protein. See Witkowski, supra note 171.
216. The second prong of the resistance management strategy is the use of
refuges. The refuge provides a population of insects that are not exposed to
either plants expressing Bt protein or to Bt insecticides, which could mate
with individuals from the non-refuge areas that are resistant to the Bt
protein. Since the population of non-resistant insects produced by the refuge
areas is considerably higher than the population of resistant insects produced
by the non-refuge areas, then the probably of two resistant moths mating and
producing a resistant progeny is very small. For this strategy to work, the
resistant and non-resistant insects must emerge into adulthood at the same
time, and the two populations must be close enough to mate. Most plans are
designed so that approximately 20-30% of the fields are non-Bt corn, and the
non-Bt corn is immediately adjacent to the Bt corn fields. See id. at 15.
217. See McGaughey & Whalon, supra note 205.
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218

of the species.
The refuge area serves as a breeding ground
for non-resistant insects. Assuming that the insect genes
219
promoting resistance are recessive or partially recessive,
those rare insects, which manage to survive a high-dose of Bt endotoxin protein would be highly unlikely to find a Bt
220
resistant mate. Rather, it would be highly likely that their
mate would be non-resistant.
Assuming that the gene
conferring Bt resistance is recessive, the gene would not be
expressed in the progeny from the mating of the resistant and
221
There would be either no or minimal
non-resistant insect.
growth in the population of resistant insects. To function
properly, the “high-dose/refuge” strategy requires first, that the
heterozygotes for Bt resistance be killed by highly toxic plant
tissue; second, that the resistant alleles are very rare; third,
that non-resistant insects are within an effective mating
222
distance for resistant insects such that when the resistant
adults emerge from the Bt plants and the susceptible adults
emerge from non-Bt plants synchronously there is a high
probability that the resistant adults will find a susceptible
adult with which to mate. If developmental asynchrony
occurred in the field, then assortive mating among Bacillus
thuringiensis -endotoxin resistant moths would accelerate the
223
evolution of resistance. That the resistance to Bt -endotoxin
protein in the European corn borer, Ostrinia nubilalis, is
224
incompletely dominant rather than recessive raises serious
218. Whether the refuge strategy is actually employed by the farmers is
subject to serious doubt. Mr. Dallas Thomason was found guilty of not
employing the refuge strategy for the Bt cotton that he planted without a
technology-use license. Evidently, failure to employ the refuge strategy is a
common practice, even amongst farmers who have signed the technology-use
license requiring the refuge area, because it is too cumbersome to implement.
It is a sad irony that Monsanto pursued Mr. Thomason so aggressively as to
drive him into bankruptcy for, in part, engaging in exactly the same practice,
of failing to use the refuge strategy, that his neighboring farmers employ. See
Interview: Thomason, supra note 7.
219. See generally F. Huang, R. A. Higgins, and L. L. Buschman, Baseline
Susceptibility and Changes in Susceptibility to Bacillus thuringiensis subsp.
kurstaki Under Selection Pressure in European Corn Borer (Lepidoptera:
Pyralidae), 90 J. ECON. ENTOMOL. 1137 (1997).
220. See McGaughey & Whalon, supra note 205.
221. See Huang, supra note 219.
222. See Tabashnik, supra note 213.
223. See Yong-Biao Liu, Bruce E. Tabashnik, Timothy J. Dennehy,
Amanda L. Patin & Alan C. Bartlett, Development Time and Resistance to Bt
Crops, 400 NATURE 519 (5 August 1999).
224. See Huang, supra note 210.
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doubts about the efficacy of the currently employed “highdose/refuge” strategy for managing Bt resistance in insects.
Further, in the near future transgenic plants containing
Bacillus thuringiensis -endotoxin will be ineffective against
insect pests with probability unity. A similar phenomenon will
occur in the case of herbicide resistant field crops. In that case,
however, it is the noxious weeds that become resistant and may
require the development of new, more potent herbicides to kill
the weeds, or return to the use of traditional herbicides such as
2,4-D.
D. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ITS PROTECTION BY
PATENT LAW
Currently, intellectual property includes intangible goods
such as copyrights, trademarks, and patents, as well as that
information retained in the private mind. This perspective on
225
intellectual property leads to confusion, muddled analyses,
226
and imprecise conclusions
when defining property and
225. For example, an essay published by the United States Department of
State states that intellectual property includes “patents, trademarks,
copyrights, and trade secrets” which, the essay pronounces, are “collectively
referred to as intellectual property” (internal quotations deleted). See
Laurence R. Hefter and Robert D. Litowitz, What is Intellectual Property,
available at http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/intelprp (last visited 09
August 2001). The authors further state that the “intellectual property owner
has the right to prevent the unauthorized use or sale of the property.” Id. It is
well established in trade secret law that others may indeed use or sell the
trade secret provided that they discovered the subject matter of the trade
secret by themselves or obtained the subject matter using “good faith”
methods. This is because once others have knowledge of the subject matter of
the trade secret then it is “public knowledge” and is no longer secret. See B. F.
Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemugh, 192 N. E.2d 99 (C. A. Ohio 1963) (stating that
the “subject matter of a trade secret must be secret, and matters of public
knowledge or of general knowledge in an industry cannot be classified as trade
secrets,” id. at 104). Therefore, the statement that the provisions of trade
secret law and patent law uniformly “prevent the unauthorized use or sale of
property” is not only misleading and confusing, but also patently incorrect.
226. By starting with the fundamental definition that “[p]atents,
copyrights, trademarks and related interests are known as intellectual
property,” Thomas G. Field, Intellectual Property: Some Practical and Legal
Fundamentals, 35 IDEA: J. L. AND TECH. 79 (1994), the analysis may lead to
the very imprecise conclusions that patents are property, see id. at 93;
copyrights are property, see id. at 101; trade secrets are property, see id. at
110; and that trademarks are property, see id. at 123. Any such conclusion is
imprecise because it is not clear what, if anything may be protected by a cause
of action. Indeed, it is a useless endeavor to “protect” patents, copyrights and
trademarks when it is the physical manifestation of the original thought that
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227

property rights in inventions in general and with regard to
genetically modified plants in particular. In order to avoid
such a morass, it is important to be precise in defining
228
intellectual property as the collection of inherent exclusive
rights, granted by law, which are vested in an individual as the
229
result of the physical manifestation of his original thought. A
the inventor wishes to protect (i.e. the intellectual property).
227. See generally Clare K. Hare, Towards an Ontology of Intellectual
Property (1999), at http://wings.buffalo.edu/philosophy/farber/hare.html (last
visited 09 August 2001). The discussion by Hare was presented at the
Conference on Ontology, which was held at University of Buffalo, New York.
Hare argues, incorrectly, that the current “legal system puts almost every
aspect of intellectual property into” either patent law, copyright law, or
trademark law. See id. Further, Hare states, again incorrectly, that there
“are currently two legal documents which define the limits of patent
protection.” See id. Hare continues to argue that the current ontology of
intellectual property has lead to the current situation in which “there are
categories of ideas and their expressions which are excluded from
protection . . . no matter how useful or unique” including business methods.
See id. Using this as a motivation, Hare presents and defends a new ontology
for intellectual property which she asserts will lead to broader protection for
new and developing technologies. The motivational basis of Hare’s new
ontology can be easily defeated: first, it is erroneous to classify patent,
copyright and trademark protection as “intellectual property.” Rather, patent,
copyright and trademark law are vehicles for protection of intellectual
property. Secondly, to state that the United States Constitution is a legal
document which “define[s] the limits of patent protection” is to ignore the
entire body of constitutional law. Indeed, Article I, of which Useful Arts
Clause is part, grants powers to Congress to act in certain enumerated areas.
The limits of the protection are defined in statute, which the Constitution
grants Congress the power to enact. Third, usefulness and uniqueness (new)
are only a subset of the elements that must be satisfied before a physical
manifestation of original thought may be granted protection through patent
law. Thus, the confusion with regard to intellectual property has little to due
with ontology (and hence a new ontology is unnecessary) but with the lack of
understanding amongst the judiciary as to what constitutes intellectual
property and a lack of understanding about the interaction between the
intellectual property and patent, copyright and trademark law.
228. Intellectual property has been defined as the inherent exclusive rights
in the work and invention of the inventor which were developed by statutes
and which are not lost by publication of the work or invention. See Frank D.
Prager, The Early Growth and Influence of Intellectual Property, 34 J. PAT.
OFF. SOC’Y. 106, 108 (1952). Before intellectual property may exist, there
must be the creation of a physical manifestation of the original thought; and if
the physical manifestation is an improvement on a prior physical
manifestation, the improvement must be of some considerable merit. See id.
at 139.
229. Manifestation of an original thought in physical form appears to be a
required element for the courts to protect the property. For instance, the
court in Bowen v. Yankee Network, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 62 (D. Mass 1942), stated
that original thought, or “[i]deas not reduced to concrete form are not
protected.” Id. at 63.
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physical manifestation of the original thought is required
because it is the only manner by which the originator of the
thought can present proof positive of the thought. It is all too
easy to claim, after others have created a physical
manifestation of that original thought, that one was the
originator of the thought when there is no proof of such an
assertion.
The preceding definition prevents such
unsubstantiated claims. The rights of property vest to the
owner of the physical manifestation of the original thought, at
230
When the
the time that the physical manifestation occurs.
property rights vest, the intellectual property comes into being.
The intellectual property is a creation of the law and does not
231
Under this
exist until the law acts to bring it into being.
construction, intellectual “property” is the collection of rights
that define the relationship between the individual (or entity)
and the physical manifestation of the original thought and,
therefore, has the full protection of the Takings Clause of the
232
Unlike tangible objects in which a single
Constitution.
property right may vest only to a single entity at any given
point in time, a single intellectual property right may vest in
233
When two or
multiple entities at the same point in time.
more entities reduce an original thought to physical form, and
the original thought of each party was generated independent
of all other parties, then property rights vest in each entity
except the right to exclude others from using that original

230. Such a position was clearly articulated by Mr. Justice Gray in
Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 458 (Supreme Judicial Court, Mass 1868)
as: if the inventor “invents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of
manufacture” then “he has a property in it, which a court of chancery will
protect against one who . . . undertakes to apply it to his own use, or to
disclose it to third persons.” Id.
231. See Jeremy Bentham THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION (C. K. Ogden ed.
1931). Bentham takes the position that natural property does not exist,
rather “it is entirely the work of law.” Id. at 111. “Property and the law are
born together, and die together. Before laws were made there was no
property; take away laws, and property ceases.” Id. at 113.
232. The Supreme Court in United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S.
373, 377-78 (1945), stated that the term property, as used in the Takings
Clause of the Constitution, was used “to denote the group of rights inhering in
the citizen’s relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and
dispose of it.” Id.
233. This distinction may very well have been apparent to Mr. Judge Gray
when he stated that even though the property right is recognized, the inventor
is not afforded, at common law, an “exclusive right to it as against the public,
or against those who in good faith acquire knowledge of” the invention. See
Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 458 (Supreme Judicial Court, Mass 1868).
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thought or its physical manifestation.
However, if the
knowledge of one party is “obtained by any breach of
confidence” by another party, then disclosure by the acquiring
234
party may be enjoined by the court.
Under common law, intellectual property included the
right to possess, use, and alienate the subject matter, but did
not include the right to exclude others from possession, use, or
235
Early statutory patent law in the United States,
alienation.
preserved the common law rights and supplemented those
rights with the right to exclude others from making, using, or
236
alienating the subject matter of the physical manifestation.
Under modern statutes in the United States, intellectual
property is defined and protected by several bodies of law
depending on the type of intellectual property. This includes
237
state trade-secret law as long as the state trade-secret law
does not conflict with Congress’ constitutionally granted power
238
239
to legislate protections for intellectual property, patent,
240
copyright and trademark law.
While the modern patent
statute has eliminated the exclusive right of making, using,
and selling of the invention, the intellectual property rights
under modern patent statutes continue to embody the common
law notions that the intellectual property vests when the
241
original thought is manifest in its physical form.

234. See Thum Co. v. Tloczynski, 72 N.W. 140, 142 (Mich. 1897) (secrets
confided in an employee may not be divulged to others upon termination of
employment if a condition of the employment was that the employee should
maintain the secret).
235. See Norfolk, 98 Mass. at 460.
236. See AN, infra note 243.
237. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1974)
(stating that trade secret law protects the holder of the trade secret against
disclosure by another through surreptitious means).
238. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152
(1989). While the Florida statute at issue, extending “patent-like” protection
to unpatented boat hull designs, was analyzed with respect to federal patent
laws, the principle may naturally be extended to any state law defining and
protecting intellectual property which conflicts with federal laws that define
and protect the same intellectual property.
239. See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 259 (1979)
(stating that the design of the keyholder “was so simple that it readily could
be copied unless it was protected by patent”).
240. It is recognized that trade secret law, copyright and trademark law
are only peripheral to the discussion at hand, but they are included only to
identify them as legal vehicles for protecting intellectual property.
241. See Frank D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to
1787, 26 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 711 (1944) (arguing that the patent statute
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Pursuant to Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, in
243
244
245
1790 Congress created the United States patent system.
Several policy arguments underlie the patent laws. One
argument states that the patent laws were intended to give
inventors an incentive to invent by granting protection for their
246
Another states that the public benefits
original thought.
from the disclosure of the intellectual property’s subject
247
matter.
This argument also includes the notion that patent

should be interpreted as declaratory of the common law doctrine of intellectual
property).
242. “The Congress shall have power . . . to promote the progress of science
and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8.
243. Act of April 10, 1790, 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2212, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109
(1790). The 1790 Act, approved on April 10, 1790 by the First Congress,
provided that “upon petition of any person or persons to the Secretary of State,
the Secretary for the Department of War, and the Attorney General of the
United States” either of the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Department of
War or the Attorney General, or any two of them, may “cause letters patent to
be made out in the name of the United States.” Act of April 10, 1790, 2
ANNALS OF CONG. 2212 (1790) (the act is entitled: “An Act to Promote the
Progress of Useful Arts”). The debates and proceedings of the First Congress
were collected and printed by Gales and Seaton in THE DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, (1834). The
collection is also available through the American memory project at
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwac.html (last visited June 21, 2001).
The granting of power to three persons was eliminated by the Second
Congress in 1793 such that only the Secretary of State could be petitioned for
granting of letters patent. See Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 111, 1 Stat. 31823 (1793) (the act published as: An Act to promote the progress of Useful Arts,
and to repeal the Act heretofore made for that purpose, ANNALS OF CONG.
1431-35 (1793) (2d Cong. Sess. 2)).
244. It is imprecise to label the 1793 Act the “Patent Act” since the 1793
Act referred only to “Useful Arts” in its title, and because the word “patent”
did not enter into the title of an act codifying the provision of Article I, § 8, cl.
8 of the Constitution until 1800. See Act of Apr. 17, 1800, 6 ANNALS OF CONG.
1473 (1800) (The act is entitled: “An Act to Extend the Privilege of obtaining
patents for useful discoveries and inventions to certain persons therein
mentioned, and to enlarge and define the penalties for violating the rights of
patentees.” It is collected and printed by Gales and Seaton in THE DEBATES
AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, (1851)).
245. A complete discussion of the genesis of intellectual property protection
by statute in the United States is given by BRUCE W. BUGBEE, THE GENESIS
OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 1 (1967). It seems unnecessary to
review the genesis at this point.
246. See id. at 9.
247. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Are Ideas Within the Traditional
Definition of Property?: A Jurisprudential Analysis, 47 ARK. L. REV. 603, 649
(1994).
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protection encourages, regulates, and manages competition
248
amongst inventors.
Perhaps the clearest summary of the
policy basis for patent protection rests upon two presumptions:
that creative and original thought benefits society in general
through the development and deployment of new technologies
and improvement in existing technologies; and that individuals
are stimulated to creative thought as a result of a government
249
grant of limited exclusive property rights as incentives.
250
Under modern federal statutes,
the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) is authorized to grant a patent to an
251
inventor for an invention. The subject matter of a patentable
252
invention is defined in 35 U.S.C. section 101. Because section
253
101 extends patentability to a broad range of subject matter,
254
it provides the primary incentive for an inventor to invent.
248. See id.
249. See BUGBEE, supra note 245, at 9. The common argument for the
patent system is that the grant of exclusive rights in the patented invention
acts as a stimulus for creativity. Consideration of the history of science
indicates that this argument is without merit. Because of space constraints,
we shall consider, briefly, only a single case. This case is chosen because the
creativity of the patentee was already well known before the patent was
granted. On September 15, 1594, Galileo Galilei was granted a patent in the
Venetian Republic for a machine to raise water. See id. at 24. The motivation
for Galileo to seek the patent was to prohibit the invention from becoming
public property, and to permit him to accrue a pecuniary gain. See id.
Galileo’s creativity and genius are now legendary. In fact, Galileo clarified the
mechanical structure of the solar system using relatively simple mechanics,
see GALILEO GALILEI, DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE TWO CHIEF WORLD
SYSTEMS, (1630) (translated by Stillman Drake and published in 1967). Also,
Galileo developed the foundation of dynamics (the study of the motion of
bodies) and the foundation of solid mechanics (the resistance of solid bodies to
fracture by external forces), GALILEO GALILEI, DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE
TWO NEW SCIENCES (Henry Crew ed. & trans., Dover Press 1954) (1638).
Galileo faced considerable obstacles to publishing and distributing the results
of his genius. In his later years, Galileo was certainly driven by ad plenioren
scientiam rather than by pecuniary gain. Thus, the grant of a patent cannot
be the underlying motive for his creativity. That Galileo did not patent either
his telescope or the method of his observations tends to indicate his desire to
further scientiam rather than enlarge his own wealth.
250. 35 U.S.C. sections 100-211, Patentability of Inventions and Grant of
Patents.
251. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152
(1989).
252. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
253. The 35 U.S.C. § 101 definition of patentable subject “remained
essentially unchanged for approximately 200 years.” David Burke, Animal
Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg: Renewed Challenge to Animal Patents, 59
UMKC L. REV. 409, 412 (1991).
254. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron the Court stated that: “[n]o patent is
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While section 101 is expansive in its definition of patentable
subject matter, the corpus of patent law restricts the range of
patentable subject matter. The invention must have “utility,”
255
that is, the function of the invention must be useful. Neither
the demonstrated perfection of operation nor commercial
256
success of the invention need be shown.
Patents cannot be
granted for the discovery of fundamental laws of nature,
257
physical phenomena, or abstract ideas
because such
discoveries “are manifestations . . . nature, free to all men and
258
reserved exclusively to none.”
The subject matter of the
259
patent must be novel and nonobvious.
Finally, the inventors
260
must file a complete, full, and exact description
of the
invention sufficient to enable any person skilled in the
261
pertinent art to make and use the claimed invention.
In return for the patent disclosure, the inventor is granted
262
an exclusive right to use his invention for a period of years.
available for a discovery, however useful, novel, and nonobvious, unless it falls
within one of the express categories of patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. §
101.” See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 475-76.
255. See Application of Jacques George Pottier, Patent Appeal No. 7790,
376 F.2d 328 (C. C. P. A. 1967); E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkeley &
Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1260 n.17 (8th Cir. 1980).
256. See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkeley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247,
1260 n.17 (8th Cir. 1980).
TH
257. HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 100 CONG., 2D SESS. TRANSGENIC
ANIMAL PATENT REFORM ACT, H. R. REP. NO. 888, at 40 (1988).
258. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
259. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (subsection (e) amended Nov. 29, 1999,
Pub. L. No. 106-113 § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1501A-565 (S. 1948 § 4805);
subsection (g) amended Nov. 29, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113 § 1000(a)(9), 113
Stat. 1501A-590 (S. 1948 § 4806)) and § 103 (1994) (amended Nov. 1, 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-41, § 1, 109 Stat. 3511; subsection (c) amended Nov. 29, 1999,
Pub. L. 106-113, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1501A-591 (S. 1948 § 4807)).
260. The Court has clearly stated that the “ultimate goal of the patent
system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public domain
through disclosure.” See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 151 (1989).
261. See 35 U.S.C. § 111-113 (1994). See also In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232,
1236 (C.C.P.A. 1971). In the case of biotechnology, a full written description
may be difficult if not impossible. Therefore, a sample of the genetic material
(i.e. an aliquot of cells frozen in liquid nitrogen) must be deposited with a
registered depository. See generally In re Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
262. In Kewanee Oil Co., the Court stated that the patent laws have
fostered “a positive effect on society through the introduction of new products
and processes of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of
increased employment and better lives for our citizens.” Kewanee Oil, 416
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The Court stated, “[w]hen a patent is granted and the
information contained in it is circulated to the general
public . . . such additions to the general store of knowledge are
of such importance to the public wealth that the Federal
Government is willing to pay the high price of” twenty years
after the filing of the patent application “of exclusive use for its
disclosure, which disclosure, it is assumed will stimulate ideas
and the eventual development of further significant advances
263
Disclosure of knowledge by the inventor to the
in the art.”
public is one of the most important functions of the United
264
States patent law system.
Furthermore, disclosure of the
invention also encourages other inventors to either improve on
265
or design around the subject matter.
The argument is established that an invention or
discovery, which is a physical manifestation of an original
thought, is the property of the person who made the invention
or discovery. The property is his to dispose of as he pleases.
However, once the invention or discovery is published to the
general public, the person to whom it belonged may no longer
assert property rights in the invention or discovery under
common law. The inventor then has two alternatives: either
keep the invention secret and use it as a trade secret or release
it to the general public. If the discovery is used as a trade
secret, then the inventor runs the risk that others, in good
faith, may discover the invention. Once the invention is
released to the public, the inventor may no longer control the
intellectual property. If the invention is published, then the
public benefits from the knowledge and others may use the
knowledge to advance technology. However, the inventor is no
longer able to profit from the exclusive use of the invention.
Through the grant of a patent, the inventor, or patentee,
U.S. at 481.
263. Id.
264. Justice Story once stated that:
[p]atents for inventions are now treated as a just reward to
ingenious men, and as highly beneficial to the public, not only by
holding out suitable encouragements to genius and talents and
enterprise; but as ultimately securing to the whole community great
advantages from the free communication of secrets, and processes,
and machinery, which may be most important to all great interests
of society, to agriculture, to commerce and to manufacturers, as well
as to the cause of science and art.
Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 F. Cas. 648, 650 (No. 1,518) (C.C.D. Mass. 1839).
265. See R. G. Adler, Biotechnology as an Intellectual Property, 224
SCIENCE 35, 358 (1984).
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may retain his property rights in the invention while the public
gains the benefit of the invention. The inventor benefits in
several ways from the publication of his intellectual property in
the form of a patent. First, when the intellectual property is
published through the grant of a patent, the patentee retains
exclusive property rights in that intellectual property. When
the inventor chooses to keep his ideas and thought processes
(the invention) secret, then he runs the risk that another will
obtain the invention through either good faith observation of
the physical manifestation or cleverness of another by
independent original thought and work. In either case, the
invention is published to the general public and the original
inventor no longer retains any common law property rights in
the invention. When a patent is granted then the inventor
intentionally and purposefully publishes his invention as
consideration for the retention of exclusive property rights in
that invention. As a result, any other person who in good faith
discovers the invention is prohibited, by statute, from enjoying
the benefit of that discovery without the permission of the
266
patentee.
The second benefit, which accrues to the inventor by a
patent grant is that the inventor retains control over the
intellectual property. Because the inventor retains control, he
may choose to either use the invention strictly for his own
benefit or may license or sell the invention to others. The
control is enforced because the statute authorizing the granting
of a patent provides for a private right of action against any
person who infringes the patent. That is, should any other
person discover, by any means, or attempt to exercise the
exclusive property rights granted to the patentee, then that
person is an infringer and is subject to a private right of action
brought by the patentee.
The public benefits from the publication of the intellectual
property in the form of a patent for several reasons. First, the
general public will have access to the ideas and thought
processes behind the physical manifestation which will permit
those interested to either use the invention to make, use, or sell
the physical manifestation after the termination of the patent
term; or to incorporate the thought processes into their own
266. In the case of genetically modified plants, the holder of the patent
grants the farmer permission to use and reproduce the genetically modified
seed through a technology-use license. Failure to obtain the license subjects
the farmer to liability that may be very large.
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inventive activity before the termination of the patent term.
Second, by having access to the mental processes behind the
physical manifestation, other inventors are encouraged, some
by a profit motive, to “design-around” the old invention to
267
create a new invention.
The process of designing around an
old invention advances technology that advances commerce.
Should the ideas and thought processes be kept secret and
hidden from public view, then each inventor would necessarily
have to go through the same, or substantially similar, thought
268
processes to reach the same conclusion. Such a system would

267. It might be argued that the motive to design around a patent is
strictly the profit motive associated with advancing science and technology.
However, some consideration must be given to the validity of such an
argument. Consider a doctoral student in chemical engineering who requires
the use of a particular process for the extraction of a particular compound
from biomass. It turns out that the compound and the process for extracting it
are patented; and the patentee is charging a prohibitive amount for both the
compound and licensing of the extraction process. Further, the compound is to
be derivatized in the plant (biomass before harvesting) before extraction. The
director of the laboratory and the University both believe that the patent is
invalid and unenforceable; however, neither has the resources to either fight
an infringement case nor pay the licensing fees. Further, the doctoral student
simply does not have time to await resolution of the case before proceeding
with his work (only to possibly encounter a similar obstacle in the near
future).
Only two alternatives remain open to the director of the laboratory and
doctoral student: either design around the patent; or abandon that particular
line of inquiry. The latter alternative is being embraced at a worrisome rate
in the academic arena. The former, while time consuming, can yield some
progress with the project. However, whether the doctoral student or the
director of the laboratory actually “profit” from the design around is open to
serious debate. Certainly the design around may minimize the cost of
advancing the inquiry, but unless the fruits of the inquiry are marketable,
then the direct profitability of designing around the patent does not exist.
268. The strategy of relying on “trade secret” as a mechanism for
protecting intellectual property would restrict advancements in science and
engineering as well as inventive activity. The scientific and engineering fields
rely on open and free exchange of ideas, data, and conclusions: which accounts
for the voluminous scientific and engineering literature.
The data,
observations, and conclusions obtained by one investigator supports those of
all other investigators working in either the same or closely connected fields of
study (more frequently in recent years, the work of an investigator in one field
may prove of considerable value to an investigator in a completely unrelated
field even if the work is of only minor importance in its original field of study).
It is the free exchange of data (that is the intellectual property) and ideas,
which is the engine advancing modern science and engineering. Any
mechanism that serves to restrict the free flow of data, ideas, conclusions in
the scientific and engineering communities will eventually halt progress in
these communities. While such mechanisms may profit those who impose
them in the short term, the general public will be harmed in the long term
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be inefficient to the point of severely restricting the
advancement of the “useful arts.”
E.

PROPERTY RIGHTS

This discussion, focuses on the property rights attendant to
genetically modified plants. To the seed manufacturers, these
rights include the right to make a profit, the right to develop
technology, and the right to exclude others from making a
profit on that same technology. To some seed manufacturers,
the property rights also appear to include the right to enter the
premises of the farmer to test his plants (which requires taking
269
270
some of the plants ), the right to pollute the farmer’s fields,
and the right to the value of the farmer’s crop after having
271
polluted his fields.
To the farmer, these rights include the
because technological advancements will stagnate.
269. In the case of Mr. Dallas Thomason, agents for Monsanto entered his
cotton fields and took samples of his cotton plants. Evidently, this entry and
taking was committed without a valid warrant and without the permission of
Mr. Thomason. See Interview: Thomason, supra note 7. Even if Monsanto had
obtained a court order requiring Mr. Thomason to allow Monsanto to collect
plant samples from his fields, Monsanto may still not exercise authority to
enter and take the plants. Such an authority must rest only with the
government and any permission for Monsanto to do so is relinquishing the
police authority of the government to a corporation. An analogous situation is
where representatives of a company enter a private residence because the
company suspects that stolen property may be found there. Such authority to
enter and search must rest only with the government through its police power
and not with a corporate entity.
270. Mr. Percy Schmeiser maintains that the wind will easily carry the
canola seed across long distances. Sufficiently far, in fact, that genetically
modified canola plants wind up dispersed in fields where it was never planted
and, evidently, was blown a considerable distance by the wind from a road
heavily traveled by trucks carrying canola seeds. In another case, genetically
modified canola was found in a field where the farmer neither planted canola
nor wanted such canola. The genetically modified plant when neither planted
by the farmer nor desired by the farmer is defined as genetic pollution. The
seed manufacturer, evidently, neither can nor desires to control such
pollution.
Telephone Interview with Mr. Percy Schmeiser, Farmer,
Saskatchewan, Canada (July 6, 2001) [hereinafter Interview: Schmeiser{July
6, 2001}].
271. Federal Judge MacKay neither considered nor cared to consider the
source of the genetic pollution found on Percy Schmeiser’s land. See Monsanto
Can., Inc. v. Schmeiser Enters., Ltd., 2001 FCT 256, paragraph 31 (Fed. Ct.
Canada 2001) available at http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2001/2001fct256.html
(last visited Aug. 25, 2001). Judge McKay further stated that: “[y]et the
source of the Roundup resistant canola in the defendants’ 1997 crop is really
not significant for the resolution of the issue of infringement which relates to
the 1998 crop.” Id. ¶ 112. Judge McKay agreed with Monsanto’s argument
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right to engage in the legitimate business practice of
maximizing profit while minimizing input capital and labor
costs, the right to save and replant seeds, and the right to
272
dispose of his property as he deems fit. It may be argued that
there is no common law basis for the farmer to save and
replant seeds from his own fields. The analysis leading to such
a conclusion was based upon the common law doctrines of real
property including: the prescriptive easement; the public trust
doctrine; the doctrine of customary rights; and reliance by the
public upon access to the property. These doctrines of property
law are briefly reviewed here, as they will be useful in the
ensuing analysis.
1.

Legal Theories

It is textbook doctrine that rights in property dictate the
relations between persons with regard to control of that
property.
273
The law protects the rights of individuals in their
property, including the liberty to use; the right to exclude
others; the right to alienate; immunity from damage to the
274
Further,
property; and immunity from expropriation.
property law doctrine teaches that all rights in property do not
necessarily vest in the same person at the same time, and that
275
the property rights are not absolute. In fact, it is common for
the property rights to be shared between several different
276
people depending upon the temporal epoch of the property.
In the case of genetically modified plants, property rights in
both the plant and the seed are shared between several distinct
entities or individuals at any given moment in time.
There are several issues to be resolved regarding property
rights in genetically modified plants. One is whether the
that the presence of the glyphosate-resistant plants on Mr. Schmeiser’s farm
was sufficient to find him guilty of patent infringement.
272. See Jeremy P. Oczek, In the Aftermath of the “Terminator” Technology
Controversy: Intellectual Property Protections for Genetically Engineered Seeds
and the Right to Save and Replant Seed, 41 B. C. L. REV. 627 (2000).
273. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND
PRACTICES 3-4 (1997).
274. See id. at 4-5.
275. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 86 (3d ed.
1993).
276. See Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 10
STAN. L. REV. 611, 665 (1987).
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farmer may dispose of the seeds and plants that he has grown
in a manner he deems necessary. Oczek considered several
legal theories and concluded that there is no common-law right
277
for the farmer to save and replant seeds.
By arguing that
common-law property doctrines relate only to real property,
Oczek states that, “common law property right for farmers to
278
Such a conclusion is
save seed is difficult to recognize.”
against the basic doctrine of property law in the United States,
that personal and real property are treated essentially the
279
The law of property is left to the purview of the states
same.
280
under the United States Constitution, and it is anticipated
that variations will exist in the substantive law depending
upon the state in which the cause of action is brought.
Nonetheless, through study of the same property law doctrines
used by Oczek, and by introducing a small aliquot of public
policy argument, it is possible to come to a conclusion contrary
to that arrived at by Oczek.
Oczek employed the doctrine of customary rights in his
281
The
analysis of the farmer’s right to save and replant seeds.
doctrine of customary rights requires that a customary right be
282
acquired only if seven elements are satisfied. The acquisition
of customary rights require that the right must be ancient,
“exercised without interruption”, “peaceable and free from
dispute”, reasonable, certain (which may be satisfied by visible
boundaries to the use), obligatory (meaning the landowner does
not have the option of deciding whether the property is used by
the general public), and the use must not be inconsistent “with

277. See Oczek, supra note 272, at 651-52.
278. Id. at 652.
279. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 11-12 (2d
ed. 1993). Interests in cultivated crops are treated as either real property or
personal property depending upon the circumstances. Id. With the merger of
personal and real property law the distinction of whether cultivated crops are
real property or personal property seems quaint at best and misleading at
worst.
280. See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 114 S. Ct. 1332 (Mem) (1994)
(Justice Scalia and Justice O’Connor dissenting from the denial of certiorari.
Case below was Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993)).
281. See Oczek, supra note 272, at 652.
282. See Erin Pitts, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Tool for Ensuring
Continued Public Use of Oregon Beaches, 22 ENVTL. L. 731, 737 (1992)
(recommending the use of the public trust doctrine over the doctrine of
customary rights in protecting access to beaches in Oregon, and possibly
elsewhere).
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283

other customs or with other law.”
Where the public has
relied upon access to the property and has relied upon the
allowance by the property owner of such access, the doctrine
grants to the public an interest in continued use of the
284
The doctrine has been adopted only by a small
property.
285
286
number of states and in a narrow range of circumstances.
The public trust doctrine was also considered by Oczek
with the aim of resolving the issue of the farmer’s right to save
287
and replant seeds.
Historically, the scope of public trust law
includes the land area below the low-water mark along the
288
289
ocean coasts
and the coasts of the Great Lakes.
The
purpose of the public trust doctrine is to have the public
authority hold title to the land so that the people of the state
“may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce
over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the
290
obstruction or interference of private parties.” The Wisconsin
Supreme Court articulated a clear definition of the public trust
291
doctrine in a set of five factors. These factors are:
283. State ex rel. Thorton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 676-78 (Or. 1969) (referring
to Blackstone’s traditional criteria for customary rights).
284. See id.
285. The doctrine of customary rights has been, most notably, adopted by
Texas and Florida. In Texas, the public retained a right to use the beach
above the high-water mark even though the original line of vegetation had
been moved as a result of hurricane damage. See Matcha v. Mattox, 711
S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1986). In Florida, continuous use by the public of
the dry-sand portion of the beach resulted in a public interest in private land
through the doctrine of customary rights. See City of Daytona Beach v. TonaRama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974).
286. See generally Pitts, supra note 282.
287. See generally Oczek, supra note 272, at 647-53.
288. See Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845) (the
dominion and jurisdiction over navigable waters and land under these waters
belongs only to the state within its territorial jurisdiction and only that state
has the constitutional authority to exercise the dominion and jurisdiction);
Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 66 (1873) (the state
reserves the right to dispose of all soils under tide waters subject to the
“paramount right of navigation over such waters” as required by the
necessities of commerce between the several states and with foreign nations).
289. See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 437 (1892) (holding
that the doctrine of public trust applies to equally to the “dominion and
sovereignty over and ownership of lands under the navigable waters of the
Great Lakes” and to the “dominion and sovereignty over and ownership of
lands under tide waters on the borders of the sea”).
290. Id. at 452.
291. See Wisconsin v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 81 N.W.2d 71 (Wis. 1957) (the
city of Madison, Wisconsin proposed to fill part of a lagoon on Lake Wingra for
construction of a public parking lot granted property use rights but not the
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(1) the use of the affected area will be controlled by public bodies;
(2) the affected area will remain open to the public and it will be
devoted to public purposes; (3) the affected area will be small in
comparison with the whole of the area held in public trust; (4) no
one of the uses of the whole of the area held in public trust “will be
destroyed or greatly impaired”; and (5) “[t]he disappointment of
those members of the public who may desire” to use the affected
area is “negligible when compared with the greater convenience to
be afforded to those members of the public who use” the entire
292
area held in public trust.

Although useful as a guide to application, the precise
doctrine that the court adopts is of far less import than the
attitude that that court takes towards the inadequacies of the
293
This is
democratic process in protecting public interests.
because the public trust doctrine is meant to protect the public
and is applicable in those “situations in which diffuse public
interests need protection against tightly organized groups with
294
clear and immediate goals.” While the traditional application
of the doctrine has been quite narrow, the principle underlying
the doctrine may be employed in controversies relating to
subject matter beyond soils below the low-water mark and
295
natural resources.
To obtain an easement by prescription requires the
exercise of the rights of ownership against the actual owner for
a defined period of time without obtaining the permission of the

property itself, and reserves all property rights for the state).
292. Id. at 73-74.
293. See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 521 (1970)
(arguing for an extension of the doctrine of public trust beyond the
traditionally narrow applications in matters of land below the low-water
mark).
294. Id. at 556.
295. See id. at 556-57. For instance, New Jersey employed the public trust
doctrine to allow public access to beaches, by both residents and non-residents,
by extending the doctrine to land above the low-water mark. See Neptune
City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54-55 (N.J. 1972) (holding that
municipalities may charge for the use of their beaches, but that discrimination
between residents and non-residents is not permissible); Matthews v. Bay
Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984) (extending the public trust
doctrine: to include “bathing, swimming and other shore activities,” id. at 363,
because those activities are “consonant with and furthers the general welfare,”
id.; and to the use and enjoyment of the upland beach for the purposes of
bathing and swimming below the mean high water mark, id. at 364), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
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296

actual owner who has had notice.
A prescriptive easement
arises from the open, notorious, adverse, and continuous use of
297
the servient estate for a period years.
In a prescriptive
easement the actual owner retains title in the property while
the claimant obtains a limited right to make use of the
property.
Any positive easement may be obtained as a
298
However, a prescriptive easement
prescriptive easement.
cannot be obtained against public property that is not
alienable. Also, a prescriptive easement cannot be obtained on
non-governmentally owned property where there is a public
299
interest that affects the property.
2.

Application of the Theories

The background section demonstrated that the
development of domesticated plants currently in use in the
United States was the result of efforts on the part of private
individuals initially, on the part of farmer-government
cooperation later, and on the part of the researchers in
agricultural research stations funded by the federal
government still later. It has also been demonstrated that the
development of the agricultural genome was mature before the
arrival of the seed manufacturing industry. A review of the
history of American agricultural research and development
leads to a conclusion that public funds went to the development
of an agricultural genome suitable for agricultural practices in
300
the United States and for the benefit of the American people.
Because public funds paid for the development and deployment
of the agricultural genome, then that genome belongs to the
general public as public property. It is natural, then, to raise
the issue of whether a single person may obtain an interest in
the agricultural genome in general, and in a plant genome in
particular. If the public owns the plant genome, then a private
party cannot gain an interest in the property under the
prescriptive easement doctrine because the private party may
296. See 7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITION § 60.03(b)(6)(i)
(David A. Thomas ed., 1994).
297. See, e.g. Goodall v. Whitefish Hunting Club, 528 N.W.2d 221, 223
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
298. See 7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITION §
60.03(b)(6)(iii) (David A. Thomas ed., 1994).
299. See id. at § 60.03(b)(6)(iv).
300. See generally TRUE, supra note 29.
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not obtain a prescriptive easement against public property.
Due to the limited jurisdictions that have adopted the doctrine
of customary rights, and due to the narrow range of
circumstances to which it has been applied, it is a fruitless
endeavor to attempt to use the doctrine in analyzing the public
interest in the genome of the plant. Because a diverse public
interest exists in the availability and maintenance of the plant
301
genome and because one clear and immediate goal of the seed
manufacturers would be to establish dominion over the
genome, the doctrine of public trust may apply to the genome.
In this case, it is possible that the public trust doctrine would
allow alienation of the public interest in the plant genome, but
302
the legislature must be very clear of its intent to do so.
Whether the farmer may use the genome to produce a crop
for sale, and whether he may save and plant seeds in the next
crop cycle, turns upon a point of public policy. A fundamental
requirement of a strong nation is that its people are properly
nourished. Nourishment requires food to eat. Without the
farmer, the country would have a dearth of food. Therefore, the
public has a strong interest in allowing the farmer free access
to the agricultural genome to produce crops for (eventual)
human consumption. The farmer and the public are able to
form a mutually beneficial contract: the farmer gives his labor
and the crop as consideration and the public gives the genome
and cash as consideration. Whether the farmer may save and
replant the genome in the form of seeds turns upon matters of
convenience to members of the public.
As discussed earlier, the farmer traditionally provided his
own plant genome through a save-and-plant program, or the
government provided it gratis.
In modern times, it is
inconvenient for members of the public to provide the requisite
genome to the farmer, therefore, the seed manufacturer may be
used as an agent of the public to provide the plant genome.
Alternatively, the farmer may be allowed to save and plant the
genome that he produces on his own lands because he is given
a license to do so by the public. Therefore, contrary to the
conclusion drawn by Ozcek, a legal basis does exist for the
301. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DESIGNING AN
AGRICULTURAL GENOME PROGRAM 1 (1998) (published by the National
Academy Press); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING GLOBAL GENETIC
RESOURCES: THE U.S. NATIONAL PLANT GERMPLASM SYSTEM 1 (1991)
(published by the National Academy Press).
302. See SAX, supra note 293, at 486-89.

66

MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW

[Vol. 3:1

common law to protect the right of a farmer to save seeds from
a crop for planting in the next planting cycle.
II. ANALYSIS
The man who makes two blades of grass grow where but
303
one grew before is a benefactor of his race.
Three sets of rights attach to the design, manufacture, and
use of genetically modified plant tissue.
The seed
manufacturers claim the right to develop the technology, the
right to exclude others from making a profit on that technology,
and the right to make a profit for themselves from the
technology. The farmers claim the right to engage in the
legitimate business practice of farming, the right to business
autonomy, and the right to use and dispose of their property
(both personal and real) as they see fit. The farmer also has
the right to have his crop free of unwanted transgene
contamination. The public claims the right to a stable and safe
fiber and food supply and the right to minimum impact on the
environment in producing the fiber and food. Where Jack’s
purchased seeds have been genetically modified, a clash exists
between his property rights and those of the owner of the grant
of protection on the seeds. The tension between the rights of
the farmer and of the seed manufacturer must be resolved in
light of the rights of the public in genetically modified plants.
The seeds may be protected under either the Plant Variety
Protection Act or the Patent Act; by license; or, by a contract
304
Jack may have entered into for production of the bean crop.
The ultimate form of protection of the seeds is by biochemical
means through the terminator technology. The beans Jack
planted, which eventually led him to the magical kingdom in
the clouds, could have been derived by a number of techniques:
deliberate engineering by technicians working for the seed
manufacturer; the harvesting of progeny seeds generated from

303. OWEN LOVEJOY, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, H.R. REP. NO. 37-21, at 4 (1862). This
statement is the clearest articulation of the goal of agricultural biotechnology.
It remains to be seen whether such a lofty goal can, indeed, be attained using
genetic manipulation techniques.
304. See generally Neil D. Hamilton, Why Own The Farm If You Can Own
The Farmer (And The Crop)?: Contract Production And Intellectual Property
Protection Of Grain Crops, 73 NEB. L. REV. 48 (1994).
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parent seeds which in turn were generated by deliberate
engineering; or, cross pollination where the pollen was
transported to the progenitor non-modified plants from remote
genetically modified plants. While this mode of acquiring the
genetic material for his magic beans at first glance appears to
fall under the purview of tort law, it actually implicates two
sets of rights including Jack’s right to have his plants free from
the genetic material which confers the magical qualities, and
Jack’s neighbors’ right to grow the beans with this material.
The seed manufacturer’s position regarding Jack’s beans, is
that the source of the seeds or plants is irrelevant, rather, that
the plants or seeds were found on Jack’s land is relevant. This
position leads the seed manufacturer to conclude that Jack is
infringing its property rights in the seed. Such a simple
answer may be neither statutorily correct nor just. What is
taken from the farmer by statute must be given back by reason
of justice.
A.

THE TAKING FROM THE FARMER

In this modern version of the tale of Jack and the
Beanstalk, the seed manufacturers sue Jack for infringement of
their patent, for violation of the conditions of the license
agreement, and for violation of the provisions of the PVPA.
What result? The answer depends upon how the beans are
protected, and is independent of whether Jack signed a license
agreement for the beans.
1.

Property Rights Under the Plant Variety Protection
Act

Consider the case in which Jack purchased the magic
beans from a seed manufacturer who had obtained protection
for the beans under the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970,
and who intended to sexually reproduce the beans. The Plant
Variety Protection Act grants to the owner of a certificate of
protection the attribute of personal property in the protected
305
plant variety which means that the owner of the certificate
has the “right to exclude others from selling the variety, or
offering it for sale, or reproducing it, or importing, or exporting
it, or using it in producing . . . a hybrid or different variety
305. See 7 U.S.C. § 2531(a) (1997).
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306

therefrom.”
When Jack purchased the beans, the seller
retained certain property rights while certain rights were
transferred to Jack. Before 1995, Jack could have reproduced
the seed and sold it to his neighbors for reproductive purposes.
However, since 1995 the situation has changed.
The seed manufacturers, whom we presume hold either
rights under the Plant Variety Protection Act, or patent
307
are limited under the Plant Variety
protection, or both,
Protection Act as previously discussed. Of relevance to the
current discussion is the crop exemption which allows the
farmer to save progeny seed from a planting of the variety of
seed protected by the Plant Variety Protection Act, and to use
the seed without compensating the holder of the Plant Variety
Protection Act certificate. The right to save and plant the seed
in the next crop cycle, the limitations on selling to others for
reproductive purposes, and the right to either hybrid or new
variety development is called “the crop exemption.” Without
the crop exemption, the Plant Variety Protection Act would be
meaningless because no farmer would buy Plant Variety
Protection Act protected seeds and invest the labor and expense
required to grow a crop if he could not profit from the crop by at
least selling it for non-reproductive purposes. While the crop
exemption was written into the Plant Variety Protection Act to
protect farmers from increased costs, Congress clearly did not
intend that it would provide the farmer with an unlimited right
308
to save, sell, and dispose of protected seed as he saw fit.
The central question is: exactly what property rights does
306. 7 U.S.C. § 2483(a)(1) (1997).
307. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated in
dictum that a seed or seed produced plant may enjoy protections under both
the Plant Variety Protection Act and patent, under Title 35 of the United
States Code. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. v. J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc., 200
F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The defendant argued that Pioneer held both
patents under Title 35 and certificate of protection under the Plant Variety
Protection Act, and that simultaneous protection could not be afforded because
these two statutes are in conflict. The Federal Circuit stated that:
The district court observed, correctly, that the asserted conflict is
simply the difference in the rights and obligations imposed by the
two statutes. It is not unusual for more than one statute to apply
to a legal or property interest. For example, an ornamental design
may qualify for protection under both copyright and design patent
law. The fact that the laws are of different scope does not
invalidate the laws.
Id.
308. See Delta and Pine Land Co. v. Peoples Gin Co., 694 F.2d 1012, 101516 (5th Cir. 1983).
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the crop exemption afford the farmer? The Court in Asgrow
answered this question under the statute as it stood in 1995.
When the Supreme Court decided Asgrow, 7 U. S. C. section
2541 defined the crop exemption as follows: “it shall not
infringe any right hereunder for a person to save seed produced
by him from seed obtained” by the “authority of the owner of
the variety for seeding purposes and use such saved seed in the
production of a crop for use on his farm, or for sale as provided
310
Subsections (3) and (4) of section 2541
in this section.”
provide respectively, that it is a violation of the Plant Variety
Protection Act to: (3) “sexually multiply the novel variety as a
step in marketing (for growing purposes) the variety”; and (4)
“use the novel variety in producing (as distinguished from
311
The
developing) a hybrid or different variety therefrom.”
Plant Variety Protection Act, as it stood in 1994, could
reasonably be interpreted as granting the farmer the right to
save progeny seed from Plant Variety Protection Act
certificated progenitor seeds and plant those progeny seeds on
his own farm. However, apparently the farmer could not
reproduce a Plant Variety Protection Act certificated progenitor
seed with the intent of selling the progeny seed to others, nor
could the farmer use a Plant Variety Protection Act certificated
progenitor seed to produce either a hybrid seed or a different
variety of seed. The statute was not clear on the extent to
which the farmer’s rights, in light of the crop exemption, in his
own progeny seed extended.
312
plaintiff Asgrow Seed Company was the
In Asgrow,
309. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 192 (1995) (held
that “a farmer who meets the requirements set forth in the proviso to § 2543
may sell for reproductive purposes only such seed as he has saved for the
purpose of replanting his own acreage”). The first sentence of 7 U.S.C. § 2543
states that “it shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person to save seed
produced by the person from [protected] seed . . . and use such saved seed in
the production of a crop,” and that the crop may be used “on the farm of the
person,” or sold as provided in the PVPA. 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1997). The Asgrow
Court stated that the “first sentence of § 2543 allows seed that has been
preserved for reproductive purposes . . . to be sold for such purposes.” 513 U.S.
at 190. The Court articulated the meaning of the crop exemption as being that
“a farmer saves seeds to replant his acreage, but for some reason changes his
plans, he may instead sell those seeds for replanting under the terms set forth
in the proviso” of § 2543. Id. at 191.
310. 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1994).
311. 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a)(4) (1997). A sexually reproduced plant is one which
is reproduced from seed, 7 U.S.C. § 2401(a)(6) (1997), and an asexually
reproduced plant is reproduced by either propagation or by grafting.
312. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995).
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313

holder a Plant Variety Protection Act certificate on each of
314
two varieties of soybean seed that it had developed.
The
certificate granted to Asgrow Seed Company “patent-like
protection to [its] novel varieties of sexually reproduced
315
Defendants purchased seed from plaintiff, planted it,
seed.”
316
harvested seed, cleaned it, and sold it to neighboring farmers.
Defendant Winterboer admitted that the seeds were
protected under the Plant Variety Protection Act and that they
had sold the seeds. However, he argued in defense, that the
sales were exempt under the Plant Variety Protection Act
because their primary farming occupation consisted of growing
313. See 7 U.S.C. § 2421 (1994) (application for a certificate of recognition
of plant variety rights); 7 U.S.C. § 2481 (2001) (issuance of certificate of
recognition of plant variety rights); 7 U.S.C. § 2483 (2001) (rights granted by
certificate of recognition of plant variety rights). The owner of the novel plant
variety sought to be protected applies to the Secretary for the Department of
Agriculture for a certificate of plant variety protection. 7 U.S.C. § 2421. If the
application meets the examination requirements, 7 U.S.C. § 2441, of the Plant
Variety Protection Office, 7 U.S.C. § 2321, then the Secretary of the
Department of Agriculture “shall issue a notice of allowance of plant variety
protection,” 7 U.S.C. § 2441 (2001), for the seed. The holder of the certificate
of plant variety protection “has the right, during the term of the plant variety
protection,” which is 20 years from the date of issuance of the certificate of
plant variety protection, 7 U.S.C. § 2483(b)(1), “to exclude others from selling
the variety, or offering it for sale, or reproducing it, or importing it, or
exporting it, or using it in producing . . . a hybrid or different variety
therefrom.” 7 U.S.C. § 2483(a)(1) (2001). The language which dictates the
protections afforded to the holder of the certificate of plant variety protection
is similar to the language dictating the protections afforded to the holder of a
patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1994) (amended Oct. 11, 1996, Pub. L. 104-295,
§ 20(e)(1), 110 Stat. 3529). Therefore, the protections afforded to the holder of
a certificate of plant variety protection under the Plant Variety Protection Act
are indeed similar to those granted to the holder of a patent under the Patent
Act.
314. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 181 (1995).
315. Id.
316. See id. at 181-82. During 1990, defendants planted 265 acres of the
protected soybean and sold the entire saleable crop of 10,529 bushels
neighboring farmers for reproductive purposes. See id. The seed from the 265
acres was enough to plant approximately 10,000 acres. See id. at 182. Asgrow,
acting upon suspicion that defendants were deriving substantial profits out of
selling the protected soybean, sent an agent to defendant’s farm and
determined that the defendants were indeed selling Asgrow’s protected
soybean variety. See id. at 182. The Winterboers sold the two varieties of
soybeans, which they labeled A1938 and A2235, for an average price of $8.70
per bushel where Asgrow sold the two varieties, A1937 and A2234, for
between $16.20 and $16.80 per bushel. See id. The total revenue lost by
Asgrow was approximately $173,728. Asgrow sued the defendants, seeking
damages and a permanent injunction against selling the protected variety of
seed. See id.
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crops for purposes other than sale in the seed market for
317
reproductive purposes.
The trial court rejected the
318
defendant’s arguments and held that the farmer may sell for
reproductive purposes only that quantity which he has saved
319
for replanting his own fields.
The trial court justified the
narrower interpretation of “saved seed” by stating that
Congress’ intent “in enacting the Plant Variety Protection Act
was to encourage companies to develop improved varieties of
seed and to provide for these developers the right to protect
320
The court
this seed from unauthorized sales by others.”
reasoned that if defendant were allowed to make unauthorized
sales of Plant Variety Protection Act certificated seed to fellow
farmers beyond the amount required for planting his own
fields, then Congress’ intent would be “thwarted when a
developer’s sales of such seed is diluted by the lower priced
sales by those who have contributed nothing to the
321
development of the novel variety.”
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and rejected
317. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 795 F. Supp. 915, 916-17 (N.D.
Iowa 1991). The issues before the Asgrow trial court were:
(1) that defendant Winterboer sold Plant Variety Protection Act
protected seeds without authorization from Asgrow Seed
Company, 7 U.S.C. § 2541(1); (2) that defendant Winterboer
sexually multiplied the varieties as a step in marketing the
varieties, 7 U.S.C. § 2541(3); and (3) defendant Winterboer
distributed the seed for reproductive purposes without notice that
the seed is protected by a Plant Variety Protection Act certificate,
7 U.S.C. § 2541(6).
Id. The defendant did not dispute that the soybean varieties that they had
planted, harvested, cleaned and sold for reproductive purposes were indeed
protected under the Plant Variety Protection Act. See id. at 917. Pointing to
the language in 7 U.S.C. § 2451 regarding the farmer exception, “[t]his section
provides that no infringement occurs if: . . . a person, whose primary farming
occupation is the growing of crops for sale other than reproductive purposes”
sells the “saved seed to other persons so engaged, for reproductive purposes,”
defendant argued in defense that the sales were allowed under the crop
exemption of the PVPA, because since almost 80 percent of their crop was sold
for other than reproductive purposes then the sale was within the farmer
exception. See id. at 917.
318. See id. at 918. The court stated that “[i]n 7 U.S.C. § 2543 Congress
specifically protected the historical and traditional right of small farmers like
the Winterboers to make seed sales to fellow farmers.” Id. Indicating that
Congress intended for limitations in § 2543, the court further stated that, “the
intent of Congress in enacting the Plant Variety Protection Act was not to give
a farmer an unrestricted right to sell seed.” Id.
319. See id. at 918-19.
320. Id. at 919.
321. Id. at 920.
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the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
holding that the farmer may sell for reproductive purposes only
323
that quantity he has saved for replanting his own fields.
Specifically, the Asgrow Court held that a farmer who satisfied
the crop exemption requirements could engage in “brown-bag”
sales of the protected seed for reproductive purposes, but could
sell only that quantity of protected seed necessary to replant
324
his own fields.
The Supreme Court in Asgrow considerably narrowed the
scope of the “crop exemption” by prohibiting the practice of
saving more seed than is necessary to replant one’s own fields
with the intent of selling the seeds to others for reproductive
purposes. Because it was not before the Court in Asgrow, the
question of whether a farmer may save the seeds from his own
farm and then plant that seed on another farm in the following
year remains unanswered.
The question is of some
considerable practical import, especially in circumstances in
which one farmer, who is a member of a cooperative or
partnership, grows Plant Variety Protection Act certificated
seeds and then distributes those seeds to other members of the
325
cooperative or partnership.
It is common practice for a farmer to rent fields from
another farmer for the purpose of planting. Typically, the

322. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 982 F.2d 486 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the trial court and stated
that if a “farmer grows more crop from a protected seed variety for sale to
consumers than for sale to other farmers for planting, that farmer qualifies
under [the crop exemption] to buy or sell saved seed.” Id. at 490.
323. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 192 (1995).
324. See id. The term “brown-bag” is derived from the traditional practice
of farmers selling seed, which had originally been obtained from the seed
manufacturer, planted, harvested, and cleaned on their own farm, to other
farmers in nondescript brown bags. See id. at 182. Although apparently
insignificant, the aggregate effect of brown-bag sales of protected seed
varieties can significantly decrease the profit of a seed manufacturer. See
Hamilton, supra note 304, at 95. In 1989, Pioneer Hi-Bred International
discovered that only eight percent of the variety of red winter wheat grown in
Kansas had been raised from seed actually purchased from Pioneer, with the
illegal brown-bag market accounting for the balance of that particular variety.
As a result, Pioneer Hi-Bred International ceased sale of its red winter wheat
variety in Kansas. See id. at 95. Hence the “brown-bag” sales, in aggregate,
can have a crippling effect on the seed manufacturers. The long-term result is
that the available seed will diminish in quality as the “brown-bag” seeds
diminish in integrity.
325. Such a situation is very similar to that practiced by the early
agricultural societies as discussed previously.
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renter farmer will enter into a “share cropper” arrangement
where the renter farmer agrees to supply the seed, fuel, and
labor necessary to plant the seeds. The profit from the harvest
is then split with the land’s owner. The arrangement is
dynamic in that the total number of acres involved may change
from year to year. In the event that the renter farmer has a
good yield on some of the fields using protected seed, then he
would be inclined to save a portion of the seed for subsequent
planting (part of the artificial selection process which has
produced many of the agricultural crops in use today). Since
the Court in Asgrow specified that the farmer may save only
that amount necessary to replant his own fields, the planting of
an expanded number of fields not his own might be precluded.
The trial court in Asgrow stated, in dictum, that the farmer
might be allowed to save seed from one planting cycle to plant a
larger number of acres in the next planting cycle. Specifically,
the trial court stated that the crop exception “allows a farmer
to save, at a maximum, an amount of seed necessary to plant
326
It is not clear,
his acreage for the subsequent crop year.”
unfortunately, whether the Supreme Court will adopt the trial
court’s dictum regarding how much Plant Variety Protection
Act certificated seed the farmer may save from one planting
cycle for replanting the next planting cycle.
The Plant Variety Protection Act, however, may illuminate
the answer. The statute states that it is not an infringement
for “a person to save seed produced” from the protected seed for
“use on the farm of the person.” Construing this last phrase
strictly, it would seem that the crop exemption granted the
property right of use for planting to the farm of the person who
originally purchased the protected seed. A far more reasonable
wording for the second quoted phrase is “use by the person”
which would remove the restriction that the purchaser had to
actually own the land upon which the progenitor, protected
seeds are planted or upon which the progeny seeds are
327
Under the interpretation suggested here, the crop
planted.
326. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 795 F. Supp. 915, 919 (N.D. Iowa
1991).
327. Our interpretation flows naturally from the decision in Asgrow. The
Asgrow trial court reasoned that allowing a farmer to save enough seed to
satisfy his planting needs in the next planting cycle would comport with the
intent of Congress in enacting 7 U.S.C. § 2543. See id. at 918. The result,
however, could have potentially devastating impact upon the seed
manufacturers. Under the preferred interpretation of 7 U.S.C. § 2543, a
single farmer or farming entity could purchase a small amount of protected
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exemption would confer the property right of use for planting
upon the farmer, rather than leaving it with the seed
manufacturers. In addition, it would permit the seed
manufacturers to dictate to the farmer which fields may be
planted with certificated seeds (whether progenitor or
progeny). The farmer may then plant the saved seed upon any
field of his choosing. To interpret the statutory language any
other way would be to deny the farmer the property right of
using his property (that is, the seeds grown on his own lands)
as he sees fit, and would defy Congress’ intent (of protecting
the right of farmers to save and replant) when it passed the
crop exemption of the Plant Variety Protection Act.
The farmer’s right to save and replant Plant Variety
Protection Act certificated seed can also be considered under
the doctrine of alienation of property. The owner of property
(including a patented article) is free to dispose of that property
328
as he deems necessary. Since the farmer grew the crop on his
own land with the investment of his own time and money, it
would seem reasonable that the progeny seeds produced would
329
be his own property independent of the status of ownership of
330
the progenitor seeds.
Since the progeny seeds are the

seed for planting in the first year. The farmer or farming entity, under both
the Asgrow trial court decision and 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1997), would be entitled
to save that quantity required to replant his farm during the next growing
season. This would be of great benefit to the single farmer since he would
realize considerable savings in seed for subsequent planting cycles. The
benefit would also be realized by corporate farmers who farm many hundreds,
if not thousands, of acres. Farm cooperatives or partnerships of farms would
also be able to take advantage of the preferred interpretation, articulated
here, since the crop would not belong to a single farmer but to the cooperative
or partnership. This last construct avoids the problems confronted in Delta
and Pine Land Co. v. Peoples Gin Co., 694 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1983),
because the co-operative or partnership would not be acting as an
intermediary, but rather as original owners of the right to use for planting.
The net result would certainly be a substantial decline in profits to the seed
manufacturers.
328. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 194 (1995) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). The majority does not reject this well-established point of law.
However, the majority does take issue with the application of this point in the
context of the Plant Variety Protection Act.
329. Recall that this article has described a seed as real property when still
connected to the plant, which is growing or standing on the farmer’s field. The
seed becomes personal property when harvested. For simplicity, this article
follows the modern trend in property law and merges the concepts of real and
personal property and speaks of them as “property”.
330. The language of the Plant Variety Protection Act indicates that
through certification, plants and seeds attain statutory protection as property
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farmer’s own property, he should be able to dispose of the
progeny seed at his own discretion. Such an interpretation
331
would be consistent with both the Supreme Court precedent
of “viewing restraints on alienation of property with
332
disfavor,” and with Congress’ intent to protect the farmer
against increased seed costs.
The precedent explicitly states that because of “that
absolute power which a man possesses over his own property,”
then, “he may make any disposition of it which does not
333
The doctrine
interfere with the existing rights of others.”
disfavoring restraints on alienation of personal property, as set
334
forth by Chief Justice Marshall, states that the alienation of
335
property will be considered valid “if it be fair and real” with
336
only those limitations “which are prescribed by law.”
Justice
337
Stevens’ dissent in Asgrow argues that the Federal Circuit’s
338
decision in Asgrow is supported by the doctrine disfavoring
339
restraints on the alienation of personal property. The Asgrow
Court, however, indicated that such reasoning is clearly
340
misguided.
The majority of the Court in Asgrow disposes of
the dissent’s argument by stating that “[a]pplying the rule
disfavoring restraints on alienation to interpretation of the
Plant Variety Protection Act is rather like applying the rule
disfavoring restraints upon freedom of contract to
341
The Court’s use of such
interpretation of the Sherman Act.”
an obtuse analogy to dispose of a clear argument for retaining
the doctrine in the context of seeds grown by the farmer on his
own farm indicates a refusal to recognize the very important
of the certificate holder. As we will describe later, such a reference is
imprecise because it does not allow clear identification of the rights of
certificated plants.
331. See generally Sexton v. Wheaton, 21 U.S. 229, 242 (1823) (opinion of
Marshall, C.J.).
332. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 194-5 (1995) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
333. See Sexton v. Wheaton, 21 U.S. 229, 242 (1823).
334. See id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. See supra text accompanying note 309.
338. See generally Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 982 F.2d 486 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
339. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 194-5 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
340. See id. at 188 n.3.
341. Id.
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limitation imposed by Chief Justice Marshall. The doctrine
requires that if the alienation of personal property is within the
limitations set by law, then the disposition of the property will
be viewed as valid.
Before the issue of whether the disposition of the progeny
seed of a Plant Variety Protection Act certificated progenitor
seed is lawful can be addressed, it is necessary to carefully
answer the central question of what property rights the farmer
342
retains in his own seeds. If he retains the right of alienation,
then the dissent in Asgrow must be correct and Asgrow must
have been incorrectly decided. However, if the farmer retains a
limited right of alienation, then Congress has taken a property
right without compensation and appropriated that property to
the holder of the Plant Variety Protection Act certificate. It
343
that
would appear from the language of the PVPA
propagation of the progeny seeds constitutes infringement of
the rights of the owner of the certificate of protection.
However, the language in § 2451(d) stands in stark contrast
344
345
and § 2543.
In order to reconcile the
with § 2541(e)
statute’s language and give effect to the statute as a whole, it is
necessary to conclude that the farmer retains only the right of
alienation of the progeny seed for non-reproductive purposes;
that the farmer retains the right to use the propagating
material from a certificated seed for reproductive purposes only
if the crop produced is used upon his own farm; that the farmer
does not retain the right to alienate the progeny seed from the
certificated progenitor seed for reproductive purposes; and that
the farmer does not retain the right to alienate the second
generation progeny seed from the certificated progenitor seed
342. Since a definition of property rights in progeny seeds of statutorily
protected progenitor seeds is required under both the Patent Act and the
Plant Variety Protection Act, and since the discussion of these rights will be
enriched by analysis of the protection afforded to the holder of the statutory
protection, the discussion of the property rights will be deferred until later.
Instead, this article will concentrate on identifying the statutory protections
under the Plant Variety Protection Act and identifying the ambiguities
associated with the statutory protections.
343. See 7 U.S.C. § 2541(d) (1997).
344. It is not an infringement of the rights of the owner of a Plant Variety
Protection Act certificate to perform any act with the propagating material
harvested with a certificated seed, if it is “done privately and for
noncommercial purposes.” See 7 U.S.C. § 2541(e) (1997).
345. So long as the act does not violate 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (3)-(4), the farmer
may save progeny seed for “production of a crop for use on the farm of the
person.” 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1997).
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for either non-reproductive or reproductive purposes.
The Court in Asgrow sidestepped articulating the exact
rights granted to the owner of a Plant Variety Protection Act
certificated seed and those rights granted to the farmer who
has produced progeny seeds on his own farm. The Court does,
however, explain that the Plant Variety Protection Act creates
a “valuable property in the product of botanical research by
giving the developer the right to exclude others from selling the
variety, or offering it for sale, or reproducing it, or importing it,
346
or exporting it, etc.”
This comment, made by the Court in
dictum, cannot be squared with the language identified above
in § 2541 and § 2543, and does little to clarify the rights of
either the farmer or the holder of the Plant Variety Protection
Act certificate. In fact, the statutory language in § 2541 states
that “any act concerning propagating material of any kind” is
deemed to not be infringement of the rights of the owner of the
certificate “unless the act involves further propagation of the
347
In addition, the language in § 2541 permits
variety.”
reproduction of the certificated seed for private and
348
noncommercial purposes.
Finally, § 2543 contemplates sale
of the progeny seed, of certificated progenitor seed, for non349
reproductive purposes.
Nowhere in § 2541 or § 2543 is
language found “giving the developer the right to ‘exclude
others from selling the variety, or offering it for sale, or
350
reproducing it, or importing it, or exporting it,’ etc.” Nor is
language found that vests control of such rights in the holder of
the Plant Variety Protection Act certificate.
The Court in Asgrow seems to have clarified relatively
little with regard to infringement of the rights of the holder of a
Plant Variety Protection Act certificate. What is certain, then,
is that if the farmer grows the protected seed variety for the
purpose of selling the seeds for replanting by another, the
346. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 188 n.3 (1995) (quoting,
in part, 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1994)).
347. See 7 U.S.C. § 2541(d) (1997). Furthermore, the language specifically
states that export of the protected seed is permitted if the “exported material
is for final consumption purposes.” Id.
348. See 7 U.S.C. § 2541(e) (1997).
349. See 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1997). The precise language is: “[a] sale for other
than reproductive purposes, made in channels usual for such other purposes,
of seed produced on a farm either from seed obtained by authority of the
owner for seeding purposes . . . shall not constitute an infringement.” Id.
350. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 188 n.3 (1995)
(quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2483 (1994)).

78

MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW

[Vol. 3:1

farmer loses the protection afforded in § 2543 of the Plant
Variety Protection Act. However, if the farmer sets aside a
portion of his crop from the first year with the intent of using
that “saved seed” to replant his farm the following year and
then changes his mind, then the farmer may sell the “saved
351
seed” for reproductive purposes to another.
In Asgrow, the
Court seems to be signaling that the individual farmer does not
“own” the seeds he produces on his own farm in the sense that
he holds all of the property rights in those seeds. In fact, it is
the position of the Court that by creating the genetically
modified seed, the seed manufacturer holds the property right
352
The farmer is restricted to two
of transfer of the property.
options: selling his crop for non-reproductive purposes and
retaining a portion for replanting his fields, or selling that part
he retained for reproductive purposes and selling what remains
for non-reproductive purposes. After Asgrow, it appears that in
using genetically modified, protected seeds, the farmer loses
the property right of selling his entire crop for reproductive
purposes.
Shortly before Asgrow was decided, Congress amended the
crop exemption provided in 7 U. S. C. § 2543 by removing the
“brown bag” exemption, thus making only sales for non353
reproductive purposes eligible under the crop exemption.
Because the amendment took effect after the Supreme Court
decided Asgrow, the Court held that brown-bag sales of only
that seed sufficient to replant the farmer’s own fields were
354
Were Asgrow
permissible under the “crop exemption.”
decided today, it would come out differently because farmers
would be totally prohibited from selling seed for reproductive
355
The substantive law now indicates that a farmer
purposes.
may not sell Plant Variety Protection Act certificated seed that
he has grown on his land for anything other than non-

351. With the “terminator technology,” this entire problem is moot because
the seeds cannot be sexually reproduced beyond the first generation. See
generally Jeremy P. Oczek, In the Aftermath of the “Terminator” Technology
Controversy: Intellectual Property Protections for Genetically Engineered Seeds
and the Right to Save and Replant Seed, 41 B.C. L. REV. 627 (2000).
352. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 188 n.3 (1995).
353. See Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-349, 108 Stat. 3142, 3144 (1994). The Supreme Court decided Asgrow
shortly after the 1994 amendment of the crop exemption, but before the
effective date of the amendment.
354. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 188 n.2 (1995).
355. See generally Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995).
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356

reproductive purposes. Also, the Plant Variety Protection Act
allows farmers to save the Plant Variety Protection Act
certificated seed from one planting cycle for use in a
357
It is precisely for this reason that
subsequent planting cycle.
the seed manufacturer would be motivated to seek a utility
patent under 35 U.S.C. for the seed rather than Plant Variety
Protection Act certification.
The current value of the Plant Variety Protection Act
should be seriously questioned for the following reason:
Congress’ stated intent of protecting the certificate holder’s
profits and rights was circumvented by permitting the farmers
to save and replant certificated seed. In addition, the patenting
and subsequent licensing of new varieties has made Plant
Variety Protection Act protection unattractive. When Congress
enacted the Plant Variety Protection Act in 1970, it expressly
stated that its purpose in enacting the Act was to encourage
358
Of
research and marketing for eventual public benefit.
course, lawmakers raised concerns that the new law would
impose higher costs on farmers that would ultimately be passed
359
Even though § 2543 was added to exempt
on to consumers.
360
sales of seeds between individual farmers
to lessen the
potential rise in certificated seed prices, Congress recognized
361
that a price rise was inevitable.
Recognizing that the Act

356. See 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1997).
357. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 188 n.2 (1995);
Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-349, 108
Stat. 3136, 3142 (1994); 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1994); 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1997).
358. Specifically, the language is: “[i]t is the intent of Congress to provide
the indicated protection for new varieties by exercise of any constitutional
power needed for that end, so as to afford adequate encouragement for
research, and for marketing when appropriate, to yield for the public the
benefits of new varieties.” 7 U.S.C. § 2581 (1970).
359. See generally 116 CONG. REC. 40,295-40,303, 40,295 (daily ed. Dec. 8,
1970) (statement of Rep. Poage).
360. See Delta and Pine Land Co. v. Peoples Gin Co., 694 F.2d 1012, 1017
(5th Cir. 1983) (holding that the crop exemption contemplates only direct sales
between individual farmers without the participation of a third party).
361. Representative Poage stated that:
I do not think there is any doubt that it will mean if somebody
produces a seed that gives better results than anybody else’s seed,
and if he is the only one who can sell that seed, then he will get more
for it . . . . This is the only way we know to get people to invest their
time and money. It is expensive to develop such seeds. So in the end,
we believe there will be beneficial results for the producers and
farmers.
116 CONG. REC. at 40,296.
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would clearly benefit the seed manufacturers through
competition, it became clear that the farmer could not be
insulated from the negative economic side effects of the Plant
362
Variety Protection Act, notwithstanding § 2543.
Since a
farmer can replant seed produced on his farm from Plant
363
Variety Protection Act protected seed without liability, the
seed manufacturer loses a potential sale each time a farmer
does replant. Despite the prohibition on sale of protected seed
between individual farmers, the crop exemption of the Plant
Variety Protection Act runs counter to the Act’s express
purpose because the farmer can still replant his fields with
protected seed that he has grown on his own land. Therefore,
in order to prevent significant financial loss to the seed
manufacturers, the Plant Variety Protection Act must be
amended to remove this exemption as articulated in § 2543.
2.

Property Rights Under the Patent Act

Section 101 of Title 35 of the United States Code defines
patentable subject matter. The Supreme Court stated in
364
that statutory subject matter “include[d]
Chakrabarty
anything under the sun that is made by man” including manmade life forms. Living organisms are considered patentable
because they are either articles of manufacture or compositions
365
The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
of matter.
addressed the question of whether either the Plant Patent Act
366
367
of 1930 or the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 were the
exclusive forms of protection for plants, or whether protection
could be afforded by 35 U. S. C. § 101 in addition to either the
368
Based
Plant Patent Act or the Plant Variety Protection Act.
on the analysis set forth in Chakrabarty, the Board found that
neither the Plant Patent Act nor the Plant Variety Protection
362. See Delta and Pine Land Co. v. Peoples Gin Co., 694 F.2d 1012, 1016
(5th Cir. 1983).
363. See 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1994).
364. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).
365. See id. at 309-10 (quoting Hantranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615
(1887)).
366. See 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1994).
367. See 7 U.S.C. § 2321 (1994).
368. See generally Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (Bd. Pat.
App. & Interf. 1985) (holding that a maize plant variety which produced a
high level of tryptophan was patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and may be
certificated under the Plant Variety Protection Act).
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Act narrowed the scope of patentable subject matter under 35
U. S. C. §101. While the question was not directly before the
Board in the case, the Board stated that genetically modified
369
plants, seeds, and plant tissue are patentable under the
principles set forth in Chakrabarty. The Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit in Pioneer Hi Bred International, Inc. v.
370
371
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. clearly stated that a novel plant
369. See id. at 443, 447-48.
370. See Pioneer Hi Bred International, Inc. v. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 200
F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
371. While the statement was made in dictum, it is a clear representation
of the position of the United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, and is a
position that the Supreme Court has taken as well. As this manuscript was
entering the final editing stage for publication, the Supreme Court decided the
case of Pioneer Hi-Bred Inc. v. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. Because of the
importance of the case, a brief review is given here.
In Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc. v. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1813 (N.D. Iowa 1998), the District Court of the Northern District of
Iowa denied a motion for summary judgment brought by defendants in favor
of Pioneer Hi-Bred on the question of patentability of plants. Specifically, the
issue before the district court, upon the motion for summary judgment, was
whether “the Plant Variety Protection Act is the exclusive federal statutory
mechanism for granting patent like protection for sexually reproducing plants
to the exclusion of the general patent law.” Id. at 1814. An interlocutory
appeal was made to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See Pioneer
Hi-Bred Intern. Inc. v. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 200 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Judge Newman wrote the opinion, for the panel consisting of Judges Mayer,
Newman and Lourie, affirming the denial of summary judgment by the
district court. On December 10, 2001, the Supreme Court upheld the denial of
summary judgment on writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit in J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern.
Inc., 122 S. Ct. 593 (2001). The case was the first opportunity for the Supreme
Court to decide the issue of patentability of plants since the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences, of the United States Patent and Trademark Office,
held that plants were patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Ex parte
Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 444 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1985). The
Supreme Court held “that utility patents may be issued for plants.” J.E.M. Ag.
Supply, 122 S. Ct. 593, 596 (2001). The question before the Supreme Court
was whether “utility patents may be issued for plants under 35 U.S.C. § 101,”
J.E.M. Ag. Supply, 122 S. Ct. 593, 596 (2001), or whether the Plant Patent Act
and the Plant Variety Protection Act are the exclusive means “of obtaining
federal Statutory right to exclude others from reproducing, selling, or using
plants or plant varieties,” id. J.E.M. Ag Supply had purchased bags of hybrid
corn seeds bearing a limited label license and resold those same bags to
farmers. J.E.M. Ag Supply was not a licensed agent of Pioneer Hi-Bred
International. Pioneer Hi-Bred brought a cause of action against J.E.M. Ag
Supply for patent infringement and J.E.M. Ag Supply counterclaimed patent
invalidity. See id. at 597. The District court for the Northern District of Iowa
held that plant life is patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See J.E.M. Ag
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern. Inc., 122 S. Ct. 593, 597 (2001);
Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc. v. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d
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(BNA) 1813 (N.D. Iowa 1998). Significantly, the district court stated that the
seed was not removed from the Pioneer Hi-Bred seed corn bags, was not
rebagged, and “the markings on the Pioneer bags have not been altered.”
Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc. v. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1813, 1814 (N.D. Iowa 1998). The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit affirmed both the reasoning and the decision of the district court. See
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern. Inc., 122 S. Ct. 593, 597
(2001); Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern. Inc. v. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 200 F.3d 1374
(Fed. Cir. 2000). The Federal Circuit stated that: “[n]either Congress nor the
courts excluded new plant varieties from the patent statute; the enactment of
the PVPA did not effect such an exclusion.” Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern. Inc. v.
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 200 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the Federal Circuit, and thus the case must be
tried to a jury in the Northern District of Iowa on the question of patent
infringement. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that “newly developed
plant breeds fall within the terms of §101.” J.E.M. Ag. Supply, 122 S. Ct. 593,
606 (2001). Two unresolved issues are immediately apparent: first, even if
“newly developed plant breeds” are patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101, whether
the patent is valid in light of obviousness and prior art; and second, whether
the first sale doctrine applies to seed that has been purchased from the seed
manufacturer such that it can be resold without being reproduced under
United States v. Univis Lens Co., Inc., 316 U. S. 241, 249 (1942). The first of
these issues is briefly discussed here; the other is discussed elsewhere in this
article.
The first immediately apparent issue is whether the patent, issued on a plant
variety, is valid. 35 U.S.C. § 101 provides that: “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. §
101 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). In 1980, the Supreme Court concluded that
living things were patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because “the relevant
distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between
products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions.”
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980). The issue upon which
Chakrabarty turned was whether a “composition of matter” included living
things. The Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty stated that: “[i]n
choosing such expansive terms as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’
modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the
patent laws would be given wide scope.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 308 (1980). Because the Court viewed living things as compositions of
matter, then it held, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, that living things were
patentable. The Supreme Court extended this logic to plants in J.E.M. Ag
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern. Inc. However, reliance by the Supreme
Court upon the decision by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, in
Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1985), as to
whether plants are “compositions of matter” and hence patentable under §101
is misplaced. This is because of three interconnected concepts: (a) the term
“plant” is ambiguous; (b) the plant cell is actually a biological machine; and (c)
naturally occurring mutations in the plant variety genome preclude a clear
definition of exactly what legal estate is actually protected by the letters
patent. While these concepts will be considerably expanded elsewhere, space
limitations permit only the briefest exposition of them here.
When the Court states that “plants” are patentable, it does nothing to clarify
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the state of the patent law with respect to genetic manipulation of the plant
genome. This is because the term “plant” is ambiguous. While common sense
dictates that a “plant” is that item that we can perceive using our five senses,
a clear definition of the term “plant” such that the force of patent law may be
engaged is certainly not in hand. Turning to the plain meaning canon of
construction, a plant is defined as: “any living thing that cannot move
voluntarily, has no sense organs, and generally makes its own food by
photosynthesis; a vegetable organism, as distinguished from an animal
organism; any tree, shrub, herb, etc.” WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY
DICTIONARY 1373 (1983). While this moves us further toward what the term
“plant” means for patenting purposes, the movement is only incremental.
This is because, as indicated earlier, 35 U.S.C. § 101 provides that: “[w]hoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.” Thus, for “plants” to be patentable, the inventor must have either
invented or discovered the “plant” or “any new and useful improvement” of the
“plant” (accepting for the time being that a “plant” is included in the
“composition of matter” category). That is, the inventor must have either
invented or discovered an inanimate object devoid of senses and voluntary
movement, which generates its own food by photosynthesis, or “any new and
useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). One can easily make
the argument that indeed by inserting a transgene into the genome of a plant
variety, the criteria articulated in the previous sentence are indeed satisfied.
However, the inanimate object devoid of senses and voluntary movement,
which generates its own food by photosynthesis, existed before the inventor
inserted the transgene. The only difference between the inanimate object
before the inventor inserted the transgene and after the transgene was
inserted is that after the transgene was inserted the cells of the inanimate
object produce the protein or chemical specifically encoded for by the
transgene (presuming, of course, that the transgene is completely expressed
by those same cells). The inventor did not change the physical form of the
inanimate object, except, possibly, for a scaling in size, (which accounts for the
lack of ability of the average farmer to know whether genetically manipulated
plants exist on his fields by mere visual inspection) nor did the inventor
change the function of the cells of the inanimate object. Because nothing
changed about the inanimate object upon insertion of the transgene, except for
the production of a single chemical species, the inventor did not either invent
or discover an inanimate object devoid of senses and voluntary movement,
which generates its own food by photosynthesis, or “any new and useful
improvement thereof,” id., then the inventor did not invent a “plant.” In order
for the physical manifestation of the inventor’s original thought to be
protected by the granting of a letters patent the term “plant” must be replaced
by a term that correctly describes the nature of that physical manifestation.
The Supreme Court considers the combination of the transgene and the plant
genome a “plant” which it places within the statutory subject matter
“composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). As discussed elsewhere,
labeling the aforementioned inanimate object/transgene a “composition of
matter” is to use clever language of form to mask the reality of function. A
plant is composed of cells. Each cell is a biological machine that uses the
information stored in the plant genome (the cellular DNA) to produce a
myriad of chemical compounds (some of which are more useful to the plant
than others). That is, the expression of a gene, contained in the plant genome,
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causes the cell (the biological machine) to produce a particular chemical
compound. If the codons of the gene are altered, through either natural
mutations or through insertion of foreign codons, then the chemical compound
produced by the cell will be altered. If a given naturally occurring gene is
replaced by a foreign gene, which may be a transgene, then the cell will (or
may) not produce the original chemical compound but will generate a different
compound. If the plant genome is supplemented by the insertion of a
transgene (a gene that is from a sexually incompatible species) then the cell of
the plant will produce a new chemical compound in addition to the previous
set of chemical compounds (presuming, of course that the transgene is
completely expressed, and that insertion of the transgene does not inhibit
normal expression of the native genes). The cell of the plant, that is the
biological machinery, is not altered by the presence or expression of the
transgene and the biological machinery is not changed by the presence of the
chemical compound encoded for by the inserted transgene. To give a concrete
analogy, consider a manufacturing plant that initially produces green widgets.
A change in instructions to the machinery of the plant to produce blue widgets
does not change the machinery of the manufacturing plant, only the color of
the product produced by that machinery. So it is for the biological machinery
of the plant cell. The biological machinery is not altered by the expression of
the transgene, only the type of chemical compound produced.
While the presence of the chemical compound, encoded for by the inserted
transgene, in the cells of the plant may be new, and may confer useful
characteristics upon the plant, the inventor has neither invented or discovered
“any new and useful” biological machinery nor has the inventor invented “any
new and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). The most that
the inventor has done is to take a previously existing biological machine and
instructed it to produce a different chemical compound.
Finally, as discussed elsewhere in this paper, the plant genome is public
property. Therefore, even if a patent is granted for a “transgenic plant,” the
genome of the plant is public property and the patent is not infringed because
to hold otherwise would be to allow adverse possession against public
property.
While it is the position of the author that patents on “transgenic plants”
cannot be valid (even given that the Supreme Court held that “plants” are
patentable), it is also the position of the author that valid patents may be
obtained to protect the rights in intellectual property of inventors who
genetically manipulate plants. To see this, consider the statement of the
Supreme Court, in J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern. Inc., that:
“advances in biological knowledge and breeding expertise have allowed plant
breeders to satisfy § 101’s demanding description requirement.” J.E.M. Ag
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern. Inc., 122 S. Ct. 593, 600 (2001). When
a transgene is inserted into the plant genome, current biological techniques
can be used to determine that: (a) the complete transgene has been inserted;
(b) the introns can be both identified and their location within the transgene
can be precisely determined; (c) the transgene is completely expressed by the
cell; and (d) the chemical compound encoded for by the transgene is both
produced and is produced as a direct result of the expression of the transgene
by the cell. Thus, the physical manifestation of the original thought of the
inventor can be completely characterized sufficient to meet the patenting
standards of 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) and 112, ¶ 1 (1994). Thus, a claim that
covers the transgene satisfying the criteria enumerated in (a) through (d)
above is not only patentable, but indeed valid. In fact, such a claim may be all
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variety might be protected under both Title 35, Section 101 of
the United States Code and the Plant Variety Protection Act.
Thus, a seed manufacturer may obtain a patent on a variety of
genetically modified seed as well as certification under the
Plant Variety Protection Act. Furthermore, the case history
indicates that a particular variety of plant may be protected
372
under both Section 101 and Section 161 of Title 35.
Because
Section 161 of Title 35 relates to asexually reproduced plants
while the Plant Variety Protection Act relates to sexually
reproduced plants, and since “variety” is defined differently
under each statute, a plant cannot be protected under both the
Plant Patent Act and the Plant Variety Protection Act.
In Jack’s case, statutory protection for the beans could
have been obtained by a utility patent on that particular bean
373
The statute states that the utility patent protection
variety.
may be obtained for “any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
374
In exchange for creating Jack’s beans
improvement thereof.”
and making full public disclosure of the invention, the seed
375
manufacturer is granted patent protection. In order to obtain
a patent on Jack’s beans, the seed manufacturer must convince
376
the Patent and Trademark Office
that the pertinent
requirements of Title 35 of the United States Code have been
377
satisfied. Once this demonstration has been made the Patent
and Trademark Office will issue a patent on the beans, which
that is required to fully protect the interests of the inventor in his legal estate.
372. See generally Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (Bd. Pat.
App. & Interf. 1985).
373. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). “Whoever invents or discovers
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” Id.
374. Id.
375. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1022 (1989).
376. In order to obtain a patent, the inventor must show that the invention
is useful and novel, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 (1994), and non-obvious, 35 U.S.C. §
103(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Also, the patent holder must enable the
invention, meaning that the inventor must provide sufficient information
about the invention to enable “others skilled in the art” to replicate the
invention. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994 &
Supp. III 1997).
377. Since the beans are presumed to have been obtained by sexual
reproduction, the Plant Patent Act provisions of Title 35 are not applicable.
The seed manufacturer may only obtain a utility patent on the beans it sold to
Jack.
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protects the invention for a period of twenty years after the
378
date of filing the patent. As discussed infra, the granting of a
patent on an invention creates rather broad and exclusive
rights to exclude others from producing, selling, using, or
379
offering for sale the invention within the United States.
380
When infringement of the patent occurs, the patent holder
381
has a cause of action against the infringer.
Since Jack purchased the seeds, he may plant them and
382
reap the harvest from the magical kingdom in the clouds.
The question is what may Jack legally do with the beans
produced by his mighty beanstalk?
The grant of a patent by the United States Patent and
Trademark Office creates a legal estate in the patentee for a
statutorily specified period. Similar to other legal estates,
equitable interests may be incident to the estate created by the
patent, and these interest may be conveyed by either contract
or by operation of law. The person to whom the patent is
issued, the patentee, holds a present interest in the legal
383
The interest,
estate, which descends to his heirs or assigns.

378. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
379. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
380. Infringement of the patent may occur in a number of ways, including
imitation of the invention, see Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical
Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997), and independent invention after the original invention
was made.
381. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1994).
382. While it is common sense that Jack should be able plant the beans
and to reap the harvest from the plants, in light of the patent statute, it is not
so clear what rights Jack has in his beans.
383. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The patentee holds
a present interest in a legal estate, which his heirs or assigns may take either
by contract or by operation of law. The patentee, however, need not be the
inventor because the inventor may have assigned the patent to the patentee
either before the invention was completed or before the patent was issued. See
35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994). When the invention has been assigned by the inventor,
the patent will issue to the assignee. See 35 U.S.C. § 152 (1994 & Supp. III
1997) (“Patents may be granted to the assignee of the inventor of record in the
Patent and Trademark Office, upon the application made and the specification
sworn to by the inventor, except as otherwise provided in this title.”) When the
patent is granted to the assignee, the interest in the legal estate becomes
vested in the assignee, and the assignee becomes the patentee of the
invention. Since the entire interest in the legal estate is vested in the
patentee, upon granting of the patent, the inventor cannot, and does not, hold
an interest in the legal estate; hence the inventor is divested of title to any
interest in the legal estate.
In the case that the inventor assigned his title in the legal estate before the
patent was granted, the assignee does not take possession of title to the legal
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which the holder of the legal estate possesses, is only the power
384
to exclude others from “making, using, [or] offering for sale”
the invention for a period of 20 years from the date of filing of
385
the patent application in the United States.
In order to analyze the interests held by the patentee, it is
necessary to look at the Patent Act because the statute
“regulate[s] the whole subject of transferring or subdividing the
386
exclusive right vested by the patent in the patentee,” and the
387
transfer and subdivision are not regulated by common law.
The statutory provision recites that the patents “shall be
388
assignable in law by an instrument in writing.”
The statute
addresses only the legal estate vested in the patentee. That is,
the statute recognizes an exclusive right, vested in the
patentee, which can be conveyed to another only in the form of
estate until the patent has actually issued. Between the time that the
assignment was made by the inventor and the issuance of the patent, the
assignee holds only the right to obtain title to the legal estate and the right to
pursue remedies, in both law and equity, against the inventor and third
parties. A question arises as to whether the right to obtain the title to the
legal estate can be conveyed to another before the invention is perfected. That
is: is a conveyance of the right to take title to the legal estate valid before
either conception or reduction to practice of the invention? The answer is no.
The statute mandates that “[a]pplications for patent, patents, or any interest
therein, shall be assignable in law.” 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994). Since constructive
reduction to practice occurs when the application for patent is filed, and the
invention is presumed to exist when the patent is granted, then the statute
appears to contemplate assignment of title to the legal estate of completed
inventions. Since the invention must exist before title may be assigned, then
an assignment of an incomplete or inchoate invention is not valid. However, a
contract to convey the exclusive interest in a legal estate of a future invention
may be enforced by a bill of specific performance. See Nesmith v. Calvert, 1
Wood. & M. 34, 18 F. Cas. 2 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 10,123). The conveyance
of interest in the legal estate can only operate when the device or process has
been either conceived or reduced to practice and is suitable subject matter for
an application for a patent. A contract may be negotiated between the
inventor, or his heirs or assigns, and the party who is to take legal title to the
invention before the invention has been perfected. However, the contract to
convey the interest in a future invention or an improvement to be made to an
existing invention will not, standing by itself, authorize the party who is to
take legal title to take the patent upon issue.
384. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
385. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
386. George T. Curtis, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL
INVENTIONS 162 (1867).
387. Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477 (1850) (the court stated that:
“the monopoly granted to the patentee . . . is created by the act of Congress;
and no rights can be acquired in it unless authorized by statute, and in the
manner the statute prescribes,” id. at 494).
388. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).
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writing. The statute provides that either the whole or part of
389
the vested exclusive right may be conveyed to another and
that the conveyed exclusive right may cover either the “whole
390
or any specified part of the United States.”
The statutory grant of an exclusive right in the patentee is
peculiar to patent law because the interest, as stated above, is
the “right to exclude others from making, using, offering for
391
sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States.”
In addition, the interest relates spatially to various regions of
the United States. This means that the patentee may, by a
written instrument, convey to any other person the right to
exclude others from “making, using, etc.” within any particular
part of the United States. The patentee retains all other rights
392
The statute does not, however, act to
in the legal estate.
create an exclusive interest in a legal estate which includes the
right to make, use, offer for sale, or sell the “invention
393
but rather, the exclusive
throughout the United States,”
interest is the right to exclude others from doing so.
The statute relates solely to the conveyance of the
exclusive interest in the legal estate created by the grant of a
patent within a particular territory of the United States. After
the conveyance, the patentee retains no interest in the legal
estate within that particular territory of the United States.
Consider an instrument, which conveys a limited and nonexclusive right to exercise some of the privileges secured to the
patentee by the grant of a patent within a limited territory or
the whole of the United States. The statute does not relate to
such an instrument of conveyance because the instrument is a
license, and no language can be found in the statute relating to
the conveyance of less than the exclusive interest. The
formalities attending the conveyance of exclusive interest must
394
The conveyance
be reduced to “an instrument in writing.”
389. If a contract or covenant has been made that the inventor will convey
his exclusive interest in the legal estate to a party, in whose favor the contract
operates, then equity holds that the inventor is compelled to make the
conveyance, including any improvements made to the invention after the
patent application has been filed. See Nesmith v. Calvert, 1 Wood. & M. 34, 18
F. Cas. 2 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 10,123).
390. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).
391. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
392. See Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 494 (1850).
393. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). See also 35 U.S.C. §
261 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
394. 35 U.S.C. § 261, ¶ 2 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
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may operate as either an assignment or a license.
To
distinguish, recognize that to operate as an assignment, the
instrument must convey to the grantee the exclusive interests
395
which the patentee, or inventor, holds in the legal estate.
Therefore, the patentee may partition his legal estate as he
396
sees fit. Of course, the marketability of a limited interest in a
legal estate may be inhibited. Once the interest has been
397
assigned, it is not revocable.
The statute contemplates that
the interest is divisible into two parts: first, the “patent, or any
398
interest therein” is “assignable in law”;
and second, an
exclusive right under the patent can be granted to any specified
399
part or the whole of the United States. The conveyance of the
exclusive interest in the legal estate created by the patent must
400
be recorded with the Patent and Trademark Office.
Three classes of conveyances of exclusive interest must be
recorded with the Patent and Trademark Office: first, an
assignment of the whole exclusive interest must be recorded;
second, an assignment of an undivided part of the exclusive
interest must be recorded; and third, the exclusive interest to
exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention
within a specified part or the whole of the United States must
401
One can see that the conveyance to be recorded
be recorded.
must divest the patentee of his entire interest in such part of
the legal estate, or in such part of the United States, as the
instrument affects. If the instrument vests an exclusive
interest in the grantee such that the patentee is no longer able
to exert control over that interest in law or equity, then that
instrument must be recorded with the Patent and Trademark
Office.
The instrument conveys a license, and as such, is not
required to be recorded with the Patent and Trademark office if
the instrument permits the patentee to exercise control over
that interest which the instrument affects, and vests in the
grantee the privilege to be free from liability if the grantee
395. The patentee has the right to exclude others from making, using,
selling, or offering to sell the invention; further, in granting to others an
interest in his legal estate, the patentee also retains the right to limit the
interest granted.
396. See Steam Cutter Co. v. Sheldon, 10 Blatch. 1, (C.C.D. Vt. 1872).
397. See id. at 12.
398. Id.
399. See id.
400. See 35 U.S.C. § 261, ¶ 3 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
401. See id.
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chooses to make, use, sell, or offer to sell the invention
402
patented.
Whether the conveyance is an assignment of
exclusive interest (either in whole or in part of the legal estate
created by the patent grant) or a license is to be determined by
the following: an “inquiry into the fair meaning and intention
403
of the parties;” the nature of the transaction; the type and
quantity of consideration; and extrinsic circumstances
404
indicating that an assignment was conveyed.
If the patentee
holds the interest to make, use, sell, or offer to sell within a
particular part or the whole of the United States with the
grantee, then the instrument of conveyance will certainly be a
license, which need not be recorded with the Patent and
Trademark Office.
To be precise, an assignment relates to the interest in the
patent whereas the license relates to the mere right to not be
liable for infringement of the patent should the grantee use the
patented invention or practice the invention. The license does
not grant to the grantee the primary interest in the legal
estate; that is, the right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention patented. The
assignment necessarily diminishes pro tanto the interest that
the patentee holds in the legal estate, while the interest of the
patentee remains unencumbered by the rights conveyed by the
license. The licensee cannot acquire an exclusive interest in
the patented invention, and hence takes no part of the legal
estate. For example, consider a composition of matter as the
subject matter of the invention. If the patentee authorizes
another to make and sell a composition of matter, the grantee

402. See Brooks v. Byam, 2 Story 256, 4 F. Cas. 258 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840)
(No. 1,947); Pitts v. Whitman, 2 Story 609, 19 F. Cas. 767 (C.C.D. Me. 1843)
(No. 11,196). The precise result derived from the cited cases is that: if the
instrument permits the patentee to exercise control over that interest which
the instrument affects, and vests in the grantee the privilege to make, use, or
sell the invention free of liability then the instrument of conveyance is a
license and as such is not required to be recorded with the Patent and
Trademark Office. This result cannot be reached under modern patent law
because the patentee is granted, by letters patent, the exclusive right to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale or selling the invention
patented. Since the only interest, of present concern, in the legal estate is the
right of the patentee to exclude others then the only interest that can be
conveyed is the right to not be liable when the grantee chooses to infringe the
patent.
403. Dorsey Revolving Harvester Rake Co. v. Bradley Mfg. Co., 12 Blatch.
202, 208, 7 F. Cas. 946, 948 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 4,015).
404. See id.
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becomes a licensee and has no authority to grant to other
405
parties the right to make and sell the composition of matter.
The patentee retains the exclusive interest of granting to the
406
other parties such a right.
Thus, the licensee has the
authority to exercise only those privileges contemplated by the
patentee when the license was conveyed and the exclusive
interest in the legal estate remains with the patentee.
Having described in detail that which is created when a
patent is granted, this Note will now examine the nature of the
legal estate with respect to genetically modified plants. There
can be no doubt that the current status of the law holds that
genetically modified plants are patentable subject matter under
35 U. S. C. § 101 (they may also be certificated under either the
Plant Variety Protection Act or the Plant Patent Act). In fact,
the Supreme Court decided on December 10, 2001, just as this
work was in the last stage of the editing process, that plants
407
The question of patentability
are patentable subject matter.
408
of Roundup Ready canola was also raised by the defense in
409
the case of Monsanto v. Schmeiser.
The corpus of the legal
405. See Brooks v. Byam, 2 Story 256, 4 F. Cas. 258 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840)
(No. 1,947).
406. See Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 495 (1850) (holding: “the
legal right in the monopoly remains in the patentee, and he alone can
maintain an action against a third party who commits an infringement upon
it”). See also Woodworth v. Wilson, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 712 (1846); Wilson v.
Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 646, 686, 688 (1846).
407. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern. Inc., 122 S. Ct.
593 (2001). The case clarifies relatively little, and in fact may have actually
set the stage for a multitude of problems for the seed manufacturers in the
future. A brief discussion of the case is presented supra, note 371.
408. Roundup® and Roundup Ready® are trademark names of products
produced and marketed by Monsanto. For simplicity, these trademark names
will be used throughout the text, unless a specific quotation is identified,
without the symbol ®.
409. See Monsanto Can., Inc. v. Schmeiser Enters., Ltd., 2001 FCT 256
(Fed. Ct. Canada 2001), available at http://decisions.fctcf.gc.ca/fct/2001/
2001fct256.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2001). In discussing the validity of the
patent which Mr. Schmeiser was accused of infringing, Mr. Judge MacKay
stated in paragraph 83 that:
[m]oreover, the fact that replication of the gene may occur in the
natural course of events, without human intervention after
insertion of the gene in the original plant cells, and plants,
produced for seed, and that this may result in differences between
individual canola plants does not in itself preclude registration,
under the Patent Act, of the invention, that is, creation of the gene
and the process for inserting the gene. Not all progeny from pollen
of Roundup Ready plants will be Roundup tolerant if outcrossing
with Roundup susceptible plants occurs, but only use of those
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plants containing the gene can be subject to Monsanto’s claims as
patent holder.
Id. Because this paragraph may be dispositive in determining liability for
contamination of a non-licensed farmer’s fields through genetic pollution and
because it is determinative in assessing liability for patent infringement by
Mr. Schmeiser (and similarly situated farmers), it warrants some
consideration. The conclusion that “only use of those plants containing the
gene can be subject to Monsanto’s claims as patent holder” is both drawn on a
faulty analysis of the relevant plant genetics and plant biochemistry,
discussed infra, and leads to a serious undercutting of Monsanto’s legal
position, of the farmer’s legal position, and puts the court in a position that it
very well might not want to be. The court’s analysis appears to hinge on the
presumption that the exhibition of Roundup resistance in a variety implies
that the transgene is present in that variety. The court’s conclusion is that
the right of Monsanto to protect its interest in the transgene follows the
transgene independent of where that transgene might be found. Thus, the
court appears to desire to find that any farmer who has the transgene in
plants on his fields, without a license, is guilty of infringement of Monsanto’s
patent.
Several possible outcomes are immediately apparent as a result of the court’s
conclusion that Monsanto’s right to protect its interest in the transgene is
independent of where the transgene is found. Provided the court was correct
in its assertion that “[n]ot all progeny from pollen of Roundup Ready plants
will be Roundup tolerant if outcrossing with Roundup susceptible plants
occurs,” which it was not, then a case could exist in which the transgene is
present in the progeny (of the originally Roundup Ready progenitor variety)
but not be expressed, and hence the progeny would be Roundup sensitive.
Unless Monsanto performed a careful DNA analysis on the progeny variety it
would be unable to determine whether the transgene was present in the
progeny (that is, Monsanto could not simply rely on the grow-out test it used
to determine whether Roundup Ready canola was growing on Mr. Schmeiser’s
fields). In this case, it would not be economically, or practically, feasible for
Monsanto to obtain the probable cause to believe that the transgene was
present on the farmer’s fields. Further, because the court is equating the
presence of the transgene with Roundup tolerance, if Monsanto attempts to
claim infringement of a patent where the transgene is found on the farmer’s
field when the transgene is not expressed, under the court’s statement it
cannot do so (because the plants are Roundup sensitive). When the transgene
is present in the plants on the farmer’s fields but not expressed, the farmer
has no way of knowing of the existence of the transgene until testing of the
crop occurs prior to selling that crop into a premium market (such as for
human consumption). Here, the farmer has two options: first, to not sell into
the premium market and hence eliminate the need for testing for the presence
of the transgene; second, to attempt to sell into the premium market and run
the dual risk associated with testing for the presence of the transgene. The
first risk is that his crop will not be suitable for sale into the premium market
and hence he will lose his premium price. The second risk is that Monsanto
will find out about the presence of the transgene on the fields of the farmer
and sue the farmer for patent infringement. Finally, if the farmer is
producing a crop to be sold into the premium market for reproductive
purposes, and that crop is contaminated by the transgene unbeknownst to the
farmer, then the farmer has the same dual risk just identified.
The second possible outcome may result when the transgene is both present
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and expressed in the progeny (of originally Roundup sensitive progenitor
variety) plants. The result concerning the farmer, as discussed in the previous
paragraph, will occur in this case. The current case is the strongest case for
Monsanto because when it is observed that the progeny both has the
transgene present in its genome and the transgene is (apparently) expressed,
then the court will conclude that the farmer is guilty of infringement. There
are several problems with this outcome. First, as discussed infra, the
presence of the transgene and the exhibition of Roundup tolerance by the
progeny variety is not sufficient to conclude infringement of the patent.
Second, it necessarily denies the farmer his right to not have the transgene in
the plants on his fields. Third, it denies Monsanto the possible defense of
disclaiming all interest in the transgene when the transgene has polluted the
farmer’s fields.
The third possible outcome may result when the progeny (of an originally
Roundup sensitive progenitor variety) exhibits Roundup resistance but the
underlying biochemical and genetic basis for the resistance is not certain.
Because the court is equating Roundup tolerance with the presence of the
gene, then the court must necessarily conclude that whenever Roundup
tolerance is found then the transgene is present. This is problematic for
Monsanto on several levels: first, if the progeny of originally Roundup
sensitive weeds exhibit Roundup tolerance, then the court must conclude that
the transgene is present in the noxious weeds. In this case, Monsanto may be
liable for genetic pollution and creation of a nuisance and may not be able to
use the defense that the progeny noxious weeds lack the transgene. Second, if
a progeny plant (of an originally Roundup sensitive plant variety) that is
Roundup tolerant occurs in the farmer’s field, then the farmer will be unable
to use the defense that the tolerance was naturally developed because the
court must conclude that the tolerance is the result of the transgene’s
presence on the farmer’s fields. Also, should the farmer sue Monsanto for
genetic pollution, then Monsanto will be unable to argue that it has no
interest in the gene (that has caused the plant to exhibit Roundup tolerance)
and, simultaneously, Monsanto may successfully sue the farmer for
infringement of the patent (because the court has held that Monsanto’s
interest in the legal estate containing the transgene travels with the
transgene independent of where that transgene may be found). Because the
court fails to separate the existence of Roundup tolerance from the presence of
the gene, its statement that “only use of those plants containing the gene can
be subject to Monsanto’s claims as patent holder” undercuts Monsanto’s legal
position with respect to the farmer; undercuts the farmer’s legal position with
Monsanto; and puts the court into the position of coming to unjust conclusions
(as it did in the Schmeiser case). The court came to this untenable position
because it failed to recognize the basics of plant genetics and plant
biochemistry.
Stating that “[n]ot all progeny from pollen of Roundup Ready plants will be
Roundup tolerant if outcrossing” occurs, clearly mixes the concepts underlying
the areas of plant genetics and plant biochemistry while failing to understand
the biochemistry of gene expression. The court in paragraph 83, quoted supra,
is making two highly questionable assumptions: first, that the presence of the
transgene is a necessary condition for the plant to exhibit commercially useful
Roundup resistance; and second, that outcrossing with a Roundup sensitive
variety may lead to the existence of the transgene in the progeny without
being expressed and that the transgene simply may not be transferred at all.
The presence of the transgene is not conclusive as to whether the plant
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exhibits Roundup resistance. If the gene is not properly expressed or is not
expressed at all, then the plant may not exhibit Roundup resistance. Further,
the presence of the transgene might not be necessary for the plant to exhibit
Roundup resistance (as is amply demonstrated by the development of
Roundup resistance in noxious weed species). The transgene (conferring
Roundup resistance) was designed to be dominant; that is, both present and
expressed in the progeny plant. In fact, Robert Horsch, under crossexamination at trial in the case of Monsanto v. Schmeiser, “agreed [that] a
dominant gene, such as the Roundup resistant gene transferred to canola
plants, would be present in any pollen from that plant and could be
incorporated by nontransgenic plants.” Murray Lyons, Farmer’s Reapings No
Fluke, Court Told: Schmeiser Planted Roundup Ready Canola Knowingly, THE
SASKATOON STARPHOENIX at A1 (June 6, 2000), available at
http://www.biotech-info.net/no_fluke.html (last visited July 21, 2001).
Since the transgene is neither recessive nor quasi-dominant, outcrossing
between a Roundup resistant variety and a sexually compatible Roundup
sensitive species or variety will yield a progeny plant with the transgene
present (with the caveat discussed below). Because the biochemistry of the
Roundup sensitive variety determines, in part, whether the transgene will be
expressed, an a priori conclusion of transgene expression in the progeny plant
is far from certain. In addition, because a transgene designed to have a less
than unity probability of expression in the progeny of Roundup resistant
progenitor plants would be useless, the probability of the transgene failing to
express in the progeny plant of a Roundup sensitive plant is vanishingly
small. Further, those progeny plants in which the transgene is present but
not expressed will be Roundup sensitive. Those progeny plants will not
survive treatment with Roundup, and hence their variety of genome will be
eliminated. One might say that, with probability near unity, outcrossing with
a Roundup sensitive variety will yield a Roundup resistant progeny.
In exceedingly rare circumstances, the transgene for Roundup resistance is
present in the progeny of an originally Roundup sensitive variety, but is not
expressed. The reason for this event may be due only to prohibitive plant
biochemistry, not plant genetics. Monsanto is as acutely aware of this fact as
any other entity. When Koziel, who was and is working for Monsanto,
inserted the native gene for Bacillus thuringiensis kurstaki kurhd1 endotoxin CryIA(b) into Zea mays L., the endotoxin was not expressed. See
MURRAY, supra note 194 and associated text; KOZIEL, supra note 195 and
associated text; KOZIEL, supra note 173 and associated text. This is because
the codon usage of the native gene was not compatible with the biochemistry
of Zea mays L. See MURRAY, supra note 194 and associated text; KOZIEL,
supra note 195. If a gene is expressed that confers Roundup resistance on a
particular variety which is not a transgene, then that plant does not infringe
the patent. Further, that particular gene may be recessive or quasi-dominant
and hence may not be either be present or expressed when the Roundup
resistance variety is outcrossed with a Roundup sensitive variety. The
remaining possibility is the case in which the transgene is both present and
expressed. In this case, the progeny of the originally Roundup sensitive
variety will be Roundup resistant. In this case, the plant genetics dictate the
presence of the transgene and the plant biochemistry dictates the expression
of the transgene. One needs to recognize at this point that the Roundup
sensitive variety may contain a gene that would confer Roundup resistance if
it were expressed, but the variety is Roundup sensitive because that
particular gene is not expressed. Employing techniques that have the effect of
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upregulating that gene, or set of genes, would confer Roundup resistance on
that variety.
Two conclusions are then readily available. First, outcrossing between a
Roundup resistant variety and a Roundup sensitive variety will produce a
progeny that both contain the transgene and that transgene is expressed (that
is, the progeny variety is Roundup resistant). The case where the transgene is
present but not expressed would be exceedingly rare and due only to the plant
biochemistry of the Roundup sensitive progenitor variety. Second, evidence of
Roundup resistance in the progeny variety is not, and cannot be, conclusive
that either the transgene is present and completely expressed or that part of
the chimeric gene (comprised of the transgene), is not responsible for the
upregulation of a previously existing (that is, native) gene that would have
conferred Roundup resistance had it been expressed.
Thus, to show infringement of the patent, Monsanto must shew that: (1) the
transgene is present; (2) the transgene is completely expressed (that is, the
variety exhibits Roundup resistance); and (3) the exhibition of Roundup
resistance is due to complete expression of the transgene rather than
upregulation of a native gene by part of the chimeric gene.
In summary, the court, in making the statement that “[n]ot all progeny from
pollen of Roundup Ready plants will be Roundup tolerant if outcrossing with
Roundup susceptible plants occurs,” assumes that the transgene is recessive,
or at most quasi-dominant, rather than understanding that the transgene is
necessarily fully dominant by design. Further, the court assumes that no
mechanism exists for exhibiting Roundup resistance other than the presence
of the transgene and that the lack of Roundup resistance necessarily implies
the lack of the transgene. By continuing with the statement that “only use of
those plants containing the gene can be subject to” infringement, the court is
equating transgene expression (Roundup resistance) with transgene presence
in the progeny plant. Thus the court has unnecessarily mixed independent
concepts and has only muddled the legal conclusion that should have been
drawn.
Since the court appears to have been interested in finding in favor of
Monsanto, and since the court is interested in preserving the claimed patent
rights of Monsanto in the future, the statement discussed supra should have
been written differently. By recognizing that outcrossing to Roundup
susceptible varieties can happen, the court is precluding itself from agreeing
with Monsanto in a future genetic pollution case that outcrossing cannot
happen, or that outcrossing with remote fields of Roundup sensitive varieties
cannot happen. Also, the court weakens a future claim by Monsanto that if
the transgene exists then the plant will be Roundup resistance. Further, the
statement that “only use of those plants containing the gene” are subject to
claims of infringement puts Monsanto into the position of proving that the
transgene exists (in such a case, merely showing Roundup resistance is not
sufficient) and that the farmer “used” the plant containing the transgene. But
most importantly, in the single phrase “only use of those plants” the court has
completely obliterated, obviously unwittingly, its own position in the case at
hand. As discussed elsewhere in this work, “use” requires a volitive act and
the plant (while an ambiguous term as used here) can be readily construed as
that object produced by the seed and not necessarily containing the progeny
seed. Therefore, the court has concluded that Monsanto must shew that the
accused infringer (Mr. Schmeiser in the case at hand) committed a volitive act
with the plant (which may exclude the seeds) for there to be an infringement.
The position in which the court has placed Monsanto leads to nowhere because
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estate is defined by the patent’s language. It would not serve
to examine the claim language of all the current plant patents
for purposes of this analysis. Therefore, emphasis is given to
examining the language of a few representative claims.
Representative language, of interest to the current
discussion, may be found in a patent issued to Monsanto
Company and Ecogen, Inc. for insect-resistant transgenic
410
411
plants.
The patent claims, “[a] transgenic plant having
412
incorporated into its genome a gene.”
This language is
excessively broad. Recognize, of course, that in the case of a
pioneer invention, the claims of the patent are interpreted very
broadly, in recognition of the extraordinary contribution that
413
such an invention makes to the progress of technology.
However, the ‘013 patent is not a “pioneering” patent because a
number of patents were issued before it which involved claims
414
of a genome with a transgene included.
For the patent to be

Monsanto is interested in volitive acts committed with the seed, not the plant.
Also, the plant has no value. Thus, even if the court could find infringement
there can be no damages.
The far superior statement by the court would have excluded the preamble
phrase and merely concluded that: “[t]he making, use, offering for sale, or
selling of seeds containing the transgene constitutes infringement of the claim
in Monsanto’s patent.” This statement clearly articulates the law of patent
infringement and leaves Monsanto in the position of proving infringement of a
claim upon which substantial damages can be collected.
410. See Leigh H. English, Insect-Resistant Transgenic Plants, U.S. PAT.
NO. 6,023,013 (issued Feb. 8, 2000) (assignee: Monsanto Company (St. Louis,
MO) and Ecogen, Inc. (Langhorne, PA)). [the ‘013 patent]
411. The relevant claims of the ‘013 patent are: (1) “A transgenic plant
having incorporated into its genome a transgene that encodes an amino acid
sequence selected from the group consisting of . . . .”; (2) “A transgenic plant
having incorporated into its genome a transgene comprising a nucleic acid
sequence selected from the group consisting of . . . .”; (3) “A progeny or seed
from the transgenic plant of claim 1 or claim 2 comprising a modified cry3B*
gene”; (4) “A seed from the progeny of claim 3 comprising a modified cry3B*
gene;” (5) “A plant from the seed of claim 3 or claim 4 comprising a modified
cry3B* gene.” Id.
412. Id.
413. See Grubman Eng. & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Goldberger, 47 F.2d 151 (2d Cir.
1931) The court stated that the “latitude we give does indeed depend upon
how far the inventor has stepped forward; he may be a ‘pioneer.’ When he is,
we stretch his claims to the breaking point.” Id. at 153.
414. See, e.g., Dilip M. Shah, Stephen G. Rogers, Robert B. Horsch &
Robert T. Fraley, Glyphosate-Resistant Plants, U.S. PAT. NO. 4,940,835 (issued
July 10, 1990) (claiming a “glyphosate-resistant dicotyledonous plant” in
Claim 29); Camille Deluca-Flaherty, Victor J. Chan, Liliana E. C. Scarafia &
Karen J. Brunke, Thiol Protease Inhibitor, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,629,469 (issued
May 13, 1997) (claiming the “transgenic plant of claim 9 wherein said plant is
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“pioneering” in the sense of being among the first to claim a
transgenic plant, no other patents would exist before the
415
issuance of the ‘013 patent.
Since other patents claiming a
“transgenic plant” were issued before the ‘013 patent, the ‘013
patent cannot be a “pioneering” patent. Hence, the legal estate
created by granting the ‘013 patent cannot be a “transgenic
plant” with a transgene incorporated. Therefore, further
examination is needed to determine what constitutes the legal
estate.
The specification of the ‘013 patent defines the term
“transgenic plant” as “a plant that has incorporated DNA
sequences, including but not limited to genes which are
perhaps not normally present,” or “any other genes or DNA
sequences which one desires to introduce into the nontransformed plant, such as genes which may normally be
present in the non-transformed plant but which one desires to
416
either genetically engineer or to have altered expression.”
Such a definition of “transgenic plant” may very well include
nearly all plants on the planet because all that is required is
the desire to introduce into a plant, or alter the expression of, a
gene which is already in the plant. Although one may “desire[]
to introduce [the gene] into the non-transformed plant” or one
may “desire[] to either genetically engineer or to have altered
expression” of a gene in a plant, it may not be possible, using
the techniques put forth in the ‘013 patent, to do so. Also, even
if the gene is successfully inserted into the plant, the disclosed
methods in the ‘013 patent cannot guarantee that the gene will
be expressed. Now, consider the language “including but not
limited to genes which are perhaps not normally present.” A
gene is either normally or not normally present in the plant. If
maize” in Claim 15 and teaching in Claim 9 “[a] transgenic plant comprising a
foreign gene which encodes a peptide according to claim 1”).
415. Presumably, Agracetus, a small biotechnology company, obtained a
pioneering patent on genetically engineered cotton in the United States in
1992. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY 17 (1997) (proceedings of the forum on
“Intellectual Property Rights and Plant Biotechnology” held at the National
Academy of Sciences, November 5, 1996). Indeed, the patentee claimed a
“[c]otton seed capable of germination into a cotton plant comprising in its
genome a . . . chimeric gene construction being effective in the cells of the
cotton plant to express a cellular product coded by the foreign gene” in Claim 1
and “[c]otton plants germinated from the seeds of claim 1” in Claim 1. See
Paul F. Umbeck, Genetic Engineering of Cotton Plants and Lines, U.S. PAT.
NO. 5,159,135 (issued Oct. 27, 1992).
416. English, supra note 410, at § 2.6.
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there are no genes, which are not normally present, then the
specification of “transgenic plant” can only be referring to the
native genome of the plant. The native genome of the plant is
naturally occurring and has been part of this country’s
germplasm base since its beginnings. The only way that the
language, “a plant that has incorporated” can retain any
meaning within the patent context is if it means “a plant that
has incorporated DNA sequences not normally present.”
However, even this would be overly broad because it would
include all genomes with naturally occurring mutations (the
mutations occur by alterations in the DNA sequences). Thus,
in order to retain meaning, the language can only mean “a
plant that has incorporated a gene not normally present.”
Since the definition of “transgenic plant” disclosed in the
specification is so broad as to be meaningless because it
includes all plants on the planet now or in the future, then the
definition of “transgenic plant” claimed in the ‘013 patent
417
cannot be supported by the disclosure in the specification.
It must be recognized that the courts do not interpret the
claims strictly. In fact, while claim interpretation requires the
same formalistic approach used to interpret other legal
documents, such a method of interpretation requires close
scrutiny of the language of the claims and analysis of both the
418
Likewise, it is a principle of law
file history and prior art.
417. For cases in which patents were found invalid due to overly broad
claims and definitions, see: Consolidated Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light
Co., 159 U.S. 465, 474 (1895) (the objective of the disclosure “is to apprise the
public of what the patentee claims as his own, the courts of what they are
called upon to construe, and competing manufacturers and dealers of exactly
what they are bound to avoid”); In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A. 1970);
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re
Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
418. In an earlier case, the Second Circuit stated that:
[o]n the one hand, therefore, the claim is not to be taken at its face—
however freely construed—but its elements may be treated as
examples of a class which may be extended more or less broadly as
the disclosure warrants, the prior art permits, and the originality of
the discovery makes desirable. On the other, it is not to be ignored
as a guide in ascertaining those elements of the disclosure that
constitute the “invention,” and without which there could no patent
at all. It is obviously impossible to set any theoretic limits to such a
doctrine, which indeed its origin forbids, since it is in misericordiam
to relieve those who have failed to express their complete meaning.
Somewhat the same process is indeed inherent in the interpretation
of any verbal expression, and perhaps the best that can be said is
that in the case of patent claims much greater liberties are taken
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that to give value to the patent grant, the patent claims are not
limited by the precise details of the disclosure in the
419
specification.
However, the language of the claims define the
“metes and bounds” of the invention and cannot be disregarded
in interpreting the scope of the invention. The language of the
claims necessarily must be malleable, stretching to preserve
420
the entire scope of the invention, and shrinking to limit the
421
claim to allow the invention to survive a challenge.
The
language should be filled “as full as it will bear without
bursting,” or pressed “so long as it will not quite break,” while
422
recognizing that “of course the words have their limits.”
When the word is defined in the specification, then that word
423
must be given the same meaning in the claims.
Since the
words in the specification and claims must have the same

than would be allowed elsewhere. Each case is inevitably a matter of
degree, as so often happens, and other decisions have little or no
value. The usual ritual, which is so often repeated and which has so
little meaning, that the same result must follow by substantially the
same means, does not help much in application; it is no more than a
way of stating the problem. Any decision is therefore bound to have
an arbitrary color, as in all close cases of interpretation, and it is
difficult to give it greater authority than an appeal to the
sympathetic understanding of an impartial reader.
Claude Neon Lights, Inc. v. E. Machlett & Son, 36 F.2d 574, 576 (2d Cir.
1929). Later, the principle was stated as:
[n]o doubt the interpretation of patent claims depends more upon
the advance made by the inventor than upon the words used, and in
spite of protestations to the contrary, courts do at times play fast
and loose with them as they do not with other formal documents. It
is therefore always proper, and generally necessary, to look at the
prior art in order to learn how closely it presses upon the disclosure.
Cole v. Malleable Iron Fittings Co., 70 F.2d 686, 687 (2d. Cir. 1934).
419. Judge Learned Hand stated that:
[a]n inventor is, of course, not confined to the exact details of his
disclosure, else his patent would be of small value. The extent to
which he may generalize it depends, not only upon the surrounding
pressure of the art, but the extent to which the variations which he
wishes to cover in his claims, are themselves within the initiative of
a journeyman in the art. For the inventor’s contribution must be a
sufficient guide in itself, and its extent is limited to such substitutes
for any disclosed element, as the art needs no help to find.
H. Ward Leonard, Inc. v. Maxwell Motor Sales Corp., 252 F. 584, 588 (2d Cir.
1918).
420. See Gibbs v. Triumph Trap Co., Inc. 26 F.2d 312, 314 (2d Cir. 1928).
421. See Herz Straw Co., Inc. v. Smith, 52 F.2d 32, 34 (2d Cir. 1931).
422. Gibbs, 26 F.2d at 314.
423. See Page Machine Co. v. Dow, Jones & Co., 235 F. 121, 123 (2d Cir.
1916).
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meaning, and to allow “transgenic plant” to be an element of
424
the claim would be to defeat the claim for lack of enablement,
the phrase “[a] transgenic plant having incorporated into its
genome” must be read as the preamble to the claim and not as
425
an element of the claim.
Because claim language of the form “[a] transgenic plant
426
having incorporated into its genome” cannot be interpreted as
an element of the claim, the claim must relate to either the
transgene which was inserted into the genome and expressed,
or, at most, to the composition of the matter constituting the
transgene which is expressed, and the original genome into
427
In either case, the insertion
which the gene was inserted.
424. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). The disclosure in the specification of the
‘013 patent does not teach one of ordinary skill in the art how to “desire” the
“transgenic plant” in existence, or what “DNA sequences” must be
incorporated that already exist in the plant genome in order to create the
transgenic plant.
425. Also, to allow a broad and expansive interpretation of the language
would cause an infringement of earlier patents. For example, patent number
5,159,135 recites in claim 5 “[a] cotton plant comprising in the genome of at
least some of its cells” and in claims 6 and 7 “[a] cotton plant comprising in its
genome at least two . . . .” See Paul F. Umbeck, Genetic Engineering of Cotton
Plants and Lines, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,159,135 (issued Oct. 27, 1992). Similar
language claiming a plant with a gene inserted into its genome is found in the
following examples: Paul F. Umbeck, Genetic Engineering of Cotton Plants
and Lines, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,004,863 (issued Apr. 2, 1991) (application filed
December 3, 1986); Kenneth A. Barton, Insecticidal Cotton Plants, U.S. PAT.
NO. 5,608,142 (issued Mar. 4, 1997) (application filed January 23, 1989; based
upon prosecution in action since December 3, 1986); Gregory W. Warren,
Michael G. Koziel, Martha A. Mullins, Gordon J. Nye, Brian Carr, Nalini M.
Desai & Kristy Kostichka, Genes Encoding Insecticidal Proteins, U.S. PAT. NO.
6,066,783 (2000); Ronald C. Lundquist, David A. Walters & Julie A. Kirihara,
Fertile Transgenic Corn Plants, U.S. PAT. NO. 6,160,208 (issued May 23, 2000)
(filed March 20, 1996; the application was in the process of prosecution
between Jan. 22, 1990 and its issue date in 2000).
426. English, supra note 410.
427. Permitting the legal estate to include the composition of matter
constituting the transgene and the original genome is going further than the
comfort level of the author permits. In the view of the author, labeling the
product of the genetic manipulation a “composition of matter” is merely
relabeling an intrinsically unpatentable invention such that it conveniently
falls within the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). To be concrete, the plant cell
is a biological machine that uses the instructions encoded into the DNA of the
genome to carry out its normal operations. By genetic manipulation, the set of
instructions is altered such that the cellular machinery produces a compound
that it did not previously produce, or produce a compound that it did
previously produce, at a higher rate or to a higher concentration. By altering
the set of instructions that the cellular machinery uses is neither creating a
new composition of matter (as the compound newly produced by the cellular
machinery or produced at a higher level than was previously the case) nor is it
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must have occurred by genetic manipulation technology.
However, it is improper to claim the balance of the genome
429
because it was neither created by the hands of man nor
extracted, purified, and completely characterized as part of the
430
genetic modification. Under the law, as it currently stands, it
is possible to make a claim for the composition of the gene and
431
the genome but not for the genome itself.
Two situations may arise subsequent to the composition of
the transgene and the plant genome: first, the plant genome
may mutate; second, the transgene may mutate. While these
creating a new machine (the cellular machine still operates as it did without
the transgene). Also, the cellular machinery is not “improved,” it is merely
acting as it always has; only it is producing a new type of compound. The
analogous situation is found in a weaving loom operated by a program
contained in a deck of Hollereth cards. If a small set of cards is inserted into
the original deck of Hollereth cards the weaving loom will generate a new
pattern of fabric and colors, but the weaving loom goes on as it did with the
original deck of Hollereth cards.
Simply providing a new subset of
instructions does not entitle the operator of the weaving loom to claim that he
has a new invention that entitles him to a patent for the weaving loom. On its
face then, the act of inserting a small subset of instructions into the
instruction set for the plant cell does not entitle the seed manufacturer to the
right to claim the entire plant cell. Because the seed manufacturer cannot
claim the cellular machinery as discussed above, clever relabeling of that
cellular machinery must not lead to a contrary conclusion.
428. See id. at § 2.1 The patent specifies the technique required for the
gene insertion as “[s]uch modifications to primary nucleotide sequences to
enhance, target, or optimize expression of the gene sequence in a particular
host cell, tissue, or cellular localization” and the technicians who are capable
of carrying out the techniques as being: “those of skill in the art of protein
engineering and molecular biology, and it will be readily apparent to such
artisans, having benefit of the teachings of this specification, how to facilitate
such changes in the nucleotide sequence to produce the polypeptides and
polynucleotides disclosed herein.” Id.
429. See generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
430. See Ingo Potrykus et al., Genetic Engineering of Crop Plants, in
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 119-59 (Arie Altman ed., 1998) (describing
several techniques for inserting a particular gene into the complete, intact
nuclear genome of the plant cell).
431. A very candid discussion of an attempt to claim both the composition
and the individual elements in an infringement case was presented by Justice
Grove in Westinghouse v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co., 4 DIGEST OF
THE PATENT CASES REPORTED IN VOLUME I OF THE REPORTS OF PATENT CASES
230, 246 (1884). Justice Grove stated that: “[s]o that every element of the
combination, although all are old . . . is to be claimed in aid of including an
infringer; but to be disclaimed and to be treated only as a particular
combination of five or six elements when you come to treat the question of the
safety of the patent and the question of whether the patent is new or not.” The
word must be used “rationally and in the same sense” in both situations. Id. at
246.
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two possibilities present a divergence from this article’s path
that would be of some interest to follow, they shall be examined
only briefly due to their relevance to present discussion. Once
the genome or transgene has mutated, either or both may be
expressed to give new characteristics to the plant, which did
not previously exist. Although it is not entirely certain in any
given plant variety how many of the base pairs must be
mutated in order to give rise to a new expression of different
characteristics than were originally expressed in the progenitor
plant, once the set of characteristics has changed, then the
composition is no longer the same as when the patentee
invented it.
It is a fundamental principal of patent law that the claims
are the most important part of the patent and that the claims
432
Recognize that the elements of the
are the patent grant.
claim can extend no further than to the composition of a
genome constituting a transgene, inserted by genetic
manipulation techniques, which is expressed. Therefore, the
legal estate created by the granting of the claim is either to an
expressed transgene, inserted into the plant genome by genetic
manipulation techniques or, at most, to the composition of the
plant genome with the expressed transgene inserted by genetic
engineering techniques. The exclusive interest of the patentee
is the right of the patentee to exclude others from making,
using, selling, or offering to sell a genome constituting an
expressed transgene, inserted by genetic engineering
techniques.
This definition of the legal estate in which the patentee has
an interest excludes genomes other than the one employed by
the patentee, and excludes transfer of the transgene by
methods other than by genetic engineering techniques. As
discussed earlier, “a genome” may reasonably be interpreted as
being one genome from all possible plant genomes. The
patentee did not disclose insertion of the transgene into each of
433
In fact, the patentee did not
the possible plant genomes.
432. See Frank F. Smith Metal Window Hardware Co. v. Yates, 216 F. 361
( S. D. N. Y. 1914) (the court stated that a “change in the claims is as bad, if
not worse, than a change in the disclosure, for the patent especially lives in
the claim,” id. at 363-4).
433. The difficulty attendant to inserting a transgene into a plant genome
and having it successfully expressed is well known. See POTRYKUS, supra note
430; See Koziel, infra note 434. Thus for any given genome the inventor would
have to perform a considerable amount of experimentation, possibly an
excessive amount, to determine the precise method for successfully inserting
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disclose insertion of the transgene into the genome of each
variety of plant within a species and successful expression of
434
that transgene.
Based upon the available reports, the most
that can be attributed to the patentee is that the transgene was
successfully inserted into a particular plant cell and expressed
by the variety of plant grown from that cell. Thus, the most
that could have been contemplated by the patentee is that the
transgene was inserted into a single unitary genome and not
any one of the set of all possible genomes. Therefore, the
genome used by the patentee is exclusive, not inclusive, of all
other genomes.
435
many fine discussions are
In Arie Altman’s book,
presented on methods by which a transgene may be in the
genome of a particular variety of plant. Those that may qualify
under the classification of “genetic engineering techniques”
436
All other methods
necessarily involve human intervention.
for translocating the transgene necessarily do not involve the
direct intervention of man. Because the current standard for
patentability of subject matter is that it be “anything under the
437
sun made by man,” then, under the current state of the law,
only a composition created by genetic engineering may be
patentable.
The patentee cannot claim a composition of any genome
and the transgene because the patentee did not contemplate
438
the set of all genomes, has not enabled one of ordinary skill in
the transgene into the plant genome and having it expressed.
434. Koziel admitted that insertion of a transgene into cells of the same
variety of maize yielded different varieties (called “events”) of plants each with
a different characteristic expression of the transgene depending on the
promoter used for the transgene. See Michael G. Koziel et al., Transgenic
Plants for the Control of Insect Pests, in AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 283,
287-88 (Arie Altman ed., 1998) (describing research and developments in
expressing Bacillus thuringiensis -endotoxin in both dicotyledonous and
monocotyledonous plants). Based upon the information available, it may
reasonably be concluded that in most cases the transgene was either not
successfully inserted or was not successfully expressed. See id. See also
Potrykus, supra note 430.
435. See generally AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY (Arie Altman ed.,
1998).
436. In fact, if the transgene is inserted by any method other than by
human intervention neither the method of translocation nor the resultant
composition is patentable under the standard articulated in Chakrabarty. See
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
437. Id. at 309.
438. The doctrine underlying this statement is articulated in Consolidated
Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 465, 474 (1895). The
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the art to insert the transgene into any one given genome of the
439
set of all possible genomes,
and has not enabled one of
ordinary skill in the art to have the plant express the
transgene. Therefore, the legal estate is at most only the
combination of the particular genome (or limited set of
genomes) actually employed by the patentee and the transgene.
All other genomes are necessarily excluded, including those
that differ from the contemplated genome only in the
expression of certain genes. Now that the legal estate has been
established, it is necessary to determine what rights the seed
manufacturers may assert against Jack.
Plants and seeds constitute a particular problem for utility
patent protection because of the possibility of replicating the
seed to a very large number of progeny. In fact, it is the
reasonable expectation of both the patentee and the purchaser
of the seed that the seed will be reproduced. Unlike hybrids,
where the genome of the seed is notoriously unstable,
genetically modified seeds will produce plants that in turn
produce seeds with exact copies (presumably) of the genetic
code artificially inserted into the progeny plant. Jack then,
obtains a free copy of the genetically modified variety of seed
from his crop. At this point, Jack has two possible alternatives
for disposition of the progeny genetically modified beans. He
may sell all of the beans for non-reproductive purposes. He
may sell part of the seed for non-reproductive purposes and
retain the balance of the seed for either planting during the
next growing cycle or selling to his neighboring farmers.
Whether Jack may engage in either of these alternatives
depends, to a large extent, on the interpretation of the utility
patent as applied to plants.
First, consider whether Jack may sell his crop of beans for
non-reproductive purposes. The Plant Variety Protection Act
has a crop exemption that specifically states that the protected
seed may be reproduced to a very large number of progeny
seeds, which may be sold for non-reproductive purposes.
Without the crop exemption, the protection of the seed would

patentee must identify “some general quality, running through the whole” set
“which distinguishe[s] it from every other, and g[ives] it a peculiar fitness for
the particular purpose.” Id. In this case, “the man who discovered such quality
might justly be entitled to a patent.” Id. at 475.
439. “If the description be so vague and uncertain that no one can tell,
except by independent experiments, how to construct the patented device, the
patent is void.” Id. at 474.
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render it useless. The plant patent act specifically states that
the patentee has the “right to exclude others from asexually
440
reproducing the plants” and any plant so reproduced cannot
be offered for sale or sold. Section 101 of Title 35 of the United
States Code does not have a crop exemption analogous to that
441
If the variety of
found in the Plant Variety Protection Act.
beans is certificated under the Plant Variety Protection Act,
then Jack may sell the progeny beans for non-reproductive
purposes only. If the plant is protected under the Plant Patent
Act, then Jack may plant the seeds to yield the mighty
beanstalk and both sell the progeny beans for non-reproductive
purposes and save seeds from crop for planting in the next crop
cycle. This is because the only act constituting infringement of
a plant patent, issued under section 161 of Title 35, is the
asexual reproduction of the ancestral plant. If a patent has
issued on the variety of beans under section 101, of Title 35,
then Jack may purchase the seeds, but he may not reproduce
the plant from which the beans originated, either asexually or
442
That is, Jack may not plant the seeds to grow the
sexually.
mighty beanstalk. Even if Jack does sexually reproduce the
beans, he has no interest in the beans, which allows him to
dispose of the progeny seeds as he sees fit. Such a conclusion is
also independent of whether Jack knew that a patent existed
that protects the interests of the patentee in the beans. This
result seems contrary to common sense because the beans are
meant to be reproduced and because, typically, when a person
purchases something, the right to use that thing is implied in
the sale.
443
According to the first sale doctrine of patent law, once
the patent holder has sold the patented item, the patent
holder’s right to limit use or sale of that item has ended. This
440. 35 U.S.C. § 163 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
441. See Peter J. Goss, Guiding the Hand That Feeds: Toward Socially
Optimal Appropriability in Agricultural Biotechnology Innovation, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 1395, 1400 (1996).
442. This conclusion may be reached only if the existence of the mighty
beanstalk on Jack’s land constitutes infringement of the patent. This is the
view employed by Judge W. Andrew MacKay in the case of Monsanto v.
Schmeiser. See Monsanto Can., Inc. v. Schmeiser Enters., Ltd., 2001 FCT 256,
at ¶ 119 (Fed. Ct. Canada 2001), available at http://decisions.fctcf.gc.ca/fct/2001/2001fct256.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2001). It is likely to be
a common belief that possession of a genetically modified plant constitutes
infringement. Therefore, that is the perspective that will be followed in the
analysis of this issue.
443. See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456-57 (1873).
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means that a purchaser of a patented widget may use and
dispose of that particular widget as he sees fit without
444
infringing the patent.
However, if the widget is purchased
and used as a template to mechanically reproduce the widget
for sale, or reproduced for the use of the purchaser of the
original widget, then the patent would be infringed.
Plants pose a problem that is different from mechanical
widgets. In plants, the patented invention is reproduced as the
plant grows and matures. However, mechanical widgets
cannot, yet, reproduce themselves.
Also, in mechanical
widgets, common sense indicates that the “make” and “use”
function are separable, while in plants the same common sense
indicates that the “make” and “use” functions are not
necessarily separable. The sole purpose of purchased plant
seed is to plant them to produce a progeny crop. Both the seed
manufacturer and the farmer are fully aware of this purpose.
It is easy to argue that in the case of patented plants, the
“make” function and the “use” function are inseparable, both of
which the patentee has the right to exclude others from
445
The issue is whether the first sale doctrine
performing.
446
should apply in the case of patented plants.
If the doctrine

444. A complete discussion on the doctrine of first use, or the doctrine of
exhaustion, is given by Scott A. Chambers, Exhaustion Doctrine in
Biotechnology, 35 IDEA:J. L. & TECH. 289 (1995).
445. The argument is as follows: The farmer purchases the seed with the
clear intention of reproducing that seed to a very large number of progeny,
harvest the progeny seed, and sell the harvested progeny seed (presumably)
for a profit. The farmer plants the seed that he purchased, and a plant and
progeny seed are produced. Because the farmer planted the seed, then he is
using the invention patented (the seed); and because the farmer fertilized,
cultivated, and possibly watered the field where the plant was growing then
the farmer is making the invention patented. Therefore, the farmer is both
making and using the invention patented. Under this argument, it is
impossible to use the seed and not make the invention patented because as
soon as the seed germinates the invention patented is reproduced, and hence
“made”. Thus, it might be concluded that the use and make functions are
inseparable in the case of plants.
446. This question has not yet been directly addressed by the Supreme
Court. In J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern. Inc., 122 S. Ct.
593 (2001), the Supreme Court decided the issue of whether a utility patent,
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994), may be obtained for a genetically modified seed
or plant. Because the decision that was taken on certiorari by the Supreme
Court was the denial of summary judgment for the defendant, the underlying
issue in the case remains unresolved. The central issue to be decided at trial
is whether the first sale doctrine applies to genetically modified seeds. See
Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc. v. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1813 (N.D. Iowa 1998). Since the issue will not reach the Supreme
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does apply, then Jack may purchase the protected seeds and
dispose of them as he sees fit. If the doctrine does not apply,
then Jack may purchase the seed, but his right to dispose of
them is limited.
The Supreme Court has stated that “[a]n incident to the
purchase of any article, whether patented or unpatented, is the
right to use and sell it,” and that when the patentee, or his
licensee, sells “an article which is capable of use only in
practicing the patent [then there] is a relinquishment of the
447
Either the
patent monopoly with respect to the article sold.”
court must treat all articles that are offered for sale the same
under the exhaustion doctrine or plants must be treated as a
unique class of articles because the “use” and “make” functions
cannot be separated. Under the first alternative, once the seed
manufacturer sold the seeds to the farmer then it would lose all
control over the seeds. Under the second alternative the seed
manufacturer would retain all rights to the seed and the
farmer would purchase worthless seed because he could not
plant it to produce a crop.
It is worthwhile to note at this point that the sale of hybrid
seeds by the seed manufacturer causes this problem to be
solved in a natural manner. When Jack plants his beans,
raises the mighty beanstalk, and reaps the harvest of the
progeny beans from the beanstalk, he is engaged in biological
reproduction rather than mechanical reproduction. The policy
of protecting the interests of the seed manufacturer indicates
that both cases of reproduction should be held equal under the
light of patent law, and both should constitute infringement.
This means that the doctrine of exhaustion would not apply to
biological reproduction. Jack, then, may purchase the seed
from the seed manufacturer and put the seed into the ground.
From there, infringement of the patent depends upon the
nature of the legal estate. If, indeed, the legal estate owned by
the seed manufacturer is the transgene, or at most only the
Court until several years after the publication of this article, we must
speculate as to the disposition of the issue by the Court. The author predicts
that the Supreme Court, in a majority opinion authored by Justice Thomas,
will hold that legal title in the legal estate will remain with the seed
manufacturer independent of the number of times that the genetically
modified seed is sold. This is because should legal title pass to the purchaser
of the genetically modified seed then the seed manufacturer will no longer
have a basis for asserting his interest in the genetically modified seeds against
the farmer.
447. United States v. Univis Lens Co., Inc., 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942).
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composition of the plant genome and the transgene, then as
soon as the seed germinates, the patent is infringed. This is
because each cell of the plant will have a copy of the subject
matter of the legal estate that the patentee may exclude others
from making. If the legal estate is the seed of the plant, then
the patent is infringed as soon as the seed starts to grow.
However, it is not entirely clear whether the doctrine of
exhaustion applies to biological reproduction when that
448
function is the only use to which the seeds may be put.
Turn now to Jack’s second option for disposing of his
progeny beans. Consider the case of Jack selling the crop of
beans from his magic beanstalk for reproductive purposes. If
the doctrine of exhaustion were applied to biological
reproduction, then the seed manufacturer would not have the
right to exclude Jack from selling the seeds for any purpose and
Jack would be permitted to engage in biological reproduction of
the invention patented where he would not be allowed to
engage in mechanical reproduction of the patented widget. If
the doctrine of exhaustion were not applied to biological
reproduction, Jack would be infringing the patent upon selling
the progeny seeds for reproductive purpose because, as
discussed, there should be no difference under utility patent
law between mechanical and biological reproduction, and Jack
would have made the patented invention by growing the plant
on his land. It would be unjust to the patent holder of a
genetically modified seed to apply the doctrine of exhaustion
and hence allow Jack to reproduce the seed for any purpose he
sees fit, whereas the holder of the patent on the mechanical
widget would be protected from such activity.
Mechanical and biological reproduction must be treated
the same under patent law, therefore, the doctrine of
exhaustion does not apply to biological reproduction and Jack,
upon buying patented seed, does not acquire the right of
production of the beans for sale, either for non-reproductive or
for reproductive purposes. Jack only acquires the property
right transfer, use, and waste of the beans that he originally
purchased. A cause of action for equity and damages would
exist for mechanical reproduction of a widget, so the same
should lie for biological reproduction of beans. In order for
Jack to produce progeny seeds, either for his own use or for sale
for non-reproductive purposes, he must obtain a license from

448. See Chambers, supra note 444, at 321-29.
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the seed manufacturers.
3.

Property Rights Under Licensing Agreements

The seed manufacturers have increasingly turned to
licensing agreements to provide protection for their intellectual
property in genetically modified plants. The standard practice
in the seed industry is to require the farmer to sign a license
449
agreement
with the seed company before purchasing
450
genetically modified seeds for planting on his farm.
In the
case where the genetically modified plant is protected by a
utility patent, the license allows the farmer to plant the seed
451
If
and sell the progeny seed for non-reproductive purposes.
the plant is also protected by a certificate issued pursuant to
452
the Plant Variety Protection Act, then the license agreement
adds a redundant layer of protection for the seed
manufacturers by prohibiting the farmer from transferring, or
alienating, any of the seed he produces for any purpose other
453
than non-reproductive purposes.
449. See Rick Weiss, Seeds of Discord; Monsanto’s Gene Police Raise Alarm
on Farmers’ Rights, Rural Tradition, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1999, at A1.
450. See Lewontin, supra note 127.
451. See HAMILTON, supra note 304.
452. The Plant Variety Protection Act, as interpreted in Asgrow, limits the
sale of seed for reproductive purposes to only that quantity sufficient to
replant the farmer’s fields. The amendment to the Plant Variety Protection
Act, § 2543, prohibits the farmer from selling any of his seed for reproductive
purposes. Therefore, the provision in the license agreement, which prohibits
the farmer from selling genetically modified seeds certified under the Plant
Variety Protection Act for reproductive purposes, is redundant.
453. A copy of the Technology-Use License Agreement used by Monsanto in
Canada for glyphosate-resistant canola was kindly provided by Mr. Schmeiser.
It states:
Technology Use Agreement terms and conditions
[1.] The Grower shall use any purchased Roundup Ready® canola
seed for planting one and only one crop for resale for consumption.
The Grower agrees not to save seed produced from Roundup Ready®
canola seed for the purpose of replanting nor to sell, give, transfer or
otherwise convey any such seed for the purpose of replanting. The
Grower also agrees not to harvest any volunteer Roundup Ready®
canola seed crops.
[2.] The Grower shall purchase and use only Roundup® branded
herbicide labeled for use on all Roundup Ready® canola seed
purchased. The Grower shall purchase both the Roundup® branded
herbicide and the Technology Use Agreement as a package from his
retailer of choice. The Seed Purchase Fee shall be non refundable
after the date of reconciliation of actual acres planted as set forth in
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The license agreement prohibits the farmer from using the
seed produced on his land for planting in the next growing
cycle. However, the license does not prohibit the farmer from
purchasing and using “brown-bag” seed as long as the
technology-use license agreement is in force, and as long as the
farmer observes the restrictions on using the seeds for a single
454
growing cycle.
In addition, the farmer is prohibited from
harvesting any volunteer seed. This prohibition is perplexing:
first, if the volunteer plants occur in a field of non-modified
seeds of the same species (say glyphosate-resistant canola in a
field of glyphosate-susceptible canola) then how are these
plants to be identified? And if they could be identified, how is
the farmer expected to either remove the genetically modified
plants or avoid harvesting seeds from these plants? Second, if
the Monsanto Roundup Ready® canola service policy.
[3.] Monsanto warrants the tolerance of plants from Roundup
Ready® canola seed to Roundup herbicide when used at specified
label rates and as per label instruction.
[4.] The Grower grants Monsanto the right to inspect, take samples
and test all of the Grower’s owned and/or leased fields planted with
canola, or any other land farmed by the Grower, and to monitor the
Grower’s canola fields and storage bins for the following three years
for compliance with the terms of this Agreement.
All such
inspections shall be performed at a reasonable time, and if possible,
in the presence of the Grower. The Grower also agrees to supply
upon request the locations of all fields planted with canola in the
following three years. Grower has or shall obtain all permissions
required for Monsanto to exercise this right to inspect, take samples
and test.
[5.] If the Grower violates any of the Terms and Conditions of this
Agreement, the Grower shall forfeit any right to obtain any
Agreement in the future and this Agreement may, at Monsanto’s
option, be terminated immediately. In the event of any use of
Roundup Ready® canola seed which is not specifically authorized in
this Agreement, the Grower agrees that Monsanto will incur a
substantial risk of losing control of Roundup Ready® canola seed
and that it may not be possible to accurately determine the amount
of Monsanto’s damages. ***
[6.] The Terms and Conditions of this Agreement are personal to the
Grower and shall be binding and have full force and effect on the
heirs, personal representatives, successors and permitted assigns of
the Grower, but the Grower’s rights hereunder shall not otherwise
be transferable or assignable without the express written consent of
Monsanto.
Monsanto Technology-Use Agreement provided by Mr. Percy Schmeiser,
Farmer, Saskatchewan, Canada (July 6, 2001) [hereinafter Monsanto
Technology-Use Agreement].
A copy of the Monsanto Technology-Use
Agreement is on file with the author.
454. See id.at [1.].
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the genetically modified seeds are growing in a field of a
different species of crop, then who should be liable for the cost
455
of removal?
Volunteer plants arrive on the farmer’s fields
through a number of routes, including by the wind, animals,
and farm equipment; and by latent germination of dormant
456
Identifying the volunteer
seeds left from a previous harvest.
genetically modified plants in fields of the same species of
plants, or eradicating volunteer plants in a field of a different
species of plants may be extremely expensive and difficult.
Thus, the requirement that the farmer not harvest volunteer
genetically modified plants places an unreasonable burden on
the farmer’s resources and an unreasonable restraint on his
use of his land.
The license in the case of Roundup-resistant genetically
modified plants also requires the farmer to purchase Roundup
457
The
as a bundled package with the technology-use license.
458
provision
grants Monsanto the exclusive right to sell
herbicide to the farmer. The motivation behind this provision
might be that Monsanto warrants the tolerance of the
glyphosate resistant field crop plants, or that Monsanto wishes
to prohibit the farmer from using glyphosate from another
source and hence extend its monopoly in Roundup beyond the
expiration of the patent. However, the warranty could easily
be written to exclude situations in which the farmer used a
glyphosate herbicide other than Roundup without limiting the
farmer’s right to purchase the herbicide from vendors other
than Monsanto.
The most onerous provisions in the license grant Monsanto
the right to inspect any and all fields and storage bins, which
the farmer planted, or used, with the genetically modified seed.
In addition, Monsanto assumes the right to inspect the farmer’s
fields and bins the following three years for the purpose of

455. If the genetically modified seeds are Roundup-resistant then they
must be removed by hand because spraying with Roundup would be
ineffective and spraying with any effective herbicide in general would destroy
the entire crop.
456. For instance, maize left behind from a previous growing cycle will
grow as “volunteer” plants in a field of soybeans. Furthermore, canola will lie
dormant for up to 10 years before germinating. See Interview: Schmeiser
{July 6, 2001}, supra note 270.
457. While this may raise antitrust issues analogous to those where
Microsoft required bundling of its web browser with its operating system,
discussion of such issues are too far removed from this paper’s thesis.
458. See Monsanto Technology-Use Agreement, supra note 453, at [2.].
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monitoring compliance with the terms of the agreement. This
is independent of whether the farmer has chosen to use the
genetically modified seeds in subsequent growing cycles or
continue to grow that particular species of plant. Recall the
provision that prohibits the farmer from harvesting volunteer
seeds. If the volunteer seeds grew to a sufficiently dense
population, and the farmer could not detect them, then the test
for the transgene would indicate that the farmer was in
violation of the technology-use license even if, in fact, he had
planted non-genetically modified plants. In order to avoid the
possibility of a false positive test for violation of the technologyuse license, the farmer must give up his right to decide what
seed varieties of a particular plant species to plant on his fields.
Also, the farmer must give up the right to decide what species
of plant to grown on his fields. Monsanto, by license, acquires
the right to inspect both the farmer’s fields and his bins. The
license does not require the farmer’s presence when Monsanto
enters the farmer’s land to inspect the crop. Monsanto’s
assumed right to enter and inspect the farmer’s fields is
independent of whether the farmer is currently growing
genetically modified plants on those particular fields.
The license agreement binds not only the farmer, but also
the “heirs, personal representatives, successors and permitted
459
This provision leads to very curious
assigns” of the farmer.
results. First, Monsanto retains the right to enter and inspect
the land upon which genetically modified plants were grown
even after the farmer has died, and his estate has been
distributed to his heirs who may not be farming the land at all.
In fact, it is entirely conceivable that owners of the field parcels
after the fields have been subdivided and houses built upon
them, would not be able to exclude Monsanto from entering
their land. Second, is the case where the farmer dies, his
estate is distributed, and his heirs lease the land to other
farmers. In that situation, the farmer’s estate (where the
farmer signed the technology-use agreement) could be liable for
damages if the lessees unknowingly harvest genetically
modified seeds. Evidently, the farmer lessees may not be liable
for damages because the license specifies that the farmer who
460
Third, consider the case
signed the license would be liable.
where a farmer leases land from a disinterested landowner and

459. See id. at [6.].
460. See id. at [5.].
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plants genetically modified seed covered by the technology-use
license in year one. At the end of year one, the first farmer is
displaced and replaced by a second farmer who has not signed
the license and who does not wish to grow genetically modified
plants. If farmer two harvests volunteer genetically modified
plants, either knowingly or unknowingly, then it appears that
the first farmer would be liable for damages to Monsanto,
because the second farmer would be a successor to the land. It
is unjust and against the policy of contract law that a license
signed by and agreed to by the first person should be binding
upon the second person who was ignorant of the license and did
not agree to the terms of the license. Also, by its language, the
license is binding upon the signing farmer and is not an
encumbrance upon the land. If the agreement were to be an
encumbrance upon the land, then it must specifically so state
and would be an easement, not a license. An easement must be
registered with an authority of the state; the license agreement
is, evidently, not so required. Therefore, only the grower is
bound by the agreement and liable should the provisions be
461
violated by an heir, assign, or successor.
The above analysis is for Roundup-resistant canola. Yet,
reports of similar conditions have been made for other
Roundup-resistant plants in the United States. Typically, the
license agreement will restrict the use of the progeny seed
beyond that extent mandated by statute.
The license
agreement usually prohibits the farmer from using the seed
462
produced on his land for replanting in the next growing cycle.
Therefore, the license agreement restricts the farmer to a
single crop from a single purchased seed. In essence, the
farmer gives up the property right to use the purchased seed as
461. In the case of Percy Schmeiser, the person (we shall call him R) who
reported Mr. Schmeiser to Monsanto as possibly growing Roundup-resistant
canola had rented a parcel of land upon which he had planted Roundupresistant canola. The landowner declined to rent the land again to person R
the next year and rented the land to Mr. Schmeiser instead. Because canola
“volunteers” from one growing cycle to the next, the canola that Mr. Schmeiser
harvested during the subsequent growing cycle was certainly contaminated
with the transgene. Because Mr. Schmeiser would have retained some seed
from these fields, as was his customary practice and right, then the following
years his entire crop of canola would have been contaminated with the
transgene. Since Mr. Schmeiser was a successor to the land and because Mr.
Schmeiser did not sign the license agreement it is unjust to hold him to the
terms of the agreement; rather person R must be held liable to Monsanto.
Such an outcome would be ironic indeed. See supra note 456.
462. See Lewontin, supra note 127, at 72.
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463

he sees fit, and must give up substantial property rights in
his own land.
Ownership of land includes the right to use that land as
the owner sees fit. To enter into the license agreement the
farmer is forced to give up this right. The license agreement
does so by requiring that the farmer return to the same seed
company and purchase the same variety of seed for the next
growing cycle if the farmer desires to continue production of the
464
Such a license provision protects the
same type of crop.
market share that the seed manufacturer has established, by
prohibiting the farmer from: saving seed and replanting his
own fields; transferring possession of the seed, whether the
progenitor seed or progeny seed, to others; and using a
competitor’s seed in those growing cycles in which protection
465
against either insect or herb pests is not necessary. It is clear
then that the seed manufacturers who use license agreements
to protect their genetically modified seeds may have better

463. See id.
464. The licensing agreement from Monsanto for use of its Roundup Ready
seeds requires that the farmer use them for only a single planting. The license
agreement also includes a provision which states that Monsanto has the right
for three years after the purchase of the seed to enter the farmer’s lands and
test the seeds to determine whether a Roundup Ready seed has been planted.
See Monsanto Technology-Use Agreement, supra note 453. See also Weiss,
supra note 449. Not only is this requirement an invasion of the farmer’s
property rights in his own land to exclude, it is unnecessarily costly because
the farmer is required to purchase Roundup Ready seeds each year. Evidence
is being accumulated which indicates that noxious plants adapt to
environmental stress such as periodic glyphosate, the active ingredient in
Roundup, exposure at a surprising rate. It is unclear whether the successful
adaptation is the result of stress induced genetic modification by the plant
species or by some other coping mechanism. See Gregg Hillyer, PROGRESSIVE
FARMER 36 (Oct. 2000). The recommendations are that Roundup not be used
for each growing cycle, and that several years intervene between its use. See
id. at 37. Because glyphosate has a very short lifetime in the environment, it
is unnecessary for the farmer to use Roundup Ready seeds during the growing
cycles in which Roundup is not used for noxious plant control. Therefore, the
license agreement permits an unnecessary invasion of the farmer’s property
rights by requiring the farmer to submit to random inspections during those
planting cycles when he need not use Roundup Ready seeds.
465. In order to reduce the possibility of the development of herbicide
resistance in noxious plants or bio-insecticide resistance in insects, it is
necessary to alternate growing cycles in which either herbicides are applied
for control of noxious plants or bio-insecticides are applied for control of
insects with growing cycles in which the control is not applied. In those
growing seasons in which the control is not applied, it is not necessary for the
farmer to incur the additional costs associated with the genetically modified
seed.
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control over the disposition of the seed crop by the farmer than
they may have under the Plant Variety Protection Act or under
466
Title 35 of the United States Code.
Control by the seed manufacturer comes at a high cost to
the farmer. The farmer no longer has the right of alienation of
his property in the seed, either the progenitor seed or the
progeny seed. He loses the right to use his lands as he sees fit:
he may not plant a particular crop type with the genome of his
choice and he may not be able to leave his fields lie fallow
because the license stipulates that the farmer purchase the
particular seed variety each year.
Because the seed
manufacturer has written the license agreement such that the
company investigators may enter the farmers lands and test
the crop for compliance with the license agreement, the farmer
must give up the right to exclude others from his lands. The
farmer can, however, choose to not plant the genetically
modified plant and to not sign the technology-use license. This
will not guarantee that the farmer will be immune to liability
when the transgene is translocated onto his lands.
Without the genetically modified crops, the farmer must
use pesticides to control insect pests, and herbicides and
cultivation of the fields to control noxious weeds.
The
genetically modified crop is claimed to be beneficial to the
farmer because of the reduced pesticide and herbicide costs and
the reduced costs associated with the cultivation of the fields.
In fact, the genetically modified crops are delivering high
transaction costs and may not be living up to their
expectations. The high transaction costs come when the farmer
attempts to market the progeny seeds from genetically
modified plants. The progeny seeds must be tested for the
existence of the modified genome, and must be kept separate
from the stream of crops destined for human consumption
unless the crop is specifically licensed for consumption by
humans. The failure to live up to expectations is seen in the
development of glyphosate resistance in noxious plants and
with the development of bio-insecticide resistance in insect
pests. In summary, the farmer, by agreeing to the license
agreement, becomes locked into the use of a variety of
genetically modified plant marketed from a particular seed
manufacturer which carries with it high input costs to his
operation without the guarantee that the seed will yield the

466. See Lewontin, supra note 127, at 72.
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As part of the bargain, the farmer must

467. It also appears that if the reasoning of the Federal District Court in
Canada is followed then all farmers in the vicinity of the licensed farmer, who
has the genetically manipulated plants on his farm, must also sign the
Technology-Use License Agreement and pay the licensing fee, even though
they may not wish to have the genetically manipulated plant on their fields.
To see this, consider the case of Monsanto Can., Inc. v. Schmeiser Enter., Ltd.,
2001 FCT 256 (Fed. Ct. Canada 2001), available at http://decisions.fctcf.gc.ca/fct/2001/2001fct256.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2001), in which
Monsanto sued Mr. Schmeiser for patent infringement. In paragraph 28 of the
court’s decision in Monsanto v. Schmeiser, Judge MacKay discussed the rights
retained by Monsanto under contract. Specifically, Judge MacKay stated that:
[a]ll of the plaintiffs’ licensing arrangements in Canada are made by
or on behalf of Monsanto Canada. It licenses commercial seed
growers to grow Roundup Ready canola for seed purposes. Farmers
are required to attend a Grower Enrollment Meeting conducted by
Monsanto representatives who describe the gene technology and the
licensing terms for its use. A grower must be certified to use the
gene technology by signing a Roundup Ready grower agreement.
This entitles a farmer to purchase Roundup Ready canola seed from
an authorized Monsanto agent, but to acquire seed the farmer must
also sign a Technology-Use Agreement provided by the retail seed
agent acting for Monsanto Canada. Under the latter agreement, the
farmer can use the seed for planting only one crop, to be sold for
consumption to a commercial purchaser authorized by Monsanto.
The farmer undertakes not to sell or give seed to any other third
party and not to save seed for his own replanting or inventory.
Under the TUA Monsanto has the right to inspect the fields of the
contracting farmer and to take samples to verify compliance with the
agreement.
Id. The court indicated that the farmer must sign the Technology-Use License
as a prerequisite for acquiring the genetically modified seed. This does not
address the situation in which the farmer does not “acquire” the transgene
through a vendor but rather the transgene contaminates his fields through
natural forces. However, the tenor of the court’s decision in paragraphs 94
through 97 indicates that even if the farmer does not “acquire” the transgene
through normal retail channels, he must have signed a Technology-Use
License Agreement in order to avoid infringement of the patent.
Three important items in paragraph 28 need to be recognized. First, the court
is stating that Monsanto, by means of the Technology-Use License Agreement,
claims the right to determine the retail channels through which the
genetically modified seeds may be conveyed to the farmer (by stating that the
farmer is entitled “to purchase Roundup Ready canola seed from an
authorized Monsanto agent,” paragraph 28). Second, Monsanto claims the
right to dictate the channels through which the farmer may dispose of his crop
(by stating that the farmer’s crop may “be sold for consumption to a
commercial purchaser authorized by Monsanto,” paragraph 28). The court is,
then, recognizing that Monsanto, by contract, may create a vertical monopoly
which eliminates competition amongst retail level seed suppliers and which
eliminates competition amongst commercial purchasers of the farmer’s crop.
The third important item in paragraph 28 is the court’s statement that:
“Monsanto has the right to inspect the fields of the contracting farmer and to
take samples to verify compliance with the agreement.” Thus, by contract the
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farmer relinquishes the right to exclude Monsanto from his fields. However,
the contractual right, claimed by Monsanto, to control the vertical structure of
the market for genetically modified crops and the contractual right of access to
the fields and crops of the licensee, see Monsanto Technology-Use Agreement,
supra note 453, does not extend to the control of the vertical market structure
for non-licensed farmers and does not extend to the right of access to the fields
and crops of those non-licensed farmers. Further, Monsanto cannot claim
such rights under the patent law.
However, Judge MacKay seems to have missed the distinction between
contractual rights and interest protected by the grant of letters patent. In
paragraph 37, Judge MacKay recognized that:
[i]n the summer of 1997, the plaintiffs, through Robinson
Investigations, a private agency in Saskatoon, undertook random
audits of canola crops growing in Saskatchewan. The farms were
identified by Monsanto from among their licensed farmers, or from
leads or tips suggesting that Roundup Ready seed might be growing
on property of an unlicensed farmer, or from random inspections
undertaken to audit a farming area. The defendants’ farm was
included in this audit process after an anonymous tip was received
indicating that Roundup Ready canola was being grown in
Schmeiser’s fields, where it was not licensed.
Id. Indeed, while the Technology-Use License Agreement allows Monsanto to
inspect the fields of the licensee, it certainly does not grant Monsanto the
right to enter and inspect the fields of a farmer who is not a licensee. Neither
the technology-use license nor the patent grants Monsanto the right of entry
onto the fields of non-licensed farmers or to take plants from those fields. As
early as 1997, Monsanto was identifying target farmers and target fields using
either informants, or more worrisome, through illegal inspections of the fields
of farmers who did not sign the license. This strategy of conduct becomes
particularly egregious when the farmer’s land is contaminated by the
transgene without the knowledge of the farmer. Further, neither the
Technology-Use License Agreement nor the grant of a patent gives neither
Monsanto nor any other person the right to take and convert the property of a
farmer who has chosen to not become a licensee. Judge MacKay recognizes, in
paragraph 46 of the decision, that:
[l]ater in the spring of 1998, Monsanto representatives learned that
the defendants had seed treated at the HFM and that HFM had
retained samples of his seed for its own purposes. They requested a
sample of the seed withheld from Mr. Schmeiser by HFM. Mr.
Schmeiser had not previously used HFM for seed-treating purposes,
and he was not aware that samples were regularly taken from the
seed provided by farmers. As was done for all others whose seed was
treated, HFM did take samples of the seed brought in by the
defendants and of the seed after treatment and before delivery to
Schmeiser. HFM provided a portion of both samples to Monsanto
without informing Mr. Schmeiser that this had been done.
Id. Without criticism of Humboldt Flour Mills (HFM) or of Monsanto, Judge
MacKay apparently approved of the practice engaged in by Humboldt Flour
Mills of retaining seed from a customer without permission of that customer,
and making that retained seed freely available to Monsanto without prior
permission of the customer and without compensation to the customer.
Humboldt Flour Mills is not contractually bound to the customer to retain the
seed, is not contractually bound to the licensee farmer to retain the seed, and
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certainly is not contractually bound by Monsanto to either retain or assign
possessory interest in the retained seed to Monsanto.
Of course, it could be argued that this is a de minimis situation where the
remedy for the customer is in tort. However, if a representative of Humboldt
Flour Mills were to enter a grocery and take an equivalent amount of candy
from the store without obtaining permission to do so by paying, then that
representative would be guilty of shoplifting and subject to a stiff criminal
penalty. Furthermore, if that representative then assigned possessory
interest in that stolen candy to a representative of Monsanto, then the
Monsanto representative would be liable under criminal law as well. The
situation of Humboldt Flour Mills taking from its customer and assigning that
seed to a representative of Monsanto is analogous and similar criminal
sanctions must be applied. Independent of how and from where Monsanto
obtained its evidence, the court finds the evidence admissible at trial. Judge
MacKay gives a clear stamp of approval to Monsanto overstepping the bounds
of both the contractual rights and interest protected by the letters patent in
paragraph 72 of the decision when he states that the evidence obtained from
Mr. Schmeiser’s fields by Monsanto “was not obtained illegally” and that “its
admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.”
Paragraph 72. To say that trespass, theft, and conversion is not illegal is an
insult to the face of an orderly society and it sends a clear message to each
seed manufacturer that it may act with such impunity as to have no bounds
that the law will proscribe. Neither contract nor patent law should be
stretched to the point that it was in the decision by Judge MacKay in allowing
plaintiff’s evidence into court.
One may, of course, argue that Mr. Schmeiser has a cause of action in tort
against Humboldt Flour Mills for theft and conversion. Further, it might be
argued that Mr. Schmeiser has superior title over Monsanto to the sample of
seed taken by Humboldt Flour Mills and conveyed to Monsanto. In both cases,
it might be argued that the remedy is in tort and since the injury is de
minimis, no damages will lie. Such an argument is without merit and is
clearly meant to vest rights in Monsanto and Humboldt Flour Mills that
should not be vested and completely ignores the rights both denied and passed
with the sample.
Like the piece of candy in the grocery store, the small sample of Mr.
Schmeiser’s canola seeds represent far more than the fair market value of the
item in question (be it the piece of candy or the sample of canola seeds). When
Mr. Schmeiser took the canola seeds to Humboldt Flour Mills to be prepared
for planting, he conveyed to Humboldt Flour Mills an immediate possessory
interest in the canola seeds, but not the right to alienate the canola seeds to
another. Further, because Mr. Schmeiser expected to have all of canola seeds
returned, he did not convey a permanent possessory interest in the seeds.
Certainly, Humboldt Flour Mills could alienate the seeds but it could not
retain the value of the seeds because it would be unjustly enriched if it did so.
Mr. Schmeiser also had an expectation of privacy in the plant genome of the
canola seeds. Indeed this expectation of privacy is not vitiated simply because
of the conveyance of a temporary possessory interest. The conveyance was an
essential aspect of the course of normal business conducted by Mr. Schmeiser.
He expected that the plant genome would be disclosed to no other party, and
he expected that Humboldt Flour Mills would neither discover the plant
genome nor attempt to have it reproduced for itself. Furthermore, there was
an underlying trust between Mr. Schmeiser and Humboldt Flour Mills that
both the canola seed would be returned in proper course and that Humboldt
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give up property rights in not only his crop but also his land
without recourse for failure of the seed manufacturer to
perform by delivering a seed that is resistant to pests.
Because the seed manufacturers have invested a considerable
amount of resources in developing the genetically modified seed,
there is an interest in protecting that investment so that revenue
streams will compensate for the initial investment. The seed
Flour Mills would not convey the seeds to another. By retaining the sample of
canola seeds and conveying it to Monsanto, Humboldt Flour Mills violated
that trust. Such a violation might very well cost Humboldt Flour Mills dearly
in the future because of lost business. Also, the violation cost Mr. Schmeiser
because of the lost ability to have his seeds processed for planting in a readily
available facility.
More importantly is the inability, because of the actions on the part of
Humboldt Flour Mills, and ultimately Monsanto, of Mr. Schmeiser to use the
canola plant genome that he had so meticulously developed over the span of
half a century. Because the variety of canola that Mr. Schmeiser developed
was superior to other available varieties, he would not have abandoned it in
favor of an inferior variety, but for the actions of Humboldt Flour Mills and
Monsanto. This means that his measurable loss is far greater than the value
of the small sample of seeds conveyed from Humboldt Flour Mills to Monsanto
(we shall leave to the side the question of chain of custody of the sample from
Mr. Schmeiser’s fields to the scientists who tested the samples at Monsanto’s
research facilities). The loss to Mr. Schmeiser is a function of the lost
availability of the canola plant genome that he had developed.
Without specifying the nature of the function, we may assert that the loss is
easily computed as follows. Let N represent the number of future planting
cycles that Mr. Schmeiser would have had available to him. Let pS(i) be the
profit to be realized from the crop containing the plant genome developed by
Mr. Schmeiser in year (i) (in the future), and pC(i) be the profit to be realized
from the crop grown from commercially available plant genome (that is,
commercially available seeds containing a genome different from that
developed by Mr. Schmeiser). Further, let qj(i) be the profit realized by Mr.
Schmeiser due to the conveyance, either by license or transfer of title, by Mr.
Schmeiser to farmer j in year i. Finally, define Q(N+1) as the profit realized
by Mr. Schmeiser for conveying title to his plant genome in the year N+1, the
planting cycle immediately following the last year that Mr. Schmeiser plants
canola (perhaps he finally retires and goes fishing with his grandson). Using
some simple arithmetic, it is easily deduced that the total lost profit, PL, to Mr.
Schmeiser due to the actions of Humboldt Flour Mills and Monsanto resulting
from the conveyance of the sample of canola is:
N

N

i=1

i =1

PL = ∑ ( pS (i) − pC (i)) + ∑

∑ q (i) + Q(N + 1).
j

j

This number is certain to be quite large in comparison to the fair market value
of the sample conveyed by Humboldt Flour Mills. In a cause of action by Mr.
Schmeiser against Humboldt Flour Mills, this is the amount of damage that
must be awarded.
In summary, then, the total value of the sample of seeds far exceeds the fair
market value of the canola seeds. The court is, indeed, committing a grand
insult to justice if it awards an amount less than PL to Mr. Schmeiser.
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manufacturers should exercise every reasonable effort to protect
their intellectual property. The farmer is motivated to reduce the
costs of producing a crop of progeny seeds and therefore should
exercise every reasonable effort to obtain his seed at the lowest
possible cost. In the usual market place, the consumer (the
farmer) and the producer (the seed manufacturer) negotiate the
price of a commodity as roughly equals. If the consumer cannot
obtain a favorable price from one producer, he is free to go to
another producer.
Unfortunately, the market in genetically
modified plants is dominated by monopolies in the modified plants,
possessed by a producer who is economically much stronger than
the farmer. The farmer is not in a position to negotiate better
terms in the license agreement, either because he is not
sophisticated enough, because he cannot afford legal
representation, or because the seed manufacturer is the only
supplier of the seeds and the farmer has no choice but to accept
the terms of the agreement. In essence, the political and capital
strengths of the seed manufacturer simply overwhelms those of
the farmer. Also, the farmer is constrained in the methods by
which he may farm which require him to use modern technology to
stay competitive in the marketplace. It is not clear, then, that the
farmer is in a position to either negotiate better terms of the
license agreement with the seed manufacturers or to refuse to
plant the genetically modified seed variety altogether. Once the
farmer has used the genetically modified seed, he is bound,
essentially permanently, by the terms of the license agreement.
The result is that the farmer must trade his property rights in his
land and crop in exchange for a license to use the intellectual
property rights owned by the seed manufacturers.
4.

Property Rights in Light of the Terminator Gene

Three mechanisms have been examined by which the seed
manufacturers may protect their investment in the
development of genetically modified seeds.
All three
mechanisms modify, reduce, or eliminate the property rights of
the farmer in favor of the property rights held by the seed
manufacturers. However strong the protections may be, the
seed manufacturers still face a heavy caseload of violators of
these protections. The ability of the farmers to violate the
protections is due to deficiencies in the law providing the
protections.
This result was the motivation for several
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468

companies to develop “terminator technology,” a biological,
and non-statutory method for protecting the seed manufacturer
investment in genetically modified seed. The terminator
technology involves inserting a gene into a plant that enables
the seed to grow to maturity but which renders progeny seed
469
Thus, if the farmer saves seed for reproductive
sterile.
purposes it would not produce a progeny plant.
470
The terminator gene was originally developed by the
471
472
USDA, using approximately $229,000 of taxpayer money, in
collaboration with Delta and Pine Land Company, the nation’s
largest producer of cotton seeds with a seventy-three percent
market share. The terminator technology comes in several
flavors. One company has developed a seed sterilization
468. See Yves Savidan, Terminator Genes: Fertility Rights, 353 THE
ECONOMIST 104 (Oct. 9, 1999).
469. See Danielle Knight, Science-Rights: New Seed Technology Threatens
Farmers, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 31, 1998, available at 1998 WL 5986450.
470. See Oliver, supra note 139. In abstract, the patent states that:
A method for making a genetically modified plant comprising
regenerating a whole plant from a plant cell that has been
transfected with DNA sequences comprising a first gene whose
expression results in an altered plant phenotype linked to a
transiently active promoter, the gene and promoter being separated
by a blocking sequence flanked on either side by specific excision
sequences, a second gene that encodes a recombinase specific for the
specific excision sequences linked to a repressible promoter, and a
third gene that encodes the repressor specific for the repressible
promoter. Also a method for making a genetically modified hybrid
plant by hybridizing a first plant regenerated from a plant cell that
has been transfected with DNA sequences comprising a first gene
whose expression results in an altered plant phenotype linked to a
transiently active promoter, the gene and promoter being separated
by a blocking sequence flanked on either side by specific excision
sequences to a second plant regenerated from a second plant cell
that has been transfected with DNA sequences comprising a second
gene that encodes a recombinase specific for the specific excision
sequences linked to a promoter that is active during seed
germination, and growing a hybrid plant from the hybrid seed.
Plant cells, plant tissues, plant seed and whole plants containing
the above DNA sequences are also claimed.
Id. at 1.
471. See Leora Broydo, A Seedy Business: A New “Terminator” Technology
Will Make Crops Sterile and Force Farmers to Buy Seed More Often—So Why
Did the USDA Invent It?, MOJO WIRE (Apr. 7, 1998) available at
http://www.motherjones.com/news_wire/broydo.html (last visited June 15,
2001).
472. See Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy
In The (Not-So-Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property
Protection, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11, 54 (1998).
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473

technology called the “verminator” technology.
Terminator
technology and verminator technology are similar in that both
474
would render a second-generation seed sterile.
The two
technologies are different in the particular genes that are
475
altered.
In the verminator technology a rat gene is
476
incorporated into a plant seed to render seeds infertile.
The
patent covers all seeds, both transgenic and non-transgenic
477
conventional varieties.
The technology has been tested only
on cotton and tobacco; however, the inventors believe it could
work on all major crops. Traditionally, seed manufacturers
have been reluctant to invest in the wheat, oat, and rice seed
markets, because these plant species are self-pollinating,
meaning that their reproduction cannot be controlled. With
these field crops farmers can save the seeds from one crop cycle
for use in the next crop cycle with only having to return to the
478
With
commercial market to replenish every five years or so.
the “terminator technology,” the farmers will be forced to
479
purchase new seeds for each planting cycle.
While the USDA and Delta and Pine Land created the
“terminator technology,” Monsanto, upon deciding to purchase
Delta and Pine Land, stated that it disfavors the terminator
480
The terminator technology is of grave concern to
technology.
481
farmers in this country and abroad.
Since a vast majority of
the world’s farmers still collect their best seeds each year and
replant them the following year, fears about the terminator
technology were especially prevalent in developing countries.
When the public became aware that Monsanto was set to
acquire Delta and Pine Land, a worldwide protest was ignited
against Monsanto. In spite of the fact that Monsanto had
neither developed the technology nor held the patent for it,

473. See Zeneca Pits, Verminator Against Terminator, ECON. TIMES, Aug.
27, 1998, available at 1998 WL 16762266.
474. See id.
475. See id.
476. See id.
477. See Oliver, supra note 139.
478. See Broydo, supra note 471.
479. See Bill Lambrecht, Critics Vilify New Seed Technology that Monsanto
May Soon Control-”Terminator” Would Prevent Saving Seeds by Making them
Sterile, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 1, 1998, at A1.
480. See Knight, supra note 469.
481. See John Vidal, World Embraced For Terminator 2, THE GUARDIAN,
Oct. 6, 1999, available at 1999 WL 25735652; The Transgenic Scare, TIMES
(India), Oct. 13, 1999, available at 1999 WL 28425544.
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Monsanto was, consequently, inundated with protests against
the terminator technology.
Stimulated by the protests,
Monsanto’s Chief Executive Officer explained that “[t]hough we
do not own any sterile seed technology, we think it is important
to respond . . . by making clear our commitment not to
commercialize gene protection systems that render seed
482
sterile.”
5.

“Legal” Versus Intellectual Property Interest

A central question of considerable import to the defendant
in a patent infringement case is whether the legal estate of the
seed manufacturer also includes the right to dispose of the
progeny plants and seed.
If it does, then the seed
manufacturer has the right to determine how and to whom the
farmer may transfer his crop. This question was addressed in
483
In paragraph 91 of Monsanto v.
Monsanto v. Schmeiser.
Schmeiser, the Court considered defendant’s argument that
“Monsanto has no property interest in its gene, only
intellectual property rights” because Monsanto allowed the
uncontrolled release of the invention patented into the
environment. The Court
acknowledge[d] that the seed or plant containing the
plaintiffs’ patented gene and cell may be owned in a legal sense
by the farmer who has acquired the seed or plant, that
“owner’s” interest in the seed or plant is subject to the
plaintiffs’ patent rights, including the exclusive right to use or
sell its gene or cell, and they alone may license others to use
484
the invention.
The Court continued in paragraph 92:
[t]hus a farmer whose field contains seed or plants originating from
seed spilled into them, or blown as seed, in swaths from a neighbor’s
land or even growing from germination by pollen carried into his field
from elsewhere by insects, birds, or by the wind, may own the seed or
plants on his land even if he did not set about to plant them. He does
not, however, own the right to the use of the patented gene, or of the

482. Savidan, supra note 468, at 104.
483. See Monsanto Can., Inc. v. Schmeiser Enters., Ltd., 2001 FCT 256
(Fed. Ct. Canada 2001), available at http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2001/
2001fct256.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2001).
484. Id. ¶ 91.
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485

Although the case was decided in a Canadian Federal
Court, the underlying property principles are as applicable
in the United States as in Canada. While no cases have
come before United States Federal Courts concerning the
exact same issue as the Canadian Federal Court addressed,
it might be anticipated that the Federal Courts in the
United States would resolve the underlying ownership
issue very much as the Federal Court did in Canada.
When a transgene exists on the field of a farmer, the
Canadian Federal Court articulated that a “farmer who
has acquired the seed or plant” owns the “patented gene
486
and cell . . . in a legal sense,” and that that farmer “may
own the seed or plants on his land even if he did not set
487
about to plant them.” However, “that ‘owner’s interest in
the seed or plant is subject to the plaintiffs’ patent
488
rights,” and the farmer “does not, however, own the right
to the use of the patented gene, or of the seed or plant
489
containing the patented gene or cell.”
Two concerns are immediately apparent in the Canadian
Federal Court decision in Monsanto v. Schmeiser. First, the
court did not clarify the interest of each party in the seed or
plant cell that contains the transgene. Second, the court is
apparently precluding recovery for genetic pollution of the crop
of the farmer who does not wish for the presence of the
transgene on his fields.
The court failed to clearly articulate the property rights of
the farmer in the plant cells and seeds found on his fields, and
fails to define the property rights of the seed manufacturer in
the transgene found in those plant cells and seeds. When the
court stated, in light of the conclusion articulated in paragraph
127, that by growing “seed known to be Roundup tolerant and
490
selling the harvested seeds,” Mr. Schmeiser had infringed
Monsanto’s patent, that the farmer has a “legal interest” in the
plant seed or cell, which contains the transgene, but that that
interest is subject to the patentee’s patent rights, it, in effect,
stated that a farmer has no viable interest in the plant seed
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.

Id. ¶ 92.
Id. ¶ 91.
Id.
Id. ¶ 91.
Id. ¶ 92.
Id. ¶ 127.

2002]

JACK AND THE BEANSTALK

125

and cells found on his fields. This is because if the transgene
does exist in the plant seeds and cells found on the fields of the
farmer, the farmer cannot harvest those seeds or cells and
cannot either sell those same harvested seeds or cells for
consumption or retain those seeds or cells for his own use.
Also, because the court stated that the patentee “has the
491
exclusive use of the invention” the farmer may not even have
the transgene in seeds or plant cells on his fields without
infringing the patent (because in deciding the case in favor of
Monsanto, the court is, in effect, equating possession with
“use”). The court stated that how the transgene comes to exist
on the land of Mr. Schmeiser is irrelevant to the question of
492
The court also stated that it is not
patent infringement.
relevant whether Mr. Schmeiser knew that the transgene was
present on his land. The court is equating possession of the
transgene, whether knowingly or ignorantly, with use of the
transgene and hence Mr. Schmeiser is guilty of patent
infringement.
While the court stated that the canola seeds are “owned in
493
a legal sense by” Mr. Schmeiser, he cannot alienate the
transgene. If Mr. Schmeiser were a licensee of Monsanto then
he could alienate the crop for non-reproductive purposes, but
only through channels dictated by Monsanto. Because the
court stated that the evidence submitted by Monsanto “was not
494
obtained illegally,” then Mr. Schmeiser does not have an
expectation to the right of privacy in his crop. Since Mr.
Schmeiser has no viable rights at all in his canola crop then the
assertion of the court that the seeds are “owned in a legal
sense” by Mr. Schmeiser is in direct opposition to reality.
The mirror of the situation in which Mr. Schmeiser is
placed by the court is reflective of Monsanto’s position. Because
Monsanto has a legal estate containing the transgene, it
appears that it possesses the right to use and the right to
alienate the canola crop and the right to invade the property of
Mr. Schmeiser. This exceeds reasonable bounds, and must
certainly not be what the court intended. Thus, the decision of
the court necessarily leads to the conclusion that no matter how
495
the transgene arrived onto the fields of the farmer, the farmer
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.

Id. ¶ 93.
See supra note 271.
Id. ¶ 91.
Id. ¶ 72.
In paragraph 119, the court stated that “the source of the Roundup
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is liable for infringement when the transgene is found on his
fields. Because the court denies the farmer any practicable
interest in the crop grown on his own fields, then the court is, in
effect, stating that to avoid the possibility of infringement the
farmer must purchase and use genetically modified seeds from
the seed manufacturer under license from the seed
manufacturer.
Furthermore, the court is apparently precluding recovery
for genetic pollution of the crop of the farmer who does not wish
the transgene on his fields. Because the farmer owns both his
own time and the land upon which the crop is grown, and the
farmer bears the risk of the market value of his crop and the
failure of his crop due to natural causes, then the farmer must,
necessarily, also have the right of autonomy in deciding what
species and variety of plant shall exist on his land. The
autonomy of the farmer in decision making and choosing to
have his crop free of the transgene is critical when the farmer
is selling into the premium international commodity market.
To see why this is so, consider that European countries and
Japan are resistant to the introduction of genetically modified
crops into their food stream, and that these countries are
important destinations for American and Canadian grains.
Because these countries are selective about the varieties of
grain that will be allowed in their food streams, a premium
price may be charged to the consumer. Conversely, animal food
streams may contain genetically modified grains and therefore
are neither selective nor premium. The highest premium is
levied on organically grown grains that must be free of the
transgene. Thus, if the farmer wishes to obtain a premium
price by selling into either the international market or the
organic foods market, then he must chose those grains that are
free of the transgene.
The farmer’s right of choice and of autonomy is in peril
when the courts follow the position articulated by the Federal
Court in Canada. Because the Canadian Federal Court decided
to strictly adhere to the position that “Monsanto does have
ownership in its patented gene and cell” and therefore “has the
496
exclusive use of its invention,” it is denying the farmer the
right of autonomy in decision making and the choice to have his
crop be free of the transgene.
resistant canola in the defendants’ 1997 crop is really not significant” for
determining infringement of the patent.
496. Id. ¶ 93.
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By stating that the farmer “does not, however, own the
right to the use . . . of the seed or plant containing the patented
497
gene or cell,”
the court is stating that even if the seed
manufacturer negligently pollutes the farmer’s field with the
transgene, then the farmer has no right to either use the
contaminated crop for feeding to his own livestock or for selling
it into the market for consumption, premium or otherwise.
Apparently, the court’s stated position considers the farmer’s
knowledge of the presence of the transgene on his fields as
being irrelevant. Further, the court stated that it did
not agree that the situation is comparable to the “stray
bull” cases that recognize that the progeny of stray bulls
impregnating cows of another belong to that other, and that the
owner of the straying bull may be liable in damages that may
be caused to the owner of the cows. Further, the circumstances
here are not akin to those cases that the defendants urge are
part of the larger law of admixture, where property of A
introduced by A without B’s intervention to similar property of
B from which it is indistinguishable, becomes the property of B.
Monsanto does have ownership in its patented gene and cell
and pursuant to the Act it has the exclusive use of its
invention. That is an important factor which distinguishes this
498
case from the others on which the defendants rely.
The court makes a distinction when no difference exists.
It is exactly the fact that Monsanto has an interest (the
term ownership, as used here by the court, is ambiguous to the
point of being vitiated) in the transgene that makes the “stray
bull” analogy apposite. The owner of the cow may wish it to
not be impregnated by the sperm containing the genetic code of
the stray bull; hence the owner of the stray bull must be liable
in tort. The court, however, states that interest of Monsanto in
the genetic code contained in the transgene, as granted by
letters patent, puts it in a position different from the owner of
the stray bull. The court is clearly precluding the farmer from
being able to recover damages for the value of his
contaminated crop once it has been polluted by the transgene.
Also, the law of admixture is entirely apposite. Monsanto
released its transgene to the environment without the ability
to control the destination of that transgene.
Because
Monsanto did not and cannot control the destination of its

497. Id. ¶ 92.
498. Id. ¶ 93.
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transgene, then when that transgene becomes mixed with a
plant genome, then Monsanto must not be allowed to assert its
interest in that transgene without also bearing the risk of
liability for genetic pollution. The court clearly takes the
position that Monsanto may assert its interest in the
transgene and avoids liability for genetic pollution.
The court provided ample support for this last statement in
paragraphs 95 through 97. Mr. Schmeiser argued on the basis
of photographic evidence that Monsanto both released the
transgene into the environment and failed to exercise control
over the destination of the transgene. The court summarized:
On the basis of the evidence of pictures adduced by Mr.
Schmeiser, of stray plants and of plants in fields, in Bruno and
its environs, it is urged that unconfined release and lack of
control of Monsanto over the replication of the plants
containing their patented gene clearly demonstrates extensive
uncontrolled release of the plaintiffs’ invention. Indeed it is
urged this is so extensive that the spread of the invention
cannot be controlled and Monsanto cannot claim the exclusive
right to possess and use the invention. It is further urged that
it was the plaintiffs’ obligation to control its technology to
ensure it did not spread and that Monsanto has not attempted
499
to do so.
In dismissing the evidence presented by the defendants,
the court stated that:
[t]hat assessment places much weight on photographs of stray
plants in Bruno, said to have survived spraying with Roundup, in
addition to photographs of canola in fields which is said to be of
canola, some with the potential gene incorporated. With respect,
the conclusion the defendants urge would ignore the evidence of the
licensing arrangements developed by Monsanto in a thorough and
determined manner to limit the spread of the gene. Those
arrangements require agreement of growers not to sell the product
derived from seed provided under a TUA except to authorized
dealers, not to give it away and not to keep it for their own use even
for reseeding. It ignores evidence of the plaintiffs’ efforts to
monitor the authorized growers and any that might be considered
to be growing the product without authorization. It ignores the
determined efforts to sample and test the crops of the defendants
who were believed to be growing Roundup Ready canola without
authorization. It ignores also the evidence of Monsanto’s efforts to

499. Id. ¶ 95.
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remove plants from fields of other farmers who complained of
500
undesired spread of Roundup Ready canola to their fields.

The statement that “the conclusion the defendants urge
would ignore the evidence of the licensing arrangements
developed by Monsanto in a thorough and determined manner
to limit the spread of the gene” is clearly equating the use by
Monsanto of the Technology-Use License to control
dissemination of the transgene between farmers with control of
dissemination of the transgene in the open environment by
501
Further, in its statement that “[i]t ignores the
natural forces
determined efforts to sample and test the crops of the
defendants who were believed to be growing Roundup Ready
canola without authorization,” the court implicitly recognized a
right for Monsanto to trespass upon the fields of a non-licensee
and take plant material from those fields without permission of
the farmer for testing simply because Monsanto has licensee
farmers in the neighborhood. An analogous situation occurs
when the representative goes into a grocery store and takes,
without authorization by payment of value, genetically
modified plant material from the produce section. Under
shoplifting laws, that representative would be guilty of theft.
However, the court takes the position that the patent grants
immunity to representatives of Monsanto for the very same act
when that act occurs on the field of a non-licensed farmer.
Careful reading of both the United States patent statute and
Canadian patent statute fails to yield an obvious and
reasonable basis for the position of the court.
The final blow to the defendant’s position concerning the
waiver of interest in the transgene by Monsanto due to
uncontrolled release into the environment came when the court
stated, “[i]ndeed the weight of evidence in this case supports
the conclusion that the plaintiffs undertook a variety of
measures designed to control the unwanted spread of canola
502
The fallacy
containing their patented gene and cell.”
underlying the court’s position in favor of Monsanto cannot be
clearer. The court took the position that the efforts of

500. Id. ¶ 96.
501. The court specifically identifies the need to control the dissemination
between farmers as the reason for the Technology-Use License in paragraph
27 of the decision as: “Monsanto developed a licensing arrangement to protect
its patent, and its market, by limiting the opportunity of a grower, under
license, to sell or give seed to another or to retain it for his own use.”
502. Id. ¶ 97.
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Monsanto to control the dissemination of the transgene from
farmer to farmer by use of the Technology-Use License is
equivalent to control of the pollen and seed once it is released
into the environment.
The Technology-Use License only
controls the disposition of the genetically modified crop and
plant cells by the licensee. The Technology-Use License does
not require the licensee to prevent dissemination of the
transgene by the wind, birds, bees, or careless truck drivers.
Because the court equates control of dissemination between
farmers with control in the environment, the court,
presumably, expects the wind, the birds, the pollen and seed
that contain the transgene, as well as careless truck drivers
who fail to cover the beds of their trucks with tarpaulin, to be
bound by the Technology-Use License of Monsanto. In fact,
because Monsanto must have regulatory approval for
unconfined release of the transgene into the open environment,
then both the government and Monsanto must realize that once
released into the environment, the final destination of the
transgene cannot be controlled (whether by license or any other
means). Further, the court stated in paragraph 96 that
Monsanto cannot control the dispersion of the transgene by
natural forces in its statement that: “[i]t ignores also the
evidence of Monsanto’s efforts to remove plants from fields of
other farmers who complained of undesired spread of Roundup
Ready canola to their fields.” It evidently did not recognize the
importance of this statement to the validity of the defendant’s
argument. More important than the fallacy of the court’s
position, articulated in paragraphs 95 through 97 of Monsanto
v. Schmeiser, is that the court views the Technology-Use
License as a legally sufficient means of controlling the
dispersion of the transgene in the open environment.
Therefore, Monsanto needs to license only a single farmer in a
large region to have a legally sufficient basis for suing every
other neighboring farmer whose fields are contaminated with
the transgene by genetic pollution.
In summary, a farmer cannot transfer seed produced from
patented genetically modified seed.
Further, the crop
exemption of the PVPA should be eliminated so that the farmer
is prohibited from saving seed for replanting on his own farm.
Also, although the farmer loses property rights in his own land
under licensing agreements, these agreements may be the only
way that the seed manufacturers can enforce their property
rights in genetically modified seeds protected under either Title
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35 of the United States Code or the Plant Variety Protection
Act. Given this position, it is necessary to give something back
to the farmer.
B.

THE GIVING BACK TO THE FARMER

Because the seed manufacturers are concerned with
making a profit from investment in agricultural biotechnology,
and because the ability exists for the farmer to grow and sell,
for reproductive purposes, seeds that are developed by the seed
manufacturers, protection of intellectual property is of
overriding concern for the seed manufacturers. In fact, the
seed manufacturers view “[p]atenting germplasm and
biotechnology inventions [a]s critical to [their] ability to deliver
503
Driven by
useful products and get paid for those products.”
the need to show a profit, the seed manufacturers are
motivated to take all steps necessary to protect their
investment, even if such steps involve taking property rights
from the farmers.
Farmers are also driven by the need to show a profit. They
also have rights in their property, the right to continue to
develop a germplasm base suitable to their locale, and the right
to have a choice of whether to reproduce the transgene
developed by the seed manufacturers. Where the balance point
between these two groups should be located is not clear. What
is clear is that it should not be so far in favor of the seed
manufacturers that the farmer becomes a serf to the seed
manufacturers, and it should not be so far in favor of the
farmer that the seed manufacturer loses the profit motive to
develop new and useful varieties through agricultural
biotechnology.
1.

Introduction

It has been stated that: “[p]lant breeding and
discovery. . .is fundamentally connected with the Nation’s food
supply, and will, if encouraged and developed, be of
incalculable value in maintaining public health and prosperity,

503. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY, at 13 (1997) (quoting Robert Fincher of Pioneer HiBred International).
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and in promoting public safety and the national defense.”
The accuracy and insightfulness of these words are as relevant
today as they were in 1930. Since the beginning of agriculture,
establishing a secure food supply has been a driving force of
505
Hence, current domestic plant varieties have been
society.
506
almost exclusively influenced by human intervention.
Since
the United States lacked a broad spectrum of crop plants in the
early days of the country, agriculture in the United States
507
depended on importation of crops from other countries.
These imported plant varieties formed the foundation of
508
modern American agriculture.
An important player in the
process of developing the crop varieties in use today was the
farmer, because the farmer was able to select seeds from plants
which gave the best performance in his locale and use those
509
seeds for replanting his fields.
To briefly summarize our extensive discussion in the
Background section: plant development became the
responsibility of the government with the establishment of the
510
USDA in the mid 1800’s. The USDA guided the development
of new plant varieties and with the cooperation of land grant
universities and local agricultural organizations produced seed
511
Thus,
which was distributed free of charge to the farmers.
the practice of saving and transferring seed became a
commonly used part of the method of new seed variety
512
With encouragement of Congress, the
development.
responsibility for producing and marketing the seeds shifted to
the private seed manufacturers. The Congressional action
included: in 1924 Congress enacted legislation that terminated
free distribution of seeds by the government to farmers which

504. COMMITTEE ON PATENTS, PLANT PATENTS, H. R. REP. NO. 1129, at 2
(2d Sess., 1930) [hereinafter COMMITTEE ON PATENTS: 1930].
505. See Karen Lehman & Al Krebs, Control of the World’s Food Supply, in
THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND FOR A TURN TOWARD THE
LOCAL 122, 123 (Jerry Mander & Edward Goldsmith eds., 1996).
506. See CAMPBELL, supra note 13, at 407.
507. See Blair, supra note 22, at 299.
508. See id.
509. See Lewontin, supra note 127.
510. See Frederick H. Buttel & Jill Belsky, Biotechnology, Plant Breeding,
and Intellectual Property: Social and Ethical Dimensions, in OWNING
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION, VALUE AND ETHICAL ISSUES 110,
113 (Vivian Weil & John W. Snapper eds., 1989).
511. See Weiss, supra note 449.
512. See id.
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513

forced farmers to rely on private seed companies; intellectual
property right protection was afforded to the seed
manufacturers through the Plant Patent Act of 1930 and the
514
Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970; legislation passed in the
1980s
encouraged
co-operation
between
the
seed
515
manufacturers and federal agencies.
Research by both private industry and government
scientists has lead to advancing the understanding of the
genetics of plants important to agriculture, and has lead to
developments in exploiting genetic modification technology to
516
A
improve the quality and productivity of agricultural crops.
revolution in the agricultural industry has resulted from these
517
The agricultural revolution
changes in the law and science.
had the effect of significantly reducing the number of farms in
518
the United States.
It can be anticipated that the number of
farms and, most probably, the number of acres dedicated to
crop production will continue to decline.
This movement coupled with the continued aggression of
the seed manufacturers in the agribusiness arena will cause
the farmer to become nothing more than a propertied laborer
employed, under contract, by the seed manufacturer. The
packaging of intellectual property, in the form of agricultural
biotechnology, with pest management systems, and with
information systems for use by the farmer, under contract, will
strengthen the hold of the seed manufacturer over agricultural
productivity. Such a result is, however, not necessary. The
farmer has legal interests in his land, labor, and crop. There is
no need for the farmer to surrender his interests to the seed
manufacturer in order to continue to engage in agribusiness.
Within the law and historical precedent there exists tools
through which the farmer, in cooperation with certain
organizations, can become an equal to the seed manufacturer.
Before reaching that analysis, there are a few points that need
to be clarified.

513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.

See Buttel & Belsky, supra note 510, at 113.
See id. at 115-16.
See Weiss, supra note 449, at A1.
See CAMPBELL, supra note 13, at 390.
See Ehrenfeld, supra note 166.
See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 118-21.
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Whether Growing Is “Making” or “Using”

In 1977 the question of the patentability of
microorganisms, and life itself, was being litigated in the
519
courts.
While the question of patenting life forms was being
directly addressed by the courts, the prevailing belief was that
the types of life forms which could be patented were limited.
Specifically, the court stated that “[a]s for the . . . fears that our
holding will of necessity, or ‘logically,’ make all new, useful,
and nonobvious species of plants, animals, and insects created
520
The
by man patentable, we think the fear is far-fetched.”
court was clearly wrong in believing it far-fetched that all
things created by man will be patentable. Now that seed
manufacturers are being granted rights in genetically modified
plants, it is essential to look more closely at the patent statute
to determine when use by the farmers will infringe the rights of
521
the seed manufacturers.
The patentee gains the interest in the legal estate of
excluding others from making, using, selling, or offering to sell
the patented invention. There are clear distinctions among the
rights to make, to use, and to sell or offer to sell the invention
522
When the patentee transfers the right to exclude
patented.
others from making or selling the invention patented, the
purchaser obtains a portion of the interests in the legal
523
However, the purchaser of the patented invention for
estate.
use “in the ordinary pursuits of life stands on different
524
ground.”
When sold under such a condition, the patented
invention “is no longer under the protection of the act of
525
Congress.”
Instead, the purchaser acquires complete title to

519. See Application of Bergy 563 F.2d 1031, 1038 (C.C.P.A. 1977), cert.
granted, vacated by Parker v. Bergy, 98 S. Ct. 3119 (Mem) (1978).
520. Id.
521. The following discussion moves beyond the standard legal dogma
commonly used to analyze issues of rights in genetically modified plants and
seeds, and enters fields rich in concepts and ideas for discussion and analysis.
Unfortunately, limitations on time and space prohibit the full discussion of
any of the new ideas or only a partial discussion of a few of them.
522. See Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 539 (1852). The court stated that
“the distinction is there taken between the grant of the right to make and
vend the machine, and the grant of the right to use it. The distinction is a
plain one.” Id. at 549.
523. See id.
524. Id.
525. Id.
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526

the patented invention because of the purchase.
The
purchase of the patented invention for use in the ordinary
pursuit of life converts that invention into the “private
527
individual property of the purchasers.” Further, the Supreme
Court has stated that “[a]n incident to the purchase of any
article, whether patented or unpatented, is the right to use and
sell it” and that when the patentee, or his licensee, sells “an
article which is capable of use only in practicing the patent
[then there] is a relinquishment of the patent monopoly with
528
In Bloomer v. McQuewan, Chief
respect to the article sold.”
Justice Taney viewed the transfer of the right to make and to
sell the patented invention as distinct and different from the
transfer of the right to use, as long as such use was for “the
ordinary pursuits of life.” Section 271 of Title 35 states that
infringement of the patent occurs by “whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, within the United States during the term of the
529
In most cases, the acts of making, using, or
patent therefor.”
selling are distinct and separate, and when at least one is
committed then the patent is infringed.
A patent may be granted for a new device such as a type of
cooling device for a computer central processor unit and a claim
may be made for any computer containing such cooling
530
When a computer is made, used, or sold with the
device.
patented cooling unit installed without a license to do so, then
the person who made, used, or sold the computer system is
liable for infringement. By analogy, patents for genetically
526. See Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 548 (1872) (stating that
“[c]omplete title to the implement or machine purchased becomes vested in the
vendee by the sale and purchase, but he acquires no portion of the franchise,
as the machine, when it rightfully passes from the patentee to the purchaser,
ceases to be within the limits of the monopoly”).
527. Id.
528. United States v. Univis Lens Co., Inc., 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942).
529. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
530. See Bradley W. Bartilson, Large Area, Multi-Device Heat Pipe for
Stacked MCM-Based Systems, U.S. PAT. NO. 6,055,157 (issued Apr 6, 2000)
(claiming a “computing module for a computer, said module comprising: a first
heat pipe assembly having a first evaporator plate” in Claim 1 and a
“computer system comprising: a housing; a scalable computing module
positioned within the housing, . . . said scalable computing module further
comprising . . . a first heat pipe assembly having a first evaporator plate” in
Claim 14); U.S. Patent No. 5,781,411 (issued July 14, 1998) (claiming a “heat
sink for cooling an electronic component which generates heat, the heat sink
comprising. . .” in Claim 1 and a “computer system which incorporates a heat
sink, the computer system comprising . . .” in Claim 10).
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modified plants are written to claim both the transgene and the
531
plant.
Because infringement occurs in our mechanical
example, then infringement must occur in the plant situation
as well.
This conclusion does not, however, necessarily follow from
the logic used for mechanical devices when applied to plants.
Infringement occurs when a person, not the patentee, makes,
uses, offers to sell or sells the invention patented. The words
“make,” “use,” and “sell” are not defined within Title 35 and
therefore the meaning of these words must necessarily be left
to the courts. Whether the court should find infringement in
the case of agricultural biotechnology should turn on the
definition of these words, and not necessarily on whether the
alleged infringer was aware that the invention was patented.
The plant genome is a unique entity to the law. It has
contained within it the complete set of instructions to
reproduce itself with only elemental raw materials as inputs.
To date, man has been unable to construct any mechanical or
biological device which simulates the ability of the plant
genome to both reproduce itself and carry all the information
necessary to generate a useful product. Even in the case of
plants, the best that man can do is to insert a miniscule part
into a very large entity. The plant genome not only contains
the instructions necessary to reproduce itself, but it is also
capable of creating, with the aid of cellular machinery, a
variation of itself having very different characteristics. The
closest patentable thing that man can create is a computer
program capable of replicating itself onto other computers, and
those copies will replicate to still other computers. While the
program itself may be patentable, it is doubtful that any court
will uphold a claim of infringement if one of the target
computers started replicating that program onto itself or onto
other computers with or without the knowledge of the target

531. See Nicolai Strizhov et al., Synthetic Bacillus thuringiensis CryIC
Gene Encoding Insect Toxin, U.S. PAT. NO. 6,043,415 (issued Mar. 28, 2000)
(claiming an “isolated DNA sequence coding for Bacillus thuringiensisCryIC
protein comprising the nucleotide sequence shown in SEQ ID No:1,” in claim 1
and a “transgenic plant comprising the isolated DNA Sequence of claim 1” in
claim 5); Shah, supra note 414 (claiming a “chimeric plant gene which
comprises. . .” in claim 1 and a “glyphosate-resistant dicotyledonous plant. . .”
in claim 29); Deluca-Flaherty, supra note 414 (claiming a “[r]ecombinant DNA
molecule comprising a nucleic acid sequence encoding the peptide” in claim 4
and “[a] transgenic plant comprising a foreign gene which encodes a peptide
according to claim 1” in claim 9).
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computer owner.
In the case of a transgenic plant, what was actually
created was a transgene that was inserted into the plant
genome by genetic manipulation of that genome such that the
transgene is expressed. To claim property rights in the entire
plant is to claim too much. The cellular machinery required to
reproduce the inserted transgene and to effect its function was
532
not “created by man” and was not fully characterized by the
inventor. The cellular machinery, instructed by the plant
genome (discounting the presence of the transgene), has been
evolving for longer than humans have existed. While man has
developed an understanding of some of the processes occurring
in the plant cell, our understanding of all the processes
occurring is woefully inadequate. In fact, the entire genome of
any plant has not been fully characterized, let alone the
533
Therefore, it is impossible that any
genome of all plants.
inventor could have so fully characterized the entire genome of
the target plant or could have constructed that genome
(without the use of the cellular machinery) as to be entitled to a
patent on it. And, even if the inventor had fully characterized
the genome, it is impossible that he could have characterized
all of the functions of the plant genome to entitle him to a
patent on the plant. The mechanical analogy is simple to
construct. An inventor invents a widget which is made in a
manufacturing plant (which has been in existence for longer
than the inventor); the processes involved in the manufacturing
of the widget are either poorly understood or completely
unknown to the inventor. Would a patent issue for the
manufacturing plant as well as for the widget? For the widget,
probably yes; for the manufacturing plant, probably not.
Rejection of an attempt to patent the plant would fail for a
number of reasons, not the least of which, except the plant
genome, being lack of enablement by the inventor. Therefore,
to claim property interest in the biological processes involved in
replication of the transgene should not stand.
Because the inventor has characterized the transgene and
because the “creation by man” is a transgene inserted into the
532. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980).
533. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DESIGNING AN
AGRICULTURAL GENOME PROGRAM (1998). (containing proceedings, published
by the National Academy Press, of the forum on “Designing an Agricultural
Genome Project” held on April 26, 1997 as a collaborative effort between the
Board on Biology and the Board on Agricultural of the National Academy)
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genome by genetic manipulation techniques and which is
expressed, all of which may be adequately characterized, the
inventor may only claim the expressed transgene inserted into
the genome by genetic manipulation techniques. The legal
estate in what is claimed is protected by statute that grants the
patentee the right to exclude others from making, using,
selling, or offering to sell the claimed invention.
Simply stated, a transgenic plant simply is not patentable
at all. Justice Story stated with his usual perspicacity that:
[w]here a specific machine already exists, producing certain effects,
if a mere addition is made to such machine, to produce the same
effects in a better manner, a patent cannot be taken for the whole
machine, but for the improvement only. The case of a watch is a
familiar instance. The inventor of the patent lever, without doubt,
added a very useful improvement to it; but his right to a patent
could not be more extensive than his invention. The patent could
not cover the whole machine as improved, but barely the actual
534
improvement.

The cell of a plant is a machine that operates according to
the instructions in the plant genome. The multiplicity of the
cellular machines constitutes the plant, which is a machine
that produces a consumable crop. The addition of a single
transgene, or even a set of transgenes, creates neither a new
cellular machine nor a new plant, but only allows the existing
machine, be it cellular or the whole plant, to produce the same
effects (the consumable crop) in a better manner. It might be
argued that the composition of matter, constituting the plant
genome and the transgene, is patentable.
Indeed, the
combination of the plant genome and the transgene is a
composition of matter, much like an alloy constituted of several
different types of metal. However, the combination of the plant
genome and the transgene, separate from the cellular or plant
machinery cannot produce an effect, much like the alloy cannot
produce an effect; rather, it may only be used in construction to
produce an effect. The cellular and plant machinery produce
an effect, the consumable crop. They are, therefore, not simply
compositions of matter, but rather highly complex, intimately
interconnected machines. The addition of a transgene to a
plant genome is completely analogous to adding a patented
534. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1123, 1124 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No.
17,601). There is no known case history specifically reversing the holding and
arguments of this case, and there is no known legislative history specifically
overruling the same.
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lever to a watch. The plant still produces a consumable crop,
and like the watch with the patented lever, merely does it
better with the added transgene. Because the entire watch
could not be patented, the entire transgenic plant cannot be
patented. By cloaking the cellular machinery and the plant as
compositions of matter will not change the nature of the
cellular machinery and the plant. The transgenic plant,
according to the rule articulated by Justice Story, is no more
patentable as so-called compositions of matter than they are as
machines. To hold such a patent valid would be to reward
dexterity with language of form over discernment of differences
in substance. A detailed analysis of this assertion will be left
for a later date.
The central issue is whether the activity engaged in by the
farmer is “making” the invention patented. The Supreme
535
Court in Deepsouth Packing makes no attempt to define the
word “make,” but rather defers to the construction Justice Day
536
outlined in Bauer v. O’Donnell.
While such deference moves
only incrementally closer to the meaning of “make,” certainly
the Court does not believe the word should be accorded the
meaning that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals used, namely
that make “means what it ordinarily connotes–the substantial
537
manufacture of the constituent parts of the machine.”
Further, the Court refused to answer the question of whether
the definition used by the Fifth Circuit more closely
corresponds to the ordinary meaning than the meaning
538
constructed by Judge Swan in Andrea that provided that a
non-living object is made only when it has “reach[ed] the state

535. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 529 (1972)
(affirming the conclusion reached by Judge Swan in Radio Corp. of America v.
Andrea, 79 F.2d 626, 628 (2d Cir. 1935), that “unassembled export of the
elements of an invention d[oes] not infringe the patent”).
536. 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1912) (stating that the “right to make can scarcely be
made plainer by definition, and embraces the construction of the thing
invented”).
537. Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 928, 939 (5th Cir.
1971). The Fifth Circuit held against Deepsouth Packing Co. because it
believed that “substantial” construction of the deveining equipment amounted
to “making” the patented invention in the United States. See id. The author
recognizes that the line of cases up to Deepsouth Packing are concerned with
“combination inventions” constituted of mechanical or electrical components.
For the present purposes, the issue is determining the meaning of the word
“make” and the word “use” which adequately describes the state in which a
thing exists.
538. See Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea, 79 F.2d 626, 628 (2d Cir. 1935).
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539

of final ‘operable’ assembly.”
While it is not possible to know
with precision what the Court meant by “make,” it is more than
likely that the word should be given its ordinary meaning and
that the accused device is made only when it has reached a
state of construction exactly equal to the patented invention.
The ordinary meaning can be obtained from an English
540
That is, “make” is “to bring into being;
language dictionary.
specifically, (a) to form by shaping or putting parts or
ingredients together, physically or mentally; to build, construct,
541
fabricate, fashion, create, compose. . .” The common meaning
of the word “make” requires some action and volition to bring a
thing into being by “shaping or putting parts or ingredients
542
It is not practically possible that a thing could
together.”
543
construct itself without some action on the part of a person.
Having constructed an interpretation of the meaning of the
word “make,” developing an interpretation of the infringement
provision of the patent statute is now necessary.
544
Because the legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act
indicated that it was meant to codify the patent law of that
date, and “make” is to be given its ordinary meaning in section
271 of Title 35 of the United States Code, then there must be
some volitive action on the part of the accused infringer to
bring the patented thing into being by “shaping or putting

539. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp, 406 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1972).
540. See WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1983).
541. Id. at 1088. To gain a fuller understanding of the meaning of the
word, consider the meaning of the synonyms of make: to build is “to construct
or erect . . . to unite into a structure,” id. at 238; to construct is “to put
together the parts in their proper place and order,” id. at 392; to fabricate is
“to make or build as a whole, by connecting its parts,” id. at 654; to create is
“to produce; to cause; to bring about,” id. at 427; and to compose is “to form by
uniting two or more things,” id. at 372. The word “to” is used before a verb as
a sign of the infinitive. Id. at 1619. An infinitive is the “simple, uninflected
form of the verb, expressing existence or action without reference to person,
number, or tense. Id. at 939.
542. Id. at 1088.
543. A conclusion of the second law of thermodynamics is that every
enumerable state of a system will exist with a finite probability. However,
without an input of work the system will be observed in some state of disorder
far more often than in the perfectly ordered state (which will be observed with
probability near zero). A very penetrable discussion of the second law of
thermodynamics is given by HANS CHRISTIAN VON BAEYER, MAXWELL’S
DEMON: WHY WARMTH DISPERSES AND TIME PASSES (1998).
544. See Revision of Title 35, United States Code, H. R. REP. NO. 1923, 82D
CONG. 2D SESS. Committee on Judiciary, at 1 (1952).
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545

parts or ingredients together.”
Indeed, there must be some
intent on the part of the accused infringer to construct a thing,
even if by accident it becomes equal to the patented invention.
Of course, section 271 is devoid of any mention of intent on the
part of the accused infringer. This is because the right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling is independent of
the mental state of accused infringer. While this is an accurate
statement of the right to exclude granted by statute it is an
incomplete statement of the requirements for infringement.
This is because the statute requires that the accused infringer
546
must “make” the patented device, it is insufficient for a cause
of action that the accused infringer merely possess, as property,
547
the patented device.
Plants present a situation different from mechanical or
electrical devices. Where some volition and manipulation is
required to form or assemble the items necessary to yield the
mechanical device, no such volition or manipulation is required
to produce a plant. Of course, the farmer digs a small hole in
the ground, places a seed in the hole, and covers it with soil. Is
this action sufficient to make a plant? No more than replacing
the seed with a pile of electronic chips would be sufficient for
making a digital computer. While the farmer may be initiating
a process that eventually yields a plant, this initiation is no
more making a plant than placing a transistor on to the
assembly room bench would be making a radio. As stated in
Deepsouth Packing Co. the word “make” cannot be constructed
548
It means that to “make”
to mean “substantial manufacture.”
the patented invention, embodied in the plant, the farmer
would have to construct the complete genome with the
expressed, inserted transgene.
The farmer cannot completely manufacture a plant, only

545. WEBSTER’S, supra note 540 at 1088.
546. It is recognized that “makes, uses, sells, or offers to sell,” 35 U.S.C. §
271 (1994), are exclusive actions, but for present purposes we require focus
upon the word “make.”
547. See WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, 3 THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL
INVENTIONS § 898 (1890).
548. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 528 (1972).
The Court stated that it will not “endorse the view that the ‘substantial
manufacture of the constituent parts of [a] machine’ constitutes direct
infringement when [it has] so often held that a combination patent protects
only against the operable assembly of the whole and not the manufacture of
its parts.” Id. at 528 (quoting Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443
F.2d 928, 939 (5th Cir. 1971)).
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nature can do that. In fact, if the soil containing the seed is not
moistened occasionally by rain, and if the seedling lacks
sunshine, then no plant will be produced. The initiating act of
the farmer falls far short of making the patented invention or
even a substantial manufacture. Once the seed is in the soil,
the plant will either grow or not grow independent of any
reasonable actions by the farmer. The farmer, therefore, does
not make the plant. The plant is a product purely of natural
forces. A powerful corollary is that the farmer, even if deemed
to have “made” the plant, cannot by his own actions cause the
transgene to be either replicated or expressed. Replication and
expression of the transgene are controlled strictly by the
cellular machinery, machinery over which the farmer can exert
no force or influence.
Infringement of the exclusive right of the patentee can
occur by making the patented invention. Making requires the
volition to “bring into being” a patented thing. The accused
infringer must be aware that the thing is being created or
brought into being. It is irrelevant for purposes of section 271
of Title 35 that the person knew that the thing was patented
for there to be infringement, only that it was made. The
patentee must prove infringement; and to show infringement
the patentee must show that the accused infringer made the
patented thing. Merely having the patented thing in his
possession does not make him an infringer. This is because
there are a number of routes that the accused infringer could
have come into possession of the patented thing other than
having made it. The doctrine of exhaustion states that these
alternative routes protect the accused infringer from liability
for infringing the patent. With regard to plants in particular,
merely having patented plants on his farm does not
automatically subject the farmer to liability for infringement.
To examine the basis for why liability does not
automatically lie simply because the farmer possesses the
patented plants, consider two Zea mays plants growing in a
field belonging to the farmer. Presume that one plant is
genetically modified, hence patented, and the other is of
conventional Zea mays variety. Without testing the two plants,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to say which one is genetically
549
Consider two cases. In the first case, the farmer
modified.
549. Mr. Schmeiser was completely unaware that his land was
contaminated with a variety of canola different than his own conventional
canola until he sprayed canola plants which were growing by the roadside
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intentionally planted seeds for both plants. As discussed
above, this initiation of the process of growing the plant does
not constitute infringement because it is only a very small step
in the process by which the final plant comes into being. It is
not even a “substantial manufacture,” which the Supreme
Court rejected as defining the word making in Deepsouth
Packing Co. Because “substantial manufacture” cannot rise to
the level of “making” for purposes of infringement analysis,
certainly the step of planting the seed is such a small step in
the process that it cannot amount to “making.”
In the second case, in which the genetically modified plant
came into being in the farmer’s fields, involves translocation of
the seed (which already contained the transgene) into the
farmer’s field from a route other than through the farmer (the
analysis of this particular case is as applicable to crosspollination with a remote plant containing the transgene as it
is to the translocation of the genetically modified seed). The
plant is growing in the field of the farmer through no volitive
act of the farmer. The farmer is completely unaware that the
plant seeds contain the patented transgene; the farmer did not
plant the seed (or cause the cross-pollination of a non-modified
plant with a genetically modified plant through a volitive act)
to initiate the process of bringing the plant into being and the
farmer could not distinguish, without testing, the non-modified
and genetically modified plants. The farmer cannot, through
any action of his own, assemble the nucleotides to bring the
patented DNA into being. The farmer, through volitive acts of
his own, cannot cause the germination of the seed; rather, he
can only take the very small step of initiating the process by
which the germination occurs, but the germination will occur
only if other, far more substantial, forces act upon the seed.
Since the seed or pollen came to be located on the farmer’s land
through no action of the farmer, then this second case
constitutes an even less significant step in bringing the plant
into being than planting the seed does in the first case.
Therefore the farmer is not “making” the patented transgene or
plant. The natural conclusion is that the farmer cannot be
guilty of infringement merely for possessing the patented plant
on his own land.
Following the analyses above, demonstrating that the
with Roundup. See Interview: Schmeiser{July 6, 2001}, supra note 270. When
these plants failed to die, he began to suspect that they might have developed
a resistance to glyphosate. See id.
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farmer cannot make the patented genome or plant, the farmer
may not “use” the patented genome or plant even if it is
growing upon his own lands. The purchase of a patented
invention from the patentee for use in the ordinary pursuit of
life grants to the purchaser the right to use that invention as
long as the invention is capable of use, and use to the full
extent to which that invention is capable of use when title
550
The right of use of the patented
transfers to the purchaser.
invention means “the right to put into service [the] given
551
invention.”
Working from the ordinary meaning of the word
use we may deduce that a volitive action is required on the part
of the actor. Specifically, the dictionary meaning of use is “to
put or bring into action or service; to employ for or apply to a
552
Therefore, if a patented invention must be
given purpose.”
used, then the invention is to be brought into service and
applied to its given purpose to the fullest extent possible.
In the case of a genetically modified plant, “use” means
that the expressed transgene is brought into service and
applied to its given purpose to the fullest extent possible.
Consider a plant that contains a transgene encoding 5enolpyruvylshikimate-3-phosphate
synthase
(EPSPS)
553
This transgene contains a chloroplast transit
polypeptide.
peptide, which allows either the EPSPS polypeptide, or an
enzymatically active fraction of the polypeptide, to be
transported into the chloroplast of the plant cell. When this
transgene is expressed in the plant cell and the EPSPS
polypeptide is transported into the chloroplast, the cell exhibits

550. See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 455 (1873) (stating that the
purchase of an invention patented “carri[es] with it the right to the use of that
machine so long as it was capable of use” and that the basis for this holding is
that “the sale by a person who has the full right to make, sell, and use such a
machine carries with it the right to the use of that machine to the full extent
to which it can be used”).
551. Bauer v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 11 (1913) The Court stated that: “[the]
right to use is a comprehensive term and embraces within its meaning the
right to put into service any given invention.” Id. at 10-11.
552. WEBSTER’S TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 2012 (2d ed. 1983).
553. See Dilip M. Shah, Stephen G. Rogers, Robert Horsch & Robert T.
Fraley, Glyphosate-Resistant Plants, U.S. PAT. NO. 4,940,835 (issued July 10,
1990). This patent issued from a continuation-in-part application filed July 7,
1986, which claimed the earlier filing date of a continuation-in-part
application filed on October 29, 1985, which in turned was filed as a
continuation-in-part application based on the original application filed August
7, 1985.
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554

a substantial degree of glyphosate resistance.
As illustrated
earlier, even if the claims of the patent claim contain language
555
regarding claiming “a glyphosate-resistant plant cell,” or a
556
“plant comprising transformed plant cells” the claim would be
too broad if the language were to be read as being an element;
rather, the language is to be interpreted as merely the
preamble to the claim. Such a position takes on significance in
determining the “use” of the patented invention.
Consider a claim that reads, “[a] glyphosate-resistant
dicotyledonous plant seed, said seed comprising a chimeric
557
Say the farmer plants such a seed and a plant
plant gene.”
grows from the seed. While the farmer has used the purchased
seed for the purposes of planting, and the process of planting
yields a plant on his land, he has not used the invention
patented.
The
language
“[a]
glyphosate-resistant
dicotyledonous plant seed” is not an element of the claim, but
rather the preamble. Therefore, the claimed invention is the
expressed transgene that is inserted into the genome of the
plant by genetic engineering techniques. The claim identifies
that this claimed invention may be embodied within a seed.
The farmer may have either purchased the seed from some
source, including the seed manufacturer, or may have saved
the seed from a previous crop cycle for planting in the current
planting cycle. Either way, by planting the seed he is bringing
the seed into service and applying it to its given purpose to the
fullest extent possible; that is, he is planting the seed to
initiate the process by which a plant comes into being on his
lands. The only way that the farmer can bring the invention
patented into service and apply the invention to its given
purpose to the fullest extent possible is to apply glyphosate to
the plant or seed.
There are two volitional acts which involve “use”: first is
the use of the seed for planting, which does not constitute
infringement because it is not bringing into service the
patented invention; second is the use of the expressed gene to

554. See id.
555. Id. at Claim 22.
556. Ganesh M. Kishore & Dilip M. Shah, Glyphosate-Tolerant 5endolpyruvyl-3-phosphoshikimate Synthase, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,145,783, Claim
16 (issued Sept. 8, 1992).
557. See Dilip M. Shah, Stephen G. Rogers, Robert Horsch & Robert T.
Fraley, Glyphosate-Resistant Plants, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,188,642, Claim 8 (issued
Feb. 23, 1993).
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protect the plant from the action of glyphosate, which may
constitute infringement because it is bringing into service the
558
patented invention.
The patented invention may consist of
the plant genome, the transgene, and any promotors inserted
into the plant genome to cause the plant to express the gene.
The plant genome, under given necessary forces, causes the
plant to come into being from the seed. The transgene is not
necessary for the process of bringing the plant into being. The
transgene is only necessary to confer some type of protection
upon the plant. This means that the transgene may be
“switched off” such that it is not expressed and the plant will
still be produced. Since the patented invention may be the
composition consisting of the plant genome and the transgene
with its promotors, then the use of the plant gene in the
process of growing the plant is employing only an element of
the invention, not the entire invention. Indeed, a process is
initiated by planting the seed in which the plant genome, which
is an element of the patented invention, is brought into service
and applied to its given purpose of producing a plant to the
fullest extent possible, and hence is “used.” However, the use
of a component element of an invention is not infringement,
only the use of the entire invention constitutes infringement.
Whether mere possession of the patented invention implies use
559
has not been clearly articulated in any reported cases.
However, to use a thing and to possess a thing are distinct and
separate concepts; the language of the statute is clear in that it
is the “use” that constitutes infringement, not “possession.”
Mr. Schmeiser argued, as part of his defense, that he did
not “use” the patented glyphosate-resistant canola found
growing on his farm because he did not apply Roundup to his
560
While Federal Judge W. Andrew MacKay took note
canola.
of Mr. Schmeiser’s argument, he found it irrelevant for
determining infringement because he interpreted the language
of the patent statute to mean that if the transgenic plant is
growing on Mr. Schmeiser’s farm then Mr. Schmeiser is
infringing the patent rights of Monsanto. It is impossible to

558. Of course a doctrine exists in patent law in which the use of a
patented invention for a completely different purpose constitutes “use” and
hence infringement of the patent. However, in this case, the patented
invention is not being used for some completely different purpose; rather, the
patented invention is not being used at all.
559. See ROBINSON, supra note 547, § 898.
560. See supra note 442.
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know precisely why Judge MacKay drew such an erroneous
interpretation from the patent statute.
It is completely
contrary to the clear meaning of the patent statute that mere
possession of the patented invention on the lands of the farmer
constitutes infringement. To find infringement, it must be
proven that the farmer either made, used, or sold the patented
invention. Since economic aspects are not at issue for the time
being, the selling of the crop is not relevant to the question of
whether possession of the patented invention on the lands of
the farmer constitutes infringement. To make or use the
patented invention requires a volitional action on the part of
the farmer. As discussed above, no volitional action on the part
of the farmer can cause the “making” of the patented invention.
Therefore, there can be no infringement due to making the
plant simply by initiating the process by which the plant
eventually comes into being. Unless the farmer actually uses
561
the patented invention for its intended purposes, then there
is no infringement. Mr. Schmeiser never sprayed Roundup on
his fields because such an action would be counterproductive to
his efforts. Therefore, Mr. Schmeiser never used the patented
invention.
According to the decision by Judge MacKay,
Monsanto never proved that Mr. Schmeiser either made or
used the patented invention. Their claim was that he merely
possessed the patented invention on his lands and hence he
must be guilty of patent infringement.
3.

The Farmer as Plant Breeder

The advancement of law and science has left the farmer at
the side of the road. The farmer has first hand knowledge of
crops in his field. He also would be in the position to detect and
characterize, on a superficial level, any plants that appear
anamolously through routine inspection and maintenance of
his fields. The farmer may then assume the role of plant
breeder. If the farmer is classified as a plant breeder, then he

561. In the case of plant agricultural biotechnology, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to use the patented invention for any purpose other than for which
it is originally intended. The patented invention was not intended to be
planted and produce a plant. It was intended to confer some type of protection
upon the plant. Indeed, the plant genome produces a plant, but that is only an
element of the entire patented invention. Even if the farmer could “make” a
plant by employing its genome, he still would not be employing the patented
invention simply by allowing the plant to grow on his lands.
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may be allowed to use protected plants without infringing the
rights of the original developer of the plants; it may strengthen
his hand in negotiating with the seed manufacturers as well as
in legal disputes with the seed manufacturers. The farmer as a
plant breeder may also have available to him statutory
protection from infringement claims by the seed
manufacturers. Appropriate places to start in defining the
farmer as a researcher and plant breeder are the dictionary
and case law.
A breeder is a person who breeds either animals or plants.
To breed plants means to “produce (plants) by selective
562
A plant breeder is typically thought to be a
pollination.”
563
564
corporation
or a worker for an agricultural station
or
565
university.
However, it does not appear that the courts
require that “selective pollination” be the sole criteria
distinguishing a plant breeder from an ordinary grower of
566
In Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., the
plants.
Fifth Circuit stated, “the breeder must possess the skill and
discrimination to spot potential new varieties and recognize
567
While corporations
whether they possess desirable traits.”
have typically been viewed as “plant breeders” common-sense
indicates that such fictional legal entities are incapable of
being plant breeders; rather, the people employed by these
corporations are the actual plant breeders.

562. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 173 (3d ed. 1988).
563. See Pan-American Plant Co. v. Matsui, 433 F. Supp. 693, 695 (N.D.
Cal. 1977) (stating that “[p]laintiff breeds” new chrysanthemum plant
varieties); see also Pioneer Hi-Bred v. Holden, 35 F.3d 1226, 1234 n.34 (8th
Cir. 1994) (stating that “McConnell is a plant breeder employed by Pioneer”);
Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1352 (5th Cir.
1976) (identifying Mr. Duffett as Yoder’s head breeder).
564. See TRUE, supra note 29, at 221, 255, 274.
565. See Mumm v. Illinois, 10 Ill. Ct. Cl. 652, 652-53 (1939) (recognizing
that plaintiff was “an associate in plant breeding in the Agronomy
Department of the College of Agriculture of the University of Illinois”).
566. For instance, the court in Pan-American Plant Co. v. Matsui stated
that the term “breeder” of chrysanthemums “also includes a person or firm
who uses mutation inducing techniques such as radiation.” 433 F. Supp. 693,
695 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
567. Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1352
(5th Cir. 1976). In describing the process for identifying and propagating new
chrysanthemum varieties, the court stated that “a skilled breeder will select
for further development those that display such desirable characteristics as
fast response time, temperature tolerance, durability, size, and vigor” and
after the new variety has been isolated, “the only way he can preserve his
creation is by means of asexual reproduction.” Id.
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No particular set of criteria establishes an individual as a
plant breeder. For example, in the early twentieth century, an
individual could be registered as a “cotton seed breeder” in
Texas upon application and compliance with statutory
568
requirements.
While the individual plant breeder may
require that “facilities for elaborate testing and development
569
must be available,” such requirements need not always be
satisfied. Indeed, plant breeders were not required to have
elaborate facilities, only to have the ability to discern desired
traits in individual or small groups of plants. In fact, the
status of the individual as a plant breeder was recognized by
570
Congress in passing the Plant Patent Act of 1930. The report
of the House of Representatives states that the Plant Patent
Act is intended to correct the (then existing) discrimination
between rewarding genius of mechanical invention and the
failure to reward the genius of inventing new varieties of
plants. Specifically, the report states that by correcting such
discrimination it was “hoped the genius of young agriculturist
of America will be enlisted in a profitable work of invention and
571
discovery of new plants that will revolutionize agriculture.”
The author has been unable to find any case law in which the
status of a farmer as a plant breeder has been explicitly
568. See Terrell v. Kasch, 10 S.W.2d 208, 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). The
court upheld an injunction by the trial court restraining appellants from:
(a) . . . registering or certifying any cotton seed produced or owned
by the plaintiff, Ed Kasch, without his application therefor or his
express consent. (b) From in the future certifying any cottonseed
that is produced from and is the 1st-year progeny of Ed Kasch’s
unregistered commercial seed that he offers and sells to the public
as Kasch’s improved pedigreed cottonseed. (c) From in the future
issuing and delivering to any person, firm or corporation
certification tags for cottonseed that is the first-year progeny of Ed
Kasch’s unregistered commercial cottonseed.
Id. at 209.
569. Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1352
(5th Cir. 1976).
570. See COMMITTEE ON PATENTS: 1930, supra note 504, at 2. The
committee recognized that “plant breeding and research is dependent, in large
part, upon Government funds to Government experiment stations, or the
limited endeavors of the amateur breeder.” Id. The statutory language was
cited in In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834, 838 (C.C.P.A. 1940) (holding that the
word “plant” as used in the Plant Patent Act did not include bacteria),
distinguished by Application of Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1039 (C.C.P.A. 1977)
(stating that “[w]e are not here concerned with interpretation of the Plant
Patent Act as this court was in In re Arzberger, . . . which simply held that
that act did not encompass bacteria”).
571. COMMITTEE ON PATENTS: 1930, supra note 504, at 2.
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addressed. While the farmer may not be typically viewed as a
572
scientist or engineer, he may certainly be considered a plant
573
breeder.
While the farmer may not possess sophisticated
equipment, he can still engage in the practice of observing
which crop varieties work best for his local environment and
employ those same varieties. In some cases, the farmer will
conduct this practice with his own crops. Such is the case with
Percy Schmeiser who has grown conventional canola on his
farm in Canada since 1947 and is known as a seed developer
574
and seed saver. Mr. Percy Schmeiser has engaged in a multidecade long program of retaining select seed from one crop
cycle for use in the next planting cycle. He uses canola seeds
grown on a field allowed to “summer fallow” the previous year
for the subsequent growing cycle because those seeds are the
“cleanest.” In doing so, he is able to plant seeds that are the
least contaminated with weed seeds and the least likely to
transmit diseases. Through his rational farming practice, Mr.
Schmeiser has developed a variety of conventional canola that
is relatively free of blackleg and sclerotinia with higher than
575
In his practice of
average yield for the Saskatchewan area.
farming he displays all the characteristics of a plant breeder
defined above. That he lacks formal training as a scientist does
not make him less a plant breeder than the trained scientist
who works for a seed manufacturer. It is the nature of his
work that makes him a plant breeder. In fact, any farmer that
572. When the term “scientist” is used, it is easy to conjure up an image of
a bearded, slightly unkempt, pipe-smoking man in a laboratory working with
petri dishes and test tubes in deep contemplation of serious questions of
science. But, it is possible to recognize the farmer as a scientist if he engages
in the scientific method while improving the productivity of his crops. By
scientific method, it is meant that through the process of hypothesis
development and testing, a clearer understanding is obtained of the system
under investigation. The engineer is a person who understands the scientific
principles involved and is able to apply or manipulate those principles to
construct a system or device capable of converting a raw material input into a
desirable product. Such activity is the essence of farming.
573. See Kim Bros. v. Hagler, 276 F.2d 259, 260-61 (9th Cir. 1960)
(identifying Mr. F. W. Anderson as “a plant breeder of some considerable
standing, [who] produced and sold to appellant partnership a new variety of
nectarine”).
574. See Interview: Schmeiser{July 6, 2001}, supra note 270.
575. See generally Monsanto Can., Inc. v. Schmeiser Enters., Ltd., 2001
FCT 256 (Fed. Ct. Canada 2001), available at http://decisions.fctcf.gc.ca/fct/2001/2001fct256.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2001).
See also
Interview: Schmeiser{July 6, 2001}, supra note 270.
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meets the criteria of a plant breeder discussed above is, by
definition, a plant breeder. However, not all farmers are
necessarily plant breeders.
Another farmer is Mr. Dallas Thomason, who owns a
cotton ginning facility in Louisiana that is used by many
neighboring cotton farmers for ginning their cotton. It has
been a practice of Mr. Thomason to retain the cotton seeds from
the farmers who have their cotton ginned at Mr. Thomason’s
576
facility as partial consideration for the use of his cotton gin.
A portion of these seeds is used by Mr. Thomason to plant his
own fields, and the balance is sold for processing into animal
577
feed.
Mr. Thomason was successfully sued by Monsanto and
Delta and Pine Land for planting “brown-bag” genetically
578
579
without a technology use license.
modified cotton seed
However, even his long-standing practice of using part of the
seeds retained from ginning other farmer’s cotton would have
given Monsanto and Delta and Pine Land a cause of action

576. See Interview: Thomason, supra note 7.
577. Mr. Thomason has stated that he never resold any portion of these
seeds to farmers for reproductive purposes. See id.
578. Mr. Thomason planted “brown-bag” cotton seed during the 1996 crop
cycle on only 50 acres of the normal 4000 acres that he plants. Typically, Mr.
Thomason has cotton seeds, that he saved from his own fields, cleaned and
delinted by Sinkers Seed Corp., Kennett Mo., for planting during the next crop
cycle. In 1996, Mr. Thomason did not have a sufficient amount of his own
“saved” seed to complete the planting of the 4000 acres. He insists that he did
not know that the seed he purchased from Mr. Pete Mulhern, then employed
by Tri-State Chemical, in 1996 was genetically modified to contain the
Bacillus thuringiensis -endotoxin gene. See id. Furthermore, he insists that
Mr. Mulhern, who sold the seed to him, neither told him that the cotton seed
was genetically modified nor required him to sign the technology-use license.
See id. It is known that in the first year of general use of Bacillus
thuringiensis cotton, the cotton seed was first placed on the open market in
1996, the farmers were sold far more seed than they would have used had they
been planting conventional cotton, and that the farmers planted the new
genetically modified seeds more densely than they typically planted
conventional seeds. In many cases, farmers would return the excess seed to
the seed dealer, who would rebag it in unlabeled brown bags and resell the
seed without a technology-use license. Under such circumstances, it is
plausible that Mr. Thomason genuinely did not know, or could not have
known, that the “brown-bag” seed was genetically modified but, the seed
dealer certainly must have know and for his own reasons did not want to
bother with requiring the farmers who were purchasing the seed to sign the
technology-use agreement. See id. Mr. Thomason stated that it was Mr.
Mulhern who reported him to Monsanto as using Bacillus thuringiensis
genetically modified seed without a technology-use license. See id.
579. A technology-use license utilized by Monsanto in Canada to regulate
canola farmers is given supra, note 453.
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against Mr. Thomason for patent infringement and
infringement of the PVPA. Because Mr. Thomason is not
engaged in the process of creating a new variety of cotton, then
one would be hard pressed to give him the status of a plant
breeder. However, a serious question in the current status of
the law remains where Mr. Thomason is liable to Monsanto
when he does indeed engage in his conventional practice of
using a portion of the seed retained from the cotton ginning
process for reproductive purposes.
After many years of artificial selection the growers of
Washington Red Delicious apples managed to produce the
visibly “model” apple which does not have an appealing taste to
580
The Washington Red Delicious apple was
the consumer.
581
“bred for color and size and not for taste.”
Because of a
change in the taste of consumers, and the lack of appeal of the
Washington Red Delicious apple, the Red Delicious apple
growers of the United States are facing a rapid decline in their
582
Recently, one astute apple farmer in the state of
industry.
Washington observed an anomalous apple growing in his
orchard of Red Delicious apples. The new apple, called the
Cameo apple, is distinct from the Red Delicious apple in color,
skin texture, shape, and flavor.
This case raises two
interrelated questions: first, whether the apple grower is a
“plant breeder;” second, whether the apple represents a new
variety of apples. If each of these two issues is resolved in the
affirmative, then the owner of the intellectual property in the
ancestral plant variety may not have a cause of action for
infringement. The apple growers in general, and the grower of
the Cameo apple in particular, satisfy all the requirements
discussed above for giving a farmer the status of a plant
breeder. The apple growers are continuously refining a variety
of apples to make it more appealing to the consumer and
awareness and development of new varieties of apples is the
core definition of being a plant breeder. Therefore, the farmer
who discovered the Cameo apple is a plant breeder, as are all
the farmers who continue to refine the particular variety of
crop that they are growing.

580. See Timothy Egan, ‘Perfect’ Apple Pushed Growers Into Debt, N. Y.
TIMES, November 4, 2000, at A1.
581. Id. (quoting Doyle Fleming, lifelong apple farmer).
582. See id.
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Breeding a New “Variety”

The second issue related to the Cameo apple considers
whether it constitutes a new variety of apples separate from
the Red Delicious Apple. The answer to this question depends
583
upon whether the new plant is reproduced sexually
or
584
asexually.
If the newly observed plant or plant product was
the result of asexual reproduction, including a sport, then it
might be a new “variety” and hence patentable under Title 35
of the United States Code. If the plant or plant product was
produced by sexual reproduction then it might be a new
“variety” under the Plant Variety Protection Act and hence
subject to protection. While the discovering farmer may be able
to claim a patent or certification on the new plant or plant
product, will the farmer still be liable for infringement of the
original patent or Plant Variety Protection Act certification?
The answer depends upon whether the farmer has the status of

583. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 181 (1995). If the
variety is sexually reproduced, then it may be protected under the Plant
Variety Protection Act. As indicated earlier, sexual reproduction means that
plants grow from seeds, which in turn produce seeds. Sexually reproduced
plants are afforded protection under the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970.
Specifically, the Act affords “patent-like protection to novel varieties of
sexually reproduced plants (that is, grown from seed) which parallels the
protection afforded sexually reproduced plant varieties (that is, varieties
reproduced by propagation or grafting) under Chapter 15 of the Patent Act.”
Id.
584. Asexually reproduced plants are those which are reproduced through
cuttings, grafting, or otherwise cloning the source plant. These plants may be
protected by the Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act. The provisions of the
Plant Patent Act were included in Title 35 of the United States Code in 1952.
Law of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 804 (1952) (current version at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 161-64 (1994)). Subsequently, the plant patent grant was changed from the
“exclusive right” to the “right to exclude” resulting from court decisions
explaining the nature of rights granted by a patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 163
(1994); Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 34
(1923) (stating that: “[a]ll that the Government grants and protects is the
power to exclude others from making, using, or vending during the grant”); P.
J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 40-41,
reprinted in 75 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 161, 202 (1993). Only a single claim is
allowed in a plant patent, see 37 C.F.R. § 1.164, and the specification of the
plant patent must contain as complete a description of the characteristics of
the plant as possible so as to distinguish it from related known varieties; also,
the specification must contain language which points out with particularity
the manner of asexual reproduction. The entire plant is patented; hence only
a single claim is permitted in the plant patent. See Kim Bros. v. Hagler, 167
F. Supp. 665, 667 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
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a plant breeder, and upon the definition of a new “variety.”
The definition of variety depends upon whether the ancestral
plant variety was protected under the Plant Variety Protection
Act or the Plant Patent Act.
a.

Protection Under Plant Variety Protection Act

The progenitor plant may be certified under either the
586
587
Plant Variety Protection Act or under the Plant Patent
588
Act.
The right to certification under the Plant Variety
589
Protection Act depends on whether the variety
is new,
distinct, stable, and uniform. Because the scope of the Plant
590
Patent Act is different from the scope of the Plant Variety
591
Protection Act, “the meaning of variety in the Plant Patent

585. As is usually the case when dealing with language, we must struggle
with ambiguities inherent in the use and meaning of particular words. In the
case at hand, our problem is adequately by the following: “[i]t is very difficult
to tell just what is meant by the word variety; in fact, it means different things
to different people.” Carleton R. Ball, Varieties of Hard Spring Wheat, 680
U.S.D.A. FARMERS’ BUL. 1, 2 (1915). Mr. Ball gave a somewhat useful
definition as “it means a collection of plants in which all the individuals are
alike in appearance, including form, size, color, and other visible characters.”
Id.
586. See 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1994).
587. Because the Plant Variety Protection Act applies only to plants that
are sexually reproduced and the Plant Patent Act applies only to plants that
are asexually reproduced, then it is not possible to obtain protection under
both acts.
588. See 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1994).
589. Under the PVPA, the term “variety” is defined as follows:
[t]he term “variety” means a plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of
the lowest known rank, that, without regard to whether the conditions for
plant variety protection are fully met, can be defined by the expression of the
characteristics resulting from a given genotype or combination of genotypes,
distinguished from any other plant grouping by the expression of at least one
characteristic and considered as a unit with regard to the suitability of the
plant grouping for being propagated unchanged. A variety may be represented
by seed, transplants, plants, tubers, tissue culture plantlets, and other matter.
7 U.S.C. § 2401(a)(9) (1994). The 1994 amendments to the Plant Variety
Protection Act were made to conform the statutory language with the
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants of
March 1991. See H. R. REP. NO. 103-2927 (1994).
590. The Plant Patent Act grants a patent to anyone who “invents or
discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant.” 35
U.S.C. § 161 (1994).
591. The Plant Variety Protection Act permits certification of a plant that
has been sexually reproduced and has met the requirements of 7 U.S.C. §
2402(a)(1-4).
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Act and the PVPA” must not necessarily be the same.
If the
new plant was obtained by harvesting cells from a plant
protected by the Plant Variety Protection Act, satisfies the
requirements of 7 U.S.C. §2402(a), and its progeny are sexually
reproduced, then the progeny may also be protected under the
Plant Variety Protection Act. If, however, the new plant
exhibits at least one characteristic which is clearly
distinguishable from the progenitor plant and from other
publicly known variety then the new plant is the originator of a
new variety of plant.
Since the Plant Variety Protection Act grants patent-like
protection for certified plants, then the owner of the certificate
may exclude others from the use of the plant for breeding
593
purposes, but only to the extent that the progenitor and
progeny plants are of the same variety. If the research
594
farmer
uses the Plant Variety Protection Act certificated
plant variety to develop a “hybrid or different variety
595
therefrom” then the owner of the certificate may not exclude
him from doing so. For instance, Delta and Pine Land held a
Plant Variety Protection Act certificate on the Bacillus
thuringiensis transgenic cotton planted by Mr. Dallas
Thomason, and was awarded damages equal to $100 per acre of
cotton planted by Mr. Thomason. If Mr. Thomason had been
using the Bacillus thuringiensis transgenic cotton to develop a
new variety of cotton (say with a superior fiber length) then
Delta and Pine Land would not have a cause of action for
infringement of the Plant Variety Protection Act certificate
because Delta and Pine Land would not have the right to
exclude Mr. Thomason from doing so.
Because Zea Mays L. is open pollinated the argument for
using the certificated plant variety in developing a new variety
may be easier to make. For example, in the case of maize, it

592. See Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560, 1568
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (Imazio Nursery brought a cause of action for infringement of
its plant patent for a variety of winter blooming heather. Resolution of the
case depended upon the definition of “variety.”).
593. See Kim Bros. v. Hagler, 276 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1960).
594. The farmer who engages in the practice of developing a variety of
plant is a plant breeder. Also, since the farmer is also engaged in the practice
of developing hypotheses about which plants will yield the highest return on
investment, then the farmer is also a researcher. See generally Ball, supra
note 585. For simplicity, the term “research farmer” will identify any farmer
who engages in the practice of rationally refining a variety of plant.
595. 7 U.S.C. § 2483(a)(1) (1994).
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would only be necessary to intercalate a number of rows of
Bacillus thuringiensis transgenic Zea Mays L., which was Plant
Variety Protection Act Protected, with another variety of maize
596
for the purposes of developing a new variety of maize. Again,
in such a case, the owner of the certificate would not have a
cause of action against the research farmer because the
research farmer is using the certificated variety to develop a
new variety.
There is no language in the Plant Variety Protection Act
specifying that the existence of the transgene in the certificated
plant variety precludes the use of that variety in the
development of a new variety.
This observation has
considerable import in the case that the field of the research
farmer is contaminated with the transgene from a field of
genetically modified plants. Because the presence of the
transgene in the field containing originally non-modified plants
creates a new variety, the holder of the certificate has no cause
of action when the farmer, whose plants were contaminated,
saves seed from that field for use in the next crop cycle.
The Plant Variety Protection Act contains a research
597
Research is beneficial to society and must be
exemption.
encouraged rather than discouraged by the threat of liability
for either patent or Plant Variety Protection Act infringement.
Because of the overriding benefit to the public, Congress
exempted experimentalist from infringement under the Plant
598
The overarching purpose is, of
Variety Protection Act.
course, to encourage further developments of the useful arts
and continue to add to the human understanding. It is not
necessary that research be conducted only by the seed
manufacturers. Any person in the field who is working daily
with the plants and land have just as much, if not more,
experience and knowledge of plant husbandry as the person in
the lab who works with petri dishes. In fact, the person in the
field is more likely to understand the economic, environmental,
596. Such an intercalation of Bacillus thuringiensis transgenic Zea mays L.
with non-modified maize is actually required by the refuge plan to reduce the
possibility of creating -endotoxin resistant European corn borers.
597. The “research exemption” under the Plant Variety Protection Act
provides that “[t]he use and reproduction of a protected variety for plant
breeding or other bona fide research shall not constitute an infringement of
the protection provided under this chapter.” 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (1999).
598. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The
Patent System and Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051, 1073
(1988).
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and social impact of his or her work because he is the closest to
those effects. Because the research farmer is, indeed, engaged
in a bona fide research program to develop his own plant
variety, as is Mr. Percy Schmeiser, then the research
exemption must apply to the research farmer equally with its
application to the laboratory investigator.
b.

Protection Under Plant Patent Act

35 U.S.C. § 161 provides that “[w]hoever invents or
discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new
599
variety of plant . . . may obtain a patent therefor.”
Once
granted, the patent allows the patent holder to “exclude others
from asexually reproducing the plant or selling or using the
600
plant so reproduced.” Two issues need to be resolved in order
to identify the level of protection and liability of the farmer
under Title 35: first, whether the newly discovered and
reproduced plant is a new variety; second, whether the
discoverer of the Cameo apple, or the research farmer who
develops a new variety, is liable for infringement of the Plant
Patent Act (the mirror issue is whether the holder of the plant
patent has exclusive rights in the Cameo apple). The import of
the first issue is that if the newly discovered and reproduced
plant is a new variety, then the plant breeder or research
farmer that asexually reproduced the plant cannot be guilty of
infringement of the exclusive rights of the patentee. The
second issue is important because the plant breeder and
research farmer must have available to him as many legal
protections as possible for their important contributions to the
general public. The resolution of the first issue was examined
by the United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit in
601
In Imazio Nursery, the decision turned on the
1995.
definition of variety and what steps by the plant breeder give
rise to a new variety. The Federal Circuit provides a starting
point in analyzing the issue of whether the Cameo apple
constitutes a new variety of apples.
602
Presume that a plant is obtained which has a Plant
599. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1994).
600. 35 U.S.C. § 163 (1994).
601. See Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560, 1568
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
602. It is irrelevant for this part of the discussion whether the plant is
obtained as a sport, mutant, hybrid, or a newly found seedling observed in the
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Patent protected progenitor plant, but which does not contain
603
an exact copy of the progenitor plant genome.
To be precise,
consider a progeny plant that was produced by the protocol
required for asexual reproduction but which differs from that
604
protocol sufficiently to produce a plant that does not possess
605
an exact copy of the ancestral plant genome.
While the
construction of the situation under consideration is quite broad,
the analysis of this situation will be applicable to the much
narrow situation in which a Plant Patent protected plant
containing a transgene is produced by a modification of the
protocol for asexual reproduction. Such modifications could be
cultivated state. While the Plant Patent Act does not define “variety,” the
legislative history of the statute illuminates the inquiry as follows:
new and distinct variety results from bud variation and not seed
variation. A plant or portion of a plant may suddenly assume an
appearance or character distinct from that which normally
characterizes the variety or species. In the second class of cases, the
mutants, the new and distinct variety results from seedling
variation by self-pollination of species. In the third class of cases,
the hybrids, the new and distinct variety results form seedlings of
cross pollination of two species, two varieties, or a species and a
variety.
S. REP. NO. 71-315, at 3 (1930). Congress added another class of plants in
1954, newly found seedlings, with the exception that seedlings found in the
uncultivated state cannot be patented. Act of Sept. 3, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83775, 68 Stat. 1190; Ex parte Moore, 115 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 145, 146 (Pat. Off. Bd.
App. 1957) (section 161, as amended was intended to include “cultivated
sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings”).
603. The only way of knowing for sure that the relevant gene in the newly
obtained plant is not an exact copy of the ancestral gene is by gene mapping.
Currently, technology exists to do gene mapping but it is costly.
604. For instance, the protocol might be varied by exposing the ancestral
plant cells to conditions that are known to modify the genetic code. See PanAmerican Plant Co. v. Matsui, 433 F. Supp. 693, 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
605. See Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th
Cir. 1976). In recognizing that frequently occurring, but rarely observed
mutations would still be patentable, the court stated that:
[a]lthough we are willing to assume for purposes of this argument
that some mutations may appear that would have been genetically
impossible before i. e. that a fundamental change in the biochemical
structure of the chromosome may take place by far the majority of
mutations and sports of chrysanthemums are predictable to some
extent for those skilled in the field . . . . Indeed, part of the skill
required of a [] breeder is to know what to look for and to take steps
immediately to preserve it by asexual reproduction if the desired
trait appears. Given that fact we think that the purpose of the Plant
Patent Act would be frustrated by a requirement that only those
rare, never-before-seen, if not genetically impossible sports or
mutations would be patentable.
Id. at 1382.
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accomplished by radiation or toxins directed at the plant’s
DNA. The case at hand differs from Pan-American because in
Pan-American the sport from the ancestral plant was asexually
606
reproduced without modification.
Under Title 35 of the United States Code, the progeny
plant is of the same variety as the ancestral plant only if it is
607
produced as the result of asexual reproduction. To determine
whether our progeny plant is an asexual reproduction of the
ancestor plant requires review of the meaning of asexual
608
The importance of asexual reproduction to the
reproduction.
plant act was clarified in Yoder Bros.: “[a]sexual reproduction is
literally the only way that a breeder can be sure he has
reproduced a plant identical in every respect to the ancestral
609
The court went on to state that infringement of the
plant.”
patent would occur “only if stock obtained from one of the
610
patented plants is used” and that “[i]f the alleged infringer
could somehow prove that he had developed the plant in
question independently, then he would not be liable in damages
611
or subject to an injunction.”
The test then for asexual reproduction requires that some
612
form of appropriation
occur from the patented ancestral
613
plant.
The district court in Yoder Bros. determined the point
at which appropriation occurs when it ruled “that the act of
asexual reproduction was complete at the time the cutting
614
[physical appropriation] was taken.” It would seem then that
at first glance asexual reproduction has occurred in our case

606. See Pan-American Plant Co. v. Matsui, 433 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Cal.
1977).
607. See 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
608. Asexual reproduction has been described as being “not only a prerequisite but of the very essence of the patent itself.” Peter F. Langrock, Plant
Patents-Biological Necessities in Infringement Suits, 41 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y.
787 (1959).
609. Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1380
(5th Cir. 1976).
610. Id.
611. Id.
612. An adult plant can be reproduced from a single cell grown in tissue
culture. See CAMPBELL, supra note 13, at 410. Some commercially important
plants that have been grown from single cells include alfalfa, asparagus,
cabbage, carrots, citrus fruits, potatoes, sunflowers, tobacco and tomatoes. See
id. at 390.
613. See Langrock, supra note 608, at 788.
614. Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1383
(5th Cir. 1976).
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despite the progeny having a different genetic construct than of
the ancestral plant.
In 1948, Magnuson set out a test of infringement of the
plant patent protection by asexual reproduction that asked
“whether there was a reproduction of substantially the same
plant as covered by the patent by any means other than by
615
seed.”
The Magnuson test would seem to indicate that the
new plant would certainly be asexually reproduced because it
616
was “substantially the same plant.”
However, the Magnuson
test “misses the narrow confinement of the protection afforded
617
to plant patents.”
Title 35, section 161 does not allow the
618
granting of a patent for substantially the same plant but “one
particular plant that has one particular chromosome structure
and when reproduced asexually will produce plants that have
619
620
To
an absolute genetic identity” with the ancestral plant.
discriminate, our grower has not “reproduced a plant identical
621
in every respect to the parent” but has produced a plant that
622
is “substantially the same plant” as the ancestral plant.
Is the “substantially the same plant” of interest still
623
“identical in every respect to the parent”
just because
“asexual reproduction was complete at the time the cutting was
624
625
taken”?
The answer to this question should be no. Modern
615. Raymond A. Magnuson, A Short Discussion on Various Aspects of
Plant Patents, 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 493, 508 (1948).
616. Id.
617. See Langrock, supra note 608, at 789.
618. See 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1994); Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant
Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1380 (5th Cir. 1976); Langrock, supra note 608, at 789.
619. Langrock, supra note 608, at 789.
620. The court in Yoder Bros. appears to follow this reasoning. See Yoder
Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1380 (5th Cir. 1976)
(stating that “[a]sexual reproduction is literally the only way that a breeder
can be sure he has reproduced a plant identical in every respect to the
parent”).
621. Id.
622. Magnuson, supra note 615, at 508.
623. Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1380
(5th Cir. 1976).
624. Id. at 1383.
625. The position argued here is contrary to that taken by Langrock.
Langrock articulated his position as being that the law must create a
“presumption that an infringement has occurred upon the showing by the
patentee that the defendant’s allegedly infringing plants are substantially the
same as the patented plant and that the defendant has had at least a
minimum opportunity to make actual physical appropriations.” See Langrock,
supra note 608, at 789-90.
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gene mapping methods have advanced to the point that it is
nearly trivial to show whether an allegedly infringing plant is
genetically the same as the patented plant.
Therefore,
Langrock’s basic premise, that genetically identical plants can
manifest different superficial characteristics because of
626
environmental factors, fails in light of modern science. It is
now possible to determine whether two plants allegedly
genetically identical but manifesting different characteristics
627
Since the patent was
are indeed genetically different.
granted on one particular plant with one unique genetic
structure and the new plant has a different chromosome
628
structure, then the patent cannot be valid for the new plant.
The fact that there was physical appropriation from the
629
patented ancestral plant is problematic.
The resolution of
our quandary appears to be in how the plant cells were
obtained for the new plant.
If the cells for the progeny plant are harvested from a
Plant Patent protected plant which has already undergone the
genetic mutations due to environmental forces, then there is
physical appropriation of the cells from a plant which are the
same as the one protected by the Plant Patent Act. In this
case, the appropriation would constitute asexual reproduction
of the patented plant, and hence the new plant would be of a
630
If
variety indistinguishable from the plant that is protected.

626. See id. at 789.
627. Of course, environmental factors may cause two genetically identical
plants to exhibit very different characteristics. This is because the gene, or
genes, underlying the relevant characteristic, or characteristics, may be either
expressed at different levels or not expressed at all. This situation adds a
level of complexity which will serve only to obscure the point presently being
pursued.
628. How similar the genetic structure must be and still express
distinguishable characteristics is unclear. Quite possibly, a difference of one
DNA base-pair may be sufficient to assert that the two varieties are
indistinguishable.
629. The court in Yoder Bros. cited Langrock with approval that there
must be physical appropriation in order to have asexual reproduction. See
Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1380 (5th Cir.
1976).
630. Congress defined the characteristics that may be used to distinguish a
new variety. These include:
among others those of habit; immunity from disease; resistance to
cold, drought, heat, wind, or soil conditions; color of flower, leaf,
fruit, or stems; flavor; productivity, including everbearing qualities
in case of fruits; storage qualities; perfume; form; and ease of
asexual reproduction. Within any one of the above or other classes
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the cells themselves had undergone genetic mutation and then
were harvested from the Plant Patent protected plant then
there would be no appropriation because the appropriated cells
are not an identical copy of the ancestor plant results.
However, if the cells were harvested from the protected plant
and genetically modified then, according to the doctrine
articulated in Yoder Bros., there would be physical
appropriation and asexual reproduction. Thus, there would be
infringement. In summary, any cells that contain genetic
mutations and are harvested from a plant allegedly protected
by Plant Patent are not physically appropriated and hence
cannot constitute an asexual reproduction of the ancestral
plant. The rationale is that the harvested cells cannot be the
progeny of the ancestral plant because the progeny can only be
identical replicas of the ancestral plant. On the other hand, if
the cells are harvested and then modified there would be
physical appropriation.
This nonsensical result need not occur in light of recent
developments in science.
With genetic identification
techniques now available, although expensive, it is possible to
determine if two plant genomes are from the same source.
Therefore, the Patent Act should be amended to provide that
the gene or genes corresponding to the distinctive
characteristic of the plant, to be patented, be clearly identified
631
This will put the alleged infringer on notice as
in the patent.
to what property is protected by the Plant Patent. Further, the
Patent Act should include additional requirements to show
infringement: first, that the gene or genes corresponding to the
putative distinctive characteristic of the alleged infringing
plant be identified and shown to be the same as the gene or
genes in the Patent Act protected plant; second, that the gene
or genes corresponding to the distinctive characteristics of the
Plant Patent protected plant be identified and shown to be the
same as the corresponding gene or genes in the allegedly
infringing plant. Under this construction of the Plant Patent
Act, the entire question of physical appropriation becomes

of characteristics the differences which would suffice to make the
variety a distinct variety, will necessarily be differences of degree.
S. REP. NO. 71-315, at 4 (1930).
631. In the case that the patent is granted for a transgenic plant, both the
transgene and the location in the plant genome where the transgene is
inserted must be clearly identified. Further, the transgene must be inserted
using genetic engineering techniques and must be expressed.
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irrelevant. If the allegedly infringing plant cannot be shown to
have a gene or set of genes that makes it distinctive from the
Plant Patent protected plant, then infringement is
demonstrated.
The answer to the first issue surrounding the Cameo apple
is that it constitutes a new variety and infringement does not
exist because the cells leading to the Cameo apple were
mutated before being removed from the Plant Protected apple
tree. To resolve the second issue surrounding the Cameo apple,
whether the discoverer of the Cameo apple, or the research
farmer who develops a new variety, is liable for infringement of
the Plant Patent Act (the mirror issue is whether the holder of
the plant patent has exclusive rights in the Cameo apple),
requires a review of the experimental use exception.
i.

Experimental Use Exception

The experimental use exception to the Patent Act appears
632
to have been created by Supreme Court Justice Story in 1813.
In defining “infringement” the trial judge had included the
requirement that there must have been an intent to use the
633
invention for profit.
Justice Story both approved of the jury
instruction and added that “it could never have been the
intention of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed
such a machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the
purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to
634
Justice Story found that the
produce its described effects.”
defendant’s complaint regarding the jury instruction was
without merit because the instruction given by the trial judge
635
Justice Story
to the jury was in the favor of the defendant.
gave neither authority nor evidence of legislative intent
supporting the cited proposition. Furthermore, the statement
was not necessary to decide the case. Therefore, Justice Story
created the experimental use exception to the Patent Act in
dictum. The Patent Act remains devoid of language concerning
632. See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No.
17,600). On appeal defendant Cutter objected to an instruction which the trial
judge gave to the jury in a patent case which was that “the making of a
machine fit for use, and with a design to use it for profit, was an infringement
of the patent right.” Id. at 1121.
633. Id. at 1121.
634. Id. at 1121.
635. Id. at 1122-23.
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the common law experimental use exception. Congress, in the
188 years since Justice Story’s decision in Whittemore v. Cutter,
has not explicitly overruled the experimental use exception
despite sufficient opportunity to do so.
In a separate case involving the sale of the plaintiff’s
patent protected machinery by a sheriff under a writ of
execution, Justice Story was called upon to decide whether the
sale constituted patent infringement. In dictum, Justice Story
stated that
it has [been] held that the making of a patented machine to be an
offence within the purview of it, must be the making with an intent
to use for profit, and not for the mere purpose of philosophical
experiment, or to ascertain the verity and exactness of the
636
specification.

Continuing, Justice Story stated that “the making must be
with an intent to infringe the patent right, and deprive the
637
owner of the lawful rewards of his discovery.”
In Sawin v.
Guild, Justice Story formalized the element required for
infringement as being an intent to profit from the act.
Several theories have been advanced to explain the
638
By
creation of the experimental exception by Justice Story.
revisiting the circumstances under which Justice Story first
established the experimental use exception it may be
determined that while the exclusive rights of the patentee were
established by statute, such rights were the codification of long
established common law.
One possible basis for the establishment of the
experimental use exception is that it arises from the scienter
requirement of common law tort actions. Both Whittemore v.
Cutter and Sawin v. Guild were decided under the Patent Act
639
of 1793 since the Patent Act of 1793 was not repealed and
640
replaced until 1832.
The Patent Act of 1793 specified that a
patent granted to the patentee “the full and exclusive right and
636. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (NO. 12,391).
637. Id.
638. See Richard E. Bee, Experimental Use as an Act of Patent
Infringement, 39 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 357 (1957).
639. See Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 111, 1 Stat. 318-23 (1793) (the act
was also published as: An Act to promote the progress of Useful Arts, and to
repeal the Act heretofore made for that purpose, ANNALS OF CONG. 1431-35
(1793) (2d Cong. Sess. 2)).
640. See Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 162, 5 Stat. 117-25 (1836) (the act is
entitled: An Act to promote the progress of useful arts, and to repeal all acts
and parts of acts heretofore made for that purpose).
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liberty of making, constructing, using, and vending to others to
641
be used, the said invention or discovery.”
Section 5 of the
Patent Act of 1793 states that “if any person shall make, devise
and use, or sell the thing so invented” then that person is an
642
It is true
infringer of the exclusive rights of the patentee.
643
that the Patent Act did not require an intent to infringe, did
not require an intent to use for profit, and established that lack
of knowledge of the existence of the patent is irrelevant in
644
determining infringement.
Presume that indeed Justice Story based his analysis upon
the common-law tort action of trespass on the case to conclude
that it required an intent to use for profit before infringement
could be found. Then to conclude that Justice Story was
645
is to require both an ignoration of essential
incorrect
language in the Patent Act of 1793 (that is, infringement occurs
when the accused infringer makes, uses, or vends) and a
misinterpretation of the scope in relevant Supreme Court
cases. As discussed above, volitive acts are essential to “make”
or “use,” and by logical extension to “sell” the invention
patented. Therefore, scienter must be an essential element in a
cause of action for infringement. Justice Brewer, in United
646
States v. Berdan Fire-Arms, and Justice Woodbury, in Hogg
647
v. Emerson, were both referring to the use of ignorance of the
patent as a complete defense to infringement. In both cases,
ignorance of the existence of the patent was held to be
irrelevant in determining whether there was infringement.
The facts of United States v. Berdan Fire Arms do not support
an analysis of the intent to use the invention patented for
profit, and in Hogg v. Emerson analysis of the use for profit was
641. Act of February 21, 1793, supra note 639, at 321.
642. See id. at 322.
643. Bee argues that because the exclusive right in an invention is a
statutory grant, the scienter requirement that is appropriate in common-law
tort cases is inappropriate in determining whether infringement occurred. See
Bee, supra note 638, at 365.
644. See United States v. Berdan Fire-Arms Mfg. Co., 156 U.S. 552, 566
(1895) (stating that it would not be a defense to an infringement action that
the accused infringer “had, subsequent to [the] invention, and without
knowledge thereof, devised the contrivance which he was using”).
645. See generally Bee, supra note 638.
646. See Berdan Fire-Arms, 156 U.S. 552.
647. See Hogg v. Emerson, 52 U.S. 587, 607 (1850) (stating that ignorance
“of the existence of the patent right” and lack of intent to infringe may be a
defense when making the machine was “merely for a model, or for fancy, or
philosophical illustration” but not when the machine is made “to be used”).
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unnecessary to reach the decision in the case.
Justice Story correctly decided Whittemore v. Cutter and
Sawin v. Guild under the common-law doctrine of trespass on
the case. Evidence that a patent grants property rights is
obtained from the Patent Act of 1793, section 1, which states
that any person who “shall desire of obtaining an exclusive
property” in an invention may be granted letters patent for the
648
invention.
In Sawin v. Guild, Justice Story stated that to
prohibit the seizure and sale by authorities of the state of the
patented machines would create a “great public mischief”
because the patentee could “lock up his whole property,
however, great, from the grasp of creditors, by investing it in
649
profitable patented machines.” Such a possibility available to
the patentee would be “against the whole policy of the law, as
650
to the levy of personal property in execution.”
Therefore, the
exclusive interest granted by the patent was property, and
Justice Story clearly viewed it as personal property, which
651
The cause of
could be seized in execution of a judgment.
action for infringement of the exclusive rights in an invention
652
“is only a tort” and the issue to be considered is whether the
defendant “ever trespassed on any intangible right created by
653
the patent.”
The plaintiff, then, in 1813 must plead trespass
654
on the case because trespass vi et armis required an injury
resulting from the “direct and immediate force or violence
655
against the plaintiff or his property,” and most forms of

648. See Act of February 21, 1793, supra note 639, at 320.
649. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (NO. 12,391).
650. Id. (emphasis added)
651. At common law, the inventor possessed interest in his invention but
not an exclusive interest. Exclusive interest in the invention “did not exist at
common law, and the rights, therefore, which may be exercised under it
cannot be regulated by the rules of the common law.” Gayler v. Wilder, 51
U.S. (10 How.) 477, 494 (1850). Further, “no rights can be acquired in [the
invention] unless authorized by statute, and in the manner the statute
prescribes.” Id. Thus, the exclusive interests in the invention are defined by
statute and the exercise of those rights must conform to the language of the
statute. However, where the statute is silent, such as in the meaning of make,
use, sell, the courts must turn to either common law or impose their own
interpretation.
652. United States v. Berdan Fire-Arms Mfg. Co., 156 U.S. 552, 566 (1895).
653. Id. at 565.
654. See Byam v. Bullard, 4 F. Cas. 934 (C.C.D. Mass. 1852) (NO. 2,262)
(stating that the “patentees and their assignees . . . bring actions on the case,
to recover damages for making, using, or selling the thing”).
655. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1504 (6th ed. 1990).
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action were not abolished until 1832 to 1833.
The cause of
action of trespass on the case would be brought for
consequential injuries to the plaintiff resulting from the
657
Negligence is the failure
negligent activity of the defendant.
to exercise care and such failure is subject to liability only if the
law imposes the duty of care. Section 5 of the Patent Act of
1793 imposed the duty of care in defining the damages for
infringement as: “if any person shall make, devise and use, or
sell the thing so invented . . . without the consent of the
patentee” then the offender shall pay an amount no less than
“three times the price, for which the patentee has usually sold”
658
Thus, the alleged infringer is under
the patented invention.
a positive duty to seek a license from the patentee before he
may “make, devise and use, or sell” the invention. Failure to
determine whether a patent existed for an invention
constituted negligence sufficient to find for the plaintiff in a
cause of action for trespass on the case.
The language of the statute gave Justice Story
considerable latitude in determining if indeed infringement
had occurred. Section 6 of the Patent Statute of 1793 states
that “the defendant in such action shall be permitted to plead
659
the general issue” which allows the defendant to “explain the
660
circumstances in evidence to the jury.”
The evidence that
may be presented must relate to the validity of the patent.
Thus, while the statute does not impose a requirement to
intend to infringe the patent, it does impose a duty to know
whether the invention was already patented. The statement
that “lack of knowledge by a party of the existence of the patent
661
is technically
rights does not excuse his infringement”
correct, but it is incorrect to conclude that patent infringement
662
is a “creature of statute and should be governed by statute.”
As a result, Justice Story was correct in availing himself of the
interpretation of “make, use, sell” in determining whether the
defendant should be liable for infringement.
To argue that infringement of the exclusive rights of the
656.
(1979).
657.
658.
659.
660.
661.
662.

See 2 J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 60
See id. at 345.
Act of February 21, 1793, supra note 639, at 322.
Id.
BAKER, supra note 656, at 340.
Bee, supra note 638, at 365.
Id.
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patentee and the cause of action to obtain a remedy are strictly
663
creatures of statute, and not common law, is simply wrong.
In 1813 the cause of action for infringement of a patent was by
way of trespass on the case, and was clearly stated as such in
664
The cause of action for infringement
the Patent Act of 1793.
665
666
remained the tort of trespass on the case until 1952, when
the statute was changed to specify that the cause of action is to
be brought before the Federal Court as a civil action.
Nevertheless, the cause of action for infringement of a patent is
667
a tort, which is a cause of action established in common law,
not statute. This distinction was clearly recognized by Justice
Story in Whittemore v. Cutter when he stated that “a party
relying on an action given by a statute must bring himself
668
within the provisions of the statute” and “where, as in the
present case, the law is remedial, it should receive a liberal
669
construction, to effectuate the intentions of the legislature.”
The patent statute was remedial; it did not specify the cause of
action for infringement, but rather only defined what actions
constituted infringement. These characteristics of the Patent
Act remain unchanged to this day.
A second theory offered to explain Justice Story’s
development of the experimental use exception is that since no
damages occur to the patent holder because of the experimental
670
Specifically, this theory
use, there can be no cause of action.
requires that for the patentee to support an action for

663. See id.
664. Specifically, the Patent Act of 1793 stated that damages “may be
recovered in an action on the case founded on this act.” See Act of February 21,
1793, supra note 639, at 322.
665. The Patent Act of 1870 stated that: “damages for the infringement of
any patent may be recovered by action on the case in any circuit court of the
United States.” Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 207 (1870) (the act is
entitled: An Act to revise, consolidate, and amend the Statutes Relating to
Patents and Copyrights).
666. The Patent Act of 1952 states that: “[a] patentee shall have remedy by
civil action for infringement of his patent.” The Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No.
82-593, § 281, 66 Stat. 792, 812 (H.R. 7794).
667. See Honeywell Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1141 (7th
Cir. 1975) (stating that “[i]nfringement of a patent is a tort”).
668. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No.
17,600).
669. Id.
670. Under the doctrine of injuria absque damno, even though the patent
holder’s right to exclude has been violated he has suffered no damage
recognizable under the law. See Bee, supra note 638, at 365.
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infringement there must both injury and damage.
Justice
Curtis recognized that this theory was “the principle proceeded
672
upon by” Justice Story. Thus, if there is no damage there can
be no cause of action. The absence-of-damage theory developed
by Justice Story was well-engrained into patent law by the late
673
nineteenth century.
In Whittemore v. Cutter, the defendant advanced the
theory that the “making of a machine cannot be an offence,
because no action lies, except for actual damage[s]” and no
674
damages exist for an “infringement by making a machine.”
Justice Story rejected this theory and stated, “where the law
gives an action for a particular act, the doing of that act
675
The position
imports of itself a damage to the party.”
assumed by Justice Story was that every infringement of a
right causes some damage, even if that damage is nominal. In
dictum, Justice Story in Sawin v. Guild reiterated his earlier
position that the “making must be with an intent to infringe
the patent-right, and deprive the owner of the lawful rewards
676
As to what the making of a patented
of his discovery.”
machine for the purposes of “philosophical experiment” has to
do with a cause of action for patent infringement due to the
sale of protected machinery at a sheriff’s sale remains unclear
to this day. Evidently, Justice Story felt compelled to finish
molding his newly created experimental use exception even if
he had to do it in dictum. Bee erroneously concludes that the
absence-of-damages theory was specifically rejected by Justice
Story in all infringement cases because there would always be
677
at least nominal damages.
The criticism of the absence-of-damage justification is that
it is unsound because it directly contravenes the statutory
678
language and the holding in Whittemore v. Cutter.
If the
infringer had licensed the invention from the patent holder, or
had purchased the invention with the clear understanding that

671. See Byam v. Bullard, 4 F. Cas. 934, 935 (C.C.D. Mass 1852) (No.
2,262).
672. Id.
673. See ROBINSON, supra note 547, § 898.
674. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No.
17,600).
675. Id.
676. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (NO. 12,391).
677. See Bee, supra note 638, at 366.
678. See generally Bee, supra note 638.
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the infringer was going to use the machine in experiments then
the patent holder would have a substantial pecuniary gain for
679
which the infringer is liable.
In fact, the language of the
Patent Act of 1793 provided a statutory counter to Justice
Story’s absence-of-damages theory because damages shall be
“at least equal to three times the price, for which the patentee
680
has usually sold or licensed” the invention, indicating that
the minimum damages must exceed nominal damages. Of
course, it is easily recognized that more than nominal damages
may occur as the result of patent infringement under the guise
of experimental use.
The experimental use exception is readily harmonized with
both the statutory language and with the absence-of-damages
theory articulated by Justice Story and supported by Justice
681
To
Curtis (if the underlying assumption is correct).
determine if the assumption that there is no damage is correct,
it is necessary to return to the cause of action for infringement.
Infringement occurs where the person shall “make, devise and
682
use, or sell the thing so invented” and fails to determine
whether the device is, indeed, patented. In Whittemore v.
Cutter and Sawin v. Guild, Justice Story took the position that

679. See Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641,
648 (1915) (stating that the “normal measure of damages was the value of
what was taken”); Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448, 457
(1936) (stating that the “wrongdoer must yield the gains begotten of his
wrong”).
680. Act of February 21, 1793, supra note 639, at 322. In the Patent Act of
1832, this language was changed to reflect the possibility of a de minimus
actual damages: “it shall be in the power of the court to render judgment for
any sum above the amount found by such verdict as the actual damages . . .
not exceeding three times the amount thereof.” Act of July 4, 1836, supra note
640, at 123. The language was changed to “the court may enter judgment
thereon for any sum above the amount found by the verdict as the actual
damages . . . not exceeding three times the amount of such verdict” in the
Patent Act of 1870. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 207 (1870)
(emphasis added) (the act is entitled: An Act to revise, consolidate, and amend
the Statutes relating to Patents and Copyrights). By 1952, the language
specifying the level of damages read: “in no event less than a reasonable
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer.” The Patent Act of
1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 284, 66 Stat. 792, 813. The damage specification of
the Patent Act has remained essentially the same since 1952. See 35 U.S.C. §
284 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)).
681. In Byam v. Bullard, Justice Curtis stated that he doubted “whether
the assumption is correct, that in such cases there is no damage; yet if the
assumption be correct, I think the inference is sound that no action lies.”
Byam v. Bullard, 4 F. Cas. 934, 935 (C.C.D. Mass 1852) (No. 2,262).
682. Act of February 21, 1793, supra note 639, at 322.
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when there is infringement of the exclusive rights of the
patentee, then there must be at least nominal damage. Before
this point is reached, however, it must be demonstrated that
infringement actually occurred. Here, Justice Story set the
standard that the making must be with “an intent to infringe
the patent-right, and deprive the owner of the lawful rewards
683
of his discovery.”
Thus, even if the person was fully aware
that the invention was patented, he may make and use it
unless there is an intent to “deprive the owner of the lawful
684
rewards of his discovery.”
It has been argued that Justice Story believed that
inaction of Congress to create an experimental use exception in
685
the Patent Act was simply no reason for there not being one.
This position ignores the need of the courts to render justice,
and not just blindly follow narrow interpretations of the
statutory language. It is quite likely that Justice Story simply
realized that the clear language of the Patent Statute of 1793
forced the courts to decide patent infringement cases unjustly.
Consider the following cases: the patentee does not exploit
his invention patented for profit; the accused infringer makes a
single copy of the invention patented for exhibition without
686
using or selling the copy; the accused infringer makes the
invention patented strictly for experimental purposes; or the
patentee admits that there “is no evidence of actual damage”
but requests “damages either to the full value of the expense of
making the machine, or of the price, at which such a machine
687
Where the injury to the patentee is nominal
might be sold.”
or nonexistent, it would be unjust to force the accused infringer
to “pay to the patentee, a sum, that shall be at least equal to
three times the price, for which the patentee has usually
688
sold” the invention. While the language of the statute is clear
in defining the damages for infringement and the clarity with
which the statute speaks on the irrelevance of knowledge of the
existence of a patent to determination of infringement affords

683. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (NO. 12,391).
684. Id.
685. See Bee, supra note 638.
686. Standard Measuring Mach. Co. v. Teague, 15 F. 390, 393 (C.C.D. Mass
1883) (stating that in such a case “the evidence of infringement of th[e] patent
[is] insufficient to require us to compare the inventions with each other”).
687. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1123, 1125 (C.C.D. Mass 1813) (No.
17,601).
688. Act of February 21, 1793, supra note 639, at 322 (emphasis added).
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no mistake, Justice Story found great latitude in the language
defining what actions constituted infringement. To avoid the
embarrassment to his court of having to award no less than
triple the price of the invention patented to a plaintiff who
clearly admitted that he was not injured or suffered damage,
Justice Story created the exception that if there is no damage,
then there is no cause of action. This is the correct result. It is
evidence of the considerable legal genius of Justice Story that
he so clearly saw such an opening in the otherwise
impenetrable wall, created by the Patent Act, around the rights
of the patentee. By utilizing that opening, Justice Story did not
allow the Patent Act to force the courts to render unjust
decisions in a narrowly defined set of patent infringement
cases.
To illuminate the application of the experimental use
exception to the Patent Act, a number of cases have been
689
690
and carefully characterized.
To clarify the
analyzed
exception for our purposes, it seems profitable to catalogue
691
these cases and review their common threads.
ii.

Experimental Use Exception Accepted as Defense

In the following cases, the court accepted the experimental
use exemption as a defense to infringement. In the first case,
the defendant experimented with patented dyes in the course of
developing the manufacturing techniques for metal harness
692
trimmings coated with celluloid.
The experiments with the
dies were unsuccessful, and were shortly abandoned. The court
stated that “[i]t is a technical infringement, and is sufficient to
authorize an injunction restraining their future use; but no
reference will be ordered, as no damage or profits have been

689. See Bee, supra note 638.
690. See Ronald D. Hantman, Experimental Use as an Exception to Patent
Infringement, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 617 (1985).
691. The courts have employed the experimental use exception in only a
small number of cases since it was first articulated in 1813. A brief review of
some of the pertinent cases permits a determination of the scope of the
exemption and how courts will likely apply it in the case of assessing property
rights in genetically modified plants. The author acknowledges that the
following brief review depends largely upon the framework developed by both
Ronald Hantman and Richard Bee.
692. See Albright v. Celluloid Harness-Trimming Co., 1 F. Cas. 320
(C.C.D.N.J. 1877) (No. 147).
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693

shown or suggested.” Thus, liability for infringing the patent
appears to have been excused because no profit was accrued to
the infringer whilst using the infringed invention.
In the second case the defendant experimented with a
number of marble making machines before going into
694
The Plaintiff held a patent on one of the
production.
machines, designed for making children’s marbles, which was
tested by the defendant. This machine was abandoned in favor
of a machine that was not covered by the plaintiff’s patent. The
court held that there was no infringement because the
defendants tested the offset rolls, required for making the
marbles, “for a brief period before going into commercial
production” while they decide upon which offset rolls to use in
695
production and the “marbles were not commercially sold.” In
both Albright and Akro Agate, the court clearly ignored the fact
that the experimentation was conducted in the course of
business. Also, in both cases, the experimentation was clearly
not “for the sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or
696
Therefore, the decisions
curiosity, or for mere amusement.”
in these cases cannot be squared with, what was at that time,
697
considered established law.
In the third case, the defendant had built a radio directionfinding and position-indicating device based upon technology
698
that was covered by a patent held by the plaintiff. One of the
699
devices was eliminated from consideration in the case
because it appeared that the “defendant built that device only
experimentally and that it has neither manufactured it for sale
700
nor sold any.”
693. Id. at 323.
694. See Akro Agate Co. v. Master Marble Co., 18 F. Supp. 305
(D.C.N.D.W.Va. 1937).
695. Id. at 333.
696. Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No.
11,279). The precise articulation of the experimental use exception doctrine
by Judge Shipman was that: “[i]t has been held, and no doubt is now well
settled, that an experiment with a patented article for the sole purpose of
gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement, is not an
infringement of the rights of the patentee.” Id.
697. See id.
698. See Dugan v. Lear Avia, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 223 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1944).
699. It is interesting to note that even without the experimental use
exception to exclude one of the devices, the court states that since the claims
of the plaintiff’s patent are invalid, it must render judgment for the defendant.
See id. at 230.
700. Id. at 229.

174

MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW

[Vol. 3:1

iii. Experimental Use Exception Not Accepted as
Defense
In the following cases the court refused to accept the
experimental use exemption as a defense to infringement. In
the first case the defendant used a patented process for
701
creating shaped articles of vulcanized rubber.
Previous
attempts to analyze this case either misstated or ignored the
process that was protected by patent (in this case
understanding the patented process is essential to
understanding how the court handled the experimental use
exception). The court rejected the experimental use defense
because the defendant had infringed the patented invention “as
a matter of business, [and] where the product of that
experiment has been thrown into the market, to compete with
702
the products of the plaintiff.” In its analysis, the court stated
that when “use [is] merely for experiment, and not with a view
to profit; and when there has been no profit and no sale, it will
not make a party liable, because the patentee would not be
703
injured by it.”
The second case in which the court rejected the
experimental use defense involved the infringement of a patent
held by Otto P. Meyer for creating shaped articles of vulcanized
704
Apparently, defendants were once employed by the
rubber.
plaintiff and later left Poppenhusen to form their own
manufacturing company, the New York Gutta Percha and
India Rubber Vulcanite Company. The court rejected the
experimental use defense because the defendants were rivals of
the plaintiff “in the very business to which his patents
705
relate;” and they “[were] perfectly familiar with his patents
and processes, having formerly been in his employ in
706
manufacturing articles under his patents.”
The court stated
that “it can hardly be necessary for the [defendants] to
experiment with the [plaintiff’s] inventions in order to perfect

701. See Poppenhusen v. New York Gutta Percha Comb Co., 19 F. Cas.
1059 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1858) (No. 11,283).
702. Id. at 1063.
703. Id.
704. See Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No.
11,279).
705. Id. at 1049.
706. Id.
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707

their own.”
In the third case in which the court rejected the
experimental use exception defense, the defendants claimed
that they experimented with a patented process for tanning
skins in excess of nine months to determine the desirability or
708
Given the extensive time frame over
utility of the process.
which the defendants “experimented” with the process, it was
safe to assume that the use of the protected process was in the
course of ordinary business with the intent to profit from the
709
use of the invention and in competition with the patentee.
In the next three cases, the court rejected the experimental
use exception defense because the infringement clearly took
place in the course of ordinary business. In the first of these,
710
the defendant used a patented process for three years, but
claimed he was only experimenting with the machines to
identify possible improvements. In the second, defendant used
711
a patented process for three to four months and attempted to
defend the action as merely experimental. In the third case,
712
the defendant assembled six disk water meters according to a
patent owned by the plaintiff, and one of the meters was sold
713
by the defendant to the plaintiff.
The court rejected the
experimental use defense because the evidence demonstrated
714
an intention to infringe the patent. In an additional case, the
defendant claimed the experimental use exception because the
use of the protected process was only incidental to their search
for a new agent and, therefore, was not a commercial
715
Because some of the pearl essence resulting from
operation.
707. Id.
708. See Clerk v. Tannage Patent Co., 84 F. 643 (3d Cir. 1898) (holding
that in the absence of actual permission from the patent holder the expression
of a willingness to sell a license under the patent did not confer the privilege
to use the process of the patent to experimentally test its desirability or
utility).
709. See Poppenhusen v. New York Gutta Percha Comb Co., 19 F. Cas.
1059, 1063 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1858) (No. 11,283).
710. See Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v. Derboklow, 87 F. 997, 999
(C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1898).
711. See United States Mitis Co. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 89 F. 343, 346
(C.C.W.D. Pa. 1898).
712. See Thomson Meter Co. v. National Meter Co., 106 F. 519, 526
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1900).
713. See id. at 541.
714. See id. at 542.
715. See Pairpearl Prod., Inc. v. Joseph H. Meyer Bros., 58 F.2d 802, 804
(D.Me 1932).
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the experiments was sold, the court rejected the defense.
In another case, the defendant built the circuit absent the
tubes that were packaged with the circuit for sale but were not
plugged into their sockets in an attempt to circumvent the
717
patent protection on an electronic oscillator circuit.
Immediately before the packaging, the vacuum tubes were
plugged into their appropriate sockets to determine if the
718
circuits would function properly. The defendant claimed that
this was merely experimental, and hence the patent was not
infringed. In rejecting this argument the court observed: “one
can well understand that the law, not concerning itself with
trifles, would ignore a mere casual appropriation for
719
Upon modifying on
amusement or even scientific purpose.”
720
other grounds, the Court of Appeals said, with respect to the
question of experimental use, “[t]he tests were made to see if
they were marketable—a commercial and hence an infringing
721
use.”
The next case in which the experimental use defense, that
the patented anchors were used for experimental purposes, was
rejected the court said that the defendant’s “experiments were
evidently not made for philosophical or amusement purposes
but were made in connection with his business as a
722
In the last relevant
manufacturer and salesman of anchors.”
case, the defendant argued that he experimented with a
patented method for freezing fish on board a fishing vessel at
723
The defense
sea to determine the desirability of the method.
was rejected because the defendant used the patented process
while the vessel was engaged in commercial fishing
724
operations.
By analyzing the cases in which the experimental use
716. See id.
717. See Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea, 15 F. Supp. 685, 686 (E.D.N.Y.
1936).
718. See id.
719. Id. at 687.
720. See Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea, 90 F.2d 612, 614 (2d Cir. 1937)
(holding that even though the tubes were not plugged in to make the complete
circuit, which was patented, the sale of the circuit constituted infringement).
721. Id.
722. Northill Co. v. Danforth, 51 F. Supp. 928, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1942),
modified on other grounds, 142 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1944).
723. See Spray Refrigeration Co. v. Sea Spray Fishing, Inc., 322 F.2d 34, 36
(9th Cir. 1963).
724. See id.
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exception defense has been raised it can be concluded that the
exception is not applicable when there has been a business
purpose or profit motive associated with the experimental use.
If the experimental use is for personal convenience then the
exception is not a valid defense to patent infringement.
The previously reviewed cases left open the question of
whether the interest of the patent holder must always take the
form of money in assessing damages. In 1982, this question
was resolved in a case in which the defendant made and
distributed, without remuneration, substantial quantities of a
725
drug that infringed the plaintiff’s invention. The court stated
that in order to qualify for the experimental use exemption
726
there must be no intended commercial use of the invention
and that monetary remuneration by sale of the invention
within the United States was not a necessary condition to
727
The cases indicate that if the research
finding infringement.
is motivated by a commercial purpose, then the experimental
728
use exception defense is not available.
The experimental use exception to the Patent Act was
developed from judicial dictum.
The experimental use
exception as it now stands could be overruled in favor of
obtaining the same results directly from the statutory
language, and from the rules relating to patent law.
Specifically, the extenuating circumstances of experimental use
would be weighed when deciding the amount of damages to be
awarded.
Alternatively,
the
judicially
constructed
experimental use exception could be codified within the Patent
Act itself.
729
The patent laws of the United States grant a monopoly to
inventors for a period of twenty years from the date of filing the

725. See Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
157, 160 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that because
none of the drug was ever sold in the United States his actions were exempted
by the experimental use doctrine).
726. See id. at 161.
727. See id. at 158-60.
728. See Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984). The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit rejected the defendants experimental use exception defense because
experimentation in the guise of scientific inquiry is not covered “when that
inquiry has definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes.”
733 F.2d at 863.
729. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994).
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730

application.
The purposes of granting the monopoly are to
promote economic activity by encouraging the quest for new
ideas and to encourage full public disclosure of the new ideas.
When an infringement of the patent monopoly occurs is defined
by statute: “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to
sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States
or imports into the United States any patented invention
731
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”
The patent holder “shall have remedy by civil action for
732
infringement of his patent.”
The rights of the patent holder are clear and unambiguous
in that he has “the right to exclude others from using, offering
733
However,
for sale or selling throughout the United States.”
the experimental use exception, while being very narrow, limits
these rights. The statutory rights of the patent holder may
necessarily be limited in order to effect the purpose of the
Patent Act itself.
Section 101 of Title 35 provides that “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
734
Also, Title 35
thereof, may obtain a patent therefore.”
provides that the term process “includes a new use of a known
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or
735
Therefore, Title 35 contains within its statutory
material.”
language the basis for formulating the experimental use
exception. This is so because section 283 provides that the
court may “grant injunctions in accordance with the principles
of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by
736
patent,” and that the statute also provides damages for the
737
violation.
If the experimental use exception were precluded
by the statutory language of Title 35, then new and useful
improvement patents would be prevented by section 283, which
would frustrate section 101 of Title 35 that explicitly provides

730. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)-(2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
731. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
732. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1994).
733. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
734. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (emphasis added).
735. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1994).
736. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1994). It is of interest for the current discussion to
note that section 283 also contains the language “on such terms as the court
deems reasonable.”
737. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994).
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for new use and useful improvement. The only way to have a
new use and useful improvement is to allow experimentation
with an existing invention (which is presumably protected by
patent). If the experimental use exception were anticipated by
Title 35, then the “right to exclude” language found in section
154(a)(1) cannot be interpreted to mean the “exclusive right”
but must be interpreted to be the “right to exclude” limited by
the privilege of others to the experimental use of the
738
Experimental use of the patented invention is the
invention.
only way by which new and useful improvements may be
739
made.
It might be argued that if the statutory language of Title
35 were to be interpreted to mean that an experimental
exception must exist, then a scientific researcher could openly
infringe a patented invention to develop improvements. The
researcher would then replace the patented invention in the
marketplace and redirect the infringed patent holders profits to
himself. This response is exactly that contemplated by the
patent system. The open, public disclosure of the invention is
the price that the inventor must pay in exchange for the “right
to exclude,” and it opens the inventor to the very real risk that
his invention may be made obsolete.
Given the importance of experimental work to the
740
developments in biotechnology, and in particular agricultural
741
biotechnology,
an experimental use exception to Title 35
protection is a necessity for the continued growth of our
economy. Of course, reasonable royalties might be awarded to
738. It is recognized that the stated purpose of changing the statutory
language from “the exclusive right” to “the right to exclude” was to make the
meaning of the rights granted by the patent clearer by conforming the
statutory language to that used in case law. The language “the exclusive
right” is ambiguous when applied in certain situations. See Bee, supra note
638, at 360-61. It was argued then that the ambiguity was resolved by judicial
decision and codified in the Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1952).
Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The New United States Patent Act in the Light of
Comparative Law I, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 291 (1954). The argument continues
that the Patent Act of 1952 cannot have contemplated the experimental use
exception because the granting clause of the Patent Act of 1952 “reaffirms the
older decisions which governed while the experimental use exception was
being developed.” See Bee, supra note 638, at 361.
739. See Irving N. Feit, Biotechnology Research and the Experimental Use
Exception to Patent Infringement, 71 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 819, 836 (1989).
740. See Merges, supra note 598, at 1053.
741. Monsanto estimates that it takes a period of ten years and
approximately $300 million to create a commercially viable product of
genetically modified seeds. See Weiss, supra note 449, at A1.
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742

the patent holder.
The provisions of the exemptions would
include: (1) permitting the testing of a protected invention to
determine the veracity of the claim; (2) permitting
experimentation for the purposes of designing around the
743
and (3) permitting
invention or improving the invention;
testing of the invention in preparation for entering into a
744
license agreement with the seed manufacturer.
An
unfettered experimental use exception doctrine would invite
abuse. Therefore, the ordinary customer of the protected
745
In addition, a researcher
invention should not be exempted.
who used the protected invention in other experiments must
746
not be exempted because he would be the intended user of the
invention.
With regard to the second issue surrounding the Cameo
apple, the experimental use exception also applies. The
experimental use exception was developed for inventions
patented under what is now section 101 of Title 35 (of the
United States Code). Since the Plant Patent Act of 1930 is now
part of Title 35, and since plants may be patented under
section 101, then it is reasonable that the experimental use
exception applies to plants, whether a patent was granted
under section 101 or under section 161.
If plant cells of a patented plant (the analysis is
independent of whether the patent was granted under section
101 or section 161) spontaneously mutate to express a
characteristic different than those exhibited by the patented
plant, and if those cells are then harvested, a new variety of
plant comes into being. In the propagation of the new variety
there is no intent to profit from the use of the invention
patented, rather it is the characteristics of the new variety that
are seen to be of value. There is neither injury nor damage to
the patentee because the patentee could not have anticipated
the new variety, and could not have gained a financial reward
for the new variety. The patentee has already profited from the
sale of the ancestral plant; there was no intended commercial
use of the invention because the new variety arose
spontaneously. Even if there was human intervention that
742. See Feit, supra note 739, at 258.
743. See Eisenberg, supra note 375, at 1078.
744. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, TRANSGENIC ANIMAL PATENT
REFORM ACT, H. R. REP. NO. 888, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40, 51 (1988).
745. See Eisenberg, supra note 375, at 1085.
746. See id.

2002]

JACK AND THE BEANSTALK

181

eventually led to the spontaneous mutation, there can be no
intent to make that particular mutation commercially viable
because it cannot be known a priori whether the characteristics
of the new variety are of commercial interest. While any one of
these reasons is sufficient to invoke the experimental use
exception, the strongest reason to invoke the doctrine is simply
that the research farmer or plant breeder cannot know if and
when the cells of the ancestral plant will mutate to give rise to
the new variety. That is, there can be no intent to use the
invention patented for profit because of the lack of knowledge if
and when the mutation will occur.
If the plants are of a variety long cultivated and developed
by the research farmer, and if these plants become
contaminated by a transgene, then the experimental use
exception must be invoked. While the research farmer is
developing his variety for the market, his intent is to develop a
variety suitable for his local clime and soil conditions. It is not
of interest to use the invention patented, the transgene,
because if it was the research farmer would purchase the
technology-use license and the transgenic seeds from the
patentee. Indeed, following Justice Story’s lead, it would be a
manifest injustice to allow the patentee to contaminate the
plants of the research farmer and then try to claim that the
sale of a crop containing the transgene was an injury to the
patentee. Further, the cases reviewed above involve the active
procurement of the invention patented by the accused
infringer. In this case, the research farmer is not actively
engaged in procuring and experiment with the transgene,
rather the transgene literally “fell from the sky.” Therefore,
the experimental use exception must be available to the
research farmer whose land is contaminated with the
transgene.
5.

Use of Farm Cooperatives as Research Institutions

Under the current structure of the seed market and
statutory protection mechanisms, the farmer’s only choice, save
for a limited number of cases, is to purchase seed from
commercial seed manufacturers. The farmer must return to
the commercial seed manufacturer each year because either the
plant variety is a hybrid, which loses vigor upon planting the
progeny seed, or is a genetically modified variety, requiring a
yearly renewal of the technology-use license.
The seed
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manufacturer in turn dictates the nature of the rights which
the farmer has in his own property to the extent that the
farmer must effectively license the use of his own land and crop
from the seed manufacturer in exchange for the privilege of
planting the protected seed. The current market and legal
structure need not be the only structures available to the
farmer. An alternative structure can be built within existing
cooperative marketing associations.
Farm marketing associations were first created in the
early years of the twentieth century to provide a vehicle by
which individual farmers could lower their risk to fluctuations
in the commodities market. By pooling within the farm
marketing association, the individual farmer could avail
himself of the results, which accrue from the efforts of a large
organization that would not be available to him if he acted
747
In the absence of the marketing association, the
alone.
individual farmer is unable to act effectively in the market.
This occurs for a number of reasons: he is unable to effectively
bargain for a fair price or a reduction in his risk exposure; he is
exposed to a high transaction cost, as is the purchaser because
the purchaser must negotiate a large number of small contracts
(therefore, the purchaser must pay a lower price for the
commodity to recoup the transaction costs when he sells that
commodity on an exchange or into the final product market); he
is required to bear the risk of fluctuations in market price and
demands; and he must sell his crop when and where the local
748
market requires him to sell.
By pooling operating and marketing expenses, contract
negotiations, and management of risks associated with market
fluctuations, the individual farmer is able to increase his profit
margin and increase the financial stability of his farm
749
The most important role of the marketing
enterprise.

747. See Chris L. Christensen, Pooling as Practiced by Cooperative
Marketing Associations, 14 U.S.D.A. MISC. PUBL. 1, 2 (1929).
748. See id.
749. For an economic analysis of a wheat pool, a type of farm marketing
association, see Won W. Koo, William Nganje, D. Demcey Johnson, Joon Park
& Richard Taylor, Economic Analysis of The Proposed North Dakota Wheat
Pool-Summary, AG. ECON. REPORT NO. 410, (25 January 1999) (the report is
available from the Department of Agricultural Economics, P.O. Box 5636,
North Dakota State University, Fargo, N.D.). Also, a summary of Report 410
is available online. See Won W. Koo, William Nganje, D. Demcey Johnson,
Joon Park & Richard Taylor, Economic Analysis of The Proposed North
Dakota Wheat Pool-Summary, AG. ECON. REPORT NO. 410, (25 January 1999)
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association is to act to reduce the financial risks associated
with market fluctuations and expansion of the market area and
750
type of products.
The individual farmer has neither the
financial resources nor the time and skill to expand his market
through exploitation of a new market product and policy.
However, the market association can do so and can minimize
market risks by pooling the resources of a large number of
individuals.
The agricultural marketing associations may effectively
expand their control of the market by using the pooled
resources to develop plant varieties, including transgenic
varieties, suitable for their locale, or export to regions of
751
Such investment in
comparable clime and soil conditions.
plant variety development can occur through two distinct
mechanisms. The association may invest the pooled resources
to support the efforts of a group of farmers who continue to
develop varieties for their locale, or the pooled resources may
be used as consideration for contracting the efforts of university
752
schools of agriculture.

at http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/cgi-bin/pdf_view.pl?paperid=1172 (last visited
Jan. 13, 2002).
750. See id. at 4.
751. The cooperative marketing associations have assisted their members
beyond coordinating marketing efforts in other cases. Prominent amongst
such efforts is the agricultural credit corporations established in the 1920’s.
See William H. Rowe, Agricultural Credit Corporations Affiliated with Cotton
Cooperative Marketing Associations, 322 U.S.D.A. TECH. BUL. 1, 2 (1932).
752. The functioning and long term stability of farm marketing
associations depends upon the level of cooperation between the members of
the association. See Nicole Witwicki, Naomi T. Krogman & Harvey Brooks,
Theoretical Guidance on the Determinants of Success in Agricultural
Marketing and Production Clubs, RURAL ECONOMY STAFF PAPER 98-10 (1998),
available at http://lipsey.re.ualberta.ca/STAFF-PAPERS/sp-98-10.pdf (last
visited Jan. 12, 2002) (the staff paper is published by the Department of Rural
Economy, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada); John M. Staatz, The
Cooperative as a Coalition: A Game-Theoretic Approach, 65 AGRICULTURAL
ECONOMICS 1084-89 (1983); John M. Staatz, A Game-Theoretic Analysis of
Decisionmaking in Farmer Cooperatives, at http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/rbs/
pub/sr18/agame.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2002); Thomas W. Hertel, Applied
General Equilibrium Analysis of Agricultural and Resource Policies, STAFF
PAPER
99-2
(March
1999)
available
at
http://ae761e.agecon.purdue.edu/gtap/resources/ download/11.pdf (last visited Jan. 12,
2002).
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Support of Farmers as Researchers

Under the first model the association would either contract
for the services of a small group of farmers or would coordinate
the services of a large number of farmers who would pool select
seeds from each year’s crop for planting in the next crop cycle.
Under the model of contracting for the services of a small group
of farmers, the association would assume the risk of
fluctuations in the success of a particular crop in exchange for
using the results of that crop for future planting cycles. The
individual farmer who has and continues to develop a
particular variety of plant would promise to sell his entire crop,
or that portion required by the association, as consideration for
a contract under which the association would provide operating
costs for the production of the crop and a premium for any
portion of his crop used for seed in the next growing cycle.
Farmers who engage in the practice of selecting plants for
continued propagation in subsequent growing cycles are bona
fide researchers. The individual research farmer engaged in
the program would promise that his entire crop, or that
fraction sufficient to satisfy the needs of the association, will be
made available to the association at the time of harvest for a
fixed price. The price would represent a premium above
market value of seeds sold for non-reproductive purposes to
reflect the fact that seeds used for reproductive purpose
command a higher price on the commercial market than the
crop for non-reproductive purposes. That fraction of his crop
that would not be required by the association would be
purchased at a premium above the market price for a nonreproductive crop, but at a price below the price paid for that
portion to be used for reproductive purposes.
This scheme would insulate the research farmer against
the risk of a decline in demand while properly compensating
him for the efforts expended in producing the seeds. Such an
arrangement would shift most of the burden of the risk
associated with production of seed for reproductive purposes
from the research farmer to the association.
Since the
association has a large number of members, it has ready access
to the information required to determine the amount of seed
necessary for the following planting cycle. The research farmer
would be motivated to produce seed for reproductive purposes
for the association because of the premium above market value
he would obtain for his crop. The members of the association
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would be motivated to purchase and use the seed produced by
the research farmer for two primary reasons: first, the seed
would presumably be available to the non-research farmer at a
price substantially lower than the price commanded from the
seed manufacturers; second, the seed would be of a variety
which is optimized for the local clime and soil conditions.
Under this model, there would be no mechanism
constraining either the research farmer or non-research
member from saving seed for use in the next planting cycle. It
is possible that such a result could be avoided by making
continued membership in the seed pool contingent upon
returning to the pool each year and purchasing seed. This
restraint would still be to the benefit of the non-research
farmer for the reasons just cited, and would benefit the
association in the long term. Continued membership of the
farmers would result in continued support of the research
farmers and hence the plant genome would be continuously
improved for the particular locale. Counterbalancing this is
the possibility that the research farmer fails to be sufficiently
vigilant to recognize and nurture new varieties or there is a
cataclysmic failure of the research farmer’s crop. Both of these
risks are reduced or eliminated by using the services of
multiple research farmers well distributed over the
geographical area served by the cooperative marketing
association. Continued vigilance on the part of the research
farmer could be assured by requiring a showing of a superior
crop for the location.
The restriction that non-research farmer return to the pool
each year for his seeds could work to the detriment of the
association in the long run. To recapture its market share in
the geographical area controlled by the association, the seed
manufacturers would be motivated to compete directly with the
seed pool of the association. This could be done in one of two
ways. First, the seed company could show that its seed was far
superior to that produced by the association by contracting
with non-research farmers who were members of the
association to grow a competing variety on their farm. If the
seed manufacturer’s variety produced a crop sufficiently
superior to that of the association such that the profit margin
of the non-reproductive crop was favorable to the farmer, then
the seed pool of the association would be broken by defection of
members seeking superior product and a favorable profit
margin. Second, the seed manufacturer could undercut the
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price for which the co-operative marketing association would
sell its competing variety of seed. Because the association
could not compete, then the seed pool could no longer afford to
exist. In its efforts to eliminate the seed pool the seed
manufacturer would have a strong motivation to engage in
unfair competition and pricing.
It may be beneficial to the association if individual farmers
saved seed for planting in the next crop cycle. The advantage
exists in the increased probability of observing and propagating
a superior variety when there are a multiplicity of observers
than if there was a minimum number of observers. Once a new
superior variety was identified the machinery of the seed pool
would lead to its rapid dissemination over the geographical
area served by the association. The primary shortcoming of the
seed pool based upon the selection efforts of research farmers is
that neither hybrid nor transgenic varieties may be introduced
into the seed pool of the association.
b.

Coordination of Research Farmers

By coordinating the efforts of two or more research
farmers, the association can introduce hybrid varieties into the
available seed pool. Because these hybrid varieties are already
adapted to the local clime and soil conditions, and because the
costs of producing the hybrid variety is distributed between the
members of the association, the hybrid variety would be
genetically superior to varieties imported into the locale by the
seed manufacturers and would be available at a price less than
or competitive with varieties available from seed
manufacturers.
Under this model, individual research farmers would be
contracted to grow either elite or first generation hybrid
varieties for cross-breeding and other research farmers would
be contracted to conduct the steps required to produce the final
hybrid variety. The association would be in the position to hire
the expertise in plant genetics required to assist in the
production of the hybrid varieties. While individual farmers
may lack both the sophistication and resources required to
produce hybrid varieties, the collective efforts coordinated by
the association would almost certainly be sufficient to produce
superior quality hybrid varieties. The non-research farmers
would be motivated to return each year to the seed pool for two
reasons: first, the hybrid vigor is not sustained past the first
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generation; second, the variety would be superior in quality
and value to imported hybrid seed varieties. The research
farmer would be encouraged to participate in the hybrid seed
pool by the premium that his seed crop would command.
Because the hybrid variety produced by the association would
be well suited to the locale it would be superior to that
available from the seed manufacturer. Therefore, the seed
manufacturer may be disinclined to enter the geographical
market area served by the cooperative marketing association.
Because there would be directed human intervention in
producing the hybrid then the variety may be protected by
Plant Variety Protection Act certification, a utility patent, or
both. The association would be the patentee, and the patent or
753
certificate would give the
Plant Variety Protection Act
marketing association leverage to enter cross-licensing
agreements or research contracts with commercial seed
manufacturers. In addition, the association would be in the
position to enter a patent pool with other agricultural
754
An overriding benefit of this
marketing associations.
particular construct would be that the association would
directly control the intellectual property and the farmer has a
voice in the policies underlying the control because of his
ability to vote as a member of the association.
c.

Cooperation Between the Cooperative Marketing
Association and the Land-Grant University

The ultimate strength of the cooperative marketing
association would be obtained when it has interests in
intellectual property associated with genetically-modified
plants.
Clearly, individual farmers do not possess the
resources to make genetically-modified plants. However, landgrant universities certainly possess the required technological
expertise within their colleges of agriculture. The second
model available to the cooperative marketing association for

753. See, e.g., Julian M. Alston & Raymond J. Venner, The Effects of the
U.S. Plant Variety Protection Act on Wheat Genetic Improvement, EPTD
DISCUSSION
PAPER
NO.
62
(May
2000)
available
at
http://216.15.202.3/docs/eptdp62.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2002) (The EPTD
discussion paper is published by the International Food Policy Research
Institute, Washington, D.C.).
754. The instance of ownership of intellectual property by an agricultural
marketing association will be discussed below.
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expanding its control over the production of seed is to establish
a cooperative effort with the college of agriculture within the
state land-grant university. Under this model, the marketing
association would provide funding for research and
development of genetically modified plants, and individual
farmers could be contracted by the cooperative marketing
association to provide land for planting the test varieties. In
exchange for financial support from the cooperative marketing
association, the university would provide the intellectual
capital required to make the genetically-modified plants.
The revenue to fund the university research would initially
be generated by levying each member of the cooperative
marketing association an amount based on a function of the
total acreage he has traditionally planted in the crop species
and upon the deviation between his own average yield and the
average yield from the maximum yield producer. When the
new variety is actually produced, the initial price of the seed to
each member will depend upon the difference between the
average yield of the maximum producer and the average yield
from the new variety. This assessment structure will shift the
greater burden of the cost of the new variety onto those
members who will profit the most from the new variety.
The cooperative marketing association bears a great deal of
risk in funding research at a land-grant university. University
research laboratories typically follow a common model: a single
professor is at the head of the laboratory and the laboratory is
staffed by a mix of postdoctoral research fellows and graduate
students. Generally the graduate students far outnumber the
postdoctoral fellows, and the graduate students work
essentially independent of the postdoctoral fellows and the
professor of the laboratory. Typically, the graduate students
and postdoctoral fellows will report their progress from time-totime to the other members of the laboratory by means of a
semi-formal presentation.
The university laboratory is
typically organized such that an individual staff member will
work on a single aspect of a particular topic and multiple topics
may exist simultaneously within the laboratory.
While such organization of research is certainly conducive
to development of an individual’s work within an area of his or
her primary interest, it is a recipe for disaster when an outside
group wishes to fund work directed toward production of a
specific product in an economically feasible manner. Several
reasons exist for this observation. First, it is common for a
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given graduate student to start work on a particular research
project only to either abandon or substantially modify the goals
after a considerable amount of time has elapsed. Second, the
head of the laboratory may be quite unaware of the details of
the research project and even may be unaware of the possibly
high risk of failure of a particular course of research. In fact, it
is nearly impossible to start on a particular trajectory of
research with knowledge of whether that particular trajectory
will be successful and whether that particular trajectory will
lead to the desired result in an economically reasonable
amount of time. Third, the head professor, and most associate
professors within the laboratory, do not actually engage in the
practice of laboratory investigation. Also, new ideas for
pushing the research forward will typically come from
interactions between the postdoctoral fellows and graduate
students rather than from the head of the laboratory. This
means that control of the direction of research may not lie with
the head of the laboratory. Fourth, in order for all members of
the laboratory to advance their careers, it is essential that their
results, which are many times preliminary in nature, be
presented in the forum of professional meetings and published
either in the press or on the Internet. Further, informal
discussions between members of separate laboratories may be,
in many cases, essential to the progress of a research project
because the discussions facilitate the transmission of
knowledge and expertise between the parties to the
discussions. These forms of information transmission within
the academic research community facilitate progress and
inhibiting such transmission of information hampers or
completely halts progress in research.
Conversely, such
transmission of information may eliminate the proprietary
interests in the results of the research. Worse, is the very real
possibility that the information may be inadvertently
transmitted to a competitor who may be able to lay proprietary
claim to the results generated from that information.
To retain proprietary interests in the results of cooperative
marketing association funded research at land-grant
universities, the association must have a voice in the selection
of both the faculty who conduct the research and the research
staff of the laboratories that receive funds from the
755
Both the land-grant university and the
association.

755. It is immediately recognized that the optimal solution to the
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laboratory receiving the funds would be motivated to accept
these terms for several reasons. First, such cooperation would
supply much needed funds to the university. Second, it would
allow the university to hold interest in property to which it
would not otherwise have access. Third, such arrangements
would help the university fulfill its land-grant mission.
Finally, it would allow the university to remain at the forefront
of a rapidly developing technology. The cooperative marketing
association would be motivated to insist upon such conditions
by the need to protect its interests in the results of the
research.
Because the cooperative marketing association would
provide resources for the development of the geneticallymodified plant, as would the university, both would be able to
claim ownership interests in the results of the research. If the
university retained exclusive interest in the intellectual
property generated by the cooperative effort, then it would be
free to either license or sell it to any organization. Further all
royalties from the sale of the seed and the technology-use fee
would belong to the university. Most important is that the
cooperative marketing association would lose all control over
and access to the results of research that it funded. If the
cooperative marketing association retained all interests, then
the university would not have two of its primary motivations
for entering into an effort with the cooperative marketing
association, access to the technology and access to the income
streams generated by sale of seeds and technology-use licenses.
The balance point can be determined by considering
several factors. The marketing association does not want the
university to alienate any interest in or license the technology
to competitors of the cooperative marketing association. Such
alienation would immediately defeat the primary reason for the
association to fund the research. The cooperative marketing
distribution of rights between the farm marketing association and the
university is determined as an equilibrium point in a two-person cooperative
game, while the distribution of duties and benefits within the farm marketing
association is determined as an equilibrium point in an n-person cooperative
game. See, e.g., John F. Nash, Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games, 36
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 48-49 (1949); John F. Nash, The Bargaining Problem,
18 ECONOMETRICA 155-62 (1950); John F. Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, 54
ANN. MATH. 286-95 (1951); John F. Nash, Two-Person Cooperative Games, 21
ECONOMETRICA 128-140 (1953); John F. Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, 54
ANN. MATH. 286-95 (1951); J. P. Mayberry, John F. Nash & M. Shubik, A
Comparison of Treatments of a Duopoly Situation, 21 ECONOMETRICA 141-54
(1953).

2002]

JACK AND THE BEANSTALK

191

association must profit from the risk that it took in funding the
research. The university took no risk in entering into the
cooperative effort because the university can either raise the
required funds, if necessary, from other sources or not enter
into the relevant area of investigation. The balance point is
then obtained when the cooperative marketing association
retains all interests in the legal estate of the resulting research
while the university is granted a revocable license to make and
use, but not to alienate, the property. Such an arrangement
rewards the cooperative marketing association for bearing the
risks involved with the subject matter of the relationship while
allowing scientific investigations to move forward because of
access to otherwise proprietary property. All members of the
marketing association could purchase for planting the seed for
reproductive purposes without having to pay the technologyuse fee because they are already part owners of the technology.
The association may chose not to obtain patent protection
for the genetically modified seed, but rather to restrict sale to
persons outside of the association by levying the member
transferring the seed outside the association an amount equal
to that amount the purchaser would have had to pay if the
purchaser had been an initial investor in the research project.
This option may be advantageous to the cooperative marketing
association because it will eliminate the transaction costs
associated with obtaining and defending exclusive rights under
a utility patent.
The members of the association may
individually purchase the seed from growers within the
association at a premium above the price of the crop used for
non-reproductive purposes (to adequately compensate the
growers of the seed) or they may reproduce seed for planting
the next cycle. Either way, the association is not harmed. This
is because the cooperative marketing association functions to
maximize profit from sale of the crop for non-reproductive
purposes by reducing risks associated with fluctuations in
market price and reducing transaction costs.
The association, which consists of farmers as members, has
exclusive control over the seed and each member has already
paid according to the formulae described above. Since there is
no competition between the members of the association to gain
a profit by selecting between several different transgenic
varieties of seed for planting, then there is no loss of market
share because of availability of a superior seed from within the
association. There may be competition between cooperative
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marketing associations for availability of seed, but because the
particular variety of seed is optimized for the local clime and
soil conditions, such competition is unlikely to contribute much
to the profit margin of individual farmers within the
association. In fact, it might be better for the association to
allow farmers to save seed for use in the next planting cycle
because this will continue to improve the varieties through
local artificial selection. The members are not competition
against each other for the market for their crops, but rather are
acting in concert to obtain the highest price possible for the
collective. Thus, the association can avoid the transaction costs
associated with obtaining and enforcing the exclusive interests
in the legal estate in the transgenic plant while obtaining its
goal of maximizing the profit for its members by not obtaining
patent protection for its intellectual property.
That the
competition in the seed manufacturing industry may have
access to the intellectual property is not problematic for
obvious reasons.
6.

Genetic Pollution

Cross-breeding between varieties (within the same species)
occurs in the open environment and cannot be controlled by the
756
Consider then two adjacent fields: the
seed manufacturers.
one owned by Farmer Jack is planted with a genetically
modified variety of plant; the other field owned by Jack’s
neighbor Farmer Adams is planted with a non-modified variety
of the same species. The crop from the non-modified field is
intended to be sold into a market requiring that the crop does
not contain a transgene, or some other premium market.
Because the dispersion of the gene in the open environment
cannot be controlled, the crop in the field containing the nonmodified variety of plants will become contaminated with the
757
Even though the transgene translocated through
transgene.
756. For instance, Zea mays L. pollen can travel distances up to 600-800
feet, and canola pollen can travel at least one-half mile (sufficiently far to
completely engulf the one-quarter section field discussed above in the case of
Mr. Percy Schmeiser). See Interview with Dean Charles Muscoplat, Dean,
Univ. of Mn. Coll. of Agric. (July 31, 2001) [hereinafter Interview: Muscoplat].
757. If the transgene is translated through pollen, then only the crop
(containing the progeny seeds) from the plants will be contaminated. However,
if seeds from the first crop are used in the next planting cycle, then most, if
not all, of the plants and their progeny seeds in the second planting cycle will
be contaminated with the transgene.
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no effort of Farmer Adams, his crop will be polluted by the
transgene. Under one interpretation of the law, Farmer Adams
is infringing the exclusive interest of the seed manufacturer
when his crop becomes contaminated. To determine whether
this is the correct outcome, it must be determined to whom
responsibility must be assigned for the genetic pollution and
whether that party has a right to pollute and to sue Farmer
Adams.
To avoid infringement liability, Farmer Adams must either
destroy his crop or have the seed manufacturer deal with the
problem. The first alternative, though suggested in some
forums, is unrealistic. The second is equally unrealistic for
other reasons. If the seed manufacturer were called to
eliminate all possibly infringing plants, then each plant would
have to be tested for the transgene and removed by hand.
Presuming that the transgene conferred herbicide resistance,
spraying with a herbicide would allow ready identification of
infringing plants. However, such destructive testing would
cause a complete loss of the crop. If the transgene conferred
some other characteristic upon the plant, then other forms of
testing would be necessary. In either case, other techniques of
identification, such as genetic testing or growing up progeny
seeds and testing them in the laboratory, would be equally
expensive, cumbersome, and impractical. Aside from the
impracticality and costs of identifying and destroying
infringing plants, any strategy requiring that the farmer
identify the supposedly infringing plants shifts the burden
associated with the (putative) benefits of the transgene from
the seed manufacturer onto the farmer who chose to grow a
non-modified variety. Determining to whom responsibility for
causing the pollution is assigned determines to whom the
burden associated with the genetic pollution must be assigned.
The farmer who grows genetically modified plant varieties,
Farmer Jack, and the farmer who grows non-modified plant
varieties, Farmer Adams, have equal rights of choice. Both
farmers have the property right to use their land to yield a crop
that they each believe will maximize their profit. Farmer Jack
chooses to use a genetically modified variety because he
believes that by doing so his input costs will be minimized and
thereby maximize his profit even if he cannot sell his crop into
the premium market. Farmer Adams chooses to plant a nonmodified variety because he believes that by doing so he will be
able to sell into the premium market and hence maximize his
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profit even if he cannot minimize all of his input costs. Both
farmers are using their respective lands in a manner which
each believes will maximize his profit. Neither farmer is
infringing the right of the other farmer in any way. Farmer
Jack is not interfering with the rights of Farmer Adams to
plant non-modified varieties, and Farmer Adams is not
interfering with the rights of Farmer Jack to plant genetically
modified varieties. Recognize, of course, that the transgene
will be translocated from the field of Farmer Jack onto the field
of Farmer Adams. Farmer Adams may not desire that the
transgene be reproduced in the plant cells of the plants growing
on his land. Farmer Adams does not benefit from the presence
of the transgene on his land. He is, however, harmed by the
presence of the transgene if the premium market is no longer
available to him because of the transgene’s presence.
Farmer Jack, who planted the genetically modified seed,
initiated the process by which the transgene is reproduced in
the cells of the plant on his field. Farmer Jack has no (legal)
interest in the transgene; rather the seed manufacturer
possesses the exclusive interests in the legal estate of the
transgene. As discussed above, the legal estate in which the
seed manufacturer has exclusive interest is the expressed
transgene that was inserted into the plant genome using
genetic manipulation techniques. At most, the legal estate is
the combination of the plant genome and the expressed
transgene. Farmer Jack has no interest in this legal estate, he
merely has a license to use the protein, or other compound
generated when the transgene is expressed, for its intended
purpose. The license allows Farmer Jack to sell the resulting
crop for non-reproductive purposes. Since Farmer Jack has no
interest in the legal estate, and since the seed manufacturer
possesses the exclusive interest in the transgene, it is the
property of the seed manufacturer that is translocated to the
fields of Farmer Adams. Since the property of the seed
manufacturer is contaminating the fields of Farmer Adams, it
is unreasonable to hold Farmer Jack liable for the genetic
pollution.
When the transgene is translocated from the field of
Farmer Jack onto the field of Farmer Adams then under the
current legal structure, Farmer Adams may be subject to
liability for infringing the exclusive interests of the seed
manufacturer. Farmer Adams may also incur a substantial
loss in the value of his crop because he may no longer have
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access to the premium market. Furthermore, he may have
suffered a permanent loss of his own variety which he
758
developed through either artificial selection or cross breeding.
Since these outcomes are the result of translocation of property
in which the seed manufacturer has exclusive interests, then
the seed manufacturer must be liable for the damages to
Farmer Adams. The seed manufacturer enjoys the benefit that
runs with the legal estate in which it has exclusive interest.
The seed manufacturer must also bear the risk associated with
the benefit; the risk must not be shifted onto either Farmer
Jack or Farmer Adams. Justice is not served by allowing the
seed manufacturer to enforce its exclusive interest in the
genetically modified plants against the farmer upon whose
property the transgene is located and simultaneously avoid
liability when the transgene was translocated onto the land of
that same farmer either against the will of that farmer or
759
unbeknownst to that farmer.
Several theories are available under which the seed
manufacturer may be held liable for the genetic pollution, and
these theories have been thoroughly investigated elsewhere
and hence need not be detailed here. Recent proposals include:
imposition of both negligence law and strict liability for

758. It might be argued that the farmer has no interest in his own plant
variety unless it is patented. Such a position is not only erroneous, but
ignores a centuries old common-law doctrine that states that proprietary
interests in all inventions are protected by common law. What is not protected
under common law is the right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling when the other person created the invention independent of and
without knowledge of the original inventor. Justice Clark clearly stated that
“[i]t has long been settled that the patentee receives nothing from the law
which he did not have before, and that the only effect of his patent is to
restrain others from manufacturing, using or selling that which he has
invented.” Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S.
502, 510 (1917) (emphasis added). Thus, under common law the farmer that
developed his own variety through his own genius does indeed have
enforceable interests in the estate comprising the plant variety.
759. The liability for damage to Farmer Adams must be born by the seed
manufacturer even if Farmer Adams knew or should have known that the
transgene was translocated onto his land. As discussed earlier, requiring the
farmer to be continuously vigilant for the transgene, identifying contaminated
plants and eradicating those plants is an unreasonable position. Likewise,
requiring the seed manufacturer to identify and remove contaminated plants
is equally unreasonable. To place upon the farmer the liability associated
with the translocation of the transgene onto his property forces the farmer to
either purchase a technology-use license for every transgene that might
contaminate his plants or quit farming altogether. Neither of these
possibilities is reasonable.
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abnormally dangerous activity may be available for an injured
760
party to recover damages in the United States; utilization of
public and private nuisance actions when the transgene from
genetically modified plants is translocated onto fields which
761
contain non-modified plants; examination of the potential
liabilities associated with genetic pollution under the tort
liability theories of trespass, nuisance, negligence and strict
762
and examination of the legal remedies available to
liability;
763
organic farmers for genetic pollution of their crops.
While
these theories of liability may be available to the farmer, the
probability of success in any single case is very small
(considering the disparity between the legal counsel available
to the seed manufacturer and legal counsel available to the
farmer) and the cost to the farmer is prohibitive.
A far more powerful tool is available to the defendantfarmer to prevent the lawsuit from ever getting into the
courthouse door in the first place. This tool is the long
established doctrine of unclean hands. Utilizing this doctrine,
when the plants on the land of Farmer Adams are
contaminated by the transgene the seed manufacturer should
lose his exclusive interest in the legal estate of the
contaminating transgene, and hence lose his right to seek
damages in a court of justice. Simply put, it is unjust and
inequitable that the seed manufacturer markets a product for
planting in a field knowing that that product will pollute
surrounding fields and then sue the owners of the surrounding
fields because that product is found on those surrounding
fields. The doctrine of unclean hands clearly states that the
court of justice will not grant the plaintiff a remedy in such
circumstances.
Recall that Farmer Jack initiated a process by which a
plant was produced that reproduces the transgene in its

760. See Stephen Kelly Lewis, “Attack of the Killer Tomatoes?” Corporate
Liability for the International Propagation of Genetically Altered Agricultural
Products, 10 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 153 (1997).
761. See Thomas P. Redick & Christina G. Bernstein, Nuisance Law and
the Prevention of “Genetic Pollution”: Declining a Dinner Date with Damocles,
30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10328, 10333 (2000).
762. See Richard A. Repp, Biotech Pollution: Assessing Liability for
Genetically Modified Crop Production and Genetic Drift, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 585
(2000).
763. See Joshua M. Stone, Restraints on Competition Through the
Alteration of the Environment at the Genetic Level, 8 N. Y. U. ENVTL. L. J. 704,
716-19 (2000).
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cellular machinery. Farmer Adams initiated a process by
which a plant was produced that lacks the transgene. If the
transgene is translocated from the fields of Farmer Jack onto
the fields of Farmer Adams, then the fields of Farmer Adams
have been contaminated through genetic pollution. Before
turning to the discussion of why the seed manufacturers should
not be able to obtain a remedy when genetic pollution has
occurred, the issue to be considered is whether the seed
manufacturers knew or should have known that the transgene
would translocate from one field to another.
a.

Transgene Translocation Happens in the Open
Environment

There can be no question that the seed manufacturers
were aware by 1998, and quite possibly earlier, that a
transgene could be moved from one variety to another variety,
764
within a species, by traditional plant breeding techniques. In
fact, evidence indicates that seed manufacturers were
commonly using traditional breeding techniques for moving a
transgene between varieties before 1993. In 1993, Koziel
published the first report on a genetically manipulated cereal
765
To be specific,
plant with an elevated resistance to insects.
after inserting the synthetic gene for the Cry1A(b) -endotoxin
into a maize plant cell, a mature maize plant was produced.
The resulting elite transgenic maize plant was produced using
traditional cross-breeding techniques to create a stable,
766
Allowing
genetically modified variety of maize.
approximately one year for analyzing the experimental results,
writing the manuscript for publication, and publication of the
manuscript, and between five and seven years for field
experiments, Monsanto was most likely engaged in moving the
transgene between varieties of maize as early as 1985 to 1987.
Indeed, by 1985 it was known that genetically modified

764. See generally Koziel, supra note 434 (explaining that once the new
gene is introduced into a crop variety, the new characteristic exhibited due to
the expression of that gene can be moved into other sexually compatible
varieties of that plant specie using traditional breeding techniques).
765. See Michael G. Koziel et al., Field Performance of Elite Transgenic
Maize Plants Expressing an Insecticidal Protein Derived from Bacillus
thuringiensis, 11 BIO/TECHNOLOGY 194-200 (February 1993).
766. See generally Koziel, supra note 434.
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767

progeny would be reproduced in “simple Mendelian fashion.”
Moreover, by 1986 it was openly contemplated that the
methods of genetic manipulation would “compliment those used
in classical plant breeding” to produce varieties of transgenic
768
Because information about moving transgenes
plants.
between varieties, within a species by traditional breeding
programs existed from at least 1987, the seed manufacturers
either knew or should have known that the transgene would be
translocated from the genetically manipulated plant to a nonmodified plant of the same species when the transgene was
released to the environment. The transgene is present in the
769
pollen, which is readily transported by the wind and insects.
The transgene is also present in seeds that may be transported
by the wind, humans, or animals. None of these methods of
transport may be controlled by the seed manufacturers. The
seed manufacturer is, therefore, incapable of controlling the
movement of the transgene between plant varieties.
Monsanto’s position is, and was, that genetically modified
seed or pollen would be carried into a non-modified field of
770
Further, Roger Hughes,
crops by no more than a few feet.
representing Monsanto, stated, “[f]orces of nature such as wind
and bees are clearly insufficient to produce a ninety percent
771
The conclusion that the seed
crop of Roundup-ready canola.”
manufacturers want to draw is that if the transgene is located
on the land of the farmer, then the transgene must have gotten
772
In fact,
there by nefarious action on the part of the farmer.
767. Horsch, supra note 176, at 1230.
768. Patricia Powell Abel, Richard S. Nelson, Barun De, Nancy Hoffmann,
Stephen G. Rogers, Robert T. Fraley & Roger N. Beachy, Delay of Disease
Development in Transgenic Plants that Express the Tobacco Mosiac Virus Coat
Protein Gene, 232 SCIENCE 738, 743 (1986).
769. See Interview: Muscoplat, supra note 756.
770. See Karl A. Thiel, Seeds In the Wind: For Monsanto, Patent Protection
Stirs Controversy, available at http://www.biospace.com/ articles/120699.cfm
(last visited Aug. 2, 2001). In countering Percy Schmeiser’s arguments that
the Roundup-ready gene could be carried by seeds or pollen blown into the
fields, “Monsanto’s Evans claims that company studies show it is unlikely that
Roundup Ready seed from one field would penetrate an adjacent field by more
than a few feet, and that it would take hurricane force winds to spread pollen
over the large distances described by Schmeiser.” Id. (internal quotes
omitted).
771. Murray Lyons, Farmer’s Reapings No Fluke, Court Told: Schmeiser
Planted Roundup Ready Canola Knowingly, THE SASKATOON STARPHOENIX at
A1 (06 June 2000), available at http://www.biotech-info.net/no_fluke.html (last
visited July 21, 2001).
772. Roger Hughes, the attorney for Monsanto, stated that “Percy
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that transgenes may travel great distances was recently
demonstrated in a documented case from northern Alberta
773
Canada.
In this case, three varieties of canola were planted
by the same farmer on different parts of his farm in 1997. The
first field was planted with Roundup Ready canola, a twentyacre field across the road was planted with Innovator (a variety
774
of canola modified to resist Liberty herbicide), and a field four
hundred meters away was planted with canola that was
775
resistant to Cyanamid’s Pursuit and Odessey herbicides. In
1998 it was discovered that a variety of canola that was
resistant to two commonly used herbicides was growing on the
farmer’s fields, and by 2000, gene stacking had produced a
variety of canola resistant to Roundup, Liberty and Pursuit. It
is a reasonable deduction then that the transgene traveled a
great distance, by transgene standards, to create a transgenestacked variety of plant. The distances between the different
fields of canola varieties and the creation, without human
intervention, of a canola variety with “stacked” transgenes
Schmeiser deliberately segregated seed that he knew was Roundup Ready
from his 1997 canola crop” without first obtaining permission from Monsanto
and in violation of the patent on Roundup Ready canola. LYONS, supra note
771 (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, Hughes argued that the
genetically modified canola could not have been translocated onto the land of
Percy Schmeiser’s through either cross-pollination or being blown by the wind.
See id. Also, in Monsanto’s complaint against Mr. Schmeiser it was claimed
that Mr. Schmeiser “obtained canola seeds which are resistant to glyphosate
from one or more persons licensed” by Monsanto and planted them on his
lands. Monsanto Canada, Inc, and Monsanto Company -and- Percy Schmeiser
Statement of Claim, COURT FILE NO. T-1593-98, Claim 15 (06 August 1998)
available at http://www.tv.cbc.ca/national/pgminfo/canola/doc1.html et. seq.
(last visited 20 January 2002). Monsanto also claimed that Mr. Schmeiser
knowingly saved seed from his 1997 crop and planted those seeds in his 1998
crop. See id. Having dismissed the possibility that the seeds containing the
transgene arrived on Percy Schmeiser’s farm by any means other than his
intentionally purchasing them and planting them without a license, Monsanto
apparently presumed that the transgene could only have existed on the land of
Mr. Schmeiser through actions by Mr. Schmeiser which were in violation of
the law.
773. See Gillian Steward, Genetically Engineered Superweeds Emerge in
Canada, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (CANADA) at A1, (June 15, 2000), available at
www.purefood.org/ge/superweed.cfm (last visited July 21, 2001).
774. Liberty® is a trademark name of a product produced and marketed
by Aventis. For simplicity, this trademark name will be used throughout the
text, unless a specific quotation is identified, without the symbol ®.
775. Pursuit® and Odessey® are trademark names of products produced
and marketed by Cyanamid. For simplicity, these trademark names will be
used throughout the text, unless a specific quotation is identified, without the
symbol ®.
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indicate that Monsanto’s argument against extensive genetic
pollution by natural causes is vacuous at best.
An article was published on November 29, 2001 in Nature
that demonstrated that the transgene not only translocates in
the environment, but that it can do so over considerable
776
distances.
An opinion was subsequently published in Nature
776. See David Quist and Ignacio H. Chapela, Transgenic DNA
Introgressed into Traditional Maize Landraces in Oaxaca, Mexico, 414
NATURE 541-43, (Nov. 29 2001) available at http://www.nature.com/cgitaf/DynaPage.taf?file=/nature/journal/v414/n6863/full/414541a0_fs.htm&conte
nt_filetype=PDF (last visited Jan. 12, 2002). In the study by Quist and
Chapela, native, or “criollo,” landraces of maize were sampled from four fields
of standing maize, two each from two separate locations in the state of Sierra
Norte de Oaxaca, Southern Mexico. See id. at 541. The fields were located in
a remote part of Mexico, in excess of “20 km from the main mountain-crossing
road that connects the cities of Oaxaca and Tuxtepec in the Municipality of
Ixtlán.” Id. Significantly, the fields were located at least sixty miles from the
location where the last known genetically modified maize plants were grown
in 1998, see John Vidal, Mexico’s GM Corn Shocks Scientists, THE GUARDIAN,
(Friday November 30, 2002) available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
international/story/ 0,3604,609293,00.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2002)), three
full years before the discovery of the fields in the Municipality of Ixtlán. In
five of seven samples of criollo landrace maize, the element used most
commonly in transgenic constructs, the 35S promoter (p-35S) from cauliflower
mosaic virus, was detected. See QUIST AND CHAPELA, supra note 776. In four
of the samples, 98% homology was found between the p-35S promoter found in
the criollo landrace maize and the cauliflower mosaic virus 35S promoter used
in the commercially available vectors such as pMON273 (GenBank accession
number X04879.1) and the K1 sample (GenBank accession number
AF434746).
Also, the Agrobacterium tumefasciens nopaline synthase
terminator sequence (T-NOS) was detected in two of the six criollo samples
(respectively, GenBank accession number AF434752 and A434751). See id.
Further, in one of the criollo landrace maize sample, the Bacillus thuringiensis
cryIA(b) gene, which, when expressed, causes the plant cell to produce the
Bacillus thuringiensis CryIA(b) -endotoxin, was detected. These results
“demonstrate that there is a high level of gene flow from industrially produced
maize towards populations of progenitor landraces.” Id. at 542. The results
observed by Quist and Chapela were confirmed in a study conducted by the
Mexican environment ministry. See Rex Dalton, Transgenic Corn Found
Growing in Mexico, 413 NATURE 337 (Sept. 27, 2001). The findings by Quist
and Chapela and by the Mexican environment ministry are particularly
troubling to those who oppose the production and consumption of genetically
modified plants. See, for example, VIDAL, supra note 776; NEWS RELEASES,
Genetic Contamination Found In Mexican: Center of Diversity for Corn
Threatened by Gene-Altered Corn From U.S. (Sept. 27, 2001) available at
http://www.greenpeaceusa.org/media/press_releases/ 01_09_27text.htm (last
visited Jan. 12, 2002). However, as anticipated, the finding, which was
published in the journal Nature, is not free of controversy and criticism.
Specifically, studies conducted under the direction of David Hoisington,
director of the Applied Biotechnology Center at the International Maize and
Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) in El Batan, Mexico, and Tim Reeves,
director-general of CIMMYT, showed that there is no evidence of either the
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777

in January 2002, in which it was emphatically stated that the
occurrence of the transgenes, found by Quist and Chapella in
criollo landrace maize in Oaxaca, Mexico, is not genetic
contamination. Specifically, Martínez-Soriano, et al. stated
that: “[c]ontamination means unexpected, undesirable, and
uncontrollable spread” of the transgene, and “that is not
778
Further, Martínez-Soriano, et al. opined that “if
happening.”
someone wants to remove the transgene from these plants, the
procedure would be simple: select and multiply those
susceptible maizes and do not harvest and multiply the insect779
Finally, Martínez-Soriano, et al. state that
resistant ones.”
commercially used cauliflower mosaic virus 35S promoter or of the Bacillus
thuringiensis cryIA(b) transgene in any of the twenty-eight maize genomes in
its seed bank. See John Hodgson, Doubts Linger Over Mexican Corn Analysis,
20 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 3-4 (January 2002) at http://biotech.nature.com
(last visited Jan. 12, 2002). Further studies are being conducted at CIMMYT
on samples collected from fields in Oaxaca, Mexico. Hodgson argues that the
studies conducted at CIMMYT “conflict with some unreported work by the
Berkeley group.” Id. However, as of December 14, 2001, CIMMYT had only
completed screening of fifteen additional native landrace maize varieties from
its own genebank. See David Hoisington, Further Tests at CIMMYT Find No
Presence of Promoter Associated with Transgenes in Mexican Landracces in
Gene Bank or From Recent Field Collections, (Dec. 14, 2001) at
http://www.cimmyt.org/whatiscimmyt/furthertest.pdf (last visited Jan. 13,
2002). Hoisington reported that the varieties tested from the CIMMYT
genebank were free of the cauliflower mosaic virus promoter 35S that is
commonly associated with a transgene. Additionally, seeds from forty-two
native landrace varieites from Oaxaca were tested and found to be negative
for the transgene (at least for the year 2000 maize crop). See id.
The fact that the studies conducted at CIMMYT found no indication of a
transgene contaminating the native landrace maize genome pool, while the
study conducted by Quist and Chapela did find evidence of a transgene,
indicates that the possibility exists that a transgene has become introgressed
into the criollo landrace maize. The most sensible way to move forward is for
CIMMYT and the Berkeley investigators to exchange seed samples and test
again for evidence of transgene translocation. Hodgson may have overstated
the difference between the results obtained by the investigators at CIMMYT
and by the investigators at Berkeley. The two sets of studies do indicate that
introgression of transgene into native landrace maize varieties is a very real
possibility and care must be taken in assessing the effect of such introgresson
on biodiversity. But of equal or greater significance than the effect on
biodiversity is the legal consequences attendant to the translocation of
transgenes into native landrace maize varieties.
777. See Juan Pablo Ricardo Martínez-Soriano, Ana María Bailey, and Joel
Lara-Reyna, Transgenes in Mexican Maize, 20 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 19
(Jan. 2002).
778. Id. Of course the validity of the quoted statement is open to serious
debate.
779. Id. The fact that a maize is susceptible, to either insect pests or
herbicides depending upon the transgene present, is not dispositive as to the
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780

“there is no need for concern.”
This position parallels that articulated by Vivian Moss,
chairperson of the CropGen Panel, Val Giddings of BIO (an
U.S. industry organization in Washington, D.C.), and Tim
781
and reported by
Reeves, director-general of CIMMYT,
782
Hodgson.
Specifically, Tim Reves is quoted as stating that:
“the real question is whether it makes any difference if one of
783
the genes that has” translocated is a transgene.
Further,
Hodgson reported that Luis Herrera Estrella (Director of
CINVESTAV-IPN, Mexico’s premier center for plant
biotechnology) “pointed out that the Nature paper provides no
784
experimental evidence of negative effects on biodiversity.”
question of whether the transgene is present. Thus, it is entirely possible that
the simple protocol suggested by Martínez-Soriano may not be effective in
removing the transgene from the landrace maize variety. Further, if the
transgene is dominant and highly promiscuous, the suggested protocol may
not even be applicable.
780. Id.
781. CIMMYT has a partnership with IRD (France), Novartis, Limagrain
and Pioneer Hi-Bred Co. that has the objective of developing, evaluating, and
distributing apomictic hybrid maize to subsistence farmers. The agreement is
for five years extending from 1999 to 2004 and CIMMYT receives “[a]ccess to
scientific expertise and proprietary technologies; a paid-up, royalty-free,
worldwide, non-exclusive license (with the right to sub-license to non-profit
institutions) to provide research products to subsistence farmers.” CIMMYT,
Transparency Is Important (Oct., 2000), available at http://www.cimmyt.org/
whatiscimmyt/AR99_2000/transparency/transparency.htm (last visited Jan.
13, 2002). Further, CIMMYT receives “financial support for CIMMYT
scientists involved” from the industrial partners. See id. In return, CIMMYT
provides to its partners, “[s]taff and laboratory resources; access to CIMMYT
and IRD’s apomixis technology; a paid-up, royalty-free, worldwide, coexclusive license for research products.” Id. Also, CIMMYT received a grant
from Monsanto (to develop a hybrid wheat) in the amount of $154,000 in 1999
(last year for which statistics are available) and a grant from World Bank for
$3,623,000 in 1999. See CIMMYT, Resourcing the Research: CIMMYT
Financing, 1999-2000, (Oct., 2000) available at http://www.cimmyt.org/
whatiscimmyt/AR992000/resourcing/resourcing.htm (last visited Jan. 13,
2002).
782. See John Hodgson, Doubts Linger Over Mexican Corn Analysis, 20
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 3-4 (Jan., 2002) at http://biotech.nature.com (last
visited Jan. 12, 2002).
783. Id. at 3.
784. Id. While the statement by Mr. Estrella is true, the point of the Quist
and Chapela paper was to demonstrate the presence of the cauliflower mosaic
virus promoter 35S in the criollo landrace varieties. Quist and Chapela were
entirely entitled to speculate that if the transgene has indeed introgressed
into criollo landrace maize varieties then it could have an adverse affect on
biodiversity.
Quist and Chapela were careful to state that further
experimental studies were necessary in order to identify the long-term effect
of transgenes upon biodiversity. See Quist & Chapela, supra note 776.
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Finally, Hodgson has reported that Val Giddings argued “that
given its demonstrable influence in improving yields,
improving agronomic performance and decreasing agricultural
footprints, . . . biotechnology is combating the threat to
785
biodiversity.”
Thus, the proponents of the development and
deployment of agricultural biotechnology appear to take the
position that it is not particularly surprising that “genes move
around in nature” but that the fact that they do so “is hardly
786
787
Further, observing that “[g]ene flow is constant” in
new.”
the open environment is as “shock[ing as] to discover gambling
788
in a casino.”
Finally, the proponents appear to focus not on
the destruction of biodiversity but upon “whether it makes any
difference if one of the genes that has flowed in is a
789
Evidently, the preferred answer is that not only
transgene.”
790
diversity not be affected, but that it can be “predict[ed] that
this useful transgene will be found in increasing numbers and
791
types of native maizes.”
The conclusory statements of the
proponents of agricultural biodiversity may not have as solid a
basis as the proponents might think. Also, they focus only on
one single aspect of the issue associated with transgene
translocation in the open environment.
Given that “[e]xotic libraries can make a wide array of
previously unexplored genetic variation rapidly available to
792
plant breeders and geneticists,” and that these libraries of
793
exotic plants are available in existing seedbanks and wild
794
species, then the presence of transgenes in native landraces
may be quite problematic indeed. Consider a very real
785. Id.
786. Hodgson, supra note 782 (quoting Professor Vivian Moses, Chair of
the GropGen Panel).
787. Id. (quoting Val Giddings).
788. Id. (quoting Val Giddings).
789. Id. (quoting Tim Reeves).
790. See Martínez-Soriano, supra note 777.
791. Id.
792. Dani Zamir, Improving Plant Breeding With Exotic Genetic Libraries,
2 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 983, 989 (December, 2001).
793. See id. at 985 (stating that “[t]he observation that wild genetic
resources can contribute to crop improvement, combined with the alarming
rate at which locally adapted landraces are being lost and at which natural
habitats are being damaged, has led to the establishment of large germplasm
collections in the form of seed banks”).
794. See id. at 983 (stating that it is “time to return to the wild ancestors of
crop plants to use them as a source of genetic variation that has been lost
during domestication”).
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scenario: A Bacillus thuringiensis cryIA(b) gene, which, when
expressed, causes the plant cell to produce the Bacillus
thuringiensis CryIA(b) -endotoxin, translocates to a variety of
criollo landrace maize in Oaxaca. The consequences of this
795
apparently natural and “useful”
translocation may have
significant legal ramifications to the farmer upon whose field
the transgene was translocated as well as throughout the plant
breeding world. Consider the farmer upon whose field the
transgene was translocated. If the Federal Courts in Mexico
796
follow the decision in Monsanto v. Schmeiser, then by simply
having the transgene on his land, the farmer may be guilty of
infringing the patent on the transgene. Further, if the farmer
harvests the maize, then he can neither alienate that maize nor
plant the seeds in the next crop cycle because, presuming that
Mexican courts follow the lead of the Canadian Federal Courts,
disposition of the transgene follows the disposition of the seeds,
and disposition of the transgene is completely within the
control of the holder of the patent on the transgene. Further, if
the farmer attempts to market the maize containing the
transgene into the United States, and if the transgene is
patented in the United States, then the farmer will be guilty of
infringing the United States patent. Also, suppose that the
transgene is patented, and that that particular criollo landrace
797
maize genome is considered part of the exotic library sought
to be used for genetic diversification of domesticated Zea mays
species. Then not only can the criollo landrace maize not be
harvested, but the harvested maize cannot be brought into the
United States for experimental use without either infringing
the United States patent or obtaining a license from the holder
of the United States patent. The result, from the farmer’s
perspective, is that the criollo landrace maize that was
contaminated with the transgene is no longer of any value to
the farmer, and that same variety of criollo landrace maize is
no longer available for its genome to diversify the domesticated
Zea mays varieties. Should the transgene contaminate most, if
not all, of the landrace maize varieties existing in Mexico, then
that genome pool will no longer be available to any person or
entity other than the holder of the patent on the transgene (at
795. See Martínez-Soriano, supra note 777.
796. See Monsanto Can., Inc. v. Schmeiser Enters., Ltd., 2001 FCT 256
(Fed. Ct. Canada 2001), available at http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2001/
2001fct256.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2001).
797. See generally Dani Zamir, supra note 792.
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least for the term of the patent). Clearly, then, it does matter
that “any . . . one of the genes that has flowed in is a
798
transgene.”
In summary, it must be common knowledge among seed
manufacturers that transgenes can, and do, translocate
between varieties within the same species; it has been
documented that gene stacking occurs in the open
environment, even when the source of the transgenes are
hundreds of meters apart. Any argument maintaining the
position that the transgene cannot contaminate large portions
of non-genetically modified field is simply without support.
Even if, for the sake of a complete analysis, the travel distance
of a transgene were several tens of meters to several hundreds
799
of meters, then a field of 1/4 section would still exhibit a
800
considerable level of contamination.
In fact, the
contamination may be sufficient to cause a crop harvested from
the entire field to test positive for the transgene, even for a
very modest infiltration of the transgene into the field.
Therefore, the assumption that the transgene translocated to
the land of the farmer only through nefarious deeds is simply
not valid.
b.

Why Seed Manufacturers Have “Unclean Hands”

The court of equity was historically a vehicle for positively
enforcing the requirements of good faith and conscience. If the
court granted relief to a party who “acted fraudulently, or who

798. Hodgson, supra note 782 (quoting Tim Reeves).
799. One of the fields at issue in Percy Schmeiser’s case was of 1/4 section
in size. See Interview: Schmeiser{July 6, 2001}, supra note 270.
800. Given that, in a sample of seeds to be tested, a mixture of one part
genetically modified seeds and five parts non-modified seeds will test positive
for the transgene, only 1,161,600 square feet of the 1/4 section field need
contain genetically modified plants. If the genetic contamination is uniformly
infiltrating from all edges of the 1/4 section, then the distance to be traveled
into the field to obtain the required level of contamination is 115 feet. This is
calculated by recognizing that the square annulus is composed of four
trapezoids with the long edge being b = 1/2 mile in length; the area of each
trapezoid is 1,161,600/4 square feet; and the area of the trapezoid is (b - b’
cos(45°) ) b’ sin(45°), where the distance into the field is b’ sin(45°). Solving
for b allows ready computation of the required distance of infiltration into the
field. It is a remarkable conclusion that a uniform infiltration to a distance of
115 feet by the transgene into a square field of 1/4 section may cause the crop
harvested from the entire section to test “positive” for the transgene.

206

MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW

[Vol. 3:1
801

by deceit or any unfair means has gained an advantage” then
802
the court would be “the abettor [sic] of iniquity.”
Whatever
rights the plaintiff possesses, “[a] court of equity acts only
when and as conscience commands, and if the conduct of the
plaintiff be offensive to the dictates of natural justice,” then he
803
The doctrine of equity states that
will not be granted relief.
804
“he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.”
This does not mean that the doors to the courthouse are closed
to the plaintiff because of misconduct unrelated to the case at
issue; rather, plaintiffs can be denied relief “only for such
violations of conscience as in some measure affect the equitable
relations between the parties in respect of something brought
805
The doctrine of equity, or
before the court for adjudication.”
“clean hands,” is applied not to punish the plaintiff, but “upon
considerations that make for the advancement of right and
806
Thus, the court is not “bound by formula or
justice.”
restrained by any limitations that tends to trammel the free
807
and just exercise of discretion.” This means that the doctrine
of “clean hands” may be invoked by the court for “[a]ny willful
act concerning the cause of action that rightfully can be said to
808
Further, if the
transgress equitable standards of conduct.”
809
case involves a public interest as well as the private interest
of the parties to the suit, then the doctrine “not only prevents a
wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his transgression but
810
Because of the “social and
averts an injury to the public.”
economic consequences of a patent,” the public has a
“paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring
from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct
801. Bein v. Heath, U.S. (6 How.) 228, 247 (1848).
802. Id.
803. See Dweese v. Reinhard, 165 U.S. 386, 390 (1897).
804. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 814 (1945).
805. Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245
(1933) The court denied relief to plaintiff in a patent infringement case
because plaintiff came into court with “unclean hands.” Id. at 246-47.
806. Id.
807. Id. at 245-46.
808. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 815.
809. Indeed, a patent by “its very nature is affected with a public interest,”
because “[t]here are issues of great moment to the public in a patent suit.” Id.
at 816; see also Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238,
246 (1944) reversed on other grounds in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429
U.S. 17, 18 (1976).
810. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 815.
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and that such monopolies are kept within their legitimate
811
scope.”
Of course, the doctrine of equity “should never be
812
applied if its application results in injustice.”
Cases in which relief was denied because of improper
actions on the part of the patentee include: attempted use of
the patent grant to “secure a limited monopoly of unpatented
813
because the
material used in applying the invention,”
patentee derives a profit not from the invention patented but
from “the unpatented supplies with which it is used and which
814
are wholly without the scope of the patent monopoly,” a
strategy which effectively extends the power to fix the price for
815
the unpatented supplies to the patentee; the use of the patent
as a mechanism for restraining commerce in violation of the
816
Sherman Anti-Trust Act; making leases containing clauses,
817
terms, and conditions in violation of the Clayton Act;
818
committing fraud on the patent office;
entering into a
contractual agreement where defendant waives his right to
manufacture using patented devices after expiration of the
819
patent; using the patent to restrain competition and creating
820
a limited monopoly in the marketing of unpatented articles;
obtaining a patent by fraudulent misrepresentation to the
821
Patent and Trademark Office;
and committing fraud on the
patent office in obtaining a design patent renders the patent
822
unenforceable.
811. Id. at 816.
812. Leo Feist, Inc. v. Young, 138 F.2d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 1943).
813. Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33-4 (1930).
814. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502,
517 (1917). This strategy effectively extends the power to fix the price for the
unpatented supplies to the patentee.
815. See Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49
(1912) (stating that “[the] [r]ights conferred by patents are indeed very
definite and extensive, but they do not give any more than other rights an
universal license against positive prohibitions”).
816. See id.
817. See United Shoe Mach. Co. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 464 (1922)
(stating that the “patent grant does not limit the right of Congress to enact
legislation not interfering with the legitimate rights secured by the patent but
prohibiting in the public interest the making of agreements which may lessen
competition and build up monopoly”).
818. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach.
Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
819. See Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892).
820. See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
821. See Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 456 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1972).
822. See W. R. Grace & Co., Inc. v. W. U.S. Industries, Inc., 608 F.2d 1214
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Case law indicates that the court will deny enforcement of
a patent by the patentee if the patentee has acted in such a
823
manner as to “transgress equitable standards of conduct”
with regard to the issue brought before the court. The genetic
pollution of the field of Farmer Adams is germane to the issue
brought before the court by the plaintiff-seed manufacturer.
This is because if the genetic pollution had not occurred, or if
Farmer Adams had unknowingly planted seeds containing the
transgene, the transgene would not have been on the land of
Farmer Adams and the seed manufacturers would have not
had a cause to sue. Also, allowing the suit to come forward
would recognize the right of the seed manufacturer to expand
its monopoly beyond the limitations set in the patent.
The plant genome is analogous to any naturally occurring
molecule in any physical phase, including dry ice. Dry ice is an
unpatented and unpatentable subject matter because the
824
public has long known that it is carbon dioxide, which is
naturally occurring and is a product of nature. Because the
plant genome is a product of nature and has been in public use
since the beginning of the domestic use of the plant, it is
825
The patentee cannot exert
unpatented and unpatentable.
control over such unpatented material because the control is
beyond the limited scope of the patentee’s legal estate; “[E]very
use of a patent as a means of obtaining a limited monopoly of
826
Such a limitation is
unpatented material is prohibited.”
inherent in the patent grant and “is not dependent upon the
peculiar function or character of the unpatented material or on
827
Relief in such a case must be
the way in which it is used.”
denied because the patentee is using the patent to secure a
“monopoly of unpatented material used in applying the
828
invention.”
If the seed manufacturer were allowed to enforce its
exclusive interest in the transgene, the genetic pollution would
(9th Cir. 1979).
823. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 815.
824. See Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283
U.S. 27, 29 (1930).
825. See Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 461-62 (1938) (stating
that the “sole business of the Dry Ice Corporation was to make and sell dry
ice-which is unpatented material”). Once a product has been in public use for
more than one year it becomes unpatentable.
826. Id. at 463.
827. Carbice Corp., 283 U.S. at 33.
828. Id. at 34.
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affect a monopoly over the unpatented plant genome that
existed on the lands of Farmer Adams. The reasoning behind
this assertion is as follows. Either Farmer Adams planted
seeds devoid of the transgene, or, at the very least, he was
ignorant of whether the seeds contained the transgene. The
public possesses exclusive interest in the plant genome, which,
as discussed above, is unpatentable. When the transgene is
translocated onto the field of Farmer Adams, it contaminates
the plant genome of the plants on that field. The incorporation
of the transgene into the plant genome in the progeny seeds
occurs by an entirely natural process, without the intervention
of humans. The incorporation was not by genetic engineering
techniques as used to develop the patented invention. The seed
manufacturers know that such incorporation will occur in the
open environment by natural processes. The plant genome,
which is contaminated by the transgene, is not within the
limitations of the patent grant (further, the plant genome
cannot be within the patent grant). Once the transgene is
translocated into the cells of the plants on the land of Farmer
Adams, the seed manufacturer may claim infringement of its
patent by Farmer Adams.
If the seed manufacturer is
successful in enforcing its exclusive interest, then the plant
genome of the plants on Farmer Adams’ field will be pulled
within the limitations of the patent. At that point, Farmer
Adams is completely divested of any interests he may have had
in the plant genome that was on his land before the transgene
was translocated to the cells in his plants. Also, by bringing
the plant genome within the limits of the patent the public is
divested of all interest in the plant genome. Therefore, Farmer
Adams is prohibited from having the plant genome on his land
unless he pays the seed manufacturer the technology-use
license fee. Such an outcome would extend the monopoly of the
seed manufacturer far beyond the limitations inherent in the
patent grant.
By permitting the seed manufacturer to enforce its
exclusive interest when genetic pollution occurs, the seed
manufacturer would establish, with the approval of the court, a
limited monopoly in the marketing of unpatented material and
829
By enforcing its exclusive
would be restraining competition.
interest, Farmer Adams would not be able to market his crop,
in part because he would not be able to have the plants with

829. See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
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the transgene reproduced in their cells on his land. Because
multiple farmers in the same situation as Farmer Adams
comprise the competition to the genetically modified plant
industry, enforcement of the exclusive interest would
completely eliminate the competition.
Because any crop
yielded by the plant on Farmer Adams land could not be sold,
then assertion of the exclusive interest would cause the seed
manufacturer to create a monopoly in the marketing of the
consumable portion of the plant generated by the plant
genome.
Because the seed manufacturer polluted the land of
Farmer Adams and because the seed manufacturer is
attempting to assert a monopoly beyond that limited by the
patent grant, the seed manufacturer comes to the court with
unclean hands.
c.

Why Exclusive Interest is Not Enforceable

Before the seed manufacturer can assert its exclusive
interest it must have a right to do so, and it must come to the
courthouse door with clean hands. The right to assert its
interests arises from either common law or Section 271 of Title
35, United States Code. Both of these avenues have been
discussed elsewhere in this work. Common law doctrine
affords very little protection for intellectual property, and
successful assertion of an exclusive interest under 35 U. S. C.
Section 271 is not as simple as demonstrating possession and
implying that the possessor is infringing the patent as a result
of strict liability. The reason behind this assertion is that
while the patent statute requires strict liability with respect to
the exclusive interest of the patentee (meaning that it is
irrelevant whether the alleged infringer knew that the
invention was patented) there must be scienter with regard to
acts which cause legal liability. Thus, scienter with regard to
the existence of the patent is not equivalent to scienter with
regard to the infringing acts. An alternative route to assertion
of the interests may exist if the seed manufacturer acquired the
right to pollute the land of Farmer Adams. Under this
alternative, Farmer Adams would necessarily have to obtain a
technology-use license from the seed manufacturer as a part of
the shifting of the right to control the use of his land to the seed
manufacturer.
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830

The patent statute is silent on the right of a patent
holder to pollute, and specifically Section 101 is silent on the
right of a utility patent holder to pollute the property of others
with the protected property. The statute grants only the right
to exclude others from making, using, selling, or offering to sell
831
the invention patented. There is no statutory grant of a right
832
to make, use, offer to sell, or sell the invention patented. The
patentee may grant a license to Farmer Jack. The license is a
waiver by the seed manufacturer of the right to sue Farmer
Jack when he chooses to make, use, offer to sell, or sells the
patented invention, which for simplicity is taken to be the
transgene.
While neither Farmer Jack nor the seed
manufacturer have the statutorily granted right to make, use,
offer to sell, or sell the invention patented, the seed
manufacturer, through the vehicle of the license, is
relinquishing its right to sue Farmer Jack should Farmer Jack
833
Since
decide to make, use, offer to sell, or sell the invention.
the seed manufacturer does not have the statutorily granted
right to pollute, it cannot shift that right to Farmer Jack, either
outright or through a license agreement.
The license
agreement also does not shift the risk, of the genetic pollution
of the fields of Farmer Adams by the transgene, onto the
licensee, Farmer Jack. Should Farmer Jack sign such a license
to assume such a risk, he would certainly be a fool headed for
financial destitution.
The property law concepts of nuisance and trespass are
helpful in examining these issues. Nuisance theory arises from
830. Title 35 of the United States Code.
831. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1997). See also Continental Paper Bag Co. v. E.
Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908) (stating that the patentee “receives
nothing from the law that he did not have before, and that the only effect of
the patent is to restrain others from manufacturing and using that which he
has invented”).
832. Justice Clarke stated in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co, that “the only effect of his patent is to restrain others from
manufacturing, using or selling that which he has invented.” 243 U.S. 502,
510 (1912).
833. Interestingly enough, Farmer Jack cannot “make” the invention
patented, as discussed above. The waiver by the seed manufacturer of its
right to sue Farmer Jack can only relate to the use, offer to sell, or sell
privileges exercised by Farmer Jack. Further, if the transgene expresses the
characteristic in the plant of herbicide resistance and if Farmer Jack does not
use the herbicide for which specific resistance is conferred on the plant, then
Farmer Jack is also not “using” the transgene or its expressed compounds.
While these points may seem to be fine, they do assist in clarifying the precise
nature of the relationship between Farmer Jack and the seed manufacturer.
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the right of the property owner to the use and enjoyment of his
834
property without interference from others, while trespass
theory arises from the exclusive interest that the property
835
owner has in the “exclusive possession of his land.” There are
two competing interests in the case: first is the right of the
manufacturer to use its property as it sees fit, which includes
the manufacture of a thing that is beneficial to society; the
second is the right of the individual property owner to the use
and enjoyment of his property without interference.
Independent of the outcome of a trial in a court of justice, the
loser may simply pay the winner an amount sufficient to obtain
an easement for the continued exercise of their uninhibited
rights. If either Farmer Jack or the seed manufacturer has the
right to exercise their respective property interests, they may
simply pay Farmer Adams an amount sufficient to compensate
Farmer Adams for his permanent losses and continue with
business as usual. Before assigning the right to pollute, it is
first necessary to determine the relative interests of Farmer
Jack and Farmer Adams in the agricultural enterprise.
Farmer Jack has no statutorily granted right to either
836
“make” the transgene or have the transgene reproduced by
the cellular machinery of the plants on his land. Since the
public has exclusive interest in the plant genome, the public
may grant Farmer Jack permission, in essence a license, to
plant the seed and initiate the process whereby the consumable
837
Such a
portion of the plant is generated or reproduced.
834. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 619 (W. Page
Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984).
835. Id. at 622.
836. To clarify the distinction made here, to “make” the transgene is to
produce, employing the techniques of molecular biology, the precise DNA
sequence required for the transgene. Through commonly employed
agricultural production techniques, the farmer plants a seed, which may or
may not contain the transgene, thereby initiating the process by which the
consumable crop is produced and the transgene is reproduced by the cellular
machinery of the plant. If the seed planted by the farmer does not contain the
transgene then the farmer, by planting the seed, does not even initiate the
process by which the transgene is reproduced in the cells of the plant or
produced in the progeny seed.
Indeed, Farmer Jack and the seed
manufacturer initiate the process leading to the contamination of such plants.
837. Even though Farmer Jack purchased the seed from a vendor, he does
not necessarily have a license from the public to have the consumable portion
of the plant reproduced on his lands. The clearest example of the distinction
is the marijuana seed. A person may purchase marijuana seeds from the local
vendor, and therefore the person owns the seeds. However, it is a criminal
offense to plant the seeds to initiate the process by which marijuana plants
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license is granted equally between Farmer Jack and Farmer
Adams. The license is not granted to the seed manufacturer,
because it is not desirous of the license; rather the seed
manufacturer is granted the exclusive interest in the transgene
or to the combination of the plant genome and the transgene in
exchange for public access to the resulting technology. The
resulting technology advances society economically and it must
838
The seed manufacturer can
be of benefit to the public.
neither alienate nor license to Farmer Jack the right to make,
use, sell, or offer to sell the plant genome because it does not
possess the interest to do so. The rights of Farmer Jack and
Farmer Adams are equal with respect to producing a
consumable crop on their respective fields. As discussed
earlier, neither farmer interferes with the right of the other to
plant the seed. Because of the equality of the license, neither
farmer can be favored over the other based on the right to use
land for crop production. The seed manufacturer cannot be
granted the right to pollute on this basis because it is not
producing a consumable crop.
There are strongly competing public rights that exist
within the right of choice. These are the right of the public to
choose crops with the transgene and the right of the public to
839
The right of those
choose crops without the transgene.
members of the public to consume crops with the transgene is
as strong as the right of those members of the public to
consume crops without the transgene. That a majority of the
public is either indifferent to consumption of the transgene or
wishes to consume crops containing the transgene is irrelevant
are produced.
838. That the resulting technology must be for the benefit of the public
arises from Justice Story’s statement that a “useful” invention is “one as may
be applied to some beneficial use in society, in contradistinction to an
invention, which is injurious to the morals, the health, or the good order of
society.” Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1217). Justice
Story further stated that “[a]ll that the law requires is, that the invention
should not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound
morals of society.” Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817)
(No. 8568). Inventions that are not patentable include “a new invention to
poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate private assassination.”
Id.
839. The right of the public to have a choice will become a stronger issue
when the consumable crop is from plants that produce plastics, see, e.g.,
Maliyakal John, Transgenic Cotton Plants Producing Heterologous
Polyhydroxy(E) Butyrate Bioplastic, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,602,321 (issued Feb. 11,
1997), anti-cancer drugs, antibiotics, antibodies, anti-psychotic drugs, and
other pharmaceuticals.

214

MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW

[Vol. 3:1

to whether the relative rights of these two subsets of the public
must be given equal weight. There is no particular reason to
favor one subset of the public over the other subset, and the
exercise of the right of choice by each subset is reasonable. If
Farmer Jack is granted the right to have the transgene
translocated from his fields, then Farmer Adams will be denied
his ability to produce a crop free of the transgene and the
public that chooses to consume crops free of the transgene will
not have such crops locally available. If Farmer Adams is
granted the right to not have the transgene translocated onto
his fields, then Farmer Jack will be denied his ability to
produce a crop with the transgene and the subset of the public
that chooses to consume crops containing the transgene will
also not have such crops locally available. Either way, the
respective choice of the members of the public will be denied.
Also, the right to pollute cannot be shifted to the seed
manufacturer because, as in the case of favoring Farmer Jack
over Farmer Adams, the result would be discriminatory against
that part of the public that chooses to not have the transgene or
its products. Further, the seed manufacturer has no economic
or commercial interest in planting the seeds or engaging in
agricultural practices that would yield a crop for consumption
by the public. Rather, the seed manufacturer has only the
economic interest of selling the transgenic seeds and the
technology-use license to Farmer Jack.
It might be argued that both the seed manufacturer and
Farmer Jack are engaged in legitimate business enterprises,
and hence immune to a cause of action for nuisance. It is
unquestionable that Farmer Jack and the seed manufacturers
840
are each engaged in a legitimate business enterprise.
However, the legitimacy of the business enterprise does not
eliminate the clear right of the individual specially injured by
841
the pollution to seek preventive relief.
Farmer Adams is,
indeed, specially injured by the pollution of his lands by the
transgene.
840. See, e.g., United Verde Extension Mining Co. v. Ralston, 296 P. 262,
264 (Ariz. 1931) (stating that the operation of a “smelter is a perfectly lawful
business and necessarily not a nuisance per se”).
841. See Ariz. Copper Co., Ltd. v. Gillespie, 230 U.S. 46, 57 (1912). The
Supreme Court held that contamination of waters in Arizona by a copper
plant upstream of the lower appropriators constituted a nuisance and under
the circumstances of the case an injunction was properly granted. The
defendant might have the decree modified upon completion of remedial works
to avoid future contamination. See id. at 58-59.
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Farmer Adams has a license from the public to plant seeds
containing the plant genome in which the public has exclusive
interests. The public benefits from having access to the
consumable portion of the plant resulting from the efforts of
Farmer Adams. The seed manufacturer was granted a license
to develop a combination of the plant genome and the
transgene and was subsequently granted exclusive interest in
the combination (but not in the plant genome). The public
benefits from this arrangement over not having access to the
patented technology only to the extent that a choice free from
the transgene is locally available, and only to the extent that
the risk of injury to the public and damage to the environment
is no greater than that associated with the continued use of the
non-modified variety of plant. The general rule of property is
that the owner may exercise exclusive interests in his own
property, and may “subject it to such uses as will best subserve
842
his private interests.” While no other person may, in general,
infringe on the right of the owner to exercise his exclusive
interests in his own property, the owner may not, in general,
infringe excessively upon the corresponding rights of those
around him. This, of course, does not imply that the property
owner must never use his “own property so as to do any injury
843
However, the owner of the
to his neighbor or his property.”
property is bound to cause no unnecessary injury or annoyance
to those property owners that are his neighbors through
unreasonable use of his own property. The basic rule of
nuisance theory is that the property owner will be guilty of a
nuisance if “he make[s] an unreasonable, unwarrantable or
unlawful use of it, so as to produce material annoyance,
844
The
inconvenience, discomfort or hurt to his neighbor.”
requirement for a successful cause of action for nuisance is that
the property owner’s use must “produce a tangible and
appreciable injury to neighboring property, or such as to render
845
As
its enjoyment specially uncomfortable or inconvenient.”
noted earlier, if the seed manufacturer is granted the right to
842. Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568 (C. App. N.Y. 1876). The plaintiff
was awarded damages for injury by sulphuric acid gas to white and yellow
pines and Norway spruce as well as destruction of from “100 to 150 valuable
pine and spruce trees, and had injured their grape vines and plum trees.” Id.
at 576. The sulphuric acid gas was produced as the result of burning bricks
with anthracite coal. See id.
843. Id. at 577.
844. Id.
845. Id.
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pollute the fields of Farmer Adams with the transgene, Farmer
846
Adams either must submit to the technology-use license or
will not be able to enjoy the use of his lands for agricultural
production, and the public will be harmed. If the seed
manufacturer is not granted the right to pollute the fields of
Farmer Adams, then Farmer Jack either must plant a nonmodified variety of seed or will not be able to enjoy the use of
his lands for agricultural production, and the public will be
harmed. The issue is then whether the seed manufacturer is
granted the right to pollute the fields of Farmer Adams or
whether Farmer Adams is granted the right to be free from the
pollution.
The basis for the assignation of the right to pollute or to be
free from pollution was clearly articulated by Judge Earl in
1876 when he stated that:
One cannot erect a nuisance upon his land adjoining vacant
lands owned by another and thus measurably control the uses to
which his neighbor’s land may in the future be subjected. He may
make a reasonable and lawful use of his land and thus cause his
neighbor some inconvenience, and probably some damage which the
law would regard as damnum absque injuria. But he cannot place
upon his land any thing which the law would pronounce a nuisance,
and thus compel his neighbor to leave his land vacant, or to use it in
847
such way only as the neighboring nuisance will allow.

If the seed manufacturer is granted the right to pollute,
then Farmer Adams will be forced to either discontinue
agricultural production or produce a crop containing the
transgene. Further, the public will lose its right to choose
between consuming crops with the transgene and crops without
the transgene. The assignation of the right to pollute also
depends upon the relative injury to the two parties. If the
injury to Farmer Adams is small or trifling, and the damage to
the seed manufacturer is large in the event that the seed
manufacturer is restrained from polluting the fields of Farmer
Adams, the restraint may not be placed upon the seed
manufacturer. The damage to Farmer Adams is considerable.
He will loose access to his premium market, he will loose his
own interests in his own plant variety, and his crop may have
to be destroyed if the seed manufacturer is granted the right to

846. In this scenario, Farmer Adams may still plant the non-modified
variety of seed but must still sign the technology-use license to avoid liability.
847. Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 584 (N.Y. App. Ct. 1876).
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pollute. The ancient maxim remains applicable: Sic utere tuo
848
ut alienum non laedas.
The only reasonable resolution is to assign to Farmer
Adams the right to have his lands and plants free from genetic
pollution. Should the transgene translocate onto the lands of
Farmer Adams the person claiming exclusive interest in the
legal estate consisting of the transgene must be held liable for
the genetic pollution.
Further, if the transgene proves
injurious to the health of the subset of the public who chose to
not consume crops containing the transgene, then the person
claiming exclusive interest must also be held liable for the
injury to that subset of the public.
One school of economic analysis in the law states that once
the initial rights of interfering parties is delimited, market
transactions will yield an optimum utilization of the rights of
849
Under this theory, the institution of private
the parties.
property interests in combination with the pricing system
inherent in the market transactions will resolve the conflicts
between the interfering parties. In the case of interference
between radio operators at the same or adjacent frequencies,
the operator who had the right to stop the interference with his
transmission would forego his right “if he were paid more than
the amount by which the value of his service was decreased by
this interference or the costs which he would have to incur to
850
The interfering operator would pay an “amount up
offset it.”
to the costs of suppressing the interference or the decrease in
the value of the service he could provide if unable to use his
transmitter in a way which resulted in interference” to be
851
In the alternative, if the interfering
allowed to interfere.
operator had the right to interfere, he would desist “if he were
paid more than the costs of suppressing the interference or the
decrease in the value of the service he could provide if
852
In addition, the operator whose
interference were barred.”
signals were being interfered with could halt the interference

848. See id. at 576. “To use your own so that you do not injure another.”
Andrews v. Andrews, 88 S. E.2d 88, 92 (N.C. 1955) (plaintiff was awarded
damages for destruction of his crops by wild geese lured to a pond located on a
neighbor’s land).
849. See R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L.
ECON. 1, 27 (1959).
850. Id. at 28.
851. See id.
852. Id.
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by payment of “an amount up to the decrease in the value of his
service that it causes or the costs he has to incur to offset the
853
interference.”
A further refinement of this line of thought leads to the
conclusion that the rights to perform certain activities
constitute the factors of production. The loss, which is suffered
by others because of the exercise of the totality of the factors of
854
It is a
production, is the cost of exercising those factors.
tempting extension of this theory to consider only the costs
associated with the exercise of a right (that is the factor of
production) in determining which of the interfering parties is
assigned that right. This clearly ignores the basic tenant of
social cost theory, which is that it is “desirable that the choice
between different social arrangements for the solution of
economic problems should be carried out in broader terms than
this and that the total effect of these arrangements in all
855
The reduction
spheres of life should be taken into account.”
of the right to be free of harmful effects of another’s actions to
an economic factor of production allows the party with the
greater economic, and hence legal, resources to place upon the
right to engage in the harmful activity a very high value while
placing upon the right to be free of the harmful effects of that
activity a very low value. This result simply ignores “the total
856
That is,
effect of these arrangements in all spheres of life.”
while the seed manufacturer may possess resources
considerably in excess of Farmer Adams, social cost analysis
will not necessarily render the conclusion that the optimal
arrangement is for the seed manufacturer to possess the right
to pollute the lands of Farmer Adams and to possess the right
to sue Farmer Adams when the transgene is translocated to his
lands.
The seed manufacturer possesses no right to pollute the
land of Farmer Adams. No language exists in the patent
statute that dictates that liabilities lie with Farmer Jack when
the property of the seed manufacturer is translocated onto his
lands. Neither Farmer Jack nor the seed manufacturer have a

853. Id.
854. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3, 44 J. L. ECON. 1 (1960)
(stating that “[i]f factors of production are thought of as rights, it becomes
easier to understand that the right to do something which has a harmful
effect . . . is also a factor of production”).
855. Id. at 43.
856. Id.
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statutorily granted right to make, use, or sell the property of
the seed manufacturer; hence there is no right to pollute
associated with the right to manufacture or produce a
consumable crop. Nuisance theory dictates that Farmer Adams
has the right to make use of his lands for agricultural
production free of genetic pollution, and the seed manufacturer
cannot obtain the right to pollute the lands of Farmer Adams
either through direct application of nuisance theory or through
the machinery of social cost theory. Further, the public will be
denied its right of choice if the seed manufacturer obtains the
right to pollute. Under common law, the seed manufacturer
cannot enforce its exclusive interest because the discovery and
propagation of plants containing the transgene by Farmer
Adams was done through no nefarious deeds on the part of
Farmer Adams.
Under the patent statute, the seed
manufacturer cannot enforce its exclusive interests because it
does not have the right to pollute the lands of Farmer Adams,
it knows that the genetic pollution will occur in the open
environment, and because it comes to the courthouse door with
“unclean hands.”
CONCLUSION
There is a tension between the rights of the seed
manufacturers in the intellectual property underlying
genetically modified plants and the rights of the farmers in
their land and the crop produced on his land from his labors.
The rights of the seed manufacturers include the right to
exclude others from making, using, offering to sell or selling the
protected plants. A utility patent affords the strongest form of
protection for the intellectual property, and the farmer may
only make, use, or sell the crop from genetically modified
plants when he has signed a technology-use license. Because
Jack purchased and planted the beans without a technologyuse license, the seed manufacturers can successfully sue him
for infringement of their property rights.
Through the
technology-use license, the seed manufacturers can force Jack
to give up his property rights in the crop he produces and in the
land upon which the beans are grown. The technology-use
license also prohibits Jack from saving seed from one crop for
planting in the next crop cycle. The patent statute has
typically been interpreted as meaning that if a farmer has a
patented transgene on his property then he is guilty of
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infringement of the property rights of the seed manufacturer.
While the intent of the farmer is inapposite to the right of the
patentee to assert his exclusive rights, the strict liability
interpretation is overly strict because it eliminates the scienter
element required in the “making,” “using,” or “selling” of the
invention patented.
Furthermore, the strict liability
interpretation of the patent statute ignores the fact that the
seed manufacturer may come to the courthouse doors with
unclean hands, in which case the seed manufacturer may not
assert its case against the farmer.
The farmer need not remain the weak participant in
agricultural biotechnology.
Through farm marketing
associations, a collective of farmers may develop its own
intellectual property in both conventional hybrid and
genetically modified plant varieties. In this case, farmers,
through farm marketing associations, can come to the
857
negotiating table with seed manufacturers as equals.

857. In epilog, both Percy Schmeiser and Dallas Thomason have appealed
the decision of the trial court. The appeals have not been decided at
publishing of this article.
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Appendix A
To gain some fundamental understanding of the economics
underlying the introduction of hybrid maize varieties into the
United States farm market, it is necessary to review the maize
production and cost statistics between 1900 and 1950. In
Figure 1, below, the annual yields of corn (for grain), in bushels
per acre, are presented for the states of: Illinois, panel (a);
Indiana, panel (b); Iowa, panel (c); Missouri, panel (d); and
Ohio, panel (e). Also, in panel (f) the aggregate annual United
States corn yield, in bushels per acre, is given with the average
for the five indicated states. The yield data is readily available
from the U.S.D.A. National Agricultural Statistical Service
website. Specifically, the data presented in Figure 1 was
obtained by querying the database for the relevant states and
858
To insure reliability of the data
for the required years.
collected from the website, the original U.S.D.A. Agricultural
859
Statistics bulletins were consulted.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the maize
yield levels between Illinois, Indiana, Iowa and Ohio. By
inspection of Figure 1, and Table 1, it is readily seen that the
maize yield levels did not change substantially between 1900
860
and 1920. In 1920 the expected “Four State” yield was
approximately 40 bushels per acre, see Table 1, the “Five
861
State” yield was approximately 35 bushels per acre, and the
total U.S. aggregate expected yield was approximately 27
bushels per acre. While the states of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
and Ohio had an expected yield increase of approximately 0.1
per centum, of the yield level in 1900, per year, and the United
States aggregate expected yield declined by approximately 0.01
862
The
per centum, of the expected level in 1900, per year.

858. See NASS, State Level Data for Field Crops: Grains, U.S.D.A.
STATISTICAL SERVICE at http://www.nass.usda.gov:81/ipedp/ (last visited Jan.
16, 2002).
859. Specifically, the U.S.D.A. Agricultural Statistics bulletins consulted
were for the years 1924, 1930, 1932, 1933, 1936, 1946, 1952, 1972, 1998, and
1999.
860. The “Four State” annual aggregate yield is computed as the direct
average of the annual yield of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Ohio.
861. The “Five State” annual aggregate yield is computed as the direct
average of the annual yield of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri and Ohio.
862. The statistical results reported in this work are computed based
directly upon the agricultural statistical data obtained from U.S.D.A. reports.
The analysis is as follows: The U.S.D.A. agricultural statistics for the yield of
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expected annual yield for the “Four State” aggregate fell, on
average, between the years of 1920 and 1936 by approximately
1.2 per centum per year; such that by 1936 the expected
average corn yield was approximately 32 bushels per acre. The
“Five State” annual average yield declined by approximately
1.5 per centum of the 1920 yield level between 1920 and 1936
while the overall U.S. total yield declined by 1.65 per centum of
the average U.S. yield level in 1920. In the 13 years between
1937 and 1950, the expected yield changes were, in per centum
of the 1937 expected yield for the category, 0.8 for the “Four
State” aggregate, 1.3 for the “Five State” aggregate, 2.9 for the
U.S. Total aggregate.
It is not surprising that farmers in those states were
amenable to the educational and advertising campaigns
863
conducted by both the U.S.D.A. and the seed manufacturers.
While the trend in the yields did change starting in 1938, it is
not clear whether the modest increase was due to the
introduction and acceptance of hybrid maize varieties, or
whether the change was due to other factors (the yield,
averaged over the principal four states in the corn belt is
approximately 30% higher than the average for the two
decades from 1900 to 1920, when the average varied little over
these two decades). While the average yield for the corn belt
increased between 1939 and 1956, the average in 1956 was
only approximately 12% higher than the average yield in 1939.
Further, the average yield in 1956 exceed the average yield for
the first two decades of the century by only approximately 48%
of the latter yield level. To examine more carefully the relation
between yield and use of hybrid maize varieties by farmers,
corn, in bu./acre, were obtained from the U.S.D.A. National Agricultural
Statistical Service website at http://www.nass.usda.gov:81/ipedp/ (last visited
Jan. 16, 2002). The corn yields for the years in any particular desired range of
years were segregated and analyzed using basic data statistical techniques
(computing mean, variance, etc.) and simple linear regression to determine
trends in the yields over the relevant range of years. For any given range of
years, the origin of the abscissa axis is taken as the beginning of the range of
year, and the “y-intercept” is computed as the intersection of the linear
regression graph and the vertical line situated at the origin of the abscissa
axis. The per centum change in the yield is easily computed as the slope of the
linear regression equation divided by the y-intercept value and multiplied by
100%. See Table 2 for the linear regression results of the average corn yields
for the “Four States,” the “Five States,” and the U.S. Total for the years
between 1920 and 1936.
863. See generally Donald N. Duvick, Biotechnology in the 1930s: The
Development of Hybrid Maize, 2 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 69-74 (Jan.
2001).
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these two quantities are plotted, for the years from 1930 to
1950, in Figure 2 for: Illinois, panel (a); Indiana, panel (b);
Iowa, panel (c); Missouri, panel (d); and Ohio, panel (e). The
U.S. average corn production, for grain, is presented in panel (f)
for the years from 1930 to 1950.
In Figure 2, both the annual yield per acre, for each state
and the percentage of all acres of corn planted to hybrid maize
varieties are given for each year between 1930 and 1950,
864
The data for the yield of maize was collected as
inclusive.
indicated in footnotes 858 through 862. It should be noticed
that a substantial difference exists between the expected and
actual yield levels for 1937. The expected yield value in 1937,
based upon the yield levels between 1920 and 1936, were: for
the “Four State” aggregate, the expected yield was 31.6 bushels
per acre and the actual average production was 45.3 bushels
per acre (a 43 per centum difference); for the “U.S. Total”
aggregate, the expected yield was 20.6 bushels per acre while
the actual average production was 28.9 bushels per acre (a 40
per centum difference). It is striking that while the average
percent of corn acreage planted to hybrid corn varieties in the
“Four State” aggregate was 18 per centum, the actual yield was
43 percent above the expected level based upon the 1920
through 1936 yield. Further, the corresponding numbers for
the “U.S. Total” aggregate are 7.9 and 40 respectively. By
inspection from Figure 2, panels (a) and (b), it is clear that
between 1936 and 1937 the yield nearly doubled in both Illinois
and Indiana even though the percent of all corn acreage
planted to hybrid varieties were approximately 25 and 11 per

864. The data for the percentage of all corn acreage planted to hybrid
maize varieties was collected from U.S.D.A. publications as follows: the data
for all states, and the United States total aggregate, for the years 1933
through 1945 were obtained from 1945 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 42
(1945), and for 1946 the data was collected from 1946 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL
STATISTICS 41 (1946); the data for the years 1947 through 1950 is from 1951
U.S.D.A. Agricultural Statistics 45 (1951). The data for Missouri for the years
1945 through 1948 was obtained from 1948 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL
STATISTICS 48 (1948). The data for the United States total aggregate for the
years 1945 through 1948 was collected from 1948 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL
STATISTICS 48 (1948) and the data for years 1949 through 1958 were obtained
from 1959 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 32 (1959). The data for
Indiana for the years 1946 through 1948 was obtained from 1948 U.S.D.A.
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 48 (1948). The data for Illinois for the years 1947
and 1948 was obtained from 1948 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 48
(1948). The Ohio data for the years 1946 through 1948 was obtained from
1948 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 48 (1948).
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centum, respectively. From a careful analysis of Figure 2 it is
clear that the introduction of the hybrid varieties could not
have caused the significant increase in corn yields observed
between 1936 and 1937. To see this, consider that by 1938 the
percent of all corn acreage planted with hybrid corn varieties
was 47.5 per centum in Illinois and 51.9 per centum in Iowa;
however, in neither state did the yield levels change
866
Further, for all states
significantly between 1937 and 1950.
studied, the yield levels changed only modestly between 1937
and 1950. Consider the results of the statistical analysis, of the
agricultural statistics discussed in notes 858 through 862,
presented in Table 3. For the years between 1937 and 1947,
the yield levels changed as follows: for the “Four State”
aggregate, the increase was less than 0.01 per centum of the
expected 1937 value (of 47.5 bushels per acre) per year; for the
“Five State” aggregate, the increase was 0.2 per centum of the
expected 1937 value (of 43.8 bushels per acre); and for the “U.S.
Total” aggregate, the increase was 1.7 per centum of the
expected 1937 value (of 29 bushels per acre).
To gain a clearer picture of the influence of the deployment
and use of hybrid seed varieties upon the corn yield levels
between 1933 and 1946, it is necessary to consider the
unexplained increase in the yield levels between 1936 and
1937. Presuming that the event that caused the increase was
both not due to the use of hybrid maize varieties and was
constant after 1937, then the yield levels between 1937 and
1946 may be adjusted by subtracting out excess 1937 increase
from the yields of all years between 1937 and 1946. Appendix
B below examines this relatively trivial calculation. Once the
quantity (Yact(1937) - Yexp(1937) (where y is the year of interest
between 1937 and 1948, Yact(1937) is the actual corn yield for y
1937, and Yexp(1937) is the expected corn yield for 1937 based
upon the corn yields between 1920 and 1936) is subtracted
from the annual average yields for the years 1937 through 1946
then the statistical analysis may be executed in a relatively
simple manner. The results, shown in Table 4 below, indicate
that the yield levels changed as follows: for the “Four State”
aggregate, the increase was approximately 1.7 per centum of
the expected 1933 value (of 30.6 bushels per acre) per year; for
the “Five State” aggregate, the increase was approximately 1.9

865. See 1945 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 42 (1945).
866. See id.; infra, Figure 2, panels (a) and (c).
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per centum of the expected 1933 value (of 27.4 bushels per
acre); and for the “U.S. Total” aggregate, the increase was
about 2.6 per centum of the expected 1933 value (of 19.5
bushels per acre).
The modest level of increase in productivity was not offset
by a commensurate increase in profitability of maize
867
production.
As demonstrated in Figure 3, the cost of
producing a bushel of corn increased by nearly 60 per centum,
of the cost in 1936, between 1936 and 1945; however, the price
of a bushel of corn did not increase significantly. In 1933, the
season average price of corn was $0.52 per bushel, in 1936 the
season average price of corn was $1.044 per bushel, while in
868
1945 the season average price was $1.14 per bushel. Thus, in

867. Production costs were obtained from the following sources: for the
years between 1937 and 1945, the production costs were obtained from 1947
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 47 (1948); for the years between 1933 and 1936,
the production costs were obtained from 1943 AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 44
(1943). See also U.S.D.A. Cost of Producing Field Crops, 1925, 3 CROPS AND
MARKETS 170 (1926); U.S.D.A. Cost of Producing Field Crops, 1926, 4 CROPS
AND MARKETS 202 (1927); U.S.D.A. Cost of Producing Field Crops, 1927, 5
CROPS AND MARKETS 196 (1928); U.S.D.A. Cost of Producing Field Crops,
1928, 6 CROPS AND MARKETS 202 (1929); U.S.D.A. Cost of Producing Field
Crops, 1929, 7 CROPS AND MARKETS 220 (1930); U.S.D.A. Cost of Producing
Field Crops, 1930, 8 CROPS AND MARKETS 232 (1931); U.S.D.A. Cost of
Producing Field Crops, 1931, 9 CROPS AND MARKETS 222 (1932); U.S.D.A. Cost
of Producing Field Crops, 1932, 10 CROPS AND MARKETS 226 (1933); U.S.D.A.
Cost of Producing Field Crops, 1933, 11 CROPS AND MARKETS 66 (1935);
U.S.D.A. Corn, Wheat, and Oats: Cost of Production, 1934, 1936
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 342 (1936); U.S.D.A. Corn, Wheat, and Oats: Cost
of Production, 1935, 1937 AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 396 (1937); U.S.D.A.
Corn, Wheat, and Oats: Cost of Production, 1936, 1938 AGRICULTURAL
STATISTICS 440 (1938); U.S.D.A. Corn, Wheat, and Oats: Cost of Production in
1937, 1939 AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 492 (1939); U.S.D.A. Corn, Wheat, and
Oats: Cost of Production in 1938, 1940 AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 569 (1940);
U.S.D.A. Corn, Wheat, and Oats: Cost of Production in 1939, 1941
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 576 (1941); U.S.D.A. Cost of Producing Field
Crops, 1940, 18 CROPS AND MARKETS 308 (1941); U.S.D.A. Corn, Wheat, and
Oats: Cost of Production in 1941, 1943 AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 414 (1943);
U.S.D.A. Corn, Wheat, and Oats: Cost of Production in 1942, 1944
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 434 (1944); U.S.D.A. Corn, Wheat, and Oats: Cost
of Production in Groups of States, 1943, 1945 AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 452
(1945); U.S.D.A. Corn, Wheat, and Oats: Cost of Production, 1945, 1947
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 548 (1947); U.S.D.A. Corn, Wheat, and Oats: Cost
of Production in 1946, 1948 AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 604 (1948). The
commodity index number for seed was obtained from 1946 U.S.D.A.
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 551 (1946) and the consumer price index was
obtained from 1946 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 559 (1946).
868. See U.S.D.A., Corn: Acreage, Production, Value, and Foreign Trade,
United States, 1929-1946, 1946 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 39 (1946).
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1933 the average profit was 2¢ per bushel and in 1936 the
870
average profit was 2¢ per bushel and in 1945 the profit was
871
8¢ per bushel;
however, the Consumer Price Index had
increased nearly 48 per centum of its 1936 level by 1945.
In partial summary, the introduction of hybrid maize
values between 1933 and 1948 corresponded with both a
decline in average corn yield levels, between 1933 and 1936,
and a modest increase in yield between 1937 and 1948 as well
as a substantial increase in yield level between 1936 and 1937.
Because hybrid varieties were not fully introduced between
1936 and 1937, it is difficult to argue that the use of hybrid
maize varieties was a cause of that increase in yield. The use
of hybrid maize varieties did not produce a substantial increase
in yield between 1933 and 1946 when the yield levels are
adjusted for the spike in 1937. Based upon the productivity
levels discussed and the attendant economics of production, the
deployment and use of the hybrid seed varieties did not leave
the farmers financially better off during the two decades
between 1930 and 1950.
The simple statement of the summary is that the
introduction of hybrid maize varieties did not substantially
alter the corn yield levels. However, even in light of modest, or
no, increase in yield the immediate question is why did the
farmers continue to purchase and use hybrid varieties? Under
the theory of a purely competitive market, other cheaper but
equally productive non-hybrid varieties would have entered the
market and displace the hybrid varieties. The fact that the
non-hybrid varieties effectively lost the entire market to hybrid
varieties seems to indicate that the market was not purely
872
competitive.
869. See U.S.D.A. Cost of Producing Field Crops, 1933, 11 CROPS AND
MARKETS 66 (1935); U.S.D.A., Corn: Acreage, Production, Value, and Foreign
Trade, United States, 1929-1946, 1946 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 39
(1946).
870. Compare U.S.D.A. Cost of Producing Field Crops, 1933, 11 CROPS AND
MARKETS 66 (1935) and U.S.D.A., Corn: Acreage, Production, Value, and
Foreign Trade, United States, 1929-1946, 1946 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL
STATISTICS 39 (1946).
871. Compare U.S.D.A. Cost of Producing Field Crops, 1933, 11 CROPS AND
MARKETS 66 (1935) (the U.S. average price of producing corn was $1.06 per
bushel) and U.S.D.A., Corn: Acreage, Production, Value, and Foreign Trade,
United States, 1929-1946, 1946 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 39 (1946)
(the season average price of corn in 1945 was $1.14 per bushel).
872. See generally Donald N. Duvick, Biotechnology in the 1930s: The
Development of Hybrid Maize, 2 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 69-74 (January
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In the nearly four and a half decades since 1956, the yield
levels for maize have increased substantially so that by 2001
the yields were approximately 2.6 times the levels of 1956.
Since hybrid maize varieties were completely integrated into
American agriculture by 1956, the substantial rise in
productivity must be due to factors other than the use of hybrid
maize varieties (at least directly). A careful examination of
these factors is outside the scope of this endeavor.

2001) (indicating that both the U.S.D.A. and Pioneer Hi-Bred aggressively
promoted the use of hybrid seed varieties).
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Figure 2. Maize yields and percent of corn acreage planted to
hybrid varieties.
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Figure 3. Maize production costs for Illinois and Iowa
combined and for the United States in aggregate. Also
presented is the commodity price index and the consumer price
index.
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Appendix B
The analysis of the corn yield statistics was performed as
follows. The corn yield statistics were collected from the
U.S.D.A. National Agricultural Statistics Service website for a
particular year and for a desired range of years. The U.S. Total
average was collected directly from the website without the
need to collect the statistics for each of the states and then
compute the aggregate average. The aggregate average was
computed for the set of “Four States,” which includes Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, and Ohio for each of the years in the required
time range. The mean was then computed for all of the years
in the required time range.
Also, the linear regression
equation was computed from the set of yearly aggregate
averages for the “Four States.” The process was then repeated
for the “Five States,” which include Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Missouri, and Ohio. The mean and linear regression equations
were computed based upon the yearly U.S. Total averages.
The results of the corn yield analysis are given in Table 1,
below, for the years 1900 through 1920, and for 1920 through
1938. The results for the years 1920 through 1936 and 1937
through 1950 are given in Table 2, below; results for years 1937
through 1947 and 1933 through 1946 are given in Table 3; and
the results for 1933 through 1946 and 1933 through 1946
(Adjusted) are given in Table 4, below. Some discussion of the
results in Table 4, below, is warranted. The “adjusted” results
in Table 4 are computed to remove the difference between the
actual and expected difference in the yield for 1937 for all years
between 1937 and 1946. The actual average yields for 1937
are: “Four States,” 45.3 bushels per acre; “Five States,” 41.7
bushels per acre; and “U.S. Total,” 28.9 bushels per acre. The
expected values for 1937, based upon the linear regression
analysis for the years between 1920 and 1936, are: “Four
States,” 31.6 bushels per acre; “Five States,” 28.3 bushels per
acre; and “U.S. Total,” 20.634 bushels per acre. The “adjusted”
average for the years between and including 1937 and 1948 are
computed as: Yadj(y) = Yact(y) - (Yact(1937) - Yexp(1937)); where y is
the year of interest between 1937 and 1948, Yadj(y) is the
“adjusted” corn yield for year y, Yact(y) is the actual corn yield
for year y, and Yexp(1937) is the expected corn yield for 1937
based upon the corn yields between 1920 and 1936. The
rational behind “adjusting” the corn yield data for the years
between 1937 and 1948 is that the difference between the
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actual and expected (based upon the corn yields between 1920
and 1936) yields for 1937 are, arguably, not due to the
873
introduction of hybrid maize varieties.
Therefore, to be able
to assess the influence of the introduction upon the trend in
corn yields over time due to the introduction of the hybrid
maize varieties, it is necessary to remove the differences in the
1937 and subsequent year’s data.

873. The difference between the actual and expected corn yield values for
1937 are: “Four States” equals 13.7 bushels per acre (30% based upon actual
yield); “Five States” equals 13.4 bushels per acre (32% based upon actual
yield); and “U.S. Total” equals 8.3 bushels per acre (29% based upon actual
yield).
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Table 1. Part A {1900-1920, 1920-1938}. Results of the statistical analysis of
corn yield statistics for the range of years and for the states indicated. The
mean value is the mean corn yield of all years indicated in the given range,
and the linear regression equation is computed based upon the corn yields for
the indicated years, where “y” is the year.
States
Four
States

Five
States

U.S.
Total

1900 - 1920

1920 - 1938

Mean

37.348

Mean

36.632

Linear

39.94 + 0.040 (y
- 1900)

Linear

37.251 - 0.068 (y 1920)

Mean

35.368

Mean

34.163

Linear

35.28 - 0.008 (y 1900)

Linear

35.789 - 0.1808 (y 1920)

Mean

26.743

Mean

25.154

Linear

26.994 - 0.025 (y
- 1900)

Linear

27.177 - 0.225 (y 1920)

Table 2. Part B {1920-1936, 1937-1950}. Results of the statistical analysis of
corn yield statistics for the range of years and for the states indicated. The
mean value is the mean corn yield of all years indicated in the given range,
and the linear regression equation is computed based upon the corn yields for
the indicated years, where “y” is the year.
States
Four
States

Five
States

U.S.
Total

1920-1936

1937-1950

Mean

35.706

Mean

49.912

Linear

39.391 - 0.461 (y
- 1920)

Linear

46.301 + 0.40 (y 1937)

Mean

33.365

Mean

45.763

Linear

37.897 - 0.57 (y 1920)

Linear

42.34 + 0.53 (y 1937)

Mean

24.78

Mean

33.27

Linear

28.47 - 0.46 (y 1920)

Linear

27.93 + 0.82 (y 1937)
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Table 3. Part C {1937-1947, 1933-1946}. Results of the statistical analysis of
corn yield statistics for the range of years and for the states indicated. The
mean value is the mean corn yield of all years indicated in the given range,
and the linear regression equation is computed based upon the corn yields for
the indicated years, where “y” is the year.
States
Four
States

Five
States

U.S.
Total

1937-1947

1933-1946

Mean

47.67

Mean

43.69

Linear

47.5 + 0.04 (y1937)

Linear

32.5 + 1.72 (y 1933)

Mean

44.2

Mean

40.3

Linear

43.77 + 0.095 (y
- 1937)

Linear

29.3 + 1.69 (y 1933)

Mean

31.51

Mean

28.74

Linear

29.0 + 0.502 (Y
- 1937)

Linear

20.671 + 1.241 (Y 1933)

Table 4. Part D {1933-1946, 1933-1946 (Adjusted)}. Results of the
statistical analysis of corn yield statistics for the range of years and for the
states indicated. The mean value is the mean corn yield of all years indicated
in the given range, and the linear regression equation is computed based upon
the corn yields for the indicated years, where “y” is the year.
States

1933-1946

1933-1946 (Adjusted)

Four
States

Mean

43.69

Mean

33.91

Linear

32.5 + 1.72 (y 1933)

Linear

30.579 + 0.513 (y 1933)

Mean

40.3

Mean

30.7

Linear

29.3 + 1.69 (y 1933

Linear

27.4 + 0.51 (y - 1933)

Mean

28.74

Mean

22.83

Linear

20.671 + 1.241
(Y - 1933)

Linear

19.5 + 0.514 (y 1933).

Five
States

U.S.
Total

